
# Outline of Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water Management Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water and Treated Water Management

### Main decommissioning work and steps Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed in December 2014 at Unit 4 and on February 28, 2021 at Unit 3. Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3. (Note 1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident. <Milestones in the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap> Completion of fuel removal Within 2031 Unit 1 Start of fuel remova FY2027 - FY2028 FY2024 - FY2026 Unit 2 Start of fuel removal Units 1 and 2 Units 3 and 4 $\nabla$ Set in "The Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Storage **Fuel Removal** stallation of fuel remove Decommissioning issues" held on April 13. First unit Start of fuel debris retrieval **Fuel removal** from SFP /Transportation Unit 2 Within 2021 \* Due to the spread of COVID-19, w have revised the plan to start from Units 1 and 3 the second half of fiscal 2023 to improve safety and reliability. $\nabla$ $\nabla$ **Fuel Debris** Understanding the situation inside the Fuel debris Storage Retrieval PCV /Consideration of retrieval methods, etc /Transportation Dismantling Design and manufacturing Scenario development & Subcommittee on Government Dismantling Handling of ALPS technology consideration of devices /equipment Facilities treated Water

### Measures for treated water

## Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced and objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and having safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency on an ongoing basis.



## Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies (1) "Remove" the source of water contamination (2) "Redirect" fresh water from contaminated areas 3 "Retain" contaminated water from leakage


- Strontium-reduced water from other equipment is being re-treated in the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS: multi-nuclide removal equipment) and stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and sub-drains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite, etc. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water was reduced from approx. 540 m<sup>3</sup>/day (in May 2014) to approx. 130 m<sup>3</sup>/day (in FY2021).
- Measures continue to further suppress the generation of contaminated water to 100 m<sup>3</sup>/day or less within 2025.

# (2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce the stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment is underway. At present, the floor surface exposure condition can be maintained except for the Unit 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and the High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Unit 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building. For Reactor Buildings, the amount of stagnant water there will be reduced to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024.
- For zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building, measures to reduce the radiation dose are being examined with stabilization in mind.

## (3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

 Various measures are underway to prepare for tsunamis. For heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to close openings in buildings and install sea walls to enhance drainage channels and other measures is being implemented as planned.



# Progress Status and Future Challenges of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap toward Decommissioning of TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Outline)

# **Progress status**

The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable. There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold

shutdown condition had been maintained.

## Substantiation of measures to further reduce contaminated water generated

On December 21st, the 26th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (Chairperson: Dr. Yuzo Onishi) was held and discussed the substantiation of measures to further reduce contaminated water generated.

In FY2022, as well as the effects of existing multi-layered measures, facing and other measures further progressed. In conjunction with low rainfall, the average contaminated water generated during April – November remained constant at about 100 m<sup>3</sup>/day.

TEPCO presented the outlook that by 2025, through measures including completing 50% of facing and installing the roof cover over the Unit 1 Reactor Building, the target of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap, namely to suppress contaminated water generated to 100 m<sup>3</sup>/day or lower, would be achieved and that by 2028, by measures including completing 80% of facing and locally stopping water in buildings, the volume of contaminated water generated would be reduced to about 50-70 m<sup>3</sup>/day.

In response, as the Committee, opinions such as requesting, as well as providing accurate and transparent information at home and abroad and striving as far as possible to implement measures steadily without delay were concluded. As mid- and long-term issues, an examination of drastic water stoppage in buildings, while striving for consistency with the progress of the overall decommissioning process, such as fuel debris retrieval, was requested.

# Unit 1 Status of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) internal investigation (the latter half)

In the Unit 1 PCV internal investigation, regarding the deposit debris detection (gamma-ray nuclide analysis) by ROV-D, all eight points were measured during the period December 6-9.

At present, assessment such as gamma-ray nuclide analysis was completed for two of the eight points, from which data showing a high likelihood of debris was acquired. By assessing the remaining six points on an ongoing basis, debris distribution will also be assessed.

Moreover, from December 12, the preliminary work for deposit sampling investigation by ROV-E was conducted and the investigation will start from mid-January.

Since all images acquired in the first-half investigation conducted during the period February-June 2022, as preparation for publishment were completed, they are being provided at the Nuclear Information Corner at the Head Office of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. from December 12.

Nuclear Information Corner


https://www.tepco.co.jp/electricity/mechanism\_and\_facilities/power\_generat on/nuclear\_power/info-j.html



# Unit 2 Investigation of the basement floor of the Reactor Building

It is considered that in Unit 2, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) operated for about three days, even after the tsunami arrival. To clarify why the RCIC stopped, an investigation inside the RCIC room, which is located on the basement, is being examined.

Given the present difficulty in accessing the RCIC room, as the preliminary investigation, the status of the basement floor is being investigated from December to check any equipment damage that could be hindering access.



## Status regarding the rearing test of marine organisms

To eliminate concerns and reassure those in society, a rearing test for flounder and abalones in seawater with ALPS treated water added and normal seawater for comparison is underway.

