Countermeasures for contaminated water are implemented in accordance with the following three principles:

1. **Eliminate** contamination sources
   - Multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.
   - Remove contaminated water from the trench (Note 3)
   (Note 3) Underground tunnel containing pipes.

2. **Isolate** water from contamination
   - Pump up groundwater for bypassing
   - Pump up groundwater near buildings
   - Land-side impermeable walls
   - Waterproof pavement

3. **Prevent leakage** of contaminated water
   - Enhance soil by adding sodium silicate
   - Sea-side impermeable walls
   - Increase the number of (welded-joint) tanks

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**Main decommissioning works and steps**

All fuel had been removed from Unit 4 SFP by December 22, 2014. Work continues toward fuel removal and debris retrieval from Unit 1-3.

**Fuel Removal from SFP**

- Rubble removal & dose reduction
- Installing a Fuel removal handling machine
- Fuel removal & handling

**Fuel Debris Retrieval**

- Capturing the status inside the PCV
- Examining the fuel debris retrieval method, etc. (Note 2)
- Fuel debris retrieval
- Storage and handling

**Dismantling Facilities**

- Scenario development & technology consideration
- Design and manufacturing of devices / equipment
- Dismantling

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**Multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS), etc.**

- This equipment removes radionuclides from the contaminated water in tanks and reduces risks.
- Treatment of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) was completed in May 2015 via multi-nuclide removal equipment, and additional multi-nuclide removal equipment installed by TEPCO (operation commenced in September 2014) and a subsidy project of the Japanese Government (operation commenced in October 2014).
- Strontium-treated water from equipment other than ALPS is being re-treated in ALPS.

**Land-side impermeable walls**

- Land-side impermeable walls surround the buildings and reduce groundwater inflow into the same.
- Freezing started on the sea side and part of the mountain side from March 2016 and on 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017.
- In March 2016, the land-side impermeable walls were completely completed except for a portion of the depths. Based on the results of the review of the monitoring data, the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside was approximately 4.8 m. Multi-layered contaminant water management measures, including strata-less and facing, have kept the groundwater level stable. Consequently, the breakwater was constructed to isolate the groundwater. The buildings from groundwater were considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding the groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls had allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.

**Sea-side impermeable walls**

- Impermeable walls are being installed on the sea side of Units 1-4, to prevent contaminated groundwater from flowing into the sea.
- The installation of steel pipe sheet piles was completed in September 2015, and they were connected in October 2015. These works completed the closure of the sea-side impermeable walls.
Completion of obstacle removal before curing the floor opening toward Unit 1 fuel removal
As preparatory work to remove fuel from the spent fuel pool (SFP), removal of obstacles, such as winches, before covering the floor opening was completed on February 19. From March, the floor opening will be covered to remove small rubble around the SFP.

Results of the investigation after moving and containing the remaining objects inside the Unit 2 operating floor
Toward spent fuel removal, the investigation after moving and containing the remaining objects inside the operating floor was completed on February 1. This investigation measured the radiation dose on the floor, walls and the ceiling inside the operating floor and confirmed the contamination status.

Extraordinary inspection for the onsite exhaust stacks conducted in response to material having fallen from the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack
In response to scaffold material having fallen from the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack as detected on January 9, safety measures such as entry restrictions are being implemented. In addition, photos were taken by a telescopic camera during the period January 11-17 as an extraordinary inspection of all four exhaust stacks onsite.

Ongoing training using dummy fuel, etc. toward fuel removal from Unit 3
Toward the fuel removal at the end of March, a function check after cable replacement was completed on February 8. From February 14, recovery measures in the event of defect occurrence, etc. are being reviewed and training for fuel removal using dummy fuel and transport cask is underway. During the fuel removal, the fuel-handling facility will be operated remotely and after removing the upper small rubble, the fuel will be transported in the transport cask to the onsite common pool. The work will be steadily implemented with safety first.

Investigation touching the deposits inside the Unit 2 PCV
On February 13, an investigation touching the deposits inside the PCV was conducted to determine their characteristics (hardness, fragility, etc.). This contact investigation confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist. In addition, images, radiation dose and temperature data that would help determine the contour and size of the deposits could be collected by moving the investigative unit closer to the deposits. The results of this investigation will be utilized in the internal investigation in the 2nd half of FY2019, examination of the retrieval method, etc.

Results of the investigation into groundwater inflow, etc. to the Onsite Bunker Building
For the Onsite Bunker Building where an ongoing increase since mid-November 2018 was confirmed, the status of groundwater inflow was investigated after removing water from the basement floor by a temporarily installed pump on February 21. The investigation detected no groundwater inflow from walls but confirmed water was flowing into the sump tank on the basement floor, which connected with drain tunnels (drainage equipment) of each floor and overflowed in the sump pit.

*1: Air lock for workers
*2: Current pressure inside the Unit 1 PCV: atmospheric pressure + 0.5-1.5 Kpa
The temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Units 1-3 have been maintained within the range of approx. 15-25°C¹ over the past month. There was no significant change in the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings in the air². It was evaluated that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.

