Outline of Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water Management

April 25, 2024
Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

Main decommissioning work and steps

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed in December 2014 at Unit 4 and on February 28, 2021 at Unit 3.
Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident with nearby metal materials etc.

<Milestones in the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap>

Units 1-6	Completion of fuel removal	Within 2031
Unit 1	Start of fuel removal	FY2027 - FY2028
Unit 2	Start of fuel removal	FY2024 - FY2026

Fuel Removal from SFP: Units 1 and 2 — Rubble removal etc. → Installation of fuel removal equipment → Fuel removal → Units 3 and 4 — Storage/ Transportation

First unit	Start of fuel debris retrieval
Unit 2	Within 2021 * The trial retrieval will commence in around October 2024 at the latest.

Fuel Debris Retrieval: Units 1 and 3 / Unit 2 — Understanding the situation inside the PCV/Consideration of retrieval methods → Fuel debris retrieval → Storage/ Transportation

Dismantling Facilities: Scenario development & technology consideration → Design and manufacturing of devices/equipment → Dismantling

Measures for treated water

Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced and objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and having safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency on an ongoing basis.



Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

① "Remove" the source of water contamination ② "Redirect" fresh water from contaminated areas
③ "Retain" contaminated water from leakage

- Strontium-reduced water from other equipment is being re-treated in the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS: multi-nuclide removal equipment) and stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and sub-drains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has being suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m^3/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 80 m^3/day (in FY2023), achieving the milestone "suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m^3/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025."
- Measures will proceed to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated and suppress to approx. 50-70 m^3/day by FY2028.

(2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce the stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment is underway.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Unit 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- While assessing the dust impact, measures to reduce the stagnant water level were implemented. In March 2023, the target water level in each building was achieved. For the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, "reducing stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024" was achieved.
- For zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building, measures to reduce the radiation dose are being examined with stabilization in mind.

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- Various measures were carried out to prepare for tsunamis. As countermeasures for heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to close openings in buildings and install sea walls to enhance drainage channels and other measures is being implemented as planned.



Progress status

◆ The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable.
There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.

Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

In preparation for the 5th discharge of ALPS treated water, Tank Group C of the measurement/confirmation facility was analyzed and TEPCO and an external institute confirmed that the analytical results satisfied the discharge requirement.

Following the confirmation, discharge of ALPS treated water of Tank Group C of the measurement/confirmation facility into the sea commenced from April 19.

Regarding tritium in seawater, TEPCO will continue to confirm that discharge is conducted safely as planned while satisfying the discharge requirement through the results of daily quick analyses conducted by TEPCO and others.

< Measurement status for the 5th discharge of ALPS treated water >
* Detailed information described on the left on Page 6

Measurement status	Compliance with requirement
[TEPCO] Attributes of the treated water from Tank Group C (Concentration of the 29 types of radionuclides within the measurement / evaluation scope and regulatory requirements) (Sampled on February 29)	○
[TEPCO] Downstream of discharge shaft and seawater pipe header (Sampled on April 23)	○
[TEPCO] Results of sea area monitoring at 4 points within 3km of the Power Station (Sampled on April 23)	○
[Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (Flounder and others, sampled on April 23)	○

Amount of contaminated water generated in FY2023: approx. 80 m³/day, achieving the milestone prescribed in the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap

By multi-layered measures by repairing damage of building roofs and facing, the amount of contaminated water generated has being suppressed.

Rainfall in FY2023 was 1,275 mm, less than in normal years (approx. 1,470 mm), the amount of contaminated water generated was approx. 80 m³/day and even when being evaluated with the average rainfall, approx. 90 m³/day, which was evaluated that the milestone prescribed in the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap "suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to less than 100 m³/day during average rainfall within FY2025" was achieved ahead of schedule.

To further suppress the amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028. Measures including facing of the Units 1-4 buildings, the Unit 1 Reactor Building cover and water stoppage of gaps between buildings will proceed.



Unit 2 Progress of work before removing spent fuel

Before commencing Unit 2 fuel removal, shielding was installed on the top floor (operating floor) of the Reactor Building since last November, concrete placement was completed on March 18 and installation of partition shielding, on April 2 and the shielding installation work was entirely completed.

