Countermeasures for contaminated water are implemented in accordance with the following three principles:

1. **Eliminate** contamination sources
   - Multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.
   - Remove contaminated water from the trench (Note 3)
   - (Note 3) Underground tunnel containing pipes.

2. **Isolate** water from contamination
   - Pump up groundwater for bypassing
   - Pump up groundwater near buildings
   - Land-side impermeable walls
   - Waterproof pavement

3. **Prevent leakage** of contaminated water
   - Enhance soil by adding sodium silicate
   - Sea-side impermeable walls
   - Increase the number of (welded-joint) tanks

### Main decommissioning works and steps

- **Fuel Removal from SFP**
  - Units 1 & 2
  - Fuel debris retrieval
  - Fuel removal
  - Storage and handling
  - Capturing the status inside the PCV: examining the fuel debris retrieval method, etc. (Note 2)
  - Dismantling Facilities

- **Fuel Debris Retrieval**
  - Installing a Fuel removal handling machine

- **Dismantling**
  - Unit 1: Fuel removal scheduled to start in FY2022
  - Unit 2: Fuel removal scheduled to start in FY2023
  - Unit 3: Fuel removal scheduled to start in around mid-FY2018
  - Unit 4: Fuel removal completed in 2014

* Based on a series of defects, preparation will be made toward removal from the end of March 2019.

### Three principles behind contaminated water countermeasures:

Countermeasures for contaminated water are implemented in accordance with the following three principles:

1. **Eliminate** contamination sources
2. **Isolate** water from contamination
3. **Prevent leakage** of contaminated water

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**Multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS), etc.**

- **This equipment removes radionuclides from the contaminated water in tanks and reduces risks.**
- **Treatment of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) was completed in May 2015 via multi-nuclide removal equipment,**
- **additional multi-nuclide removal equipment installed by TEPCO (operation commenced in September 2014) and a subsidy project of the Japanese Government (operation commenced in October 2014).**
- **Strontium-treated water from equipment other than ALPS is being re-treated in ALPS.**

**Land-side impermeable walls**

- **Land-side impermeable walls surround the buildings and reduce groundwater inflow into the same.**
- **Freezing started on the sea side and part of the mountain side from March 2016 and on 95% of the mountain side from June 2016.**
- **Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017.**
- **In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths, based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 °C.**
- **Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and facing, have kept the groundwater level stable.**
- **Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established.**
- **The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding the groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls had allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.**

**Sea-side impermeable walls**

- **Impermeable walls are being installed on the sea side of Units 1-4, to prevent contaminated groundwater from flowing into the sea.**
- **The installation of steel pipe sheet piles was completed in September 2015 and they were connected in October 2015.**
- **These works completed the closure of the sea-side impermeable walls.**

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**Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment**
Toward removal of the roof steel frame on the Unit 1 Reactor Building north side, obstacles were removed

As preparatory work to remove fuel from the spent fuel pool, X-braces and rubble on the north side are being removed. Regarding X-braces, all planned four sections had been removed by December 20, 2018.

Regarding the collapsed roof on the north side, removal of the roof blocks, roof slabs and deck plates was completed. From January, the roof steel frame will be removed after separating.

The inside of the Unit 2 PCV will be investigated by touching deposits

The investigation inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in January 2018 detected no significant distortion or damage in the existing facility and found deposits across the bottom of the pedestal. In the forthcoming investigation, to determine the characteristics (hardness and fragility) of deposits, the investigative unit used in the previous investigation will be changed to a finger structure to touch deposits with the finger.

As in the previous investigation, measures to prevent the external leakage of gas in the PCV will be implemented and the dust density monitored throughout the work to prevent any influence on the surrounding environment in the event of leakage.

After operational training, the investigation will start from around February 2019.

The tsunami risk will be reduced by installing a tide embankment

In preparation for the potentially urgent danger of the Chishima trench tsunami, a tide embankment will be installed to prevent any increase in stagnant water in buildings and its outflow due to water ingress into buildings and subsequently reduce the risk of delaying the overall on-site decommissioning work. The tide embankment will be a reinforced concrete L-shaped retaining wall; T.P. +11.0m in height. Examination and construction are currently underway while minimizing the influence on the ongoing decommissioning work for an operational launch in the first half of FY2020.

By decompressing the inside of the Unit 2 PCV, the risk of releasing was further reduced

To reduce the hydrogen density, positive pressure is maintained inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) by filling it with nitrogen. Aiming to reduce the risk of releasing radioactive materials and improve operability during future PCV inside investigations, a decompression test was conducted in which the PCV pressure setting was decreased to “air pressure +2kPa” (October 2 – November 30, 2018). The test result confirmed no significant variation in plant parameters and dust density. Based on the test result, operation with PCV pressure at “air pressure +2kPa” started from December 1, 2018.

