Main decommissioning work and steps

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed in December 2014 at Unit 4 and started from April 15, 2019 at Unit 3. Dust concentration in the surrounding environment is being monitored and work is being implemented with safety first. Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.

Contaminated water management proceeds with the following three efforts:

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

[Three basic policies]
1. “Remove” the source of water contamination
2. “Redirect” fresh water from contaminated areas
3. “Retain” contaminated water from leakage

(2) Efforts to complete contaminated water treatment

4. Treatment of contaminated water in buildings
5. Measures to remove α-nuclide and reduce the concentration in contaminated water
6. Measures to alleviate the radiation dose of Zeolite sandbags in the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building and examine safe management methods

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

7. Planning and implementing necessary measures to prepare for large-scale disasters such as tsunami and heavy rain
8. Periodically inspecting and updating facilities to maintain the effect of contaminated water management going forward
9. Examining additional measures as required, with efforts to gradually expand the scale of fuel debris retrieval

Outline of Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Management

Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment

August 27, 2020

Units 1 & 2

Fuel Removal from SFP

Rubble removal & dose reduction
Installing fuel removal machine
Fuel removal
Storage and handling

Fuel Debris Retrieval

Ascertaining the status inside the PCV/examining the fuel debris retrieval method, etc. (Note 2)

Dismantling Facilities

Scenario development & technology consideration
Design and manufacturing of devices / equipment
Dismantling

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

Red: (1) Promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies
Blue: (2) Complete contaminated water treatment
Green: (3) Stably operate contaminated water management

(2) Efforts to complete contaminated water treatment

- Strontium-treated water from other equipment is being re-treated in the multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS)
- Contaminated water levels in buildings declined as planned and connected parts between Units 1 and 2 and 3 and 4
- For Zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building, measures to reduce the radiation dose are being examined with stabilization in mind.

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- To prepare for tsunamis, measures including closing building openings, installing sea walls and transferring and grounding the mega float are being implemented. For heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to enhance drainage channels and other measures are being implemented as planned.

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool started from April 15, 2019 at Unit 3. With the aim of completing fuel removal by the end of FY2020, rubble and fuel are being removed.

Removed fuel (assemblies) 315/566
(As of August 27, 2020)

(1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident.
Progress status

The temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Units 1-3 have been maintained within the range of approx. 20-40°C over the past month. There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.

1. The values varied somewhat, depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.
2. In July 2020, the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings was evaluated at less than 0.0005 mSv/year at the site boundary. The annual radiation dose from natural radiation is approx. 2.1 mSv/year (average in Japan).

Toward installation of support to the Unit 1 FHM

Before removing the fallen roof on the south side and other objects, to minimize the risk of the overhead crane/ fuel-handling machine shifting, becoming imbalanced and subsequently falling, materials to support the fuel-handling machine (FHM) from below will be installed. For the FHM, preparation will start from September and the installation will be completed within October.

Cutting of obstacles inside the PCV toward insertion of a robot to investigate inside Unit 1

As part of efforts to investigate inside the Unit 1 Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), work to cut obstacles inside the PCV on the route for the investigation equipment started from May 26.

For the defect of the abrasive supply part having occurred on July 7, the nozzle unit was replaced and the lack of any abnormality was confirmed. Work resumed from August 2 and cutting of the grating was completed on August 25.

Cutting of obstacles will continue.

Completion of mega float grounding to reduce the tsunami risk

To reduce the risk of floating due to tsunamis, work is being implemented to transfer the mega float to the inside of the Unit 1-4 open channel and utilize it as a bank.

Filling mortar into the mega float started from April and its grounding was completed on August 3. This work reduced the risk of floating due to tsunamis.

Treatment completion of temporarily stored Sr-treated water

Treatment of Sr-treated water temporarily stored while awaiting treatment of multi-nuclide removal equipment and other facilities was completed on August 8, except for operation tanks necessary to treat the contaminated water generated daily.

Following the completed treatment of Sr-treated water, performance verification of secondary treatment will commence from September 2020 for water treated by the multi-nuclide removal equipment or other facilities and its sum of concentration ratios required by law*, except for tritium, is 100 or more (approx. 2,000 mCi). The performance verification will involve checking that the sum of concentration ratios required by law, except for tritium, is reduced to less than 1 following treatment by multi-nuclide removal equipment or other facilities. The procedures and process of nuclide analysis and others will also be reconfirmed.

Test to suspend water injection into the Unit 2 reactor (flash report)

For Unit 2, a test to suspend water injection for about eight hours was conducted in FY2019 to optimize the emergency response procedures. A test to suspend water injection was also conducted for longer (period: August 17-20 (about 74 hours)) to verify the reproducibility of the temperature evaluation model while suspending water injection to the reactor and examine how best to inject water in future.

During the suspension period, temperatures at the RPV bottom and PCV increased by about 11.5 and 0.5°C respectively, showing variation almost within the assumed range.

Ongoing Unit 3 fuel removal proceeding steadily

Since the resumption on May 26, the fuel removal has progressed steadily and 315 of 566 fuel assemblies were removed.

At the same time, rubble removal also proceeded steadily. On August 24, a lifting test was conducted for one fuel assembly with a deformed handle, which was excluded from the previous lifting test in May, and one fuel assembly, with which a deformed handle was detected after the previous lifting test. Based on the test results, it was confirmed that all fuel assemblies could be lifted.