Regarding the gantry for fuel removal, to complete the installation in June, work to mount the roof steel frame is underway.

Work continues while prioritizing safety.

Installation of the roof steel frame
(2024.4.2)



On the west side of the operating floor
(2024.4.3)

Unit 2 Status of preparation for fuel debris trial retrieval

Before Unit 2 fuel debris trial retrieval, regarding the telescopic-type debris retrieval equipment, a mockup test is underway at the factory to verify the functions and installation procedures.

At the PCV penetration (X-6 penetration), a large portion of deposits and cables inside the penetration was removed and deposit removal will be completed within May.



< Mockup of the telescopic-type equipment >



< Removal of cables >

Major initiatives – Locations on site



Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on April 8, 2021
Product (C) [2020] DigitalGlobe, Inc., a Maxar company

I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained as shown below for recent, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.



RPV bottom temperatures (recent quarter)



PCV gas phase temperatures (recent quarter)

*1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.
*2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.



* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, April 24, 2024



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

* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, April 24, 2024

(*1) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
(*2) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)
(*3) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)
(*4) Data missing due to outage of internal power supply 1A

Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of March 2024, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 4.6×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ and 4.5×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00009 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



(Reference)

* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
  [Cs-134]: 2×10^{-5} Bq/cm³Marc
  [Cs-137]: 3×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
  Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.295 –0.983 μSv/h (March 27 – April 23, 2024).
  To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.

Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.

Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown condition or criticality sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

➢ Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, a loss of the on-site electric power system A and injured person

- At around 10:43 am on April 24, the on-site electric power system A shut down.
- The functions that keep each plant stable (reactor cooling water injection, spent fuel pool cooling, primary containment vessel gas management system, etc.) remained in operation and no significant fluctuations were noted in the parameters for monitoring posts or site boundary continuous dust monitors.
- In conjunction with the loss of on-site electric power system A, the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility, which was in operation, was automatically suspended, thereby suspending discharge. Since no abnormality in the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility was noted, discharge recommenced at 5:16 pm on April 24.
- At around the same time that the on-site electric power system A was lost, a contract worker engaged in excavation work on the west side of the on-site large equipment inspection building was injured. A field inspection of the accident site found that the area where the injured worker engaged in excavation was located near the on-site electric power system A and the cable had been damaged during the aforementioned excavation work resulting in the suspension of the on-site electric power system A.
- The injured person is conscious and not contaminated with radioactive substances. A doctor from the entrance/exit control building emergency medical center at the power station treated the injured person and deemed that the injured person required emergency medical transport to hospital and an ambulance was called at 10:57 a.m.

II. Progress status by each plan

Measures for contaminated water and treated water

➢ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and sub-drains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has being suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 80 m³/day (in FY2023), achieving the milestone to “suppress the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025.”
- Measures will proceed to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated and suppress to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028.



*1 Values differ from those announced at the 20th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50th and 51st meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.

*2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday.

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings

➢ Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Sub-drain & Groundwater drains

- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Sub-drain & Groundwater drains, release started from September 14, 2015 and up until April 16, 2024, 2410 release operations had been conducted.
  The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.



Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 sub-drains

➢ Implementation status of facing

- Facing is a measure that involves asphalting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater infiltrating the ground and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of March 2024, 96% of the planned area (1,450,000 m² on site) had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, implementation proceeds appropriately after constructing a yard from implementable zones that leave the decommissioning work unaffected. As of the end of March, 50% of the planned area (60,000 m²) had been completed.

➢ Status of the groundwater level around buildings

- Regarding the groundwater level in the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, the difference between the inside and outside has remained constant though the groundwater level on the mountain side varied due to rainfall. The groundwater level of the groundwater drain observation well has remained sufficiently lower from the ground surface, at around T.P.+1.4m (the height of the ground surface: T.P.+2.5m).
- Regarding the Units 1-4 subdrains, the pumping amount varied depending on the precipitation. The pumping amount in the T.P.+2.5m area remained constant after the facing in this area was completed.

➢ Operation of the multi-nuclide removal equipment and other water-treatment facilities

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the entire pre-service inspection was completed. For the multi-nuclide removal equipment (additional), a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA on October 12, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted from October 18, 2014. On March 2, 2023, a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA and the entire pre-service inspection was completed.
- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until April 18, 2024, approx. 756,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water

- To reduce the risks of strontium-reduced water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment is underway. Up until April 18, 2024, approx. 923,000 m³ had been treated.