¹: The values varied somewhat, depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.
²: In January 2019, the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings was evaluated as less than 0.0002 mSv/year at the site boundary. The annual radiation dose from natural radiation is approx. 2.1 mSv/year (average in Japan).
Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8)

Results of the investigation after moving and containing the remaining objects inside the Unit 2 operating floor

Completion of obstacle removal before curing the opening toward Unit 1 fuel removal

Preparation before Unit 1 PCV internal investigation (PCV depressurization during drilling)

Investigation touching the deposits inside the Unit 2 PCV

Results of the investigation into groundwater inflow, etc. to the Onsite Bunker Building

Ongoing training using mockup fuel, etc. toward fuel removal from Unit 3

Extraordinary inspection for the onsite exhaust stacks conducted in response to material having fallen from the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack

* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8)

Data (10-minute values) of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the airborne radiation rate around site boundaries showed 0.427 – 1.504 μSv/h (January 30 – February 26, 2019). We improved the measurement conditions of monitoring posts 2 to 8 to measure the air-dose rate precisely. Construction works, such as tree-clearing, surface soil removal and shield wall setting, were implemented from February 10 to April 18, 2012.

Therefore monitoring results at these points are lower than elsewhere in the power plant site.

The radiation shielding panels around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose at the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10-11, 2013, since further deforestation, etc. had caused the surrounding radiation dose to decline significantly.

Provided by Japan Space Imaging, photo taken on June 14, 2018 Product(C) [2018] DigitalGlobe, Inc.
I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

1. Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained within the range of approx. 15 to 25°C for the past month, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.

II. Progress status by each plan

1. Contaminated water management

To tackle the increase in stagnant water due to groundwater inflow, fundamental measures to prevent such inflow into the Reactor Buildings will be implemented, while improving the decontamination capability of water treatment and preparing facilities to control the contaminated water.

- Status of contaminated water generated
  - Multi-layered measures, including pumping up by subdrains and land-side impermeable walls, which were implemented to control the continued generation of contaminated water, reduced the groundwater inflow into buildings.

- Following the steady implementation of “isolation” measures (groundwater bypass subdrains, frozen walls, etc.), the inflow reduced from approx. 470 m³/day (the FY2014 average) when the measures were first launched to approx. 220 m³/day (the FY2017 average), though it varied depending on rainfall, etc.

- Measures will continue to further reduce the volume of contaminated water generated.

![Graph showing the daily average rainfall and groundwater inflow](image_url)

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater, rainwater, etc. into buildings

- **Operation of the groundwater bypass**
  - From April 9, 2014, the operation of 12 groundwater bypass pumping wells commenced sequentially to pump up groundwater. The release started from May 21, 2014 in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until February 25, 2019, a total of 448,458 m³ of groundwater had been released. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
  - Pumps are inspected and cleaned as required based on their operational status.

- **Water Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains**
  - To reduce the level of groundwater flowing into the buildings, work began to pump up groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings on September 3, 2015. The pumped-up groundwater was then purified at dedicated facilities and released from September 14, 2015 onwards. Up until February 25, 2019, a total of 656,488 m³ had been drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
  - Due to the level of the groundwater drain pond rising after the sea-side impermeable walls had been closed, pumping started on November 5, 2015. Up until February 26, 2019, a total of approx. 197,652 m³ had been pumped up and a volume of under 10 m³/day is being transferred from the groundwater drain to the Turbine Buildings (average for the period January 17 – February 13, 2019).
  - As one of the multi-layered contaminated water management measures, in addition to waterproof pavement (facing; as of the end of January 2019, approx. 94% of the planned area was completed) to prevent rainwater infiltrating the ground, etc., facilities to enhance the subdrain treatment system were installed and went into operation from April 2018; increasing the treatment capacity to 1,500 m³ and improving reliability.
  - To maintain the level of groundwater pumped up from subdrains, work to install additional subdrain pits and recover those already in place is underway. The additional pits are going into operation sequentially from a pit for which work was completed (the number of pits which went into operation: 12 of 14). For recovered pits, work for three out of three pits scheduled was completed, all of which went into operation from December 26, 2018.
To eliminate the need to suspend water pumping while cleaning the subdrain transfer pipe, the pipe will be duplicated. Installation of the pipe and ancillary facilities was completed.

Since the subdrains went into operation, the inflow into buildings tended to decline to under 150 m³/day when the subdrain water level declined below T.P. 3.0 m but increased during rainfall.

To suppress any increase in tritium density of the pit near the Unit 1/2 mountain-side subdrain, the surrounding ground is being improved in two areas and improvement work on the north side was completed on February 6, 2019. On the south side, where improvement work was completed in November 2018, the water level in the nearby subdrain is being reduced in a phased manner and no significant variation in tritium density was detected.

The monitoring, including evaluating the effect on the north side, will continue.

Detection of tritium in the Unit 1/2 Turbine Building sea-side lower permeable layer

On the Unit 1/2 Turbine Building sea side (east side), water was sampled and analyzed at the sea-side groundwater observation well as a benchmark for future subdrain operation. The analysis detected tritium in the subdrain around the lower permeable (alternative) layer.

No influence on the sea was likely because the sea-side impermeable walls were not embedded down to the low-permeable layer under the lower permeable layer, nor was any significant variation detected in the distribution of radioactive material density inside the port.

To investigate the cause following the detection of tritium, water from the lower permeable layer in the bank protection area will be sampled through the observation well to check the extent to which tritium has spread to the sea side. Further sampling will be conducted in the portion where tritium was detected and continuous monitoring will be implemented according to the results. Causes will also be examined, including relationships with the structure.

Construction status of the land-side impermeable walls

A operation to maintain the land-side impermeable walls and prevent the frozen soil from thickening further continued from May 2017 on the north and south sides and started from November 2017 on the east side, where frozen soil of sufficient thickness was identified. The scope of the maintenance operation was expanded in March 2018.

In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths; based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 °C. Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and facing, have kept the groundwater level stable. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding the groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls had allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.

Operation of multi-nuclide removal equipment

Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing and high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were underway (for existing equipment, System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013; and for high-performance equipment, from October 18, 2014). The additional multi-nuclide removal equipment went into full-scale operation from October 16, 2017.

As of February 21, 2019, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 400,000, 528,000 and 103,000 m³ respectively (including approx. 9,500 m³ stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with a high density of radioactive materials at the System B outlet of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).

To reduce the risks of strontium-treated water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment has been underway (existing: from December 4, 2015, additional: from May 27, 2015, high-performance: from April 15, 2015). Up until February 21, 2019, approx. 561,000 m³ had been treated.

Toward reducing the risk of contaminated water stored in tanks

Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION) (from January 6, 2015) and the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) (from December 26, 2014) have been underway. Up until February 21, 2019, approx. 506,000 m³ had been treated.

Measures in the Tank Area

Rainwater, under the release standard and having accumulated within the fenced-in area of the contaminated water tank area, was sprinkled on site after eliminating radioactive materials using rainwater-treatment equipment since May 21, 2014 (as of February 25, 2019, a total of 123,906 m³).
Water quality analysis revealed gross β radioactivity in the torus chambers of Units 2 and 3. However, eddy-current strainers are installed in the stagnant-water transfer lines and no gross β radioactivity was detected in the Process Main Building or the High Temperature Incinerator Building located downstream.

Radiation dose inspection on the basement floor of the Process Main Building and the High Temperature Incinerator Building
- From December 21, 2018, measures are being implemented, including radiation dose inspections, on the basement floor of the Process Main Building and the High Temperature Incinerator Building.
- The inspection detected radiation dose rates of 2.6 and 0.8 Sv/h on the basement floor of the Process Main Building and in the High Temperature Incinerator Building respectively.
- The cause of the increased radiation dose will be investigated to examine appropriate measures.

Leakage from the RO concentrated water transfer pipe flange
- On February 15, 2019, water dripping at a rate of one drop per second from the connection part of the insulator, which was installed to prevent flange leakage expansion, was detected at the RO concentrated water transfer pipe in the H1 tank area.
- In the dripping part, an ice-like solid was detected (approx. 1.0 × 0.6 m). The analytic results of the leaked water were Cs-134, below the detection limit (9.2 × 10³ Bq/L); Cs-137, 1.6 × 10³ Bq/L; gross β: 3.9 × 10³ Bq/L. The leakage was considered as system water leaking from the RO concentrated water transfer pipe.
- There was no side ditch near the water dripping part, the leakage remained directly beneath the connection part and no significant variation was detected in the radiation monitor for the drainage channel. Accordingly, it was considered that the leakage had no influence on the outside.
- From February 18, 2019, water was removed from the relevant line. After completing the water removal, an overall inspection of the leakage flange part will be conducted.

Leakage from the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment System C (1)
- On February 12, 2019, an alarm was issued from the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment System C. An onsite inspection detected water dripping from the flange on the cross-flow filter secondary side flow regulating valve downstream of the existing multi-removal equipment C pretreatment equipment (Stage 2) and a puddle was found beneath the drippage.
- The leakage spread approx. 0.2 m × 0.2 m × 2 cm inside the catch basin and approx. 2 m × 0.1 m × 0.1 cm, inside the fences. It was confirmed that the dripage ceased after the circulation pump was suspended.
- The leaked water was system water of the multi-nuclide removal equipment, but the leakage remained within the fences and had no influence on the outside. The leaked water was collected and discharged.
- The leakage was considered attributable to a defect around the packing of the relevant flange. The packing was replaced and operation resumed on February 18, 2019.

Leakage from the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment System C (2)
- On February 21, 2019, leakage traces were detected at the flange part (two traces at the inlet and outlet respectively) and on the cover sheet (approx. 1 m × 0.5 m) beneath the flange in the circulation pump line 2 discharge line, which sent water to the cross-flow filter 2 in the pretreatment equipment (Stage 2) of the existing multi-removal equipment System C.
- The leaked water (with gross β radioactivity below 1.5 × 10⁴ Bq/L) was assumed to be that used to clean the cross-flow filter prior to detection. Water was removed at the time of detection and cessation of leakage was
confirmed, whereupon the leaked water was collected and wiped out.

- The cause of the leakage will be investigated and necessary measures examined.

- Leakage from the suppression pool water-receiving water transfer pump during test operation
  - The suppression pool water-receiving water transfer pump (A) transfers strontium-treated water from the 2nd cesium-adsorption apparatus (the latest water quality measurement results: Cs134: 2.4 × 10^5 Bq/L, Cs137: 2.9 × 10^3 Bq/L; gross β: 5.0 × 10^5 Bq/L) to the waste liquid supply tank. On February 22, 2019, water leakage from the flange of the pump was detected during the test operation.
  - Leaked water scattered on the wall of the acrylic booth surrounding the pump and inner fences. The water then leaked inside the outer fences through the space between the inner fences and the acrylic wall. The test operation was immediately suspended and cessation of leakage confirmed. Based on the preceding conditions, the leakage was estimated to be in the order of several liters.
  - The drainage valve installed at the outer fences was open and the measurement of fluid on the ground outside the outer fences, which was damped in smear filter paper, confirmed a radiation level equivalent to the background. Based on this result, it was considered that the leaked water remained within the outer fences. The leaked water was collected and wiped out.
  - The cause of the leakage will be investigated and necessary measures examined.

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**2. Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools**

Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety. The removal of spent fuel from the Unit 4 pool commenced on November 18, 2013 and was completed by December 22, 2014

- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 1
  - The installation of windbreak fences, which will reduce dust scattering during rubble removal, started on October 31, 2017 and was completed by December 19, 2017.
  - As preparatory work to remove fuel from the spent fuel pool (SFP), rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 22, 2018.
  - Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around the site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors during the above removal work.
  - Once removed, rubble is stored in solid waste storage facilities or elsewhere depending on the dose level.
  - Before formulating a plan to remove rubble around the SFP, an onsite investigation started from July 23, 2018 and was completed on August 2.
  - To create an access route for preparatory work to protect the SFP, etc., work to remove four sections of X-braces (one each on the west and south sides and two on the east side respectively) started from September 19, 2018 and all planned four sections had been removed by December 20.
  - Removal of obstacles, such as winches, before covering the opening, was completed on February 19, 2019. From March, the opening will be covered to remove small rubble around the SFP.

- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 2
  - Previous investigations near the opening wall on the operating floor using a remote-controlled unmanned robot detected no significant scattering obstacles that would hinder the operation of the robot.
  - Contamination of the robot was below the level that would prevent maintenance by workers in the front room.
  - To formulate a work plan to dismantle the Reactor Building rooftop, etc., the entire operating floor will be investigated.
  - Before this investigation, work to move and contain the remaining objects was completed on November 6, 2018.
  - Toward spent fuel removal, the investigation after moving and containing the remaining objects inside the operating floor was completed on February 1. This investigation measured the radiation dose on the floor, walls and the ceiling inside the operating floor and confirmed the contamination status.

- From the analysis based on the investigative results, the “contamination density distribution” of the entire operating floor was obtained, based on which the airborne radiation dose rate inside the operating floor could be evaluated.
  - Toward fuel removal, shielding design, measures to prevent radioactive material scattering, etc. will be examined using the “contamination density distribution.”

- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 3
  - Regarding the fuel-handling machine (FHM) and crane, consecutive defects have occurred since the test operation started on March 15, 2018.
  - For the FHM, an alarm was issued during the pre-operation inspection on August 8, 2018, whereupon operation was suspended. This was confirmed as attributable to disconnection due to corrosion by rainwater ingress into the cable connection and investigation of the cause detected an abnormality in several control cables.
  - For the crane, an alarm was issued during the work to clear materials and equipment on August 15, 2018 and operation was suspended.
  - To determine the risks of defects in fuel-handling facilities, the FHM was temporarily recovered on September 29, 2018 and a safety inspection (operation check and facility inspection) was implemented. For 14 defects detected in the safety inspection, measures were completed on January 27, 2019.
  - Toward the fuel removal at the end of March 2019, a function check after cable replacement was completed on February 8, 2019.
  - From February 14, 2019, recovery measures in the event of defect occurrence, etc. are being reviewed and training for fuel removal using mockup fuel and transfer containers is underway.
  - During the fuel removal, the fuel-handling facility will be operated remotely and after removing the upper small rubble, the fuel will be transported in the transportation container to the onsite common pool. The work will be steadily implemented with safety first.

- Measures in response to fallen material from the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack
  - In response to the scaffold material having fallen from the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack as detected on January 9, 2019, safety measures such as entry restrictions are being implemented. In addition, photos were taken by a telescopic camera during the period January 11-17, 2019 as an extraordinary inspection of all four exhaust stacks onsite.
  - The inspection checking the same scaffold material as those falling previously, handrails, etc. confirmed scaffold material which was potentially significantly degraded.
  - To check the condition from closer quarters, an investigation using a drone will be conducted. Safety measures, such as installing a safe passage with a roof, will also be implemented by around the end of this fiscal year.

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**3. Retrieval of fuel debris**

- Depressurization of the PCV as part of efforts to create an access route for the Unit 1 PCV internal investigation
  - To investigate inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), measures will be implemented to prevent leakage of radioactive materials outside of the PCV during drilling for X-2 penetration inner door, etc. in the process of creating an access route. In addition, to further reduce the risk of releasing radioactive materials, the PCV will be depressurized to atmospheric levels.
  - The PCV depressurization will start around the beginning of FY2019. After completing the drilling to create an access route, the PCV pressure will be recovered.

- Results of the internal investigation of the Unit 2 PCV
  - On February 13, 2019, an investigation touching the detected deposits inside the PCV was conducted to determine their characteristics (hardness, fragility, etc.).
  - This contact investigation confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist. In addition, images, radiation dose and temperature data that would help determine the contour and size of the deposits could be collected by moving the investigative unit closer to the
4. Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

- Management status of the rubble and trimmed trees
  - As of the end of January 2019, the total storage volume of concrete and metal rubble was approx. 262,100 m³ (+6,300 m³ compared to at the end of December 2018, with an area-occupation rate of 66%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 134,000 m³ (with a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 76%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 54,200 m³ (+1,100 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 76%). The increase in rubble was mainly attributable to construction related to tanks and work related to rubble removal around Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings. The increase in used protective clothing was mainly attributable to acceptance of used protective clothing.

- Management status of secondary waste from water treatment
  - As of February 7, 2019, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 597 m³ (area-occupation rate: 85%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,330 m³ (area-occupation rate: 91%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Intensity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc., was 4,282 (area-occupation rate: 67%).