Based on the questionnaire survey results, the work environment will be further improved

With the aim of improving the work environment at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey). As a result, appro
Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1–MP8). Monitoring posts measuring the airborne radiation rate around site boundaries showed 0.439 – 1.507 μSv/h (November 28 – December 25, 2018). We improved the measurement conditions of monitoring posts 2 to 8 to measure the air-dose rate precisely. Construction works, such as tree-clearing, surface soil removal and shield wall setting, were implemented from February 10 to April 18, 2012. Therefore monitoring results at these points are lower than elsewhere in the power plant site. The radiation shielding panels around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose at the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10-11, 2013, since further deforestation, etc. had caused the surrounding radiation dose to decline significantly.
I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

1. Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained within the range of approx. 15 to 30°C for the past month, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.

2. Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of November 2018, the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 in the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 1.8×10^12 Bq/cm² for Cs-134 and 3.1×10^12 Bq/cm² for Cs-137, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00022 mSv/year.

- Following the steady implementation of "isolation" measures (groundwater bypass subdrains, frozen walls, etc.), the inflow reduced from approx. 470 m³/day (the FY2014 average) when the measures were first launched to approx. 220 m³/day (the FY2017 average), though the figure varied depending on rainfall, etc.

- Measures will continue to further reduce the volume of contaminated water generated.

II. Progress status by each plan

1. Contaminated water management

To tackle the increase in stagnant water due to groundwater inflow, fundamental measures to prevent such inflow into the Reactor Buildings will be implemented, while improving the decontamination capability of water treatment and preparing facilities to control the contaminated water.

- **Status of contaminated water generated**
  - Multi-layered measures, including pumping up by subdrains and land-side impermeable walls, which were implemented to control the continued generation of contaminated water, reduced the groundwater inflow into buildings.

- Operation of the groundwater bypass
  - From April 9, 2014, the operation of 12 groundwater bypass pumping wells commenced sequentially to pump up groundwater. The release started from May 21, 2014 in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until December 24, 2018, 432,584 m³ of groundwater had been released. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.

- Pumps are inspected and cleaned as required based on their operational status.

- Water Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains
  - To reduce the level of groundwater flowing into the buildings, work began to pump up groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings on September 3, 2015. The pumped-up groundwater was then purified at dedicated facilities and released from September 14, 2015 onwards. Up until December 24, 2018, a total of 642,772 m³ had been drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that it met the quality criteria for operational purposes.

- Due to the level of the groundwater drain pond rising after the tsunami, it was planned to close the subdrain walls had been closed, pumping started on November 5, 2015. Up until December 25, 2018, a total of approx. 196,771 m³ had been pumped up and a volume of under 10 m³/day is being transferred from the groundwater drain to the Turbine Buildings (average for the period November 15 – December 12, 2018).

- As one of the multi-layered contaminated water management measures, in addition to waterproof pavement (facing; as of the end of November 2018, approx. 94% of the planned area was completed) to prevent rainwater infiltrating the ground, etc., facilities to enhance the subdrain treatment system were installed and went into operation from April 2018, increasing the treatment capacity to 1,500 m³ and improving reliability.

- To maintain the level of groundwater pumped up from subdrains, work to install additional subdrain pits and recover those already in place is underway. They will go into operation sequentially from a pit for which work is completed (the number of pits which went into operation: 12 of 14 additional pits; 0 of 3 recovered pits).

- To eliminate the need to suspend water pumping while cleaning the subdrain transfer pipe, the pipe will be duplicated. Installation of the pipe and ancillary facilities was completed.
• Since the subdrains went into operation, the inflow into buildings tended to decline to under 150 m³/day when the subdrain water level declined below T.P. 3.0 m but increased during rainfall.

Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Unit 1-4 subdrains

➢ Status of the measures to suppress the increase in tritium density of the pit near the Unit 1/2 mountain-side subdrain
• To suppress any increase in tritium density of the pit near the Unit 1/2 mountain-side subdrain, the surrounding ground is being improved and improvement work on the south side was completed on November 16, 2018.
• The response of the groundwater level around the subdrain after the start of operation became slower than before the ground improvement, which was considered a positive effect of the ground improvement.
• The improvement work will continue on the north side and the effect, including the water quality, will be evaluated.

➢ Construction status of the land-side impermeable walls
• A maintenance operation for the land-side impermeable walls to prevent frozen soil from thickening further continued from May 2017 on the north and south sides and started from November 2017 on the east side, where frozen soil of sufficient thickness was identified. The scope of the maintenance operation was expanded in March 2018.
• In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths; based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and facing, have kept the groundwater level stable. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding the groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.

➢ Operation of multi-nuclide removal equipment
• Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing and high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were underway for existing equipment, System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013; and for high-performance equipment, from October 18, 2014). The additional multi-nuclide removal equipment went into full-scale operation from October 16, 2017.
• As of December 20, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 396,000, 521,000 and 103,000 m³ respectively (including approx. 9,500 m³ stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with a high density of radioactive materials at the System B outlet of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).
• To reduce the risks of strontium-treated water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment has been underway (existing: from December 4, 2015; additional: from May 27, 2015; high-performance: from April 15, 2015). Up until December 20, approx. 550,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Toward reducing the risk of contaminated water stored in tanks
• Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION) (from January 6, 2015) and the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) (from December 26, 2014) have been underway. Up until December 20, approx. 498,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Measures in the Tank Area
• Rainwater, under the release standard and having accumulated within the fenced-in area of the contaminated water tank area, was sprinkled on site after eliminating radioactive materials using rainwater-treatment equipment since May 21, 2014 (as of December 24, 2018, a total of 123,358 m³).
As of December 20, 2018

- Water will be removed from one of the tanks to inspect the inside as well as implementing other measures, including investigating the cause of the hydrogen sulfide generation.