➢ Storage status of contaminated water and amount of ALPS treated water, etc. stored in tanks.

- The amount of ALPS treated water, etc. was approx. 1,317,616 m³ as of April 18, 2024.
- The amount of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea was approx. 33,416m³ as of April 24, 2024.

As of April 18, 2024



(1): Stagnant water storage inside buildings (Units 1-4, Process Main Building, High Temperature Incinerator Building, Waste Liquid Supply Tank, SPT (A), SPT (B), Units 1-3 CST, buffer tank)
(2): Units 1-4 tank storage [[(2)-a RO-treated water (fresh water)] + [(2)-b Concentrated salt water] + [(2)-c ALPS treated water, etc.] + [(2)-d Sr-reduced water, etc. (ALPS pre-treatment water)]
*: Water amount from tank bottom to water-level gauge 0% (DS)
*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more
*2: Calculated in the method of contaminated water generated [(Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)], amount of ALPS treated water discharged was not taken into account.

Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

➢ Status of discharge of ALPS treated water

As of April 24, 2024

Measurement object	Requirement and operation target	Measurement results	Compliance with requirement
[TEPCO] Attributes of the treated water from Tank Group C (Concentration of the 29 types of radionuclides within the measurement / evaluation scope and regulatory requirements)	・Sum of the ratios to legally required concentrations: less than 1 ・1,000,000 Bq/L	・0.31 ・190,000 Bq/L or less	○ ○
[TEPCO] Downstream of discharge shaft and seawater pipe header	・Less than 1,500 Bq/L	(Sampled on April 22) ・Less than 1,500 Bq/L	○
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 4 points within 3 km from the Power Station)	・Discharge suspension level: 700 Bq/L or less ・Investigation level: 350 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on April 23) ・700 Bq/L or less ・350 Bq/L or less	○ ○
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 1 point within 10 km square from the Power Station)	・Discharge suspension level: 30 Bq/L or less ・Investigation level: 20 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on April 22) ・30 Bq/L or less ・20 Bq/L or less	○ ○
[Ministry of the Environment] Tritium concentration in seawater (7 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	・National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L ・WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on March 12) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 7-8 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (flounder and others)	-	(Sampled on April 23) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 8.2 Bq/kg)	○
[Fukushima Prefecture] Tritium concentration in seawater (9 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	・National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L ・WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on April 12) ・Below the lower detection limit (less than 3.7 – 4.0 Bq/L)	○ ○

- From April 19, 2024, the first discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2024 was conducted.
- Regarding Tank Group C discharged, the concentration of the 29 types of radionuclides (excluding tritium) within the measurement and assessment scope was 0.31 in terms of the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations and satisfied the national government's requirement of less than 1. The concentration of tritium was 190,000 Bq/L. Regarding 39 nuclides for which no significant existence was voluntarily confirmed, the absence of any significant presence was confirmed and 44 general water quality benchmarks (compliance with which was voluntarily confirmed) satisfied the requirements.
- Regarding the status of sea-area monitoring on handling ALPS treated water, more tritium measurement points for seawater and fish were established near the power station and off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and measurements of tritium and Iodine-129 of seaweed near the power station were added from April 20, 2022. As of April 23, 2024, no significant variation had been detected.
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 4 points within 3 km from the power station, quick measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on April 23 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 5.6 - 7.6 Bq/L) at all points, which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 700 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 350 Bq/L (investigation level).
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 1 point within 10 km square from the power station, quick measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on April 22 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 9.4 Bq/L) at all points, which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 30 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 20 Bq/L (investigation level).
- The quick measurement results obtained by each organization were as follows:
  Ministry of the Environment: The analytical results (obtained via quick measurements) for seawater sampled on March 12 at 7 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 7-8 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.
  Fisheries Agency: Quick analytical results for tritium in flounder sampled on April 23 showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (approx. less than 8.2 Bq/kg) in all samples.
  Fukushima Prefecture: On April 12, tritium concentrations in seawater at 9 sampling points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture below the lower detection limit were recorded (less than 3.7 – 4.0 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

➢ Progress of dismantling flanged tanks in E area

- In E area, dismantling of flanged tanks used to store concentrated saline is underway and 47 of 49 tanks were dismantled.
- D2 of the remaining two tanks (D1 and D2) will be dismantled by July 2024.
- For D1, sludge was collected as with D2. As the water level decreases, the inside of D1 was inspected from the side plate manhole and highly viscous sludge was detected.
- After the sludge in D1 tank has been collected by around December 2024, the inside of the tank will be decontaminated and the tank will be dismantled within 2025. During the sludge collection work, countermeasures for dust scattering, spread and body contamination will be enhanced and safety prioritized.