* The sum of concentration ratios calculated to the concentration limits required by law as specified for each radioactive material.
Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8.)

Data (10-minute values) of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the airborne radiation rate around site boundaries showed 0.385 – 1.249 μSv/h (August 1 - 25, 2020).

We improved the measurement conditions of monitoring posts 2 to 8 to measure the air-dose rate precisely. Construction work, such as tree-clearing, surface soil removal and shield wall setting, were implemented from February 10 to April 18, 2012. Therefore, monitoring results at these points are lower than elsewhere in the power plant site.

The radiation shielding panels around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose at the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10 - 11, 2013, since further deforestation, etc. had caused the surrounding radiation dose to decline significantly.

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The radiation shielding panels around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose at the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10 - 11, 2013, since further deforestation, etc. had caused the surrounding radiation dose to decline significantly.
I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

1. Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained within the range of approx. 20 to 40°C for the past month, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.

![Temperature Data](image)

RPV bottom temperatures (recent quarter)

![Temperature Data](image)

PCV gas phase temperatures (recent quarter)

* The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.

2. Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of July 2020, the concentration of the radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 2.4×10^-12 Bq/cm² and 2.1×10^-12 Bq/cm² for Cs-134 and Cs-137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00005 mSv/year.

![Radioactivity Data](image)

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Buildings 1-4

* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
  - (Cs-134) 2×10^-11 Bq/cm²
  - (Cs-137) 3×10^-11 Bq/cm²
* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MPR):
  - Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MPR): measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.385 – 2.49 μSv/h (August 1 - 25, 2020).

To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP1-MPR more accurately, work to improve the environment (planting trees, removing surface soil, and shielding around the MP1-MPR) was completed.

3. Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown condition or critically sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

1. Contaminated water management

*Based on the three basic policies: “remove” the source of water contamination, “redirect” fresh water from contaminated areas and “retain” contaminated water from leakage, multi-layered contaminated water management measures have been implemented to stably control groundwater.

![Contaminated Water Data](image)

Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered measures, including pumping up by subdrains and land-side impermeable walls, which were implemented to control the continued generation of contaminated water, suppressed the groundwater inflow into buildings.
- After “redirecting” measures (groundwater bypass, subdrains, land-side impermeable walls and others) were steadily implemented, the amount generated declined from approx. 470 m³/day (the FY2014 average) when the measures were first launched to approx. 180 m³/day (the FY2019 average).
- Measures will continue to further reduce the volume of contaminated water generated.

![Contaminated Water Data](image)

Operation of the groundwater bypass

- From April 9, 2014, the operation of 12 groundwater bypass pumping wells commenced sequentially to pump up groundwater. The release then started from May 21, 2014, in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until August 26, 2020, 578,819 m³ of groundwater had been released. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- Pumps are inspected and cleaned as required based on their operational status.

![Contaminated Water Data](image)

Operation of the Water Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains

- To reduce the level of groundwater flowing into the buildings, work began to pump up groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings on September 3, 2015. The pumped-up groundwater was then purified at dedicated facilities and released from September 14, 2015, in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until August 26, 2020, a total of 961,702 m³ had been drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- Due to the rising level of the groundwater drain pond after the sea-side impermeable walls had been closed, pumping started on November 5, 2015. Up until August 26, 2020, a total of approx. 247,186 m³ had been pumped up and a volume of under 10 m³/day is being transferred from the groundwater drain to the Turbine Buildings (average for the period July 23 – August 19, 2020).
- As one of the multi-layered contaminated-water management measures, in addition to a waterproof pavement that...
aims to prevent rainwater infiltrating, facilities to enhance the subdrain treatment system were installed and went into operation from April 2018, increasing the treatment capacity from 900 to 1,500 m³/day and improving reliability. Operational efficiency was also improved to treat up to 2,000 m³/day for almost one week during the peak period.

- To maintain the groundwater level, work to install additional subdrain pits and recover those existing is underway. The additional pits are scheduled to start operation sequentially, from pits for which work is completed (12 of 14 new subdrain pits went into operation). To recover existing pits, work for all three pits scheduled was completed and all went into operation from December 26, 2018. Work to recover another pit started from November 2019 (No. 49 pit).
- To eliminate the need to suspend water pumping while cleaning the subdrain transfer pipe, the pipe will be duplicated. Installation of the pipe and ancillary facilities was completed.
- Since the subdrains went into operation, the inflow to buildings tended to decline to under 150 m³/day when the subdrain water level declined below T.P. 3.0 m but increased during rainfall.

Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 subdrains

### Implementation status of facing

- Facing is a measure that covers the ground surface onsite with asphalt to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater infiltrating into the ground and decrease the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of July 2020, 94% of the planned area (1,450,000 m² onsite) had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, implementation proceeds appropriately after constructing a yard from implementable zones that do not affect the decommissioning work. As of the end of July 2020, 12% of the planned area (60,000 m²) had been completed.

### Construction status of the land-side impermeable walls and status of groundwater levels around the buildings

- An operation to maintain the land-side impermeable walls and prevent the frozen soil from thickening further continued from May 2017 on the north and south sides and started from November 2017 on the east side, where sufficiently thick frozen soil was identified. The scope of the maintenance operation was expanded in March 2018.
- In March 2018, construction of the land-side impermeable walls was completed, except for a portion of the depth, based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference in internal and external water levels increased to approx. 4-5 m. The 21st Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated-Water Treatment, held on March 7, 2018, evaluated that alongside the function of subdrains and other measures, a water-level management system to stably control groundwater and redirect groundwater from the buildings had been established and allowed the amount of contaminated water generated to be reduced significantly.
- A supplementary method was implemented for the unfrozen depth and it was confirmed that the temperature of this portion had declined below 0°C by September 2018. From February 2019, a maintenance operation started throughout all sections.