- Status of groundwater inflow to the On-site Bunker Building
  - Groundwater inflow to the On-site Bunker Building had been around 5 m³/day, but an ongoing increase since mid-November 2018 was confirmed and the amount currently stood at around 40 m³/day.
  - On December 21, 2018, water was removed to approx. 400 mm above the basement 1st floor using the permanent transfer pump. Subsequent visual inspection of the wall surface confirmed no groundwater inflow or water surface movement.
  - Before water removal in the On-site Bunker Building to below the lower limit of the permanent transfer pump, temporary facilities will be built to investigate the cause of the increased groundwater inflow.

- Leakage of system water within the fences of the in-building RO equipment
  - On November 29, 2018, an alarm signaling “leakage from the RO unit B” was triggered from the in-building RO equipment on the Unit 4 Turbine Building 2nd floor, whereupon operation of the in-building RO (B) was suspended.
  - An on-site inspection confirmed that the leakage had ceased and detected a puddle in the lower part of the RO unit. The puddle (approx. 13,000 x 4,000 x 30 mm) remained within the fences and no external leakage was detected.
  - It was confirmed that the leakage was from the pipe connection on the RO unit B treated water outlet side. The leaked water, which was water treated from the in-building RO equipment, had already been collected.
  - The analytical result of the leakage water: Cs-134, below the detection limit (7.3 Bq/L); Cs-137, 47 Bq/L; gross β, 56 Bq/L.
  - Detailed investigations into the leakage part will be conducted and measures examined.

- Drippage from the cross-flow filter secondary-side throttle valve of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment System A
  - On December 2, 2018, water drippage was detected (1 droplet every 20 seconds) near the lower part of the gland for the cross-flow filter secondary-side throttle valve, which was installed in the pre-treatment equipment (Stage 2) of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment System A and a puddle around the drippage was also detected.
  - System A was not in operation when the drippage was detected.
  - The puddle (approx. 2,500 x 1,000 x 1 mm) was deemed to be system water of the multi-nuclide removal equipment. Water remained within the multi-nuclide removal equipment building and no external leakage was detected.
  - An inspection after tightening the valve gland confirmed that the leakage had ceased. Based on this inspection result, the leakage was considered attributable to a loosened valve gland.
  - The leakage gland was covered. Ongoing monitoring will continue and tightening of the gland will be examined as required.

- Leakage from the additional multi-nuclide removal equipment adsorption vessel 3A
  - On December 20, 2018, leakage from the access panel in the upper part of the adsorption vessel 3A was detected while the additional multi-nuclide removal equipment System A was in operation. Operation of the equipment was then suspended.
  - The leakage (approx. 1,500 x 4,000 x 1 mm) remained within the fences of the additional multi-nuclide removal equipment building and no external leakage was detected.
  - An inspection after tightening the bolts of the adsorption vessel 3A access panel confirmed that the leakage had ceased.
  - The analytical result of the leakage water: Cs-134, approx. 53 Bq/L; Cs-137, approx. 460 Bq/L; gross β, approx. 5,900 Bq/L.
  - The leakage was attributable to recovery with access panel bolts temporarily tightened when opening and closing the access panel during work to remove adsorption materials from the adsorption vessel 3A before commencing

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6/10

1. Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 2% or more.
2. To detect storage increases more accurately, the calculation method was reviewed as follows from February 9, 2017: (The revised method was applied from March 1, 2018)
   a. Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)
   b. Leakage of system water within the fences of the in-building RO equipment System A
   c. Leakage detected by adding groundwater and rainwater inflow into the residual water areas (January 18 and 29, 2018).
   d. Review because SARRY reverse cleaning water was added to “Storage increase.” (January 25, 2018)
3. The effect of calibration for the building water-level gauge was included in the following period: March 1, 2018, (Unit 3 Turbine Building).
4. The method used to calculate the chemical injection into ALPS was reviewed as follows: additional ALPS. The revised method was applied from April 12, 2018
5. (Outlet integrated flow rate) – (inlet integrated flow rate) – (sodium carbonate injection rate)
7. Reevaluated based on the revised method to manage the transfer volume from the Unit 1 seawater pipe trench. (Period of reevaluation: May 31 – June 28, 2018)
8. Inflow into buildings increased due to the effect of repair work on the K-drainage channel.
9. The storage amount increased due to transfer to buildings in association with the decommissioning work.
10. The transformed amount comprised an ALPS chemical injection amount of approx. 12 mm/day, transfer from wells and groundwater drains: approx. 14 mm/day and transfer from On-site Bunker: approx. 100 mm/day, etc.
11. Changed from December 13, 2018 from rainfall in Namie to that within the site.
2. Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety. The removal of spent fuel from the Unit 4 pool commenced on November 18, 2013 and was completed by December 22, 2014.

Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 1
- The installation of windbreak fences, which will reduce dust scattering during rubble removal, started on October 31, 2017 and was completed by December 19, 2017.
- As preparatory work to remove fuel from the spent fuel pool (SFP), rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 22, 2018.
- Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around the site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at on-site dust monitors during the above removal work.
- Once removed, rubble is stored in solid waste storage facilities or other storage areas depending on the dose level.
- Before formulating a plan to remove rubble around the spent fuel pool, an on-site investigation started from July 23, 2018 and was completed on August 2.
- To create an access route for preparatory work to protect the spent fuel pool, etc., a plan to remove four sections of X-braces (one each on the west and south sides and two on the east side respectively) was implemented.
- The removal started from September 19, 2018 and all planned four sections had been removed by December 20. No significant variation was detected at the dust monitors and monitoring posts.
- Regarding the collapsed roof on the north side, removal of the roof blocks, roof slabs and deck plates was completed. From January 2019, the roof steel frame will be removed after separating.

Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 2
- An investigation near the opening wall on the operating floor using a remote-controlled unmanned robot detected no significant scattering obstacles that would hinder operation of the robot.
- Contamination of the robot was below the level that would prevent maintenance by workers in the front room.
- To formulate a work plan to dismantle the Reactor Building rooftop, etc., the entire operating floor will be investigated.
- Before this investigation, work to move and contain the remaining objects was completed on November 6, 2018.
- From November 14, 2018, photos will be taken using a gamma camera to check the contamination distribution and hot spots on the operating floor.
- The investigation will continue until around late January 2019, including measurements of the radiation dose at low and high locations, surface contamination, dust density and size and shape using 3D scanning.

Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 3
- Regarding the fuel-handling machine (FHM) and crane, consecutive defects have occurred since the test operation started on March 15, 2018.
- For the FHM, an alarm was issued during the pre-operation inspection on August 8, 2018, whereupon operation was suspended. This was confirmed as attributable to disconnection due to corrosion by rainwater ingress to the cable connection and investigation of the cause detected an abnormality in several control cables.
- For the crane, an alarm was issued during the work to clear materials and equipment on August 15, 2018 and operation was suspended.
- To determine the risks of defects, these facilities were temporarily recovered on September 29, 2018 and a safety inspection (operation check and facility inspection) is underway.
- The safety inspection conducted since September detected 14 defects, for which appropriate measures will be implemented by around mid-January 2019.

Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 4
- The installation of windbreak fences, which will reduce dust scattering during rubble removal, started on October 31, 2017 and was completed by December 19, 2017.
- As preparatory work to remove fuel from the spent fuel pool (SFP), rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 22, 2018.
- Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around the site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at on-site dust monitors during the above removal work.
- Once removed, rubble is stored in solid waste storage facilities or other storage areas depending on the dose level.
- Before formulating a plan to remove rubble around the spent fuel pool, an on-site investigation started from July 23, 2018 and was completed on August 2.
- To create an access route for preparatory work to protect the spent fuel pool, etc., a plan to remove four sections of X-braces (one each on the west and south sides and two on the east side respectively) was implemented.
- The removal started from September 19, 2018 and all planned four sections had been removed by December 20. No significant variation was detected at the dust monitors and monitoring posts.
- Regarding the collapsed roof on the north side, removal of the roof blocks, roof slabs and deck plates was completed. From January 2019, the roof steel frame will be removed after separating.

3. Retrieval of fuel debris

Investigation inside the Unit 2 PCV
- The investigation inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in January 2018 detected no significant distortion or damage in the existing facility and found deposits across the bottom of the pedestal.
- In the forthcoming investigation, to determine the characteristics (hardness and fragility) of deposits, the investigative unit used in the previous investigation will be changed to a finger structure to touch deposits with the finger.
- As in the previous investigation, measures to prevent the external leakage of gas in the PCV will be implemented and the dust density monitored throughout the work to prevent any influence on the surrounding environment in the event of leakage.
- After providing operational training, the investigation will start from around February 2019.

4. Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste
- Management status of the rubble and trimmed trees
  - As of the end of November 2018, the total storage volume of concrete and metal rubble was approx. 252,400 m³ (+1700 m³ compared to at the end of October, with an area-occupation rate of 60%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 134,000 m³ (+100 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 76%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 51,900 m³ (-1,900 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 73%). The increase in rubble was mainly attributable to construction related to tanks and rubble removal around the Unit 1-4 buildings. The decrease in used protective clothing was mainly attributable to incineration of the same.

- Management status of secondary waste from water treatment
  - As of December 6, 2018, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 597 m³ (area-occupation rate: 85%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,352 m³ (area-occupation rate: 87%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi- nuclide removal equipment, etc., was 4,226 (area-occupation rate: 66%).