Regarding the test of flounder, in the case of seawater with ALPS treated water (tritium concentration: less than 1,500 Bq/L), as with the previous insight, it was confirmed that the tritium concentration in the body did not exceed that in the growing environment and that following the transfer to normal seawater, the tritium concentration in the body declined. In the next, the same verification will be conducted for abalones.

In addition, from November 30, a rearing test of flounder in seawater, adjusted to a tritium concentration of about 30 Bq/L, also started.

The status of the rearing test continues to be clearly conveyed through the website, live camera, rearing diary and others.

Marine organism rearing test live camera https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC LEn8NHHX2WrMvn6ZYfAjJA Enhancement of the analysis scheme for decommissioning and others of the TEPCO Fukushima

## Daiichi Nuclear Power Station


On December 19, the Commission on Supervision and Evaluation of the Specified Nuclear Facilities was held and discussed enhancement of the analysis scheme for decommissioning and others of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

To "store and manage" a large amount of generated waste and subsequently "treat and dispose of that," TEPCO proceeds with work to clarify the analysis needs along the decommissioning timeline; based on the analysis needs, formulate the analysis plan; identify substantial proficiencies for human resources with high technical capability and skills; and quantify the amount of human resources and the time it will be required. Moreover, to steadily implement analysis for decommissioning, analysis and assessment methods are being developed by JAEA and others, analysis institutes are being secured and human resources are being

developed and secured. Regarding the development and securing of human resources in particular, the "analysis support team" integrating researchers and engineers with abundant experience and insight into analytical practices in Japan is organized and a curriculum is formulated with the aim of fostering analysis workers who will be engaged in solid waste analysis in the Fukushima Institute for Research, Education and Innovation (F-REI) to be established, to prepare for training.

These measures and examinations will steadily be realized and stakeholders will be united to proceed with decommissioning.

# Major initiatives – Locations on site





Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on April 8, 2021 Product (C) [2020] DigitalGlobe, Inc., a Maxar company

# Confirmation of the reactor conditions

# Temperatures inside the reactors


Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained within the range of approx. 15 to 30°C for the past month, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.






PCV gas phase temperatures (recent quarter)

\*1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points. \*2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.






(\*1) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (\*2) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (\*3) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)

# Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of November 2022, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx.  $1.6 \times 10^{-12}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> and  $1.7 \times 10^{-12}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00003 mSv/year.

# Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



בילים אין הילים אין ה 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

- Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.
- based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.


# Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown condition or criticality sign detected. Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

# II. Progress status by each plan

# Measures for contaminated water and treated water

- Status of contaminated water generated
- Multi-layered measures, including pumping up by sub-drains and land-side impermeable walls, which were buildings.
- After implementing "redirecting" measures (groundwater bypass, sub-drains, land-side impermeable walls and others) contaminated water generated within FY2021 declined to approx. 130 m<sup>3</sup>/day.
- Measures will continue to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated.



### (Reference)

\* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:

- [Cs-134]: 2 x 10<sup>-5</sup> Bg/cm<sup>3Mard</sup>
- [Cs-137]: 3 x 10-5 Bg/cm3
- \* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
- Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.314 - 1.065 µSv/h (November 22 - December 20, 2022).
- To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed

Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated

implemented to control the continued generation of contaminated water, suppressed the groundwater inflow into

and rainwater prevention measures, including repairing damaged portions of building roofs, the amount of

- Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility special for Sub-drain & Groundwater drains  $\geq$
- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Sub-drain & Groundwater drains, release started from September 14, 2015 and up until December 13, 2022, 2,063 release operations had been conducted. The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.





Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 sub-drains

- Implementation status of facing
- Facing is a measure that involves asphalting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater infiltrating the ground and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of November 2022, 95% of the planned area (1,450,000 m<sup>2</sup> on site) had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, implementation proceeds appropriately after constructing a yard from implementable zones that leave the decommissioning work unaffected. As of the end of November 2022, 30% of the planned area (60,000 m<sup>2</sup>) had been completed.
- Status of the groundwater level around buildings  $\geq$
- The groundwater level in the area inside the land-side impermeable walls has been declining each year due to the land-side impermeable walls and the decline in the set water level of the sub-drains. On the mountain side, the average difference between the inside and outside has remained at 4-5 m. The water level in the bank area has also remained low (T.P. 1.4 m) relative to the ground surface (T.P. 2.5 m).
- As the set water level of the sub-drains declined slightly (T.P.  $-0.55 \Rightarrow -0.65$  m) and others in FY2021, the groundwater level on the sea side of the Unit 1-4 buildings remained low (except during heavy rainfall) compared to the T.P. 2.5 m area.
- $\geq$ Operation of the multi-nuclide removal equipment
- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing), hot tests using radioactive water are ongoing (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the entire pre-service inspection was completed. The multi-nuclide removal equipment (additional) went into full-scale operation from October 16, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water have been underway (from October 18, 2014).
- As of December 15, 2022, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 494,000, 745,000 and 104,000 m<sup>3</sup>, respectively (including approx. 9,500 m<sup>3</sup> stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with highly concentrated radioactive materials at the System B outlet of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).
- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until December 15, 2022, approx. 697,000 m<sup>3</sup> had been treated.

- Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water  $\geq$
- To reduce the risks of strontium-reduced water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multinuclide removal equipment is underway. Up until December 15, 2022, approx. 864,000 m<sup>3</sup> had been treated.



 Stagnant water storage inside buildings (Units 1-4, Process Main Building, High Temperature Incinerator Building, Waste Liquid Supply Tank, SPT (B))
 Units 1-4 tank storage ([(2)-s RO treated water (fresh water)] + [(2)-b Concentrated salt water] + [(2)-c ALPS treated water, etc.] + [(2)-d Sr-reduced water, etc. (ALPS pre-treatment water)] Water amount from tank bottom to water-level gauge 0% (DS)

Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more

Calculated in the method of contaminated water generated [[Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)] Average transfer of storage increase and groundwater/rainwater into buildings for four weeks was added (November 24, 2022)

Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

- $\geq$ Temporary transfer of treated water to be re-purified to secure freshwater
- As the contaminated water management has progressed, contaminated water generated this fiscal year has been typhoons)
- · On the other hand, with a decline in the volume of contaminated water generated, the freshwater purification volume previous years.
- At the same time, during the internal investigation of Unit 1 Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), which was underway the storage in the freshwater storage tank declined.
- If it becomes difficult to inject water into the reactor from the freshwater storage tank, filtered water can be used and considered.
- To fully prepare for an increase in reactor injection water when the PCV water level declines after a large earthquake and ensure the Unit 1 PCV internal investigation is comprehensive, a portion of the treated water to be re-purified and stored in the ALPS treated water tank will be temporarily transferred to the waste liquid supply tank and subject to RO treatment to secure the storage volume in the freshwater purification tank. (The transfer will start from around February 2023.)
- This work will suppress any increase in contaminated water by using filtered water and reduce the amount of treated water to be re-purified eventually.

largely suppressed. (This may be potentially attributable to the less frequent occurrence of torrential rains like

also decreased. Storage in the freshwater storage tank in the area 33.5 m above sea level declined compared to

since early December, work to increase the water injection rate into the reactor proceeded, which is one reason why

facilities for this case have also been prepared, but the impact on the ALPS treated water tank capacity needs to be

- > Collection status of resin leaking from the Reactor Water Clean-up System spent resin tank room in the Unit 3 Filter Sludge Tank Room (FSTR) building
- On September 1, 2020, leakage of waste liquid and spent resin was detected from pipes connected with the Reactor Water Clean-up System spent resin storage tanks on the basement floor of the Unit 3 FSTR building.
- Work to collect spent resin having leaked and transfer it to the waste sludge storage tank (B) of the FSTR building started from June 2021 and was completed at the end of November 2022.
- As future management, to detect any minor leakage from the source tank at an early stage, the guality of the floor sump water will be periodically checked and time-based maintenance applied for the tank to prevent leakage.
- Status of sea-area monitoring related to the handling of ALPS treated water
- The concentration of tritium in seawater within 2km of the port has remained constant over the past year and also low at new measurement points within the fluctuation range of seawater in Japan\*. The concentration of Cesium-137 increased temporarily, which was considered due to rainfall, as applied to the past fluctuation in seawater around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. However, it remained constant relative to measurement benchmarks for the past year and at new measurement points and also low within the fluctuation range of seawater in Japan\*. For tritium, monitoring has been conducted with a lower detection limit since April 18.
- Both concentrations of tritium and Cesium-137 in seawater within 20km of the coast had remained constant for the past year and low within the fluctuation range of seawater in Japan\*.
- The concentration of tritium in seawater further than 20km from the coast remained low, including at new measurement points, within the fluctuation range of seawater in Japan\*. The concentration of Cesium-137 remained constant over the past year within the fluctuation range of seawater in Japan\*.
- \*: The range of the minimum maximum values detected during April 2019 March 2021 were as follows in the database below:

In Japan (including off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture):

Tritium concentration: 0.043 - 20 Bq/L

Cesium-137 concentration: 0.0010 - 0.45 Bg/L

Off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture

Tritium concentration: 0.043 - 2.2 Bg/L

Cesium-137 concentration: 0.0010 - 0.45 Bg/L

Source: Environmental Radioactivity and Radiation in Japan, Environmental Radiation Database

https://www.kankyo-hoshano.go.jp/data/database/

• The concentration of tritium in fish sampled at the sampling point T-S8 had remained constant for the past year. The concentration of tritium in fish sampled at new sampling points, including where the analytical value was verified, remained low within a similar fluctuation range for seawater in Japan\*. Other measurement data of fish and measurement data of seaweed are being verified.

\*: The range of the minimum - maximum values detected during April 2019 - March 2021 was as follows in the database below:

In Japan (including off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture) Tritium concentration: 0.064 - 0.12 Bg/L

- > Progress status of work to install the ALPS treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facility and related facilities
- For the measurement and confirmation/transfer facilities, work to install a pipe support, piping and others for these facilities started from August 4 from around the K4 area tanks.
- For the discharge facility, a bedrock layer is being drilled by the shield machine from August 4 to start construction of the discharge tunnel. At present, no water leakage or other phenomena have been detected within the drilling range. Previously, construction of the downstream pool started from December 18.