- The groundwater level in the area inside the land-side impermeable walls has been declining every year. On the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside was maintained, despite varying during rainfall. The water level of the groundwater drain observation well has been maintained at approx. T.P.+1.5 m, sufficiently below the ground surface (T.P. 2.5 m).

![Figure 3: Closure parts of the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side)](image)

**Operation of multi-nuclide removal equipment**

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing and high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water are underway (for existing equipment, System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013; and for high-performance equipment, from October 18, 2014). The additional multi-nuclide removal equipment went into full-scale operation from October 16, 2017.
- As of August 20, 2020, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 454,000, 678,000 and 103,000 m³, respectively (including approx. 9,500 m³ stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with highly concentrated radioactive materials at the System B outlet of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).
- To reduce the risks of strontium-treated water, treatment using existing, additional, and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment has been underway (existing: from December 4, 2015; additional: from May 27, 2015; high-performance: from April 15, 2015). Up until August 20, 2020, approx. 756,000 m³ had been treated.

**Toward reducing the risk of contaminated water stored in tanks**

- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-absorption apparatus (KURION) (from January 6, 2015), the secondary cesium-absorption apparatus (SARRY) (from December 26, 2014) and the third cesium-absorption apparatus (SARRY II) (from July 12, 2019) are underway. Up until August 20, 2020, approx. 602,000 m³ had been treated.

**Measures in the Tank Area**

- Rainwater accumulates and is collected inside the area of contaminated-water tanks. After removing radionuclides, the rainwater is sprinkled on the ground of the site, if the radioactivity level does not meet the standard for discharging into the environment since May 21, 2014 (as of August 25, 2020, a total of 162,922 m³).
Completion of mega float grounding to reduce the tsunami risk
- To reduce the risk of floating due to tsunamis, work is being implemented to transfer the mega float to the inside of the Unit 1-4 open channel and utilize it as a bank.
- Filling mortar into the mega float started from April and its grounding was completed on August 3. This work reduced the risk of floating due to tsunamis.

Treatment completion of temporarily stored Sr-treated water
- Treatment of Sr-treated water temporarily stored while awaiting treatment of multi-nuclide removal equipment and other facilities was completed on August 8, except for operation tanks necessary to treat contaminated water generated daily.
- Following the completed treatment of Sr-treated water, performance verification of secondary treatment will commence from September 2020 for water treated by the multi-nuclide removal equipment or other facilities and its sum of concentration ratios required by law, except for tritium, is 100 or more (approx. 2,000 m$^3$). The performance verification will involve checking that the sum of concentration ratios, excluding tritium, is reduced to less than 1 following treatment by the multi-nuclide removal equipment or other facilities. The procedures and process of nuclide analysis and others will also be reconfirmed.

2. Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools
Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety. The removal of spent fuel from the Unit 4 pool commenced on November 18, 2013 and was completed by December 22, 2014

Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 1
- From March 18, 2019, the removal of small rubble in the east-side area around the spent fuel pool (SFP) started using pliers and suction equipment, while small rubble removal on the south side of the SFP started from July 9.
- The well plug, which was considered misaligned from the normal position due to the influence of the hydrogen explosion at the time of the accident, was investigated for the period July 17 – August 26, 2019, by taking photos with a camera, measuring the air dose rate and collecting 3D images.
- A prior investigation on September 27, 2019 confirmed the lack of any obstacle which may affect the plan to install the cover over the SFP, the absence of any heavy object such as a concrete block, as detected in Unit 3 and the fact that panel- and bar-shaped rubble pieces were scattered on the rack.
- After examining two methods: (i) installing a cover after rubble removal and (ii) initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building and then removing rubble inside the cover, method (ii) was selected to ensure safer and more secure removal.
- Before removing the fallen roof on the south side and other objects, to minimize the risk of the overhead crane/fuel-handling machine shifting, becoming imbalanced and subsequently falling, materials to support the fuel-handling machine from below will be installed. For the installation, preparation will start from September and the work will be completed within October.
- Rubble removal and other work will proceed steadily with safety first, toward starting fuel removal during the period FY2027 to FY2028.

Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 2
- On November 6, 2018, before investigating with a work plan to dismantle the Reactor Building rooftop and other tasks in mind, work to move and contain the remaining objects on the operating floor (1st round) was completed.
- On February 1, 2019, an investigation to measure the radiation dose on the floor, walls and ceiling inside the operating floor and confirm the contamination status was completed. After analyzing the investigative results, the "contamination concentration distribution" throughout the entire operating floor was obtained, based on which the air dose rate inside the operating floor could be evaluated. A shielding design and measures to prevent radioactive material scattering will be examined.
- From April 8, 2019, work to move and contain the remaining objects on the operating floor (second round) started,
such as materials and equipment which may hinder installation of the fuel-handling facility and other work. The second round mainly included moving the remaining small objects and placing them in the container. It also included cleaning the floor to suppress dust scattering and was completed on August 21.