➢ Progress of countermeasures related to water leakage including radioactive materials from the High Temperature Incinerator Building

- As countermeasures based on the water leakage including radioactive materials from the High Temperature Incinerator Building, management measures of TEPCO commenced sequentially from February 13 and are being implemented.
- Measures for cooperating companies also commenced sequentially from February 13. The first round of education was completed and the measures will continue to be implemented.
- As measures for facilities, work is underway and scheduled for completion by the end of April.
- As a TEPCO organizational measure, an application to change the implementation plan was submitted on February 26.
- In addition to measures presented on February 15, management improvement of the operation department, which managed caution tags, is underway.
- On February 21, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry instructed TEPCO that as well as addressing simple individual human errors, TEPCO must also take them as management issues, implement measures to further improve safety and conduct the following two points while incorporating examples in other industries and opinions of external experts. At present, an in-depth study of background courses is being conducted and parts potentially triggering errors are being identified.
  - Thoroughly analyzing any common factors that generate human errors leading to high radiation risks
  - Investigating the introduction of hardware and systems using DX without hesitation

➢ Progress of the rearing test of marine organisms in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

- To eliminate concerns and reassure the public, a rearing test for marine organisms (flounder) in seawater with ALPS treated water added and normal seawater for comparison is underway.
- Regarding the flounder and abalones, in both series of tanks ("normal seawater" and "ALPS treated water diluted with seawater"), no mass death or abnormality was detected (as of April 18).
- Additional analysis of the Organically Bound Tritium (OBT) concentration was conducted for flounder (tritium concentration of less than 1,500 Bq/L) and the results were added to and reflected in the existing published OBT analytical results. Regarding the OBT intake test of flounder (tritium concentration of less than 1,500 Bq/L), it is assumed that equilibrium has been reached.
- Rearing of flounder and others in diluted ALPS treated water (less than 1,500 Bq/L) will continue.
- The Organically Bound Tritium (OBT) concentration test on flounder (less than 1,500 Bq/L) will continue.

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.

➢ Main work to remove spent fuel at Unit 1

- Before installing a large cover, advanced assembling of steel frames for a large cover outside the site and installation in the Reactor Building proceed simultaneously.
  <Outside the site> Ground assembly of box ring progress rate:
  approx. 21% (January) → approx. 42% (March)
  <On-site> Installation of the R/B lower part structure progress rate:
  approx. 46% (January) → approx. 50% (March)
- Regarding the high-dose parts detected on the external wall on the Reactor Building south side, shielding was installed to reduce exposure and the air dose rate was reduced by approx. 50%. The air dose rate after installing the base plates was reduced by 80% from the initial stage.
- A cause analysis for the high dose of the external wall showed that it was considered attributable to the Radioactive Waste Treatment Building having been damaged by the accident occuring on 1F, which led to the unpainted external wall of the Reactor Building being exposed and radioactive materials being conveyed by rain from the upper part of the building, adhering to the wall surface and eventually becoming a radiation source.

➢ Main work to remove the spent fuel at Unit 2

- Before commencing the Unit 2 fuel removal, shielding has been installed on the top floor of the Reactor Building since last November, concrete placement was completed on March 18 and the installation of partition shielding, on April 2 and the entire work to install shielding was completed.
- Regarding the gantry for fuel removal, to complete the installation in June, work to mount the roof steel frame is underway.
- Work continues while prioritizing safety.

Retrieval of fuel debris

➢ Unit 2 Progress status toward PCV internal investigation and trial retrieval

- Before Unit 2 fuel debris trial retrieval, regarding the telescopic-type debris retrieval equipment, a mockup test is underway at the factory to verify the functions and installation procedures.
- At the PCV penetration (X-6 penetration), a large portion of deposits and cables inside the penetration was removed and deposit removal will be completed within May at the earliest.

Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

➢ Management status of rubble and trimmed trees

- As of the end of March 2024, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 399,500 m³ (+900 m³ compared to the end of February with an area-occupation rate of 78%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 79,600 m³ (+100 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 45%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 20,800 m³ (-100 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 82%). The total storage volume of radioactive solid waste (incinerated ash and others) was approx. 38,300 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 60%). The increase in rubble was attributable to decontamination of flanged tanks and work related to the area around the Units 1-4 buildings.

➢ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment

- As of April 4, 2024, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 423 m³ (area-occupation rate: 60%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,480 m³ (area-occupation rate: 92%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment and others, was 5,743 (area-occupation rate: 88%).

➢ Response to the fire alarm activation due to water vapor generated at the waste storage pit of the Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator

- From March 22, work to collect chips from the waste storage pit using a rough terrain crane commenced. The collected chips are dried and packed in containers.
- From April 24, work to collect water from the waste storage pit commenced. Collected water is temporarily stored in the intermediate tank (N2 tank) for the 5/6 contaminated water storage facility.
- The direct factor for this activation was considered attributable to microorganisms adhering to trimmed trees, etc. due to outdoor storage, (1) a certain amount of trimmed trees chips were stored in the waste storage pit for an extended period and (2) a relatively large amount of trimmed trees chips remained (stagnated) in the waste storage pit as operation results, generating significant heat due to the fermentation of chips, etc.
- As the policy to restore the facility, based on the cause, the operation was revised to prevent a certain amount from storing for a long term.

Reactor cooling

The cold shutdown condition will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring continue

➢ Status of Unit 1 Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) water level decline (reach to the hold point (1))

- For Unit 1, due to the high water level in the PCV Suppression Chamber (S/C), gradual water level decline was planned from the perspective to improve seismic resistance.
- On March 26, the reactor injection rate was reduced to commence the decline of the PCV water level. On April 11, the PCV water level reached the first hold point (HP (1)).
- During the decline, no abnormality was detected in each parameter.
- While maintaining the water level at HP (1), each plant parameter will continue to be checked and after confirming no abnormality, the PCV water level will decline to HP (2).

Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

➢ Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but increased temporarily from April 2020 and is even increasing or declining at many observation holes at present, including Nos. 0-1, 0-1-2, 0-2, 0-3-1, 0-3-2 and 0-4. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. a concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 1-6 and increasing or declining at many observation holes, including Nos. 1-9 and 1-11, at low concentration. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Unit 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration

of cesium has also remained constant as the overall area but been increasing or declining at observation holes with low concentration and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations will continue including the relation with rainfall.

- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started to pass from August 30, 2022. It has remained low, despite increasing in concentrations of cesium and total β radioactive materials during rainfall. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors were installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard started to pass.
- In the open channel area of seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite the temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and has been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. Regarding the concentration of Cs-137, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Unit 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. Regarding the concentration of Sr-90, variation was observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of the weather, marine meteorology and others. During the period of discharge of ALPS treated water, the concentration of tritium increased at the sampling point near the discharge outlet, but this was considered within the assumed range based on the results of the oceanic dispersion simulation.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>



<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>

Figure 4: Groundwater concentration on the Turbine Building east side



Figure 5: Seawater concentration around the port

➢ Status of the radiation dose on site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

- To determine the radiation dose rate on the site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in detail, the area was divided into a 30m square mesh and the radiation dose rate was measured for approx. 3,800 squares from FY2021 to 2024.
- The average dose rate at 1m from the ground surface around Units 1-4 was almost the same compared with FY2023 over an area of T.P.2.5m and increased from 53 to 60μSv/h in T.P. 8.5m area. Major factors behind the increase included the contribution of the result (radiation dose rate: 3,500 μSv/h) measured near the Units 1 and 2 exhaust stack, which were previously inaccessible and measured, but become accessible and were again measured in FY2023.
- If the result measured near the Units 1 and 2 exhaust stack was not included, the average dose rate at 1m from the ground surface was 44 μSv/h, registering a decrease compared with FY2023.
- In addition, in the Units 5 and 6 Shallow Draft Quay area and H Tank area, the average dose rate had decreased compared with FY2023. The decrease was considered attributable to work to install the Japan Trench Tsunami Countermeasures Seawall and dismantling of the contaminated water storage tank (E Tank), respectively.