- For the dilution facility, precast blocks for the discharge shaft (upper stream pool) have been manufactured since September 14 at a factory within Fukushima Prefecture and ground improvement for that shaft, which has also been conducted since October 7 as part of seismic countermeasures, was completed. Construction of the upper stream pool started from December 14.
- From August 4, as part of efforts to install the partition weir, preparatory work, including constructing a runway for removed.
- · As part of the marine construction, during work to install the outlet caisson, seawater was sampled to confirm that the Seawater monitoring during marine construction offshore of the power station continues.

# Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.

- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 1
- structure and approx. 50%, for the upper structure.
- A work yard was prepared around the Reactor Building and preliminary work to install a large cover started from August 2021.
- From April 13, 2022, drilling to install an anchor in the Reactor Building started. A temporary gantry is also being installed from the portion where anchors and base plates are installed.
- was removed in late September.

\* Isolation Condenser secondary-side pipe: The secondary-side pipe of the Isolation Condenser, which cools the inside of the Reactor Pressure Vessel when the external power source is lost and is currently unused.

- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 2  $\geq$
- inspection) and measures to prevent scattering of rubble and dust).
- Outside the building, construction of a gantry foundation has been underway since June 2022. After the construction is completed, the erection of a steel structure will commence. Outside the site, before erecting the steel structure onsite, ground assembly continues.
- Status of on-site transportation of spent fuel from the common pool to the Temporary Cask Custody  $\triangleright$ Area
- To make space in the common pool to accommodate the Unit 6 spent fuel, work is underway to load spent fuel having the Temporary Cask Custody Area.
- Fuel loading of three dry casks was completed but the airtightness of the three exceeded the criteria. After removing

heavy-duty machines, is being implemented. In the sea-side area for Units 5 and 6, sedimentation inside the open intake channels is being removed simultaneously and after installing the partition weir, anti-permeation work will be

work did not involve any increase in cesium concentration in seawater. All the monitoring results until December 10 showed "Not Detected (ND)" and no significant fluctuation was detected in the cesium concentration in seawater.

From late April 2021, work to assemble a temporary gantry and others has been underway in a yard outside the site as part of efforts to install a large cover. The ground assembly was completed for the temporary gantry and lower

The Isolation Condenser secondary side pipe (IC pipe)\*, which hinders the installation of anchors and baseplates,

Decontamination to suppress dust scattering on the top floor of the Reactor Building was completed in December 2021 and contamination reduction was confirmed, based on smear sampling results before and after decontamination. Work to install shielding within a range including above the reactor well, where the highest level of dose was observed, was completed at the end of May 2022. Due to interference with the installation of the new fuel-handling machine, work to remove the control room of the fuel-handling machine (hereinafter FHM control room) has been underway since August. Once the removal of the FHM control room is complete, preliminary work to dismantle the existing facility on the south side will commence (rearrangement of site, inspection of remotely operated heavy machinery (annual

been stored in the common pool with the 22 dry casks and transport them on site from the common pool building to

fuel from the cask and cleaning the fuel top, two of the three casks satisfied the criteria and were transported to the

Temporary Cask Custody Area. For the third cask, the airtightness will be rechecked after the fuel removal and the fuel top re-cleaned.

- After observing the dry cask, the unsatisfied airtightness of the primary lid was considered attributable to iron oxide (clad) or calcium component (particle or ion) used when attaching the primary lid in the pool penetrating the flange face and turning into a foreign object.
- · At present, the establishment of additional procedures to ensure airtightness is being examined. Based on these, the time when removal of Unit 6 spent fuel is completed is being reviewed.

# Retrieval of fuel debris

- Unit 1 PCV internal investigation (the latter half)
- Regarding the deposit debris detection (gamma-ray nuclide analysis) by ROV-D, all eight points were measured during the period December 6-9.
- At present, operation of the equipment is being verified prior to injecting the succeeding machine ROV-E, aiming to start deposit sampling by ROV-E from mid-January 2023.
- > Progress status toward Unit 2 PCV internal investigation and trial retrieval
- Using the Naraha mockup facility, a mockup test simulating the actual site is underway.
- At present, after modifying the control program to position the arm more accurately, permeability test etc. using the X-6 penetration mockup continues.
- · For improvements extracted in the performance verification test at Naraha, measures and improvement will continue to be implemented.
- Regarding work to install an isolation room as a boundary while opening the X-6 penetration, bubble generation from the shielding door when the installation status was verified (verification of pressurization), was investigated. The investigative results suggested that it was considered attributable to the pressing mechanism of the shielding door.
- Work continues safely and carefully.
- > Recent results concerning dose measurement and assessment as part of efforts to examine the process of fuel debris retrieval
- The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has conducted research and development to assess the dose rate, conduct remote, on-site, swift and simple analysis and visualize radiation sources required when examining fuel debris retrieval methods and working to retrieve fuel debris.
- Dose rate assessment technology which visualized the dose rate distribution inside the Primary Containment Vessel was utilized to formulate a work plan for the investigation inside the Unit 2 reactor well. Moreover, JAEA also developed mobile and radiation-resistant equipment for fuel debris remote, on-site, swift and simple analysis and an integrated Radiation Imaging System (iRIS) which provided mobile guick 3D visualization of the dose rate distribution and highly concentrated contaminated areas and confirmed the on-site applicability.
- To decontaminate the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in a safe and solid manner on an ongoing basis, the JAEA will proceed with the on-site application of research results and engage in research and development to flexibly meet new needs, such as issues emerging according to the progress of each unit, contribute to risk reduction such as a decline in exposure by the advanced visualization of radiation sources and others and help improve swiftness and rationality by advancing analysis technologies.

Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

- Management status of rubble and trimmed trees
- As of the end of November 2022, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 328,600m<sup>3</sup> (-800 m<sup>3</sup> compared to the end of October with an area-occupation rate of 88%). The total storage volume of trimmed

trees was approx. 127,000m<sup>3</sup> (-900 m<sup>3</sup> with an area-occupation rate of 72%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 18,900m<sup>3</sup> (-3,100m<sup>3</sup>, with an area-occupation rate of 36%). The decrease in rubble was attributable to a transfer for area arrangement. As of the end of November 2022, there were six temporary deposits with storage capacity exceeding 1,000m<sup>3</sup>, storage 56,400m<sup>3</sup>.

- Management status of secondary waste from water treatment
- As of December 1, 2022, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 441 m<sup>3</sup> (area-occupation rate: 63%), while rate: 87%).
- Status of the additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power  $\geq$ Station
- On December 7, when the waste supplier of the additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator was started up, abnormal was suspended.
- The on-site investigation detected breakage or cracking in the welding part in two of the four mountain bolts which connected the electric motor base with the pedestal.
- Given the acknowledged need to investigate and repair, incineration was suspended the same day.
- The electric motor repeated start up and shut down at regular intervals. The repeated burden on the bolt connection accelerated metal fatigue, weakened the bolt and consequently resulted in ductile breakage on December 7.
- On December 20, the units of the waste supplier were repaired and inspected and similar equipment was also checked. resumed on the morning of December 22.
- While monitoring the dust concentration in the surrounding environment, work continues, prioritizing safety above all.

# Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

- Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4
- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all carefully.
- In the area between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but been increasing or declining at many observation holes, including Nos. 1-6, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12, 1-14, 1-16 and 1-17. The trend continues to be monitored carefully.
- In the area between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 or declining at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be monitored carefully.
- In the area between the Unit 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bg/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at many observation holes, including Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be monitored carefully.

that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,395 m<sup>3</sup> (area-occupation rate: 91%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment and other vessels, was 5,472 (area-occupation

vibration and floating of the electric motor was detected by the ITV screen of the control room and the waste supplier


Based on the investigative results, exposing the broken surface of the bolts, the cause was deemed to be metal fatigue.

Ignition and heating of the burner started from around 9:00 pm on December 21 and incineration of trimmed trees


observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total ß radioactive materials has remained constant overall but increased temporarily from April 2020 and is even increasing or declining at many observation holes at present, including Nos. 0-1-2, 0-3-1, 0-3-2 and 0-4. The trend continues to be monitored


Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing and declining at Nos. 2-3, 2-5, 2-6 and 2-7 but has remained constant overall. The concentration of total  $\beta$  radioactive materials has remained constant overall but been increasing

- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration of cesium has also remained constant as the overall area but been increasing or declining and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations into the fluctuation are underway for Nos. 0-3-2, 1, 1-6, 2-5, 2-6 and 3-3.
- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started to pass from August 30, 2022 and the concentration has remained low. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors will be installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard will start to pass.
- In the open channel area of seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 noted during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 has remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. Regarding the concentration of Cs-137, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Unit 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. Regarding the concentration of Sr-90, variation has been observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of the weather, marine meteorology and others.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>





Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

- Staff management
- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past work on site.
- maintained, with approx. 3,000 to 4,600.
- 70%.

<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>


Figure 4: Groundwater concentration on the Turbine Building east side

guarter from August to October 2022 was approx. 9,500 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), which exceeded the monthly average workforce (approx. 7,300). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to

It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in January 2023 (approx. 4,600 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day for each month (actual values) for the most recent 2 years were

The number of workers both from within and outside Fukushima Prefecture increased slightly. The local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) as of November 2022 remained constant at around

- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.54 and 2.60 and 2.51 mSv/person-year during FY2019, 2020 and 2021, respectively (The legal exposure dose limits are 100 mSv/person and 50 mSv/person-year over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.



35 TEPCO HD employees --- Cooperating company workers person-month 30 25 mSv/ 20 dose External exposure 15 10 October 2022 5 Average: 0.27 mSv/ person-month 0 2011/07 2011/07 2011/07 2012/03 2012/07 2013/03 2013/07 2013/11 2013/07 2014/07 2014/07 2014/07 2016/07 2016/07 2016/07 2016/07 2016/07 2016/07 2016/07 2016/07 2018/0 11 03 03 /11 /03 /07 11 03 07 2021 Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker

(monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

- Results of the 13th questionnaire survey for workers to improve the work environment
- On August to September 2022, the 13th guestionnaire survey was conducted as part of efforts to improve the work environment, to which approx. 4,690 workers (approx. 95.9%) responded.
- The results showed that many respondents assigned high marks in all questions about the present labor environment, evaluated their work in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as rewarding and that the concerns of workers about radiation had been alleviated.
- TEPCO will continue to listen carefully to workers' opinions and requests, strive to improve the labor environment and create "a safe and comfortable-to-work workplace."
- Countermeasures to suppress the spread of COVID-19 infections  $\geq$
- Since late November, as across Japan and Fukushima Prefecture, infections have also been increasing in the

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. In response, TEPCO HD employees on November 22 and cooperating company workers on November 24 were re-requested to thoroughly observe countermeasures to prevent COVID-19 infection spreading.

- decommissioning work, prioritizing safety above all
- As of December 21, 2022,
- workers) from the figures in the previous published material (as of November 23).
- workers) had been vaccinated.
- No significant influence on decommissioning work, such as a corresponding delay to work processes due to this infection, had been identified.
- Measures to prevent infection and expansion of influenza and norovirus  $\geq$
- etc.).
- Status of influenza and norovirus cases  $\geq$ 
  - Until the 50th week of 2022 (December 12-18, 2022), no influenza and 1 norovirus infection were recorded. The totals for the same period for the previous season also showed no influenza and 1 norovirus infections. Note: The above data is based on reports from TEPCO HD and cooperating companies, which include diagnoses at medical clinics outside the site.

The ongoing basic countermeasures to prevent infection spreading, such as requiring employees to take their temperature before coming to the office, wear masks at all times, avoid the "Three Cs" by using the rest house in shifts, eat silently and carefully select business travel, continued to be properly implemented to proceed with

(1) 1,583 workers (including 246 TEPCO HD employees, 1, 332 cooperating company workers, 3 business partner company employees and 2 temporary workers) of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station had contracted COVID-19, an increase in 172 workers (including 46 TEPCO HD employees and 126 cooperating company


(2) Regarding the workplace vaccination program of COVID-19 (for the omicron variant), which has been implemented since November 28, 2022, 1,704 workers (including 429 TEPCO HD employees and 1,275 cooperating company


Since November, measures for influenza and norovirus have been implemented, including free influenza vaccinations (subsidized by TEPCO HD) at medical clinics around the site (from October 11, 2022 to January 28, 2023) for cooperating company workers. As of December 17, 2022, a total of 4,121 workers had been vaccinated. In addition, a comprehensive range of other measures is also being implemented, including daily actions to prevent infection and expansion (measuring body temperature, health checks and monitoring infection status) and response after detecting possible infections (swift exit of possible patients and control of entry, mandatory wearing of masks in working spaces,

The subjects of this report were cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees in Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Stations.


# Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

"The highest value" → "the latest value (sampled during November 28 - December 12)"; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit







Note: The Total  $\beta$  measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.




# **TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site Layout**

Appendix 2







Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall complete

Construction of Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall

# 2 Handling of ALPS treated water

In "The Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated water and Decommissioning" held on April 13, the basic policy on how to handle ALPS treated water was set. Based on this, the response of TEPCO was announced on April 16.

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.

### Enhancement of communication activities

Press conference

- Measures for decommissioning, contaminated water and treated water of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station need efforts to reduce risks over a long term. Regarding handling of ALPS treated water as a part of decommissioning, to local residents, those who in the fishery industry and related parties, we will thoroughly explain about the policies and responses concerning the facility design, operation and management to ensure safety, monitoring of radioactive materials and others, and proceed with efforts to sincerely face their concerns and interests and respond to each of them.
- Moreover, to further deepen the understanding of everyone in Japan and overseas, efforts to coherently disseminate measurement results of ALPS treated water and information concerning facility operation, radiation impact assessment and others will continue and be enhanced.

#03

海の安全はどう確認するの?

Treated Water" series

2016.6 Report of Tritiated

"Understand by video. ALPS

Now available on youtube

(Japanese and English)

- Information dissemination via media in Japan and overseas and others
- To help deliver information based on scientific evidence, press release, press conference, disclosure of power plant site, briefing and others are held.
- For overseas major media, diplomatic corps and others, briefing and press tour are held. Information dissemination to neighboring countries is also being enhanced. Information dissemination to overseas media and information provision to embassies is focused. Ex.) May 10, 2022 Diplomatic corps and others, overseas media and others

処理水

Completely revised in

January 2022

Examination concerning handling of ALPS treated water

Tritiated Water Taskforce (2013.12 - 2016.5, 15 meetings)

- In February 2022, IAEA officials and international professionals (US/ UK/ France/ Russia/ China/ others) visited Japan to conduct technical inspection based on the international safety standard and on April 29, the

Safety review of International Atomic Energy IAgency (IAEA)


- report of safety assessment was published. - The report states that in regards to the safety of the facility, the IAEA has found that, "TEPCO successfully incorporated prevention measures in the design of the facility as well as in the associated operating procedures." In regards to the Radiological Environmental Impact Assessment, "it acknowledged that the doses to the assumed representative person are expected to be very low and significantly below the dose constraint set by the Japanese regulatory body."