5. Reactor cooling

The cold shutdown condition will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring will continue

- Results of the decompression test inside the Unit 2 PCV
  - To reduce the hydrogen density, positive pressure is maintained inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) by filling it with nitrogen.
  - Aiming to reduce the risk of releasing radioactive materials and improve operability during future PCV inside investigations, a decompression test was conducted in which the PCV pressure setting was decreased from "air..."
6. Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effecting dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

- Status of groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4
  - The H-3 density at No. 0-3-1 had been increasing from around 120 Bq/L since October 2018 to around 1,900 Bq/L, before declining and currently stands at the level before increasing (below the detection limit).
  - Since March 2018, the H-3 density at No. 1-6 has been repeatedly declining and increasing and currently stands at around 3,500 Bq/L.
  - The density of gross β radioactive materials at No. 1-12 had been increasing from around 300 Bq/L since September 2018 to around 800 Bq/L. It has since been declining and currently stands at around 1,200 Bq/L.
  - The H-3 density at No. 1-14 remained constant at around 3,000 Bq/L, then declined since September 2018 and currently stands at around 1,200 Bq/L.
  - Since August 15, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes: August 15, 2013 – October 13, 2015 and from October 24; at the repaired well: October 14 - 23, 2015).
  - The H-3 density at No. 2-3 had been increasing from around 1,000 Bq/L since November 2017 and currently stands at around 5,000 Bq/L. The density of gross β radioactive materials at the same point had been increasing from around 600 Bq/L since December 2017 and currently stands at around 7,500 Bq/L. Since December 18, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes: December 18, 2013 - October 13, 2015; at the repaired well: from October 14, 2015).
  - The H-3 density at No. 3-4 had been declining from around 2,000 Bq/L since January 2018 to around 900 Bq/L, then increasing and currently stands at around 2,800 Bq/L. Since April 1, 2015, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 3 and 4 intakes: April 1 – September 16, 2015; at the repaired well: from September 17, 2015).
  - Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the Unit 1-4 intake open channel area, densities have remained below the legal discharge limit except for the increase in cesium 137 and strontium 90 during rain. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The density of cesium 137 has been increasing since January 25, 2017, when a new silt fence was installed to accommodate the relocation.
  - Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the area within the port, densities have remained below the legal discharge limit except for the increase in cesium 137 and strontium 90 during rain. They have been below the level of those in the Unit 1-4 intake open channel area and have been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
  - Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the area outside the port, densities of cesium 137 and strontium 90 have been declining, but remained unchanged following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.

Figure 5: Groundwater density on the Turbine Building east side
Securing appropriate staff long-term while thoroughly implementing workers’ exposure dose control. Improving the work environment and labor conditions continuously based on an understanding of workers’ on-site needs.

- **Staff management**
  - The monthly average total of people registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from August to October 2018 was approx. 9,600 (TEPCO and partner company workers), which exceeded the monthly average number of actual workers (approx. 7,200). Accordingly, sufficient people are registered to work on site.
  - It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in January 2019 (approx. 4,290 per day: TEPCO and partner company workers) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 4,000 to 6,200 since FY2016 (see Figure 7).
  - The number of workers from within and outside Fukushima Prefecture remained constant. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of November has also remained constant at around 60%.
  - The monthly average exposure dose of workers remained at approx. 0.59 mSv/month during FY2015, approx. 0.39 mSv/month of workers per day per month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 4,000 to 6,200 since FY2016 (see Figure 7).
  - The number of workers from within and outside Fukushima Prefecture remained constant. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of November has also remained constant at around 60%.
  - The monthly average exposure dose of workers remained at approx. 0.59 mSv/month during FY2015, approx. 0.39 mSv/month during FY2016 and approx. 0.36 mSv/month during FY2017. (Reference: Annual average exposure dose 20 mSv/year ≈ 1.7 mSv/month)
  - For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.

- **Measures to prevent infection and expansion of influenza and norovirus**
  - Since November, measures for influenza and norovirus have been implemented, including free influenza vaccinations (subsidized by TEPCO HD) in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (from October 24 to November 30) and medical clinics around the site (from November 1 to January 30, 2019) for partner company workers. As of December 22, a total of 6,155 workers had been vaccinated. In addition, a comprehensive range of other measures is also being implemented, including daily actions to prevent infection and expansion (measuring body temperature, health checks and monitoring infection status) and response after detecting possible infections (swift exit of possible patients and control of entry, mandatory wearing of masks in working spaces, etc.).

- **Status of influenza and norovirus cases**
  - Until the 51st week of 2018 (December 17-23, 2018), five influenza infections and four norovirus infections were recorded. The totals for the same period for the previous season showed 15 cases of influenza and four norovirus infections.
Results of the 9th questionnaire survey for workers to improve the work environment and the direction future improvement

- With the aim of improving the work environment at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the 9th questionnaire survey was conducted. (Approx. 5,000 workers responded, with a collection rate of approx. 94%, a 2.9% increase compared to the previous survey).
- As a result, approx. 78% of respondents evaluated their work in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS as "rewarding" or "reasonably rewarding."
- At the same time, mobility to the access control facility was evaluated by more than 25% as "not easy" or "not so easy," with the most citing "the need for rain gears during rainfall or snowfall."
- Efforts to improve labor conditions will continue based on opinions and remarks from workers.