- From September 10, 2019, work got underway to move and contain the remaining objects on the operating floor (third round), such as materials and equipment which may hinder the installation of the fuel-handling facility and other work. The third round mainly included moving the remaining large objects and placing them in the container.

- After completing the training to practice work skills for transportation, preparatory work inside the operating floor started from July 20, 2020. Containers housing the remaining objects during the previous work will be transported to the solid waste storage facility from August 26.

- For fuel removal methods, based on the investigative results inside the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019, a method to access from a small opening installed on the south side of the building was selected with aspects such as dust management and lower work exposure in mind (the method previously examined had involved fully dismantling the upper part of the building).

- **Main process to help fuel removal at Unit 3**

  - From April 15, 2019, work got underway to remove 514 spent fuel assemblies and 52 non-irradiated fuel assemblies (566 in total) stored in the spent fuel pool. Seven non-irradiated fuel assemblies were then loaded into the transportation cask and transported to the common pool on April 23. The first fuel removal was completed on April 25.

  - The periodical inspection of the fuel-handling facility, which started on July 24, 2019, was completed on September 2, 2019. Some defective rotations of the tensile truss and mast were detected during the following adjustment work toward resumption of the fuel removal. In response, parts were replaced and the operation checked to confirm no problem.

  - Fuel removal work was resumed from December 23, 2019 and has proceeded as planned.

  - By February 14, 2020, a visual check of all fuel handles was completed.

  - The inspection of the fuel-handling machine and other equipment and additional training for added workers, which had been conducted since March 30, 2020, were completed without issue by May 23, whereupon fuel removal resumed from May 26. At present, 315 of 566 fuel assemblies have been removed. Removal work has progressed steadily with 25 assemblies remaining, for which rubble needs to be removed from the fuel top.

  - At the same time, rubble removal also proceeded steadily. On August 24, a lifting test was conducted for one fuel assembly with a deformed handle, which was excluded from the previous lifting test in May, and one fuel assembly, with which a deformed handle was detected after the previous lifting test. Based on the test results it was confirmed that both fuel assemblies could be lifted.

  - Fuel removal continues and matters confirmed during rubble removal and the issue related to the handling of fuel assemblies with deformed handles will be addressed according to a plan to complete fuel removal by the end of FY2020.

3. Retrieval of fuel debris

- **Status of obstacle cutting work related to the Unit 1 PCV inside investigation**

  - As part of efforts to investigate inside the Unit 1 Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), work to cut obstacles inside the PCV on the route for the investigation equipment started from May 26.

  - For the defect of the abrasive supply part having occurred on July 7, the nozzle unit was replaced, and the lack of any abnormality was confirmed. Work was resumed from August 2 and cutting of the grating was completed on August 25. Cutting of obstacles will continue.

- **Status of water sampling from the Unit 3 suppression chamber**

  - To reduce the water level in the Unit 3 PCV in a phased manner, water sampling inside the suppression chamber started on July 21 to determine the water quality. To reduce exposure during the work, any dose increase around the sampling equipment was suppressed and the water was sampled several times from late July.

- Based on the sampling results obtained to date that showed relatively high concentration from the initial stage, the water quality is assumed to be similar to that of water in the suppression chamber targeted for this analysis. Work will continue taking the reduction of exposure dose into consideration and water sampling, analysis and water release will be completed within September based on future dose measurement and analytical results.

4. Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

**Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste**

- **Management status of the rubble and trimmed trees**

  - As of the end of July 2020, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 297,700 m³ (+1,600 m³ compared to the end of June with an area-occupation rate of 72%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 134,400 m³ (slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 77%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 35,800 m² (+2,000 m², with an area-occupation rate of 52%). The increase in rubble was mainly attributable to rubble removal around the Unit 1-4 buildings and transfer of general waste and area arrangement within the site, while the decrease in used protective clothing was attributable to the incinerator operation.

- **Management status of secondary waste from water treatment**

  - As of August 6, 2020, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 421 m³ (area-occupation rate: 60%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,380 m³ (area-occupation rate: 91%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment and other vessels, was 4,886 (area-occupation rate: 77%).

5. Reactor cooling

**The cold shutdown condition will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring will continue**

- **Ventilation check of the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel nitrogen injection line**

  - The Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) nitrogen injection point is a single configuration. To improve the reliability of the Unit 2 nitrogen injection line, there are plans to install an additional line.

  - To select an additional line taking the ventilation, maintainability and other related factors of nitrogen injection into consideration, the ventilation of four candidate lines for the new injection point will be checked from August 31 to September 4.

  - This check will include nitrogen injection from each new candidate injection point to examine (1) the pressure increase rate of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), (2) ventilation conditions and (3) the maximum injection capacity.

  - The ventilation check can be conducted while leaving the existing RPV nitrogen injection rate and the exhaust rate of the existing PCV gas control system unchanged.

- **Results of the test to suspend water injection into Unit 2 reactors (flash report)**

  - For Unit 2, a test to suspend water injection for about eight hours was conducted in FY2019 to optimize the emergency response procedures.

  - A test to suspend water injection was also conducted for a longer period (period: August 17-20 (about 74 hours)) to verify the reproducibility of the temperature evaluation model while suspending water injection to the reactor and examine how best to inject water in future.

  - During the suspension period, temperatures at the RPV bottom and PCV increased by about 11.5 and 0.5°C respectively, showing variation almost within the assumed range.

6. Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

**Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment**
Status of groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining. The concentration of total β radioactive materials had remained constant overall but increased temporarily from April. The trend will continue to be monitored.
- In the area between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It increased temporarily at No. 1-14 but is currently declining and remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant at many observation holes overall, though temporarily increasing at No. 1-11.
- In the area between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained almost constant or been declining, though it has been increasing or decreasing at No. 2-3. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has been increasing at No. 2-3 located on the east side of No. 2-5 at the highest location.
- In the area between Unit 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has also remained constant or been declining overall, though it increased at No. 3-4 in June but was lower compared to No. 3-3.
- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant, despite increasing during rainfall.
- In the Units 1-4 open channel area of seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radionuclides in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit, despite increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 noted during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 has remained slightly higher in front of the south side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radionuclides in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit, despite increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected.

7. Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

- Staff management
  - The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from April to June 2020 was approx. 8,900 (TEPCO and partner company workers), which exceeded the monthly average number of actual workers (approx. 6,300). Accordingly, sufficient personnel are registered to work on site.
  - It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in September 2020 (approx. 4,000 per day; TEPCO and partner company workers) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 3,400 to 4,400 since FY2018 (see Figure 7).
The number of workers from both within and from outside Fukushima Prefecture remained constant. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of July 2020 also remained constant at around 65%.

- The monthly average exposure doses of workers remained at approx. 0.22, 0.20 and 0.21 mSv/month during FY2017, FY2018 and FY2019, respectively. (Reference: Average annual exposure dose of 20 mSv/year ≈ 1.7 mSv/month)

- For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.

- In FY2020, four workers suffered heat stroke due to work up until August 24 (in FY2019, eight workers up until the end of August). Continued measures will be taken to prevent heat stroke.

- COVID-19 infectious disease prevention countermeasures at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
  - At the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS), countermeasures continue to be implemented according to the local infection status to prevent the COVID-19 infection spreading, such as requiring employees to take their temperature prior to coming to the office, wear masks at all times and avoid the "Three Cs" (Closed spaces, Crowded places, Close-contact settings) by shift-use of the rest house, etc.
  - As of August 25, 2020, no TEPCO HD employees or cooperative firm laborers of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS had contracted COVID-19 and no significant influence on decommissioning work, such as a delay to the work processes, was identified.

- Status of heat stroke cases
  - Measures to further prevent heat stroke commenced from April 2020 to cope with the hottest season.

- Request for cooperation to the survey to improve the work environment
  - With the aim of improving the work environment for workers at the power station, an annual survey is being conducted. Distribution of the 11th survey questionnaire sheet will start sequentially from August 27, 2020.
  - The answers will be collected by the end of September 2020 and the results will be compiled in December 2020.
  - This survey includes a new question related to the COVID-19 infectious disease prevention countermeasures for the rest house. In addition, questions related to the usability of the emergency room (ER) are changed to those asking about the awareness of ER and whether or not the workers will use the ER.
Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

"The highest value" → "the latest value (sampled during August 17-24)"; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit


**Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.25) Below 1/10**
Cesium-137: 9.0 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.27) Below 1/30
Total β: 74 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(14) Below 1/5
Tritium: 67 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.7) Below 1/30

**Cesium-134: 4.4 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.27) Below 1/10**
Cesium-137: 10 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.35) Below 1/20
Total β: 60 (2013/ 7/ 4) → ND(14) Below 1/4
Tritium: 59 (2013/ 8/19) → 2.6 Below 1/20

**Cesium-134: 5.0 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.35) Below 1/10**
Cesium-137: 8.4 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.33) Below 1/20
Total β: 69 (2013/8/19) → ND(14) Below 1/4
Tritium: 52 (2013/8/19) → 2.9 Below 1/10

**Cesium-134: 2.8 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.41) Below 1/6**
Cesium-137: 5.8 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.60) Below 1/9
Total β: 46 (2013/8/19) → ND(14) Below 1/3
Tritium: 24 (2013/8/19) → 4.9 Below 1/4

**Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.52) Below 1/6**
Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) → ND(0.47) Below 1/10
Total β: 69 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(13) Below 1/5
Tritium: 68 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

**Cesium-134: 3.5 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.36) Below 1/9**
Cesium-137: 7.8 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.36) Below 1/20
Total β: 79 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(14) Below 1/5
Tritium: 60 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.7) Below 1/30

**Cesium-134: 32 (2013/10/11) → ND(0.50) Below 1/60**
Cesium-137: 73 (2013/10/11) → 2.2 Below 1/30
Total β: 320 (2013/ 8/ 12) → ND(13) Below 1/20
Tritium: 510 (2013/ 9/ 2) → 5.6 Below 1/90

From February 11, 2017, the location of the sampling point was shifted approx. 50 m south of the previous point due to the location shift of the silt fence.

Summary of TEPCO data as of August 25, 2020

**Note:** The Total β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.
Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Cesium-134</th>
<th>Cesium-137</th>
<th>Total β</th>
<th>Tritium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast side of port entrance (offshore 1km)</td>
<td>ND (2013) → ND (0.85)</td>
<td>ND (2013) → ND (0.71)</td>
<td>ND (2013) → 12</td>
<td>ND (2013) → 0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East side of port entrance (offshore 1km)</td>
<td>Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.73)</td>
<td>Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.69)</td>
<td>Total β: ND (2013) → ND (11)</td>
<td>Tritium: 4.7 (2013/8/18) → ND (0.97) Below 1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast side of port entrance (offshore 1km)</td>
<td>Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.73)</td>
<td>Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.69)</td>
<td>Total β: ND (2013) → ND (11)</td>
<td>Tritium: 6.4 (2013/10/18) → ND (0.97) Below 1/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North side of north breakwater (offshore 0.5km)</td>
<td>Cesium-134: 1.8 (2013/6/21) → ND (0.74) Below 1/2</td>
<td>Cesium-137: 4.5 (2013/3/17) → ND (0.72) Below 1/6</td>
<td>Total β: 12 (2013/12/23) → 13</td>
<td>Tritium: 8.6 (2013/6/26) → 1.3 Below 1/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet</td>
<td>Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) → ND (0.52) Below 1/6</td>
<td>Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) → ND (0.47) Below 1/10</td>
<td>Total β: 69 (2013/8/19) → ND (13) Below 1/5</td>
<td>Tritium: 68 (2013/8/19) → ND (1.8) Below 1/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South side of south breakwater (offshore 0.5km)</td>
<td>Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.80)</td>
<td>Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.67)</td>
<td>Total β: ND (2013) → 16</td>
<td>Tritium: ND (2013) → 0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near south release outlet</td>
<td>Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.80)</td>
<td>Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.67)</td>
<td>Total β: ND (2013) → 16</td>
<td>Tritium: ND (2013) → 0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Total β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

Sea side impermeable wall
Silt fence
Silt fence for construction

Note: Because safety of the sampling points was unassured due to the influence of Typhoon No. 10 in 2016, samples were taken from approx. 330 m south of the Unit 1-4 release outlet. Samples were also taken from a point approx. 280m south from the same release outlet from January 27, 2017 and approx. 320m from March 23, 2018.

Summary of TEPCO data as of August 25, 2020

Progress toward decommissioning: Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP)

**Unit 1**

Toward fuel removal from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, investigations have been implemented to ascertain the conditions of the fallen roof on the south side and the contamination of the well plug. Based on the results of these investigations, the method to initially install a large cover over the Reactor Building and then remove rubble inside the cover was selected to ensure a safer and more secure removal. Work continues to complete installation of a large cover by around FY2023 and start fuel removal from FY2027 to FY2028.

<Reference> Progress to date

Rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 2018 and has been implemented sequentially. In July and August 2019, the well plug, which was misaligned from its normal position, was investigated and in August and September, the conditions of the overhead crane were checked. Based on the results of these investigations, as the removal requires more careful work taking dust scattering into consideration, two methods were examined: installing a cover after rubble removal and initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building and then removing rubble inside the cover.

installation of domes started from January 2018 and has been implemented sequentially. In July and August 2019, the well plug, which was misaligned from its normal position, was investigated and in August and September, the conditions of the overhead crane were checked. Based on the results of these investigations, as the removal requires more careful work taking dust scattering into consideration, two methods were examined: installing a cover after rubble removal and initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building and then removing rubble inside the cover.

**Unit 2**

Toward fuel removal from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, based on findings from internal operating floor investigations from November 2018 to February 2019, instead of fully dismantling the upper part of the building, the decision was made to install a small opening over the Reactor Building and then removing rubble inside the pool. Work on the opening was completed in January 2019. Following this, the opening was widened and fuel removal investigations from November 2018 to February 2019 underlined the potential to conduct limited work there and the means of accessing from the south side had been examined.

<Reference> Progress to date

Previously, potential to recover the existing overhead crane and the fuel handling machine was examined. However, the high radiation dose inside the operating floor meant the decision was taken to dismantle the upper part of the building in November 2015. Findings from internal investigations of the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019 underlined the potential to conduct limited work there and the means of accessing from the south side had been examined.

**Unit 3**

Prior to the installation of a cover for fuel removal, removal of large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training of remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine which will be installed on site (February – December 2015). Measures to reduce dose on the Reactor Building top floor (decontamination, shielding) were completed in December 2016. Installation of a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine is underway from January 2017. Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.

Toward fuel removal, the rubble retrieval training inside the pool, which was scheduled in conjunction with fuel removal training, started from March 15, 2019, and started fuel removal from April 15, 2019.

**Unit 4**

In the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap, the target of Phase 1 involved commencing fuel removal from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completion of Step 2 by December 2013. On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, or the 1st Unit, commenced and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.

On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing work to fuel removal, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (2 of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)

This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building. Based on this experience, fuel assemblies will be removed from Unit 1-3 pools.

* A part of the photo is corrected because it includes sensitive information related to physical protection.

Common pool

Storage area

An open space will be maintained in the common pool (Transfer to the temporary cask custody area)

Fuel removal status

(April 15, 2019)

Fuel removal status

(August 27, 2020)

Reference

Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment

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Investigation into TIP Room of the Unit 1 Reactor Building

- To improve the environment for future investigations inside the PCV, etc., an investigation was conducted from September 24 to October 2, 2015 at the TIP Room (*1). (Due to high dose around the entrance to the TIP Room, the investigation of dose rate and contamination distribution was conducted through a hole drilled from the sidewalk of the Turbine Building, where the dose was low)
- The investigative results identified high dose at X-31 to 33 penetrations (*2) (instrumentation penetration) and low dose at other parts.
- As it was confirmed that work inside the TIP room would be available, the next step will include identification of obstacles which will interfere the work inside the TIP Room and formulation of a plan for dose reduction.

Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]
- In April 2015, a device, which entered the inside of the PCV through a narrow access opening (bore: φ100 mm), collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, the investigation using a self-propelled investigation device, conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, took images of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The status inside the PCV will continue to be examined based on the collected image and dose data.

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of the Unit 1 Suppression Chamber (S/C(*3))

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of Unit 1 S/C from May 27, 2014 from one expansion joint cover among the lines installed there. As no leakage was identified from other parts, specific methods will be examined to halt the flow of water and repair the PCV.

Notes:
- (*1) TIP (Traversing In-core Probe)
- (*2) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV
- (*3) S/C (Suppression Chamber): Suppression pool, used as the water source for the emergent core cooling system.
- (*4) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)
- (*6) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)

<Image of investigation inside the PCV>

<Image of the S/C upper part investigation>

<Image of hanging of dosimeter and camera>

<Image near the bottom>

Capuring the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Evaluation results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb - May 2015</td>
<td>Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<Image of investigation inside the PCV>
Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Immediate target
Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Installation of an RPV thermometer and permanent PCV supervisory instrumentation

1. Replacement of the RPV thermometer
   - As the thermometer installed at the Unit 2 RPV bottom after the earthquake had broken in February 2014, it was excluded from the monitoring thermometers.
   - In April 2014, removal of the broken thermometer failed and was suspended. Rust-stripping chemicals were injected and the broken thermometer was removed in January 2015. A new thermometer was reinstalled in March. The thermometer has been used as a part of permanent supervisory instrumentation since April.

2. Reinstallation of the PCV thermomter and water-level gauge
   - Some of the permanent supervisory instrumentation for PCV could not be installed in the planned locations due to interference with existing grating (August 2013). The instrumentation was removed in May 2014 and new instruments were reinstalled in June 2014. The trend of added instrumentation will be monitored for approx. one month to evaluate its validity.
   - The measurement during the installation confirmed that the water level inside the PCV was approx. 300mm from the bottom.

Investigative results on torus chamber walls

- July 2014, the torus chamber walls were investigated (on the north-east side of the reactor) using equipment specially developed for that purpose (a swimming robot and a floor traveling robot).
- At the east-side wall penetrations (five points), "the status" and "existence of flow" were checked.
- A demonstration using the above two types of underwater wall investigative equipment showed how the equipment could check the status of penetration.
- Regarding Penetrations 1-5, the results of checking the sprayed tracer by camera showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the swimming robot)
- Regarding Penetration 3, a sonar check showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the floor traveling robot)

Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

Investigative outline

- Investigative devices such as a robot will be injected from Unit 2 X-5 penetration and access the inside of the pedestal using the CRD rail.

Progress status

- On January 26 and 30, 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the status of the CRD replacement rail on which the robot will travel. On February 9, deposit on the access route of the self-propelled investigative device was removed and on February 16, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the device.
- The results of this series of investigations confirmed talled and deformed gratings and a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- On January 19, 2018, the status below the platform inside the pedestal was investigated using an investigative device with a hanging mechanism. From the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits probably including fuel debris were found at the bottom of the pedestal. In addition, multiple parts higher than the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple routes of fuel debris falling. Obtained data were processed in panoramic image visualization to acquire clearer images.
- On February 13, 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.
- In addition, images, etc. would help determine the contour and size of the deposits could be collected by moving the investigation unit closer to the deposits than the previous investigation.

Investigations inside PCV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Evaluation results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st (Jan 2012)</td>
<td>- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (Mar 2012)</td>
<td>- Confirming water surface - Measuring water temperature - Measuring dose rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd (Feb 2013 – Jun 2014)</td>
<td>- Acquiring images - Measuring water level - installing permanent monitoring instrumentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th (Jan – Feb 2017)</td>
<td>- Acquiring images - Measuring dose rate - Measuring air temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th (Jan 2018)</td>
<td>- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th (Feb 2019)</td>
<td>- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leakage points from PCV
- No leakage from torus chamber rooftop
- No leakage from all inside/outside surfaces of S/C

Images of the torus chamber east-side (investigative investigation)

Investigative equipment
- Without tracer
- With tracer
- Swimming robot
- Floor traveling robot
- Sonar

Investigative outline
- Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV
- PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)
- tracer: Material used to trace the fluid flow. Clay particles

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Progress toward decommissioning: Works to identify the plant status and toward fuel debris retrieval

Immediate target
Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Water flow was detected from the Main Steam Isolation Valve* room

On January 18, 2014, a flow of water from around the door of the Steam Isolation Valve room in the Reactor Building Unit 3 1st floor northeast area to the nearby floor drain funnel (drain outlet) was detected. As the drain outlet connects with the underground part of the Reactor Building, there is no possibility of outflow from the building.

From April 23, 2014, image data has been acquired by camera and the radiation dose measured via pipes for measurement instrumentation, which connect the air-conditioning room on the Reactor Building 2nd floor with the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor. On May 15, 2014, water flow from the expansion joint of one Main Steam Line was detected. This is the first leak from PCV detected in the Unit 3. Based on the images collected in this investigation, the leak volume will be estimated and the need for additional investigations will be examined. The investigative results will also be utilized to examine water stoppage and PCV repair methods.

* Main Steam Isolation Valve: A valve to shut off the steam generated from the Reactor in an emergency

Investigative results into the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch using a small investigation device

- As part of the investigation into the PCV to facilitate fuel debris retrieval, the status around the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch was investigated using a small self-traveling investigation device on November 26, 2015.
- Given blots such as rust identified below the water level inside the PCV, there may be a leakage from the seal to the extent of bleeding.
- Methods to investigate and repair the parts, including other PCV penetrations with a similar structure, will be considered.

Investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, the inside of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) was investigated to identify the status there including the location of the fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]
- The status of X-53 penetration(*)4, which may be under the water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated using remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under the water (October 22-24, 2014).
- For the purpose of confirming the status inside the PCV, an investigation device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration on October 20 and 22, 2015 to obtain images, data of dose and temperature and sample contaminated water. No damage was identified on the structure and walls inside the PCV and the water level was almost identical with the estimated value.
- In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal.
- Analysis of image data obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals. Consideration about fuel removal base on the obtained information will continue.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Evaluation results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May – Sep 2017</td>
<td>The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that part of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Work to improve the reliability of the circulation water injection cooling system and pipes to transfer contaminated water.

- Operation of the reactor water injection system using Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a water source commenced (from July 5, 2013). Compared to the previous systems, the reliability of the reactor water injection system was enhanced, e.g. by increasing the amount of water-source storage and enhancing durability.
- To reduce the risk of contaminated water leakage, the circulation loop was shortened by installing a reverse osmosis (RO) device in the Unit 4 Turbine Building within the circulation loop, comprising the transfer of contaminated water, water treatment and injection into the reactor. Operation of the installed RO device started from October 7 and 24-hour operation started from October 20. Installation of the new RO device inside the building shortened the circulation loop from approx. 3 to 5.8 km.
- To accelerate efforts to reduce the radiation density in contaminated water inside the buildings, circulating purification of contaminated water inside the buildings started on the Unit 3 side on February 22 and on the Unit 1 and 2 side on April 11.
- For circulating purification, a new pipe (contaminated water purification line) divided from the water treatment equipment outlet line was installed to transfer water purified at the water treatment equipment to the Unit 1 Reactor Building and the Unit 2-4 Turbine Buildings.
- The risks of contaminated water inside the buildings will continue to be reduced in addition to reduction of its storage.
- The entire length of contaminated water transfer pipes is approx. 2.1km, including the transfer line of surplus water to the upper heights (approx. 1.3km).

Completion of purification of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water)
Contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) is being treated using seven types of equipment including the multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS). Treatment of the RO concentrated salt water was completed on May 27, 2015, with the exception of the remaining water at the tank bottom. The remaining water will be treated sequentially toward dismantling the tanks.

Preventing groundwater from flowing into the Reactor Buildings
Reducing groundwater inflow by pumping sub-drain water
To reduce groundwater flowing into the buildings, pumping-up of groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings started on September 3, 2015. Pumped-up groundwater was purified at dedicated facilities and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization confirmed that its quality met operational targets.

Reducing groundwater inflow by pumping sub-drain water
Measures to pump up groundwater flowing from the mountain side upstream of the Building to reduce the groundwater inflow (groundwater bypasses) have been implemented.
- Through periodical monitoring, pumping of wells and tanks is operated appropriately.
- At the observation holes installed at a height equivalent to the buildings, the trend showing a decline in groundwater levels is checked.
- The analytical results on groundwater inflow into the buildings based on existing data showed a declining trend.

Installing land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil around Units 1-4 to prevent the inflow of groundwater into the building
To prevent the inflow of groundwater into the buildings, installation of impermeable walls on the land side is planned. Freezing started on the sea side and at a part of the mountain side from March 2016 and at 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unknown sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017.

In March 2018, construction of the land-side impermeable walls was completed, except for a portion of the depth, based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. The 21st Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, 2018, evaluated that together with the function of sub-drains, etc., a water-level management system to stably control groundwater and isolate the buildings from it had been established and had allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.

For the unfrozen depth, a supplementary method was implemented and it was confirmed that temperature of the part declined below 0°C by September 2018. From February 2019, maintenance operation started at all sections.

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**Progress toward decommissioning: Work to improve the environment within the site**

- **Immediate targets**
  - Reduce the effect of additional release from the entire power station and radiation from radioactive waste (secondary water treatment waste, rubble, etc.) generated after the accident, to limit the effective radiation dose to below 1mSv/year at the site boundaries.
  - Prevent contamination expansion in sea, decontamination within the site.

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**Optimization of radioactive protective equipment**

Based on the progress of measures to reduce environmental dosage on site, the site is categorized into two zones: highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas to optimize protective equipment according to each category aiming at improving safety and productivity by reducing load during work. From March 2016, limited operation started. From March and September 2017, the G Zone was expanded.

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**Installation of sea-side impermeable walls**

To prevent the outflow of contaminated water into the sea, sea-side impermeable walls have been installed. Following the completed installation of steel pipe sheet piles on September 22, 2015, connection of these piles was conducted and connection of sea-side impermeable walls was completed on October 26, 2015. Through these works, closure of sea-side impermeable walls was finished and the contaminated water countermeasures have been greatly advanced.

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**Installation of dose-rate monitors**

To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 4, 2016. These monitors allow workers to confirm real-time on-site dose rates at their workplaces.

Workers are also able to check concentrated data through large-scale displays installed in the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the access control facility.

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**Status of the large rest house**

A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced on May 31, 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest.

On March 1, 2016 a convenience store opened in the large rest house. On April 11, operation of the shower room started. Efforts will continue to improve convenience of workers.

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