- Efforts to explain about policies and safety measures for handling of ALPS treated water, countermeasures to rumors and others to people in the Metropolitan area. local residents and related parties and hear their opinions proceed. (In FY2021, approx. 3,000 times)
- Visits and Discussion Meetings of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since FY2019 for 13 municipalities in Hamadori. In FY2021 and FY2022, the Visits and Discussion Meetings were expanded to within Fukushima Prefecture. (In FY2022, a total of 17 times are scheduled)
- Moreover, online visits (connecting visitors and guide online) utilizing the "Fukushima Daiichi Virtual Tour" video, which is now being published on the TEPCO web site, and others are also offered in response to the need of people in Japan and overseas. (From August 2020 to July 2022 Online visitors: 59 organizations. 2,250 persons including overseas organizations)

Discussion meeting (face-to-face dialogue)

Opportunity for receiving opinions

from parties concerned concerning





view of mockup tanks

Reference 2/6 December 22, 2022 Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water



Flounder in rearing preparation tank

- Rearing test of marine organisms To alleviate concerns and lead to relief of local residents, related parties and the everyone in society, marine orgasms are being reared in tanks of seawater containing ALPS treated water and the status is compared with the original seawater controls. The progress will be shown coherently and clearly. Regarding behaviors of tritium and others, a lot of research has been conducted in Japan and overseas. Based on the experimental results, firstly experimental data for a half year will be collected and subsequently, the same as past experimental results, the theory "tritium in vivo is not concentrated and the concentration of tritium in vivo will not exceed the level in the growing environment" will also be reaffirmed.
- Froom March 2022, practice to rear flounder started using coastal seawater around the nuclear power station to learn how to rear marine organisms, verify the equipment design and others
- From September 30, the stage was shifted to the next "rearing test" and on October 3. ALPS treated water was added.
- From March 17, daily rearing status is published on the TEPCO HD homepage and twitter.

- Homepage address:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/information/newsrelease/breedi atest/index-i.html




- Twitter address: https://twitter.com/TEPCOfishkeeper

2021.12.21 The "Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Specified Nuclear Facility" regarding ALPS treated water were submitted to the Nuclear Regulation Authority

2021.12.28 "The Action Plan concerning the Continuous Implementation of the Basic Policy on Handling of ALPS Treated Water" was formulated

Review meeting concerning the implementation plan on handling of ALPS treated water



IAEA onsite investigation Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water (2016.11 - 2020.1, 17 meetings) Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Completion of Unit 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)

· Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023), start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)

Reference 3/6

Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for

Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

December 22, 2022

 Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026) Legend Storage and handling of fuel Rubble removal. etc. Fuel removal 2011 2014 2018 2020 2021 2012 2013 2016 2017 2019 2015 In the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap, the Phase 1 target involved starting to remove fuel from inside ▼ 2011.11- 2012.7 Removal of rubble on the Reactor Building top floor All fuel assemblies from Unit 4 had been the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completing Step 2 (by December 2013). removed by December 2014. On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, namely the first Unit, got underway and Phase 2 of the ▼ 2012.4-2013.3 Ground improvement and foundation work roadmap ▼ 2013.4-2013.7 Installation of external walls and roof panels started. On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing fuel removal work, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies ▼ 2013.6-2013.10 Installation of overhead crane and fuel-handling machine in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP ▼ 2013.8-2013.10 Removal of rubble inside the reactor well and pool was completed on December 22, 2014, (two of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks) ▼ 2013.11.18 Start of fuel removal <Unit 4 Cover for fuel removal> Fuel removal This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building. 2014.12.22 Fuel removal was completed (1533 assemblies) Unit 4 ▼ 2013.10 Completion of removal of large rubble on the Reactor Building top floor All fuel assemblies from Unit 3 had ▼ 2015.8 Completion of removal of the fuel-handling machine B within the spent fuel pool been removed by February 2021. Overview of the fuel-handling facility inside the cover ▼ 2016.12 Completion of shielding on the Reactor Building top floor <Unit 3 Cover for fuel removal (dome roof) 2019.2.21> Before installing a cover for fuel removal, the 2017.1 Installation start of a cover for fuel removal process of removing large rubble from the spent fuel ▼ 2019.4.15 Start of fuel removal pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure 2021.2.28 Fuel removal completed (566 assemblies) safe and steady fuel removal, training via remote in 🛱 control was conducted at the factory using the actual Unit 3 fuel-handling machine to be installed on site (February - December 2015). Installation of the fuel Init 3 Reactor Building removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018. With fuel removal in mind, rubble retrieval training ▼ 2015.3-2016.11 Yard construction inside the pool, which was scheduled in conjunction with fuel removal training, started from March 15. Unit 2 ▼ 2016.9-2017.4 West-side gantry installation work 2019 and fuel removal started from April 15, 2019. Overview of fuel removal ▼ 2017.5 Opening a hole in the west-side external wall Fuel removal was completed on February 28, 2021. (bird's-eye view) ▼ 2018.8-2020.12 Moving and containment of remaining objects For Unit 2, with the removal of spent fuel in mind, a "gantry for fuel removal" (gantry and front room) will be constructed on the south side of the building. ▼ 2020.6 Investigation inside the spent fuel pool ▼ 2021.10-2022.4 Ground improvement work Jnit 2 Construction of gantry for fuel removal> As part of efforts to remove fuel from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool and based on findings from Unit 2 internal operating floor investigations from November 2018 to February 2019, instead of fully dismantling the upper part of the building, the decision was made to install a small opening on ▼ 2020.3-6 Installation of spent fuel pool cover the south side and use a boom crane. Examination continues to initiate fuel removal from ▼ 2020.9-11 Measures to prevent and alleviate rubble falling FY2024 to FY2026. ▼ 2020.11-2021.6 Dismantling of remaining cover ✓ 2017.12 Completion of building cover dismantling and windbreak fence installation ✓ 2018.1-2020.12 Rubble removal on the north side of Reactor Building 20 <Reference> Progress to date ▼ 2021.8 Start of large cover pre-work For Unit 1, a large cover will be installed over the whole Previously, scope to recover the existing overhead crane ▼ 2018.9-12 Removal of X-braces building, within which rubble will be removed. and the fuel-handling machine was examined. However, the high radiation dose inside the operating floor meant Unit 1 the decision was taken to dismantle the upper part of the As part of efforts to remove fuel from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, investigations are underway to building in November 2015. Findings from internal ascertain the conditions of the fallen roof on the south side and the contamination of the well plug. investigations of the operating floor from November 2018 Based on the results, "the method initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, then to February 2019 underlined the potential to conduct removing rubble within the cover" was selected to ensure safer and more secure removal. Work to install limited work there and the means of accessing from the a large cover started from August 2021. Work to complete the installation of a large cover by around south side was examined. FY2023 is ongoing, with fuel removal scheduled to run from FY2027 to FY2028. <Reference> Progress to date Rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 2018 and has been implemented sequentially. In July and August 2019, the well plug, which was misaligned, was investigated, followed in August and September by the conditions of the overhead crane. Based on the results of these investigations, as the removal requires more careful work taking dust scattering into consideration, two methods were examined: Installing a cover after rubble removal, initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, then removing rubble inside the cover. <Unit 1 Dismantling of remaining cover> Rubble removal (image Fuel removal (image) 2020 2013 2017 2018 2019 2011 2012 2014 2015 2016 2021 \* Part of the photo is corrected because it includes machine information related to nuclear material prote

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Start of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (within 2021 \* The schedule will be extended for about 1 year due to the spread of COVID-19 infections)

### Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

### Unit 1 Investigation overview

 In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore: @100 mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.

• In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



In February, the first remotely operated underwater vehicle (ROV-A) was inserted to install "guide rings" which will facilitate the investigation. As installation of guide rings has been completed, then a detailed investigation will be implemented.

In this investigation, distribution of deposits outside the pedestal and their characteristics or others will also be investigated. The results of these investigations will be utilized in the examination of method and procedures toward future debris retrieval.



<Status inside the PCV (February 9)>

### Unit 1 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.10)	Acquiring images     Measuring the air temperature and dose rate     Measuring the water level and temperature     Sampling stagnant water     Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation		
	2nd (2015.4)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation		
	3rd (2017.3)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation		
Leakage points from PCV	PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11)			
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons				

Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)


### Unit 2 Investigation overview

 In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.

 In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.

· In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist






Bottom of the pedestal (after being processed in panoramic image visualization)

 In October 2020, as part of work to prepare for the PCV internal investigation and trial retrieval, a contact investigation to study deposits inside the penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted, which involved inserting a guide pipe incorporating an investigative unit into the penetration. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck. The investigative information obtained will be utilized in the mockup test of the equipment to remove deposits inside the X-6 penetration.





<Unit 2 Reactor Building 1st floor Location of the penetration>

Unit 2 PCV internal investigation				
Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature		
	2nd (2012.3)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature     - Measuring the dose rate		
	3rd (2013.2 - 2014.6)	<ul> <li>Acquiring images</li> <li>Sampling stagnant water</li> <li>Measuring water level</li> <li>Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation</li> </ul>		
	4th (2017.1-2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature		
	5th (2018.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature		
	6th (2019.2)	<ul> <li>Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature</li> <li>Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit</li> </ul>		
Leakage points from PCV	points from - No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C			
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part				

and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)


### Unit 3 Investigation overview

 In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.

 In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.

• In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals


· Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.



### Unit 3 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2015.10-12)	Acquiring images     Measuring the air temperature and dose rate     Measuring the water level and temperature     Sampling stagnant water     Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation     (2015.12)		
	2nd (2017.7)	<ul> <li>Acquiring images</li> <li>Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8)</li> </ul>		
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5)			
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9)				

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
which treatment and reuse is decided at present are not included

The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.

Main equipment

While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

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dosage on site, the site was categorized into two zones: Highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas where limited operation started to optimize protective equipment according to each category.

In May 2018, within about 96% of the site, workers are allowed to wear light equipment such as general workwear and disposable dust-protective masks.

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30 ~ 50

20~ 30

10 ~ 20

5~10

50~100

30~ 50

20~30

10~20

5~10

0 - 5