8. Status of Units 5 and 6

- Status of spent fuel storage in Units 5 and 6
  - Regarding Unit 5, fuel removal from the reactor was completed in June 2015. 1,374 spent and 168 non-irradiated fuel assemblies were respectively stored in the spent fuel pool (storage capacity: 1,590 assemblies).
  - Regarding Unit 6, fuel removal from the reactor was completed in November 2013. 1,456 spent and 198 non-irradiated fuel assemblies (190 of which transferred from the Unit 4 spent fuel pool) are stored in the spent fuel pool (storage capacity: 1,654), while 230 non-irradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the storage facility of non-irradiated fuel assemblies (storage capacity: 230).

- Status of stagnant water in Units 5 and 6
  - Stagnant water in Units 5 and 6 is transferred from Unit 6 Turbine Building to the outdoor tanks and sprinkled after undergoing oil separation and RO treatment and confirming the density of the radioactive materials.
### Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit (Bq/L)</th>
<th>Value (2013)</th>
<th>Value (latest)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cesium-134</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3 (2013/12/24)</td>
<td>Below 1/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesium-137</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3 (2013/10/11)</td>
<td>Below 1/10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Summary of TEPCO data as of December 26, 2018

- **Gross β**: Includes all radioactive isotopes except for Cesium-137.
- **Tritium**: A measure of hydrogen-3, which is used as a tracer for seawater flow.

### Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit (Bq/L)</th>
<th>Value (2013)</th>
<th>Value (latest)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cesium-134</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesium-137</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Summary of TEPCO data as of December 26, 2017

- **Gross β**: Includes all radioactive isotopes except for Cesium-137.
- **Tritium**: A measure of hydrogen-3, which is used as a tracer for seawater flow.

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#### Source

- [Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station](http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/fukushima-np/15344/index.html)
Progress toward decommissioning: Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP)

**Unit 1**

Regarding fuel removal from Unit 1 spent fuel pool, there is a plan to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal over the top floor of the Reactor Building (operating floor). All roof panels and wall panels of the building cover were dismantled by November 10, 2016. Removal of pillars and beams of the building was completed on May 11, 2017. Modification of the pillars and beams of the building cover and installation of building cover were completed by December 19.

Rubble removal from the operating floor north side started from January 22, 2018. Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors during the above removal work.

**Unit 2**

To facilitate removal of fuel assemblies and retrieval of debris in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, the scope of dismantling and modification of the existing Reactor Building rooftop was examined. From the perspective of ensuring safety during the work, controlling impacts on the outside of the power station, and removing fuel rapidly to reduce risks, we decided to dismantle the whole rooftop above the highest floor of the Reactor Building.

Examination of the following two plans continues: Plan 1 to share a container for removing fuel assemblies from the pool and retrieving fuel debris; and Plan 2 to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal from the pool.

**Unit 3**

Prior to the installation of a cover for fuel removal, removal of large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training of remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine which will be installed on site (February – December 2015). Measures to reduce dose on the Reactor Building top floor (decontamination, shields) were completed in December 2016. Installation of a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine is underway from January 2017. Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.

Regarding fuel removal, after confirming the cause of the defects in the crane and implementing measures for similar parts, work will continue toward removal starting from the end of March 2019 putting safety first.

**Unit 4**

In the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap, the target of Phase 1 involved commencing fuel removal from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completion of Step 2 (by December 2013). On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, or the 1st Unit, commenced and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.

On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing work to fuel removal, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (2) of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)

This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building. Based on this experience, fuel assemblies will be removed from Unit 1-3 pools.

* A part of the photo is corrected because it includes sensitive information related to physical protection.
Investigation into TIP Room of the Unit 1 Reactor Building

- To improve the environment for future investigations inside the PCV, etc., an investigation was conducted from September 24 to October 2, 2015 at the TIP Room (*1). (Due to high dose around the entrance in to the TIP Room, the investigation of dose rate and contamination distribution was conducted through a hole drilled from the walkway of the Turbine Building, where the dose was low)
- The investigative results identified high dose at X-31 to 33 penetrations (*2) (instrumentation penetration) and low dose at other parts.
- As it was confirmed that work inside the TIP room would be available, the next step will include identification of obstacles which will interfere the work inside the TIP Room and formulation of a plan for dose reduction.

Unit 1

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of the Unit 1 Suppression Chamber (S/C(*3))

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of Unit 1 S/C from May 27, 2014 from one expansion joint cover among the lines installed there. As no leakage was identified from other parts, specific methods will be examined to halt the flow of water and repair the PCV.

Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]
- In April 2015, a device, which entered the inside of the PCV through a narrow access opening (bore: φ100 mm), collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, the investigation using a self-propelled investigation device, conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, took images of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The status inside the PCV will continue to be examined based on the collected image and dose data.

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

To improve the environment for future investigations inside the PCV, etc., an investigation was conducted from September 24 to October 2, 2015 at the TIP Room (*1). (Due to high dose around the entrance in to the TIP Room, the investigation of dose rate and contamination distribution was conducted through a hole drilled from the walkway of the Turbine Building, where the dose was low)

Investigations inside PCV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Investigation Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st (Oct 2012)</td>
<td>Acquiring images + Measuring air temperature and dose rate + Measuring water level and temperature + Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (Apr 2015)</td>
<td>Acquiring images + Measuring air temperature and dose rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd (Mar 2017)</td>
<td>Confirming the status of PCV 1st floor + Acquiring images + Measuring and dose rate + Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leakage points from PCV</td>
<td>- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in May 2014) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in November 2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period | Evaluation results
Feb - May 2015 | Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core.

* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, December 26, 2018

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Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Immediate target

Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Installation of an RPV thermometer and permanent PCV supervisory instrumentation

(1) Replacement of the RPV thermometer
   - As the thermometer installed at the Unit 2 RPV bottom after the earthquake had broken in February 2014, it was excluded from the monitoring thermometers.
   - In April 2014, removal of the broken thermometer failed and was suspended. Rust-stripping chemicals were injected and the broken thermometer was removed in January 2015. A new thermometer was reinstalled in March. The thermometer has been used as a part of permanent supervisory instrumentation since April.
(2) Reinstallation of the PCV thermometer and water-level gauge
   - Some of the permanent supervisory instrumentation for PCV could not be installed in the planned locations due to interference with existing grating (August 2013). The instrumentation was removed in May 2014 and new instruments were reinstalled in June 2014. The trend of added instrumentation will be monitored for approx. one month to evaluate its validity.
   - The measurement during the installation confirmed that the water level inside the PCV was approx. 300mm from the bottom.

Investigative results on torus chamber walls

- The torus chamber walls were investigated (on the north side of the east-side walls) using equipment specially developed for that purpose (a swimming robot and a floor traveling robot).
- At the east-side wall pipe penetrations (five points), “the status” and “existence of flow” were checked.
- A demonstration using the above two types of underwater wall investigative equipment showed how the equipment could check the status of penetration.
  - Regarding Penetrations 1 - 5, the results of checking the sprayed tracer (5) by camera showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the swimming robot)
  - Regarding Penetrations 3, a sonar check showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the floor traveling robot)

Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]
- Investigative devices such as a robot will be injected from Unit 2 X-6 penetration(1) and access the inside of the pedestal using the CRD rail.

[Progress status]
- On January 26 and 30, 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the status of the CRD replacement rail on which the robot will travel. On February 9, access was made on the outer periphery of the self-propelled investigative device was removed and the inside of the PCV was investigated using the device.
- The results of this series of investigations confirmed fallen and deformed gratings and a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- On January 19, 2018, the status below the platform inside the pedestal was investigated using an investigative device with a hanging mechanism. From the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits probably including fuel debris were found at the bottom of the pedestal. In addition, multiple parts higher than the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple routes of fuel debris falling.

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period
Mar – Jul 2016

Evaluation results
Confirmed the existence of high-density materials, which was considered as fuel debris, at the bottom of RPV, and in the lower part and the outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a large part of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV.

<Glossary>
(1) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV
(2) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)
(3) TRV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
(4) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)
(5) Tracer: Material used to trace the fluid flow. Clay particles

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Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Water flow was detected from the Main Steam Isolation Valve* room
On January 18, 2014, a flow of water from around the door of the Steam Isolation Valve room in the Reactor Building Unit 3 1st floor northeast area to the nearby floor drain funnel (drain outlet) was detected. As the drain outlet connects with the underground part of the Reactor Building, there is no possibility of outflow from the building.

From April 23, 2014, image data has been acquired by camera and the radiation dose measured via pipes for measurement instrumentation, which connect the air-conditioning room on the Reactor Building 2nd floor with the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor. On May 15, 2014, water flow from the expansion joint of one Main Steam Line was detected.

This is the first leak from PCV detected in the Unit 3. Based on the images collected in this investigation, the leak volume will be estimated and the need for additional investigations will be examined. The investigative results will also be utilized to examine water stoppage and PCV repair methods.

* Main Steam Isolation Valve: A valve to shut off the steam generated from the Reactor in an emergency

Investigative results into the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch using a small investigation device

- As part of the investigation into the PCV to facilitate fuel debris retrieval, the status around the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch was investigated using a small self-traveling investigation device on November 26, 2015.
- Given blots such as rust identified below the water level inside the PCV, there may be a leakage from the seal to the extent of bleeding.
- Methods to investigate and repair the parts, including other PCV penetrations with a similar structure, will be considered.

Investigation inside the PCV
Prior to fuel debris retrieval, the inside of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) was investigated to identify the status there including the location of the fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]
- The status of X-53 penetration*4, which may be under the water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated using remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under the water (October 22–24, 2014).
- For the purpose of confirming the status inside the PCV, an investigation device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration on October 20 and 22, 2015 to obtain images, data of dose and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage was identified on the structure and walls inside the PCV and the water level was almost identical with the estimated value. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal.
- Analysis of image data obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals. Consideration about fuel removal based on the obtained information will continue.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Evaluation results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May – Sep 2017</td>
<td>The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that part of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Glossary:
- (1) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)
- (2) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
- (3) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)
- (4) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV
Work to improve the reliability of the circulation water injection cooling system and pipes to transfer stagnant water.

- Operation of the reactor water injection system using Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a water source commenced (from July 5, 2013). Compared to the previous systems, the reliability of the reactor water injection system was enhanced, e.g. by increasing the amount of water-resource storage and enhancing durability.
- To reduce the risk of contaminated-water leakage, the circulation loop was shortened by installing a reverse osmosis (RO) device in the Unit 4 Turbine Building within the circulation loop, concentrating the RO device to the Unit 1, 2, 3, and 4 condensate storage tanks.
- To facilitate efforts to reduce the radiation density in stagnant water inside the buildings, circulations purifying stagnant water inside the buildings stored on the Unit 3 and 4 side, with the RO device started from October 7 and 24-hour operation started from October 20. Installation of the new RO device inside the building shortened the circulation loop from approx. 3 to 0.8 km.
- To stabilize the cooling conditions, the entire length of contaminated water transfer pipes is approx. 2.1 km, including the transfer line of surplus water to the upper heights (approx. 1.3 km).

**Work toward decommissioning:**

- To facilitate replacement of flange tanks, dismantling of flange tanks started in H1 east/H2 areas in May 2015. Dismantling of all flange tanks was completed in H1 east area (12 tanks) in October 2015, in H2 area (28 tanks) in March 2016, in H4 area (56 tanks) in May 2017, in H5 area (31 tanks) in September 2017, in H5 and H6 north areas (31 tanks) in June 2018, in G6 area (30 tanks) in July 2018 and H6 and H6 north areas (24 tanks) in September 2018. Dismantling of flange tanks in G4 south area is underway.

**Immediate target:**

- Stably continue reactor cooling and stagnant water treatment, and improve reliability

**Progress status of dismantling of flange tanks**

- To facilitate replacement of flange tanks, dismantling of flange tanks started in H1 east/H2 areas in May 2015. Dismantling of all flange tanks was completed in H1 east area (12 tanks) in October 2015, in H2 area (28 tanks) in March 2016, in H4 area (56 tanks) in May 2017, in H5 area (31 tanks) in September 2017, in H5 and H6 north areas (31 tanks) in June 2018, in G6 area (30 tanks) in July 2018 and H6 and H6 north areas (24 tanks) in September 2018. Dismantling of flange tanks in G4 south area is underway.

**Completion of purification of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water)**

Contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) is being treated using seven types of equipment including the multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS). Treatment of the RO concentrated salt water was completed on May 27, 2015, with the exception of the remaining water at the tank bottom. The remaining water will be treated sequentially to distort the tank. The strontium-treated water from other facilities than the multi-nuclide removal equipment will be re-purified in the multi-nuclide removal equipment to further reduce risks.

**Preventing groundwater from flowing into the Reactor Buildings**

**Reducing groundwater inflow by pumping sub-drain water**

To reduce the groundwater flowing into the buildings, pumping of groundwaters from wells (subdrains) around the buildings started on September 3, 2015. Pumped-up groundwater was purified at dedicated facilities and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization confirmed that its quality met operational targets. Via a groundwater bypass, reduce the groundwater level around the Building and groundwater inflow into the Building. Measures to pump up groundwater flowing from the mountain side upstream of the Building to reduce the groundwater inflow (groundwater bypass) have been implemented. The pumped up groundwater is temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization have confirmed that its quality meets operational targets. Monthly monitoring of pumping of wells and tanks is performed appropriately. At the observation holes installed at a height equivalent to the buildings, the trend showing a decline in groundwater levels is checked. The analytical results on groundwater inflow into the buildings based on existing data showed a declining trend.

**Installing land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil around Units 1-4 to prevent the inflow of groundwater into the building**

To prevent the inflow of groundwater into the buildings, installation of impermeable walls on the land side is planned. Freezing started on the sea side and at a part of the mountain side from March 2016 and at 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017. In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas and on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4.5 m. The multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and freezing, have kept the groundwater level stable. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment held on March 7 clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls allowed for a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.
Progress toward decommissioning: Work to improve the environment within the site

**Immediate targets**

- Reduce the effect of additional release from the entire power station and radiation from radioactive waste (secondary water treatment waste, rubble, etc.) generated after the accident, to limit the effective radiation dose to below 1mSv/year at the site boundaries.
- Prevent contamination expansion in sea, decontamination within the site

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**Optimization of radioactive protective equipment**

Based on the progress of measures to reduce environmental dosage on site, the site is categorized into two zones: highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas to optimize protective equipment according to each category aiming at improving safety and productivity by reducing load during work.

From March 2016, limited operation started. From March and September 2017, the G Zone was expanded.

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**Installation of dose-rate monitors**

To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 4, 2016. These monitors allow workers to confirm real-time on-site dose rates at their workplaces. Workers are also able to check concentrated data through large-scale displays installed in the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the access control facility.

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**Installation of sea-side impermeable walls**

To prevent the outflow of contaminated water into the sea, sea-side impermeable walls have been installed. Following the completed installation of steel pipe sheet piles on September 22, 2015, connection of these piles and connection of sea-side impermeable walls was completed on October 26, 2015. Through these works, closure of sea-side impermeable walls was finished and the contaminated water countermeasures have been greatly advanced.

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**Status of the large rest house**

A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced on May 31, 2015.

Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest.

On March 1, 2016 a convenience store opened in the large rest house. On April 11, operation of the shower room started. Efforts will continue to improve convenience of workers.