- The driving survey of on-site major roads, the dose rate decreased on roads on the west and south sides of the High Temperature Incinerator Building.

Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

➢ Staff management

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from December 2023 to February 2024 was approx. 9,500 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), which exceeded the monthly average workforce (approx. 8,000). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in May 2024 (approx. 4,600 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day for each month (actual values) for the most recent 2 years were maintained, at approx. 3,500 to 4,700.
- The number of workers from within Fukushima Prefecture remained constant and that from outside decreased slightly. The local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) as of March 2024 remained constant at around 70%.
- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.60, 2.51 and 2.16 mSv/person-year during FY2020, 2021 and 2022, respectively (The legal exposure dose limits are 100 and 50 mSv/person-year respectively over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose remained sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.



Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers weekday per day for each month of the most recent 2 years (actual values)



Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker
(monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

➢ FY2023 accident occurrence status and FY2024 safety activity plan

- The number of work accidents in FY2023 decreased slightly to 21 from 23 in FY2022, but remained high. Issues need to be analyzed and accident prevention measures must continue to be added, reviewed and improved. There were no serious injuries (incapacitating workers for 14 days or more) (three in FY2022). Accidents with incapacitating workers (for one day or more) halved to two from four in FT2022.
- The number of heat stroke cases in FY2023 decreased to seven (degree-II: one case; degree-I: four cases; dehydration: two cases) from ten (degree-I: six cases; dehydration: four cases) in FY2022. In FY2023, there were one case diagnosed as degree II and one case of slight-1 (with incapacitating). As a characteristic in FY2023, there were cases of “onset in less than two hours from starting work” and “work wearing full-face masks.” Strengthened management of work will be reflected in the heat-stroke prevention plan to prevent the cases.
- In FY2024, as in FY2023, “efforts to thoroughly ensure safety actions” and “efforts to conduct safety activities together with partners (prime contractors) and TEPCO” continue to be set as the focused activities. In particular, for the first focused activity, by thoroughly eliminating on-site risks through a series of safety management measures, including “on-site KY” and “after KY,” any accidental injuries or fatalities will be prevented.

➢ Health management of workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

- As health management measures in line with the guidelines of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (issued in August 2015), a scheme was established and operated, whereby prime contractors confirmed reexamination at medical institutions and the subsequent status of workers who were diagnosed as requiring “detailed examination and treatment” in the health checkup, with TEPCO confirming the operation status by the prime contractors.
- The recent report on the management status of the health checkup during the 3rd quarter (October – December) in FY2023 confirmed that the prime contractors had provided appropriate guidance and managed operations properly under the scheme. The report on the follow-up status during the second quarter in FY2023 and before confirmed that responses to workers, which had not been completed by the time of the previous report, were being provided on an ongoing basis and checking of operations will continue.

➢ Countermeasures for infectious diseases

- Countermeasures for various infectious diseases (influenza, norovirus, COVID-19, etc.) depend on personal decisions and basic countermeasures (visiting medical institutions when feeling unwell, ventilation, avoidance of the “Three Cs,” frequent handwashing, etc.) being implemented appropriately by each worker and TEPCO proceeds with decommissioning while prioritizing safety.
- As in previous years, to prevent the spread of influenza infections and serious infections, a vaccination program of influenza had been implemented since October 2023 until January 2024 for TEPCO HD employees and cooperating company workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station who wish to be vaccinated.

Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

"The highest value" → "the latest value (sampled during March 25 - April 22)"; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Summary of TEPCO data as of April 23, 2024

Note: The Total β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

Cesium-134	:	ND(0.30)		
Cesium-137	:	0.52		
Total β	:	ND(11)		
Toritium	:	ND(1.7)	*1	

Cesium-134	:	3.3 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.32)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	:	7.3 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.28)	Below 1/20
Total β	:	69 (H25/8/19)	→	15	Below 1/4
Toritium	:	68 (H25/8/19)	→	0.43	Below 1/100

Cesium-134	:	3.3 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.40)	Below 1/8
Cesium-137	:	9 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.26)	Below 1/30
Total β	:	74 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/5
Toritium	:	67 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.8)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134	:	3.5 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.33)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	:	7.8 (H25/10/17)	→	ND(0.30)	Below 1/20
Total β	:	79 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/5
Toritium	:	60 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.3)	Below 1/40

Cesium-134	:	4.4 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.34)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	:	10 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.24)	Below 1/40
Total β	:	60 (H25/7/4)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/4
Toritium	:	59 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.8)	Below 1/30

Cesium-134	:	32 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.35)	Below 1/90
Cesium-137	:	73 (H25/10/11)	→	1.2	Below 1/60
Total β	:	320 (H25/8/12)	→	13	Below 1/20
Toritium	:	510 (H25/9/2)	→	2.1	Below 1/200

Cesium-134	:	5 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.39)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	:	8.4 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.31)	Below 1/20
Total β	:	69 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(14)	Below 1/4
Toritium	:	52 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(1.3)	Below 1/40

Cesium-134	:	ND(0.40)
Cesium-137	:	3.8
Total β	:	13
Toritium	:	23 ※1



Sea side impermeable wall
Silt fence
Silt fence for construction

Cesium-134	:	2.8 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.34)	Below 1/8
Cesium-137	:	5.8 (H25/12/2)	→	ND(0.30)	Below 1/10
Total β	:	46 (H25/8/19)	→	15	Below 1/3
Toritium	:	24 (H25/8/19)	→	ND(2.0)	Below 1/10

Cesium-134	:	5.3 (H25/8/5)	→	ND(0.37)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	:	8.6 (H25/8/5)	→	0.40	Below 1/20
Total β	:	40 (H25/7/3)	→	13	Below 1/3
Toritium	:	340 (H25/6/26)	→	ND(1.7)	Below 1/200

*1: Monitoring commenced in or after March 2014. Monitoring inside the sea-side impermeable walls was finished because of the landfill.

*2: For the point, monitoring was finished from December 12, 2018 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.

*3: For the point, monitoring point was moved from February 6, 2019 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float. The point was further moved to the outside of the silt fence from January 20, 2023, to install the silt fence to the Drainage Channel K outlet as a measure for fish in the port. (The sampling point was moved to approx.. 3m east side)

*4: For the point, monitoring was finished from April 3, 2019 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.

*5: For the point, monitoring point was moved to the land side from May 25, 2023 along with work in the surrounding area.

*6: For the point, with the completion of work to install ALPS related facilities and others, monitoring point was moved from "In front of Unit 6 intake" to "In front of Unit 5 intake" from July 3, 2023.

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Total β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html

Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port
(comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

(The latest values sampled during March 25 - April 22)

Summary of TEPCO data as of April 23, 2024

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Total β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

【Northeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.31)	
Cesium-137	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.31)	
Total β	ND (H25)	→	15	
Toritium	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.33)	

【East side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.34)	
Cesium-137	1.6 (H25/10/18)	→	ND(0.25)	Below 1/2
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(13)	
Toritium	6.4 (H25/10/18)	→	ND(0.30)	Below 1/20

【Southeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.34)	
Cesium-137	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.30)	
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(13)	
Toritium	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.33)	

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.32)	
Cesium-137	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.35)	
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(13)	
Toritium	4.7 (H25/8/18)	→	ND(0.33)	Below 1/10

【North side of north breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

Cesium-134	3.3 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.32)	Below 1/10
Cesium-137	7.3 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.28)	Below 1/20
Total β	69 (H25/8/19)	→	15	Below 1/4
Toritium	68 (H25/8/19)	→	0.43	Below 1/100

【Port entrance】

【South side of south breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.31)	
Cesium-137	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.33)	
Total β	ND (H25)	→	ND(13)	
Toritium	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.33)	

Cesium-134	1.8 (H25/6/21)	→	ND(0.62)	Below 1/2
Cesium-137	4.5 (H25/3/17)	→	ND(0.65)	Below 1/6
Total β	12 (H25/12/23)	→	8.5	
Toritium	8.6 (H25/6/26)	→	ND(0.33)	Below 1/20

【North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet】

Cesium-134	ND (H25)	→	ND(0.63)	
Cesium-137	3 (H25/7/15)	→	ND(0.68)	Below 1/4
Total β	15 (H25/12/23)	→	12	
Toritium	1.9 (H25/11/25)	→	ND(0.34)	Below 1/2

【Near south release outlet (*)】



Sea side impermeable wall

Silt fence

Silt fence for construction

Note: The Total β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L).
They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

*: Because safety of the sampling points was unassured due to the influence of Typhoon No. 10 in 2016, samples were taken from approx. 330 m south of the Unit 1-4 release outlet.
Samples were also taken from a point approx. 280m south from the same release outlet from January 27, 2017 and approx. 320m from March 23, 2018.

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommision/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html

TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site Layout

Appendix 2
April 25, 2024

- Rubble storage area
- Used protective clothing
- Trimmed trees area
- Mid-/ low-level contaminated water
- Secondary waste from water treatment
- Waste treatment facility
- Non-controlled facility
- Analysis and research facility

MP-1 Temporary trimmed trees storage pool
MP-2
MP-3
MP-4
MP-5
MP-6
MP-7
MP-8 Temporary trimmed trees storage pool
Trimmed trees
Rubble
Used protective clothing
Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator
1st Large Waste Storage
10th Waste Storage Facility (under construction)
Volume Reduction Facility
Radioactive Waste Incinerator
Futaba town
Unit 6
Unit 5
Downstream Pool
Upstream Pool
Town boundary
Vehicles maintenance site
3-9th Waste Storage Facilities
Water treatment facility for Sub-drain
Periodical Inspection Material Storage (cutting of flanged-tanks)
1 and 2nd Waste Storage Facilities
JAEA Analytical Facility Management Building
JAEA Analytical Facility Laboratory-1
Temporary Cask Custody Area
High-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment
Main Anti-Earthquake Building
K1 North
K2
K3
K4
K1 South
Multi-nuclide removal equipment
Additional multi-nuclide removal equipment
Measurement/ Confirmation Tank
Large equipment
Spent absorption vessel temporary storage
Vehicle screening and decontamination site
Land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Mega float
Okuma town
Sea side impermeable wall
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
D
E
F
Underground reservoirs
Partner Companies' Building
Groundwater bypass temporary storage tank
Common pool
2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (HTI Building)
Water desalinations (RO)
Cesium absorption apparatus (Incineration Workshop Building)
Decontamination instruments (Process main Building)
3rd cesium adsorption apparatus (Onsite Bunker Building)
Onsite Bunker Building
Temporary rest house outside the site
New Administration Office Building
Heliport
Large rest house
Access Control Building
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J8
J9
Water desalinations (evaporative concentration)
Water desalinations (RO)
Cesium Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility
Temporary Waste Sludge Storage
Spent Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage Facility
G1
G1 South
G3・G4・G5
G6
G7
B
C
Tank installation status
Site boundary


1st Large Waste Storage Facility


Radioactive Waste Incinerator

10th Waste Storage Facility


Volume Reduction Facility


Solid Waste Storage Facility


Temporary waste sludge storage


Spent adsorption vessel temporary storage facility


Access Control Building


Large rest house


Heliport


New Administration Office Building


Tank installation status

Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corporation, photo taken on January 14, 2024
Product(C) [2024] Maxar Technologies.

1 Contaminated water management

- Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on three basic policies:
  ① "Remove" the source of water contamination ② "Redirect" fresh water from contaminated areas
  ③ "Retain" contaminated water from leakage

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 150 m³/day or less (within 2020)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less (within 2025)
- [Completed] Treatment of contaminated water in buildings was completed* (within 2020) *Except for Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High Temperature Incinerator Building.
- [Completed] Contaminated water in Reactor Buildings was reduced to about a half of the level at the end of 2020 (FY2022-FY2024)

April 25, 2024
Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Contaminated water management【Remove】

Contaminated water treatment facility
- ▽Reception start of contaminated water to Central Waste Treatment Building
- ▽Decontamination equipment (AREVA)
- ▽Evaporative concentration equipment
- ▽Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)
- ▽2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)
- Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)
- ▽Treatment of RO-condensed salt water complete
- ▽Reduction of strontium by Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) (from 2015.1.6)
- ▽Reduction of strontium by 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY) (from 2014.12.26)
- ