

Main decommissioning work and steps


Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed on December 22 2014 at Unit 4 and February 28 2021 at Unit 3.
Trial fuel debris retrieval at Unit 2 commenced from September 10 2024 and a milestone of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap "Commencing fuel debris retrieval at the first Unit" was achieved.

Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and fuel debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident with nearby metal materials etc.

<Milestones in the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap>

Units	Completion of fuel removal	Within 2031
Unit 1	Start of fuel removal	FY2027 - FY2028
Unit 2	Start of fuel removal	FY2024 - FY2026




Measures for treated water

Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, ongoing efforts will continue, including enhanced monitoring, ensuring objectivity and transparency by engaging with third-party experts and having safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency.

Flow of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea



Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

- "Removing" the contamination source
- "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
- "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water


- For stagnant water in buildings (contaminated water), first, cesium and strontium are reduced by the cesium absorption apparatuses (SARRY and KURION). Then, after treated by the multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS), stagnant water in buildings is stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of the building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 70 m³/day (in FY2024). It was confirmed that the milestone of "suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025," which was achieved in FY2023, has been maintained in FY2024.
- Measures will proceed to further reduce and suppress the amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028.

(2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce the stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment is underway.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- While assessing the dust impact, measures to reduce the stagnant water level were implemented. In March 2023, the target water level in each building was achieved. For the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, "reducing stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024" was achieved.
- For zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building, measures to reduce the radiation dose are being implemented with stabilization in mind.

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- As part of the tsunami countermeasures, openings in buildings were closed and work to install sea walls was completed. As countermeasures for heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to enhance drainage channels and other measures is being implemented as planned.



Progress status

- ◆ The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable. There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained.

Unit 3 Aerial investigation (by micro-drone) inside the PCV



For the main purpose of collecting information around X-6 penetration inside the Unit 3 PCV, which is important for fuel debris horizontal access and others, as well as inside the pedestal, investigation inside the PCV using a "micro-drone" is planned.

At present mockup training on the installation of the seal box, and the operation of the install equipment and drone, is underway to learn the skill.

As well as learning the skill, reviews of the work procedures and a detailed examination of the flight route are also underway. To facilitate visibility to detect the pedestal upper structure, the "vertical camera micro-drone" was verified. Based on the expected effect, adjustment is being made to use the micro-drone in the investigation inside the pedestal.

In preparation for the investigation inside the Unit 3 PCV, the process of reducing the PCV water level by reducing the reactor water injection commenced from September 1, 2025. Among the three PCV water-level gauges, a gap was identified between indicated values of the bubbler type water-level gauge and others. Accordingly, the PCV water level reduction was suspended on September 16. The bubbler type water-level gauge indirectly measures inside the PCV by measuring the RHR pipe water level connecting to the PCV inside. As no linkage with the water level was assumed, work to increase the connectivity was conducted on September 18, whereupon the indicated values of the water level gauge and the PCV inside became equivalent. From September 24, PCV water level reduction towards the initially planned hold point (T.P8000) was resumed. In conjunction with the water level reduction, the behaviors of the adjusted water level gauge are being verified.

Even if the bubbler-type water level gauge does not indicate the PCV water level correctly, efforts to reduce the water level will continue while monitoring using an S/C pressure gauge.




Unit 1 Progress of work towards fuel removal

Towards installing a large cover within FY2025, work is underway. As part of efforts to reduce the radiation dose, materials are assembled on the ground outside the site and subsequently installed on site. At present, materials near the large cover top are being installed.

With waste reduction in mind, for Unit 1, the fuel-handling machine installed in Unit 4 in 2013 will be transported to the manufacturer for modification and effectively utilized as the Unit 1 fuel-handling machine.

For utilization, parts which do not satisfy the specifications of Unit 1 and for which discontinued production or age-related degradation is anticipated will be newly manufactured.

For transportation to the factory, based on the "Regulation on Security and Protection of Nuclear Material at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of the Tokyo Electric Power Company, Incorporated", after confirming that the surface contamination concentration does not exceed 1/10 of the limit, the fuel-handling machine will be transported outside the site.



Unit 2 PCV internal investigation/ Status of fuel debris trial retrieval

Regarding the robot arm, movement checks that were commenced after completion of the comprehensive inspection are underway. The arm movement was confirmed to be unhindered.


Conversely, based on problems affecting the telescopic device camera, an irradiation test was conducted on the camera mounted on the robot arm, although the radiation resistance indicated in the manufacturer specifications could not be confirmed.

In addition, since the cameras cannot be acquired, the decision was made to change the cameras that will be subject to high accumulated doses during fieldwork to those that have been adopted in our previous works.

Going forward, as well as changing the camera, based on the assumed camera replacement, the design of mounting brackets for certain cameras will be changed and visibility tests of the cameras mounted on the arm will be conducted as well as additional verification tests that involve using a manipulator to replace the cameras.

The estimated time taken to commence the internal investigation and debris sampling by the robot arm will be after the change of cameras mounted on the arm and in FY2026.

Major initiatives – Locations on site




Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on January 14, 2024
Product (C) [2024] Maxar Technologies.


I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained as shown below for recent, though they varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.




- *1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.
*2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.



Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of August 2025, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 6.2×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ and 4.8×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00002 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



(Reference)

- * The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
[Cs-134]: 2×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
[Cs-137]: 3×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
- * Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.249–0.974 μ Sv/h (August 27 – September 23, 2025).
To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

- Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.
- Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.
- Note 3: Dose assessment has been changed since July 2024 due to the change of standard meteorology, etc. in the implementation plan (effective July 8, 2024).

Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown state or criticality sign detected.


Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

Measures for contaminated water and treated water

➤ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 70 m³/day (in FY2024). It was confirmed that the milestone of “suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025,” which was achieved in FY2023, has been maintained in FY2024.
- Measures will proceed to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated and suppress to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028.



- *1 Values differ from those announced at the 20th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50th and 51st meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.
- *2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings

- Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains
- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains, release started from September 14, 2015, and up until September 10, 2025, 2768 release operations had been conducted.
- The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.




Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 subdrains

- Implementation status of facing
- Facing is a measure that involves asphaltting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater from infiltrating the ground and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of August 2025, 97% (1,410,000 m²) of the planned area (1,450,000 m²) on site had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, implementation proceeds appropriately after constructing a yard from implementable zones that leave the decommissioning work unaffected. As of the end of August 2025, 55% (30,000 m²) of the planned area (60,000 m²) had been completed.
- Status of the groundwater level around buildings
- Regarding the groundwater level in the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, the difference between the inside and outside has remained constant, though the groundwater level on the mountain side varied due to rainfall. The groundwater level of the groundwater drain observation well remained sufficiently lower than the ground surface, at around T.P.+1.4m (the height of the ground surface: T.P.+2.5m).
 - Regarding the subdrains of Units 1-4, the pumping amount varied depending on precipitation. The pumping amount in the T.P.+2.5m area remained constant after the facing in this area was completed.

- Operation of the multi-nuclide removal system and other water-treatment facilities
- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (existing), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, an inspection prior-to-use certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the entire inspection prior to use was completed. For the multi-nuclide removal system (additional), an inspection prior to use certificate was granted by the NRA on October 12, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted from October 18, 2014. In March 2, 2023, an inspection prior to use certificate was granted by the NRA and the entire inspection prior to use was completed.
 - Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until September 11, 2025, approx. 798,000 m³ had been treated.
- Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water
- To reduce the risks of strontium-reduced water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal system is underway. Up until September 11, 2025, approx. 965,000 m³ had been treated.
- Storage status of stagnant water and amount of ALPS treated water, etc. stored in tanks
- The volume of ALPS treated water, etc. was approx. 1,274,511 m³ as of September 11, 2025.

- The total volume of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea since the discharge commenced on August 24, 2023, was approx. 109,778 m³ as of the completion of the third discharge in FY2025.

As of September 11, 2025




Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

- Status of discharge of ALPS treated water
- As of September 24, 2025

Measurement object	Requirement and operation target	Measurement results	Compliance with requirement
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 4 points within 3 km of the Power Station)	• Discharge suspension level: 700 Bq/L or less • Investigation level: 350 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on September 23) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 7.2 – 8.4 Bq/L)	○ ○
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 1 point within a 10 km radius of the Power Station)	• Discharge suspension level: 30 Bq/L or less • Investigation level: 20 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on September 22) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 6.4 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Ministry of the Environment] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 3 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	• National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L • WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on September 12) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 8 – 9 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (flounder and others)	-	(Sampled on September 19) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 8.9 Bq/kg)	○
[Fukushima Prefecture] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 9 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	• National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L • WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on September 16) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 3.9 – 4.1 Bq/L)	○ ○

- From August 7 to 25, 2025, the third discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2025 was conducted.
- Regarding the status of sea-area monitoring on handling ALPS treated water, more tritium measurement points for seawater and fish were established near the power station and off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and measurements of tritium and Iodine-129 of seaweed near the power station were added from April 20, 2022. As of September 24, 2025, no significant variation had been detected.
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 4 points within 3 km of the power station, quick measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on September 23 showed concentrations under the lower detection limit (less than 7.2 – 8.4 Bq/L) at all points, which were below the TEPCO operation indices of 700 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 350 Bq/L (investigation level).
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 1 point **within a 10 km radius** of the power station, quick measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on September 22 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 6.4 Bq/L), which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 30 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 20 Bq/L (investigation level).
- The quick measurement results obtained by each organization were as follows:
Ministry of the Environment: The analytical results (obtained via quick measurements) for seawater sampled on September 12 at 3 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 8 - 9 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.
Fisheries Agency: Quick analytical results for tritium in flounder sampled on September 19 showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 8.9 Bq/kg) in all samples.
Fukushima Prefecture: On September 16, tritium concentrations in seawater at 9 sampling points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture below the lower detection limit were recorded (less than 3.9 – 4.1 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

➤ Progress status of handling of zeolite sandbags and others

- Regarding stagnant water in the Process Main Building (PMB) and the High Temperature Incinerator Building (HTI), the stagnant water transfer facility will be installed in the floor sump for treatment. After handling zeolite sandbags, installing a facility to receive stagnant water in Units 1-4 buildings, and implementing α-nuclide measures, the water level will be reduced in preparation for exposing the floor.
- As high-dose zeolite sandbags and others (max. 4,400 mSv/h) were detected on the basement floor of PMB/HTI, centered on underwater collection with which water shielding effect is expected, examination and work towards collection of zeolite sandbags and others in two steps (“accumulation” and “container enclosure”) are underway.
- For accumulation, on-site work commenced from March 2025. In the trial, accumulation of about three rows was almost completed. Conversely, for new on-site knowledge such as detecting new hindrances (fallen lighting equipment and others), a response based on mockup tests is underway.
- For container enclosure, the process of design verification, including mockup tests, continues. Design specifications are almost determined, while for on-site preparation (removal of interferences to secure the first floor area), a prolonged removal period is expected.
- Commencement of the container enclosure will be delayed for about a year, but is now being examined.

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Activities ahead of spent fuel removal from the pool are progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.

➤ Progress of work towards fuel removal at Unit 1

- **Ahead of installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, ground assembly and on-site installation are both underway.**
- In the off-site yard, ground assembly of the **Temporary work platform**, upper and **Bottom frameworks** and box rings was completed. Ground assembly of the moving roof and the overhead crane for rubble removal is underway.
- **On site, the installation of the box rings, exhaust equipment for the large cover, and other facilities is underway.**
- **For Unit 1, rubble inside the large cover will be cleared before fuel removal begins. To mitigate the consequences if the fuel-handling machine's auxiliary hoist falls during rubble clearance, an additional cover was installed over the spent fuel pool (SFP) gate on June 27, 2025.**

- **As a result of the mock-up test, it was confirmed that the SFP gate would remain unaffected even if the auxiliary hoist were to fall onto the additional cover.**
 - **The installation of the large cover makes it difficult to directly inject water from outside, such as by using a concrete pump truck. Therefore, to diversify water injection methods in addition to the existing SFP cooling system, an alternative injection line was installed.**
 - **With waste reduction in mind, the fuel-handling machine that was installed in Unit 4 in 2013 will be sent back to the manufacturer for modification and will be reused for Unit 1.**
 - **For reuse, parts that cannot be reused as they are, or those expected to be discontinued or degraded due to age, will be newly manufactured.**
 - Installing a large cover requires the process to be extended. Given the fact that the detailed dose impact can be confirmed from the operating floor, shielding needs to be added as an additional means of reducing radiation exposure and the work time needs to be reviewed. Work stoppages have become increasingly common due to bad weather, issues with the large cranes used on site, and other factors.
 - **Considering the possibility of future schedule extensions due to similar factors, and taking into account reduced work hours caused by intense summer heat and other factors, the expected completion date for installing the large cover has been revised from around summer 2025 to within FY2025.**
 - For starting fuel removal (FY2027-2028), future timelines can be shortened by revising work procedures and other aspects after rubble removal is completed. Accordingly, the start date currently remains unchanged.
 - To remove rubble effectively, all rubble conditions need to be fully assessed, given ongoing uncertainties in the process. The decision over whether to revise the entire timeline will be considered after the mid-stage of rubble retrieval.
- #### ➤ Progress of work toward fuel removal at Unit 2
- Work to install runway girders, which support the rails to be used when the fuel-handling machine moves between the Reactor Building and the front chamber, was completed.
 - To ensure visibility during fuel removal, a purification system was installed in the spent fuel pool.
 - At present, preparation for installing the fuel-handling machine and cleaning of the cask pit bottom is underway.
 - The fuel-handling machine was transported from the factory on May 21, 2025, carried into the site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on May 24, and hoisted within **Fuel removal work platform** on May 30.
 - The power supply of the fuel-handling equipment was completed on August 20, 2025 and the test to verify the operation of the hydraulic supply unit commenced from August 21.
 - After the operation verification, the test operation of each unit of the fuel-handling equipment will be verified.
 - Progress toward work for the fuel removal to be commenced in FY2026 remains steady at present and work prioritizing safety will proceed.

Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

➤ Management status of rubble and trimmed trees

- As of the end of August 2025, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 412,800 m³ (-400 m³ compared to the end of July with an area-occupation rate of 68%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 68,800 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 39%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 10,500 m³ (+100 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 42%). The total storage volume of radioactive solid waste (incinerated ash and others) was approx. 38,500 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 60%). The decrease in rubble was due to decontamination of flanged tanks, and move for site preparation, etc.

➤ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment

- As of September 4, 2025, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 516 m³ (area-occupation rate: 74%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,483 m³ (area-occupation rate: 92%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for the multi-nuclide removal system and others, was 5,931 (area-occupation rate:

86%).

➤ **Commencement of construction preparatory work for the 11th Solid Waste Storage Facility**

- In the 11th Solid Waste Storage Facility, rubble generated during decommissioning and radioactive solid waste (ash generated from the incinerator and others) will be temporarily stored after being enclosed in containers.
- The 11th Solid Waste Storage Facility comprises the “storage building” which stores waste and the “transportation building” which has a slope for transportation to the storage building.
- Rubble generated during decommissioning and incinerated ash generated from the Radioactive Waste Incinerator and the Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator will be stored after being enclosed in containers.
- During the construction preparatory work, prior to the foundation concrete work of the building, drilling to under the building foundation (to an approx. depth of 10m) is planned.
- Once preparations are complete in early October 2025, work will begin on mountain retaining structures to install supports that prevent ground collapse during drilling. This preparatory construction will continue through the first half of fiscal year 2026, when the main building construction is scheduled to start.
- As part of efforts to eliminate the temporary outdoor storage of solid waste from an early stage, advanced operation will commence in part of the building.

➤ **Removal of hindrances and other works in preparation for installing the waste sludge collection facility**

- The decontamination equipment installed in the Process Main Building was operated from June to September 2011 to treat contaminated water generated after the earthquake. Highly concentrated sludge (concentrated radioactive materials, hereinafter referred to as “waste sludge”) is stored in the agglomeration pit/granulated solidification matter storage (D) (hereinafter referred to as “Storage D”) within the building.
- The Process Main Building is located at elevation T.P. 8.5m. To prevent waste sludge from flowing out due to tsunami undertow—a risk demonstrated during the largest recorded event of 3/11 tsunami—the building entrance and conduit openings have been sealed as a protective countermeasure.
- To prepare for a tsunami exceeding the largest recorded event, waste sludge from Storage D will be extracted, sealed in storage containers, and relocated to higher ground above the assessed tsunami reach level (the T.P. 33.5m area). This measure addresses the risk of tsunamis surpassing the 3/11 event level.
- Waste sludge in Storage D is sucked in by the eductor at the end of the manipulator for waste sludge collection. Once sucked in, the waste sludge is transferred to the temporary waste sludge storage tank inside the outdoor storage unit installed outside the Process Main Building via the booster pump for waste sludge transfer, where it is subject to dehydration treatment by the centrifuge.
- The manipulator for waste sludge collection, the booster pump for waste sludge transfer and the transfer pump will be installed in the upper part of Storage D inside the Process Main Building and on the southwest side of the building. However, since it hinders the decontamination equipment installed after the earthquake, the equipment needs to be removed.
- The main hindrances on the southwest side of the building are the pipes, scaffold and support. To remove pipes installed at elevation, a remote-controlled pipe cutter will be used to reduce dose exposure.
- Hindrances in the upper part of Storage D were removed by September 2023 to allow installation of the manipulator for waste sludge collection. Hindrances in the southwest area of the Process Main Building will be cleared by September 2025 to make way for the booster pump and transfer pipes needed for waste sludge transfer.
- In the next phase, decontamination on the floor of the area (around Storage D), where the waste sludge collection facility will be installed, and the openings of Storage D will be closed.
- After floor decontamination, an environmental dose measurement will be conducted, then utilized to examine the details (installation of shielding, floor decontamination in the southwest area and others) inside the Process Main Building.


Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment


➤ **Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4**

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but increased temporarily from April 2020 and is even currently increasing or declining at a low concentration at observation holes including Nos. 0-1, 0-1-2, 0-2, 0-3-1, 0-3-2 and 0-4. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 1-6 and increasing or declining at low concentration at Nos. 1-8, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12 and 1-14. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing and larger fluctuation was seen at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration of cesium has also remained constant as the overall area but been increasing or declining at observation holes with a low concentration and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations will continue, including to ascertain the impact of rainfall.
- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started to pass from August 30, 2022. It has remained low, despite concentrations of cesium and total β radioactive materials increasing during rainfall. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors were installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard started to pass.
- In the open channel area of the seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite the temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. Regarding the concentration of Cs-137, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Units 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. Regarding the concentration of Sr-90, variation was observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of weather, marine

meteorology and others. During the period for which ALPS treated water was discharged, the tritium concentration increased at the sampling point near the discharge outlet, but this was considered within the assumed range based on the oceanic dispersion simulation results.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>



<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>

Figure 4: Groundwater concentration on the Turbine Building east side




Figure 5: Seawater concentration around the port

Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

Staff management

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from May – July 2025 was approx. 8,900 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), which exceeded the monthly average workforce (approx. 7,700). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in October 2025 (approx. 4,900 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) for the most recent two years were maintained, at approx. 3,600 to 4,900.
- The number of workers from within and outside Fukushima Prefecture remained constant. As of August 2025, the local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) remained constant at around 70%.
- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.16, 2.18 and 2.08 mSv/person-year during FY2022, 2023 and 2024, respectively (The legal exposure dose limits are 100 and 50 mSv/person-year respectively over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose remained sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.




Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers weekday per day for each month of the most recent 2 years (actual values)




Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker (monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

➤ Status of heat stroke cases

- In FY2025, measures to further prevent heat stroke commenced from April to cope with the hottest season.
- In FY2025, eight workers suffered heat stroke due to work up until September 22 (in FY2024, eight workers up until the end of September). An environment encouraging workers to report any feelings of illness will continue to be created and countermeasures will be taken to prevent heat stroke.

➤ Countermeasures for infectious diseases


- Countermeasures for various infectious diseases (influenza, norovirus, COVID-19, etc.) depend on personal decisions and basic countermeasures (visiting medical institutions when feeling unwell, ventilation, avoidance of the “Three Cs”, frequent handwashing, etc.) being implemented appropriately by each worker and TEPCO proceeds with decommissioning while prioritizing safety.

Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

“The highest value” → “the latest value (sampled during September 8 - 22)”¹; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β -ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.

Summary of TEPCO data as of September 23, 2025




Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in () represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

(The latest values sampled during August 18 - September 22)

Summary of TEPCO data as of September 23, 2025

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000



* Due to erosion, the sampling point was moved from approx. 320m south to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet in December 2021. In September 2023, since erosion was eliminated, the sampling point was returned to the original point, approx. 320m south from the south release outlet. Moreover, due to erosion, the sampling point has been moved again to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet since June 11, 2024.

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station <http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html>

Appendix 2
September 25,





1 Contaminated water management

- Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on three basic policies:
 - ① "Removing" the contamination source
 - ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
 - ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 150 m³/day or less (within 2020)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less (within 2025)
- [Completed] Treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed* (within 2020) *except for Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High Temperature Incinerator Building
- [Completed] Stagnant water in Reactor Buildings was reduced to about a half of the level at the end of 2020 (FY2022-FY2024)


Reference 1/6
September 25, 2025
Secretariat of the Team for
Countermeasures for Decommissioning,
Contaminated Water and Treated Water

		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	
Contaminated water management (Remove)	Contaminated water treatment facility	▽ Reception start of contaminated water to Central Waste Treatment Building ▽ Decontamination equipment (AREVA) ▽ Evaporative concentration equipment ▽ Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) ▽ 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)		 Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)		▽ Treatment of RO-condensed salt water complete ▽ Reduction of strontium by Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) (from 2015.1.6) ▽ Reduction of strontium by 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY) (from 2014.12.26)	▽ Treatment start of strontium-reduced water (ALPS: from 2015.12.4, additional: from 2015.5.27, high-performance: from 2015.4.15) ▽ Multi-nuclide Removal System (ALPS) (System A: from 2013.3.30, System B: from 2013.6.13, System C: from 2013.9.27, hot tests conducted) ▽ Multi-nuclide Removal System (additional ALPS) ▽ Multi-nuclide Removal System (high performance ALPS) (from 2014.10.18, hot tests conducted)	▽ Completion of shaft filling ▽ Completion of full-scale operation (from 2017.10.16)		▽ Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete ▽ Purification of strontium-reduced water complete							
	Removal of contaminated water from sewerage pipe trench	 Landing of the second Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)		 Multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS)	▽ Trench Purification by mobile equipment [Removal of contaminated water in sewerage pipe trench]	Unit 2 ▽ Completion of tunnel filling ▽ Transfer of stagnant water complete ▽ Completion of shaft filling (except for upper part of Shaft D) ▽ Completion of tunnel filling ▽ Filling of openings II and III complete ▽ Transfer stagnant water complete ▽ Completion of filling parts running over drainage channel	Unit 3 ▽ Completion of tunnel filling ▽ Transfer of stagnant water complete ▽ Completion of shaft filling (except for upper part of Shaft D) ▽ Completion of tunnel filling ▽ Filling of openings II and III complete ▽ Transfer stagnant water complete ▽ Completion of filling parts running over drainage channel	Unit 4 ▽ Completion of tunnel filling ▽ Transfer of stagnant water complete ▽ Completion of shaft filling (except for upper part of Shaft D) ▽ Completion of tunnel filling ▽ Filling of openings II and III complete ▽ Transfer stagnant water complete ▽ Completion of filling parts running over drainage channel	 Unit 2 sewerage pipe trench Shaft D filling work								
Contaminated water management (Redirect)	Groundwater bypass		▽ Installation start of groundwater bypass		▽ Operation start of groundwater bypass (drainage started from 2014.5.21)												▽ Suppressing the average amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 80 m³/day
	Subdrain	 Pumping well	▽ Recovery of existing subdrain pit and start of new installation ▽ Installation start of Water-Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains			▽ Operation start of subdrain (drainage started from 2015.9.14) (Treatment capacity: 1000 m³/day)		▽ Enhancement of treatment capacity (2000m³/day)									
	Land-side impermeable wall			 Land-side impermeable wall brine (refrigerant) circulation pipe	▽ Installation start of land-side impermeable walls	▽ Freezing start 東側に維持管理運転開始	▽ Freezing completion (except for some parts)	▽ Start of maintenance operation on north and south sides ▽ Freezing completion ▽ Start of maintenance operation in all sections	In some temperature measurement tubes near the K drainage channel cross, temperature exceeded 0°C locally Although no influence was detected on the impermeable function of the land-side impermeable walls but test investigation is underway for the stoppage effect								
	Facing	 Subdrain purification system			▽ Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for around Units 1-4)				▽ Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for around Units 1-4)								
Contaminated water management (Retain)	Bank groundwater measures		▽ Installation start of radioactive materials detected from observation well of bank ▽ Area 2.5m above sea level - Start of ground improvement by water glass ▽ Start of pumping of water from contaminated areas (well point) ▽ Installation start of seaside impermeable walls		▽ Installation of seaside impermeable walls complete ▽ Operation start of groundwater drain (pumping-up started on 2015.11.5)												
	Storage facility	 Storage in steel square tanks  Storage in flanged cylindrical tanks	▽ Water leakage (300L) from flanged tank ▽ Water leakage (100L) from flanged tank ▽ Completion of fence to prevent leakage expanding ▽ Work to raise fence height complete ▽ Leakage of contaminated water from underground reservoir => Start of transfer to tanks ▽ Transfer of contaminated water to tanks complete ▽ Storage in cylindrical steel welded-joint tanks ▽ Sprinkling start of rainwater within tank fences by rainwater treatment facility (from 2014.5.21)	▽ Completion of replacement of RO concentrated salt water ▽ Completion of purification treatment of RO concentrated salt water ▽ Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete ▽ Transfer and storage of all treated water in welded-joint tanks ▽ Purification of strontium-reduced water complete	 Construction of welded-joint tanks	 Placement of seaside impermeable walls complete  Flanged and welded-joint tanks	apt for condensed waste liquid storage tank Commencement of dismantling of J9 area tanks										
Treatment of stagnant water		▽ Installation of stagnant water transfer equipment/transfer start	▽ Completion of work to improve reliability of transfer line (replacement with PE pipes) ▽ Transfer start from each building to Central Re Building	▽ Start to maintain water-level difference with subdrain water level ▽ Floor exposure of Unit 1 T/B ▽ Separation of stagnant water between Units 1 and 2 ▽ Floor exposure of Unit 1 R/B ▽ Separation of stagnant water between Units 3 and 4			▽ Treatment of stagnant water in buildings complete ▽ Floor exposure of Unit 2 T/B, R/B ▽ Floor exposure of Unit 3 T/B, R/B ▽ Floor exposure of Unit 4 R/B, T/B, R/B	▽ Reduction of stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to approx. half of the level at the end of 2020 achieved ▽ Completed lowering to target water level of Unit 2 R/B ▽ Completed lowering to target water level of Units 1, 3 R/B									
	Closure of openings		▽ Examination start of measures to close building openings ▽ Work for common pool complete ▽ Work for Units 1 and 2 T/B complete ▽ Work for HTB building complete				▽ Work for Process Main Building complete ▽ Work for Unit 3 T/B complete	▽ Work for Units 1-3 R/B complete ▽ Work for Units 1-4 R/B was completed									
	Seawall	▽ Installation of outer-sea tsunami seawall complete						▽ Construction start of Chishima Trench Japan Trench tsunami seawall ▽ Completion of installation On-site start	Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall Completion of main wall construction								
Countermeasures to tsunami risks	Mega float							▽ Start of marine construction Temporary grounding of mega float		▽ Internal filling complete (reduction of tsunami risks)							


Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall complete


Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall Main seawall
Unit 4 south side

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.




- Occasions to deepen the understanding are organized by communications related to decommission via various media and visit to the power station.



- On the dedicated website "Treated Water Portal Site" (Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean) within the TEPCO website, monitoring results of radioactive materials are published timely.
- Visit and dialogue meeting of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since 2019 for 13 cities, towns and villages.
- Through various opportunities such as visit and on-site explanations, communications continue where opinions of related parties are heard, their thoughts are taken seriously, and TEPCO conveys its efforts, thoughts, and countermeasures for reputational damage.

Tritiated Water Taskforce (2013.12 – 2016.5, 15 meetings)



• Flounders and abalones that were being raised in normal seawater were put in “water discharged into the environment” and TEPCO confirmed that there was no remarkable change in the growth of the flounders or abalones around this time. Flounder and abalone were reared in water discharged into the environment for approximately six months and we confirmed that there is no change in the growth of them.

The Comprehensive Report on the safety review concerning handling of ALPS treated water was published by the IAEA on July 4, 2023.

In the Executive Summary of the IAEA Comprehensive Report, the IAEA concluded the following: (1) the activities by Japan associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

We will continue to share necessary information with the IAEA, while striving to foster further understanding of the international community about the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

<https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-alps-treated-water-discharge-comprehensive-reports>




3 Removal of fuel from spent pool

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

- Completion of Units 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)
- Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023), start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)
- Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026)

Reference 3/6
September 25, 2025
Secretariat of the Team for
Countermeasures for Decommissioning,
Contaminated Water and Treated Water



* Part of the photo is corrected because it includes machine information related to nuclear material protection

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)


Commencement of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (From September 10, 2024, trial fuel debris retrieval commenced)

Reference 4/6
September 25, 2025
Secretariat of the Team for
Countermeasures for Decommissioning,
Contaminated Water and Treated Water


Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

Unit 1 Investigation overview

- In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore: $\phi 100$ mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



In February 2022, "the guide ring" was installed to facilitate the investigation. From March 28, 2023, the investigation inside the pedestal by ROV-A2 started and confirmed that a portion of the bar arrangement was exposed. Regarding the soundness of the pedestal, based on the past earthquake resistant evaluation by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), it was evaluated that even though a portion of the pedestal was lost, there would be no serious risk. However, as the present information is very limited, the investigation will continue to acquire as much information as possible for continued evaluation.




Unit 1 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.10)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	2nd (2015.4)	- Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	3rd (2017.3)	- Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (From 2022.2)	- Acquiring information inside PCV (inside/outside of the pedestal) - Acquiring images - Measuring deposit thickness and sampling deposit - Detecting deposit debris, 3D mapping
Leakage points from PCV	- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11)	
<u>Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons</u> Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)		

Unit 2 Investigation overview

- In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.
- In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.



- In October 2020, a deposits contact investigation at the PCV penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck.


From September 10, 2024, the end tool of the telescopic equipment passed through the isolation valve, and the trial fuel debris retrieval commenced. On October 30, fuel debris was gripped with the end tool, on November 2, the guide pipe was pulled off, and the telescopic equipment was stored in the enclosure. On November 7, fuel debris was carried out from the hatch on a side of the enclosure, and the trial retrieval was completed.

Unit 2 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature
	2nd (2012.3)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature - Measuring the dose rate
	3rd (2013.2 – 2014.6)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (2017.1-2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	5th (2018.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	6th (2019.2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature - Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit
Leakage points from PCV	- No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C	
<u>Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons</u> The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)		

Unit 3 Investigation overview

- In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, were investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.
- In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.




Unit 3 PCV internal investigation


Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2015.10-12)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2015.12)
	2nd (2017.7)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8)
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5)	
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9)		

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Eliminating temporary outdoor storage of rubble and others * Except for secondary waste of water treatment and materials for reuse or recycling (within FY2028)



● Solid Waste Storage Management Plan for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Revision in December 2024)



- The exposure dose at the site boundaries will be reduced by aggregation to indoor storage and eliminating outdoor storage.
- The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.

6 Improvement of work environment

Reference 6/6
September 25, 2025
Secretariat of the Team for
Countermeasures for Decommissioning,
Contaminated Water and Treated Water

While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

Regarding the site-wide reduction in the radiation dose and prevention of contamination spreading, the radiation dose on site was reduced by removal of rubble, topsoil and facing. Moreover, the operation was improved to use environmentally-improved areas as a Green Zone, within which workers are allowed to wear general work clothes and disposable dust-protective masks which are less of a physical burden.