5. Reactor cooling

The cold shutdown condition will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring will continue

- Status of measures in response to the decline in the Unit 4 condensate storage tank water level
  - During an inspection of stagnant water in the building connection trench, stagnant water was detected in the Unit 4 fluid pipe duct, in which high tritium density was confirmed.
  - As a part of the investigation into stagnant-water inflow from ducts, the operation status of the Unit 4 condensate storage tank was inspected. The inspection confirmed that the tank water level was gradually declining from around November 2016.
  - The Unit 4 condensate storage tank was a dual structure and pipes from the tank connected only to the Unit 4 building. An onsite inspection on January 22, 2019 detected no leakage from the Unit 4 condensate storage tank and pipes. Based on these results, water in the Unit 4 condensate storage tank was considered to flow into the building through pipes.
  - Water transfer from the Unit 4 condensate storage tank, in which the water level had been continuously declining, started from February 20, 2019.
  - The inside of the duct is also being investigated from February 6, 2019 to identify the water inflow route to inside of the Unit 4 fluid pipe duct. However, the inflow route remains unclear and the investigation will continue.

- Cause and measures for the total suspension of the Unit 2 reactor water injection pump
  - To duplicate the water source of the reactor water injection system, the Unit 2 condensate storage tank (CST) was restored on January 8, 2019 to be used as the water source of the Unit 1 and 2 reactor water injection.
  - During the operation, the suction pressure of the Unit 2 reactor water injection pump (B) declined. To switch the pump (System B → A), pump (A) was started up. The discharge pressure of the pump increased and (A) and (B) pumps were automatically suspended. Reactor water injection to the Unit 2 reactor was suspended for one minute (deviation from the limiting condition for operation (LCO)).
  - An investigation detected stain and iron rust attached to the inside the suction strainer of the Unit 2 reactor water injection pump (B), which were considered to be the cause of the decline in the pump suction pressure.

As the next measure, the pump suction strainer will be inspected and parts prone to iron dust accumulating will be flushed.

- Suspension of both systems to replace the radiator for the Unit 2 and 3 PCV gas control facilities
  - The Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas control facilities extract and filter, etc. the gas inside the PCV to monitor the sub-critical condition inside the reactor, the hydrogen concentration inside the PCV, etc. and minimize the density and amount of radioactive materials emitted into the environment.
  - In association with an inspection of the radiator, all operations of the Unit 2 and 3 PCV gas control facilities will be suspended intermittently during the period March 5-22, 2019.
  - During the suspension, “sub-criticality monitoring” of the LCO (limiting condition for operation) cannot be satisfied. After specifying the necessary safety measures in advance and shifting outside the LCO according to the plan, the work will be implemented.

6. Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

- Status of groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4
  - The H-3 density at No. 0-3-1 had been increasing from around 120 Bq/L since October 2018 to around 1,900 Bq/L, then declining and currently stands at the level before increasing.
  - Since March 2018, the H-3 density at No. 1-6 has been repeatedly declining and increasing and currently stands at around 3,000 Bq/L.
  - The H-3 density at No. 1-8 had been increasing from around 2,000 Bq/L since December 2018 and currently stands at around 3,300 Bq/L.
  - The density of gross β radioactive materials at No. 1-12 had been decreasing from around 800 Bq/L since September 2018 to around 200 Bq/L. Since August 2015, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes: August 15, 2013 – October 13, 2015 and from October 24; at the repaired well: October 14 - 23, 2015).
  - The H-3 density at No. 2-3 had been decreasing since November 2017 and then remained constant at around 5,000 Bq/L. It has been declining since January 2019 and currently stands at around 4,000 Bq/L. The density of gross β radioactive materials at the same point had been increasing from around 600 Bq/L since December 2017 and currently stands at around 8,000 Bq/L.
  - The H-3 density at No. 2-5 had been increasing from around 1,200 Bq/L since December 2018 and currently stands at around 2,600 Bq/L. The density of gross β radioactive materials at the same point had been increasing from around 30,000 Bq/L since December 2018 and currently stands at around 80,000 Bq/L. Since December 18, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes: December 18, 2013 - October 13, 2015; at the repaired well: from October 14, 2015).
  - Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the Unit 1-4 intake open channel area, densities have remained below the legal discharge limit except for the increase in Cs-137 and Sr-90 during rain. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The density of Cs-137 has been increasing since January 13, 2020, while a new silt fence was installed to accommodate the relocation.
  - Regarding the radioactive materials in seawater in the area outside the port, densities of Cs-137 and Sr-90 have been declining, but remained unchanged following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
Securing appropriate staff long-term while thoroughly implementing workers’ exposure dose control. Improving the work environment and labor conditions continuously based on an understanding of workers’ on-site needs

7. Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Staff management

- The monthly average total of people registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from October to December 2018 was approx. 9,500 (TEPCO and partner company workers), which exceeded the monthly average number of actual workers (approx. 7,200). Accordingly, sufficient people are registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in March 2019 (approx. 4,240 per day; TEPCO and partner company workers) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 4,000 to 6,200 since FY2016 (see Figure 7).
- The number of workers decreased from both within and outside Fukushima Prefecture. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of January 2019 has remained constant at around 60%.
- The monthly average exposure dose of workers remained at approx. 0.59 mSv/month during FY2015, approx. 0.39 mSv/month during FY2016 and approx. 0.36 mSv/month during FY2017. (Reference: Annual average exposure dose 20 mSv/year ≒ 1.7 mSv/month)
- For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.

Figure 7: Changes in the average number of workers per weekday for each month since FY2016 (actual values)
Measures to prevent infection and expansion of influenza and norovirus

- Since November 2018, measures for influenza and norovirus have been implemented, including free influenza vaccinations (subsidized by TEPCO HD) in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (from October 24 to November 30, 2018) and medical clinics around the site (from November 1, 2018 to January 31, 2019) for partner company workers. As of January 31, 2019, a total of 6,330 workers had been vaccinated. In addition, a comprehensive range of other measures is also being implemented, including daily actions to prevent infection and expansion (measuring body temperature, health checks and monitoring infection status) and response after detecting possible infections (swift exit of possible patients and control of entry, mandatory mask-wearing in working spaces, etc.).

Status of influenza and norovirus cases

- Until the 8th week of 2019 (February 18-24, 2019), 267 influenza infections and 12 norovirus infections were recorded. The totals for the same period for the previous season showed 263 cases of influenza and nine norovirus infections.

FY2019 R&D plan for decommissioning

- Based on the progress of FY2018 R&D projects, a plan for R&D projects implemented in the next fiscal year will be formulated.
Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

The highest value — the latest value (sampled during February 18-26)

Unit (Bq/L): ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

Sea side impermeable wall
Silent fence

Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.36) Below 1/9
Cesium-137: 9.0 (2013/10/17) → 0.59 Below 1/10
Gross β: 74 (2013/8/19) → 17 Below 1/4
Tritium: 67 (2013/8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 4.4 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.26) Below 1/10
Cesium-137: 10 (2013/12/24) → 0.60 Below 1/10
Gross β: 60 (2013/7/4) → ND(16) Below 1/3
Tritium: 59 (2013/8/19) → 2.4 Below 1/20

Cesium-134: 5.0 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.27) Below 1/10
Cesium-137: 8.4 (2013/12/2) → 0.68 Below 1/10
Gross β: 69 (2013/8/19) → ND(16) Below 1/4
Tritium: 52 (2013/8/19) → 2.5 Below 1/20

Cesium-134: 2.8 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.48) Below 1/5
Cesium-137: 5.8 (2013/12/2) → 0.71 Below 1/8
Gross β: 46 (2013/8/19) → ND(14) Below 1/3
Tritium: 24 (2013/8/19) → 3.9 Below 1/6

Summary of TEPCO data as of February 27, 2019

Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

(2013) represents ND throughout 2013

Cesium-134: 1.8 (2013/6/21) → ND(0.70) Below 1/2
Cesium-137: 4.5 (2013/3/17) → ND(0.53) Below 1/8
Gross β: 12 (2013/12/23) → 11
Tritium: 8.6 (2013/6/26) → 1.7 Below 1/5

Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.60) Below 1/5
Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) → 0.71 Below 1/10
Gross β: 69 (2013/8/19) → ND(17) Below 1/4
Tritium: 68 (2013/8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 3.5 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.25) Below 1/20
Cesium-137: 7.8 (2013/10/17) → 0.34 Below 1/20
Gross β: 79 (2013/8/19) → ND(16) Below 1/4
Tritium: 60 (2013/8/19) → 1.9 Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 32 (2013/10/11) → ND(0.61) Below 1/50
Cesium-137: 73 (2013/10/11) → 5.6 Below 1/10
Gross β: 320 (2013/8/12) → 19 Below 1/10
Tritium: 510 (2013/9/2) → 16 Below 1/30

From February 11, 2017, the location of the sampling point was shifted approx. 50 m south of the previous point due to the location shift of the silt fence.

Tritium: 10,000 (2013/8/19)

Note: The gross β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of strontium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

Sea side impermeable wall
Silent fence

Note: Because safety of the sampling point was unsuited due to the influence of Typhoon No. 10 in 2016, samples were taken from approx. 330 m south of the Unit 4 release outlet. Samples were also taken from a point approx. 300 m from the same release outlet from January 27, 2017 and approx. 320m from March 23, 2018.

Progress toward decommissioning: Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP)

Unit 1

Regarding fuel removal from Unit 1 spent fuel pool, there is a plan to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal over the top floor of the Reactor Building (operating floor). All roof panels and wall panels of the building cover were dismantled by November 10, 2016. Removal of pillars and beams of the building was completed on May 11, 2017. Modification of the pillars and beams of the building cover and installation of building cover were completed by December 19.

Rubble removal from the operating floor north side started from January 22, 2018. Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors during the above removal work.

Prior to the installation of a cover for fuel removal, removal of large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training of remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine which will be installed on site (February – December 2015). Measures to reduce dose on the Reactor Building top floor (decontamination, shields) were completed in December 2016. Installation of a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine is underway from January 2017. Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.

Regarding fuel removal, after confirming the cause of the defects in the FHM and crane and implementing measures for similar parts, work will continue toward removal starting from the end of March 2019 putting safety first.

To facilitate removal of fuel assemblies and retrieval of debris in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, the scope of dismantling and modification of the existing Reactor Building rooftop was examined. From the perspective of ensuring safety during the work, controlling impacts on the outside of the power station, and removing fuel rapidly to reduce risks, we decided to dismantle the whole rooftop above the highest floor of the Reactor Building. Examination of the following two plans continues: Plan 1 to share a container for removing fuel assemblies from the pool and retrieving fuel debris; and Plan 2 to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal from the pool.

Unit 3

Prior to the installation of a cover for fuel removal, removal of large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training of remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine which will be installed on site (February – December 2015). Measures to reduce dose on the Reactor Building top floor (decontamination, shields) were completed in December 2016. Installation of a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine is underway from January 2017. Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.

Regarding fuel removal, after confirming the cause of the defects in the FHM and crane and implementing measures for similar parts, work will continue toward removal starting from the end of March 2019 putting safety first.

Unit 4

In the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap, the target of Phase 1 involved commencing fuel removal from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completion of Step 2 (by December 2013). On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, or the 1st Unit, commenced and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.

On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing work to fuel removal, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (2 of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)

This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building. Based on this experience, fuel assemblies will be removed from Unit 1-3 pools.

* A part of the photo is corrected because it includes sensitive information related to physical protection.

Reference
February 28, 2019
Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment
Investigation into TIP Room of the Unit 1 Reactor Building

- To improve the environment for future investigations inside the PCV, etc., an investigation was conducted from September 24 to October 2, 2015 at the TIP Room.(*1). (Due to high dose around the entrance in to the TIP Room, the investigation of dose rate and contamination distribution was conducted through a hole drilled from the walkway of the Turbine Building, where the dose was low)
- The investigative results identified high dose at X-31 to 33 penetrations(*2) (instrumentation penetration) and low dose at other parts.
- As it was confirmed that work inside the TIP room would be available, the next step will include identification of obstacles which will interfere the work inside the TIP Room and formulation of a plan for dose reduction.

Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]
- In April 2015, a device, which entered the inside of the PCV through a narrow access opening (bore: φ 100 mm), collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, the investigation using a self-propelled investigation device, conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, took images of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The status inside the PCV will continue to be examined based on the collected image and dose data.

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Evaluation results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb - May 2015</td>
<td>Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, February 27, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st (Oct 2012)</td>
<td>Acquiring images</td>
<td>Measuring air temperature and dose rate</td>
<td>Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation</td>
<td>PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in May 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (Mar 2017)</td>
<td>Confirming the status of PCV 1st floor</td>
<td>Acquiring images</td>
<td>Measuring air temperature and dose rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd (Apr 2015)</td>
<td>Confirming the status of PCV 1st basement floor</td>
<td>Acquiring images</td>
<td>Measuring air temperature and dose rate</td>
<td>Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<Image of investigation inside the PCV>

Part to store a camera and a dosimeter Self-propelled investigation device

PCV penetration to be used in this investigation

(X-100β penetration)
Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Immediate target: Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Installation of an RPV thermometer and permanent PCV supervisory instrumentation

(1) Replacement of the RPV thermometer
   - As the thermometer installed at the Unit 2 RPV bottom after the earthquake had broken in February 2014, it was excluded from the monitoring thermometers.
   - In April 2014, removal of the broken thermometer failed and was suspended. Rust-stripping chemicals were injected and the broken thermometer was removed in January 2015. A new thermometer was reinstalled in March. The thermometer has been used as a part of permanent supervisory instrumentation since April.

(2) Reinstallation of the PCV thermometer and water-level gauge
   - Some of the permanent supervisory instrumentation for PCV could not be installed in the planned locations due to interference with existing grating (August 2013). The instrumentation was removed in May 2014 and new instruments were reinstalled in June 2014. The trend of added instrumentation will be monitored for approx. one month to evaluate its validity.
   - The measurement during the installation confirmed that the water level inside the PCV was approx. 300mm from the bottom.

Investigative results on torus chamber walls

- The torus chamber walls were investigated (on the north side of the east-side walls) using equipment specially developed for that purpose (a swimming robot and a floor traveling robot).
- At the east-side wall pipe penetrations (five points), the status and “existence of flow” were checked.
- A demonstration using the above two types of underwater wall investigative equipment showed how the equipment could check the status of penetration.
- Regarding Penetrations 1 - 5, the results of checking the sprayed tracer (*) by camera showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the swimming robot)
- Regarding Penetration 3, a sonar check showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the floor traveling robot)

Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris. [Investigative outline]

- Investigative devices such as a robot will be injected from Unit 2 X-6 penetration (**1) and access the inside of the pedestal using the CRD rail.

[Progress status]
- On January 26 and 30, 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the status of the CRD replacement rail on which the robot will travel. On February 9, deposit on the access route of the self-propelled investigative device was removed and on February 16, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the device.
- The results of this series of investigations confirmed fallen and deformed gratings and a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- On January 19, 2018, the status below the platform inside the pedestal was investigated using an investigative device with a hinging mechanism. From the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits probably including fuel debris were found at the bottom of the pedestal. In addition, multiple parts higher than the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple routes of fuel debris falling. Obtained data were processed in panoramic image visualization to acquire clearer images.
- On February 3, 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.
- In addition, images, etc. would help determine the contour and size of the deposits could be collected by moving the investigative unit closer to the deposits than the previous investigation.

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Evaluation results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar – Jul 2016</td>
<td>Confirmed the existence of high-density materials, which was considered as fuel debris, at the bottom of RPV, and in the lower part and the outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a large part of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Glossary

- **Penetration**: Through-hole of the PCV
- **SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)**
- **Tracer**: Material used to trace the fluid flow. Clay particles
Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

**Water flow was detected from the Main Steam Isolation Valve**

On January 18, 2014, a flow of water from around the door of the Steam Isolation Valve room in the Reactor Building Unit 3 1st floor northeast area to the nearby floor drain funnel (drain outlet) was detected. As the drain outlet connects with the underground part of the Reactor Building, there is no possibility of outflow from the building.

From April 23, 2014, image data has been acquired by camera and the radiation dose measured via pipes for measurement instrumentation, which connect the air-conditioning room on the Reactor Building 2nd floor with the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor. On May 15, 2014, water flow from the expansion joint of one Main Steam Line was detected. This is the first leak from PCV detected in the Unit 3. Based on the images collected in this investigation, the leak volume will be estimated and the need for additional investigations will be examined. The investigative results will also be utilized to examine water stoppage and PCV repair methods.

* Main Steam Isolation Valve: A valve to shut off the steam generated from the Reactor in an emergency

**Investigative results into the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch using a small investigation device**

- As part of the investigation into the PCV to facilitate fuel debris retrieval, the status around the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch was investigated using a small self-traveling investigation device on November 26, 2015.
- Given blots such as rust identified below the water level inside the PCV, there may be a leakage from the seal to the extent of bleeding.
- Methods to investigate and repair the parts, including other PCV penetrations with a similar structure, will be considered.

**Investigation inside the PCV**

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, the inside of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) was investigated to identify the status there including the location of the fuel debris.

- The status of X-53 penetration(*4), which may be under the water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated using remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under the water (October 22-24, 2014).
- For the purpose of confirming the status inside the PCV, an investigation device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration on October 20 and 22, 2015 to obtain images, data of dose and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage was identified on the structure and walls inside the PCV and the water level was almost identical with the estimated value. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal.
- Analysis of image data obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals. Consideration about fuel removal based on the obtained information will continue.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.

**Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons**

- The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that part of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV.

**Glossary**

- (*1) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)
- (*2) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
- (*3) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)
- (*4) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV

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Work to improve the reliability of the circulation water injection cooling system and pipes to transfer stagnant water.

- Operation of the reactor water injection system using Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a water source commenced (from July 5, 2013). Compared to the previous systems, the reliability of the reactor water injection system was enhanced, e.g. by increasing the amount of water-source storage and enhancing durability.
- To reduce the risk of contaminated-water leakage, the circulation loop was shortened by installing a reverse osmosis (RO) device in the Unit 4 Turbine Building within the circulation loop, comprising the transfer of contaminated water, water treatment and injection into the reactors. Operation of the installed RO device started from October 7 and 24-hour operation started from October 20. Installation of the new RO device inside the building shortened the circulation loop from approx. 3 to 0.8 km.
- To accelerate efforts to reduce the radiation density in stagnant water inside the buildings, circulating loops comprising the transfer of contaminated water, water treatment and injection into the reactors. Operation of the instal

**Immediate target**

Stably continue reactor cooling and stagnant water treatment, and improve reliability

Progress status of dismantling of flange tanks

- To facilitate replacement of flange tanks, dismantling of flange tanks started in H1 east/H2 areas in May 2015. Dismantling of all flange tanks was completed in H1 east area (12 tanks) in October 2015, in H2 area (28 tanks) in March 2016, in H4 area (56 tanks) in May 2017, in H3 B area (31 tanks) in September 2017, in H5 and H5 north areas (31 tanks) in June 2018, in G6 area(30 tanks) in July 2018 and H6 and H6 north areas (24 tanks) in September 2018. Dismantling of flange tanks in G4 south area is underway.

Completion of purification of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water)

- Contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) is being treated using seven types of equipment including the multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS). Treatment of the RO concentrated salt water was completed on May 27, 2015, with the exception of the remaining water at the tank bottom. The remaining water will be treated sequentially toward dismantling the tanks. The strontium-treated water from other facilities than the multi-nuclide removal equipment will be re-purified in the multi-nuclide removal equipment to further reduce risks.

Preventing groundwater from flowing into the Reactor Buildings

**Reduction of groundwater inflow by pumping sub-drain water**

To reduce groundwater flowing into the buildings, pumping of groundwater from walls (subdrains) around the buildings started on September 3, 2015. Pumped-up groundwater was purified at dedicated facilities and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization confirmed that its quality met operational targets. Via a groundwater bypass, the reduce groundwater level around the Buildings and groundwater inflow into the Building

- Measures to pump up groundwater flowing from the mountain side upstream of the Building to the reduce the groundwater inflow (groundwater bypass) have been implemented
- The pumped up groundwater is temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization have confirmed that its quality meets operational targets. Through periodical monitoring, pumping of wells and tanks is operated appropriately. At the observation holes installed at a height equivalent to the buildings, the trend showing a decline in groundwater levels is checked. The analytical results on groundwater inflow into the buildings based on existing data showed a declining trend.

**Installing land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil around Units 1-4 to prevent the inflow of groundwater into the building**

To prevent the inflow of groundwater into the buildings, installation of impermeable walls on the land side is planned. Freezing started on the sea side and at a part of the mountain side from March 2016 and at 99% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017. In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas and on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. The multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and freezing, have kept the groundwater level stable. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment held on March 7 clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls in shielding groundwater and evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls allowed for a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.

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Progress toward decommissioning: Work to improve the environment within the site

**Immediate targets**

- Reduce the effect of additional release from the entire power station and radiation from radioactive waste (secondary water treatment waste, rubble, etc.) generated after the accident, to limit the effective radiation dose to below 1mSv/year at the site boundaries.
- Prevent contamination expansion in sea, decontamination within the site

Optimization of radioactive protective equipment

Based on the progress of measures to reduce environmental dosage on site, the site is categorized into two zones: highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas to optimize protective equipment according to each category aiming at improving safety and productivity by reducing load during work. From March 2016, limited operation started. From March and September 2017, the G Zone was expanded.

Installation of dose-rate monitors

To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 4, 2016. These monitors allow workers to confirm real time on-site dose rates at their workplaces. Workers are also able to check concentrated data through large-scale displays installed in the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the access control facility.

Installation of sea-side impermeable walls

To prevent the outflow of contaminated water into the sea, sea-side impermeable walls have been installed. Following the completed installation of steel pipe sheet piles on September 22, 2015, connection of these piles was conducted and connection of sea-side impermeable walls was completed on October 26, 2015. Through these works, closure of sea-side impermeable walls was finished and the contaminated water countermeasures have been greatly advanced.

Status of the large rest house

A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced on May 31, 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. On March 1, 2016 a convenience store opened in the large rest house. On April 11, operation of the shower room started. Efforts will continue to improve convenience of workers.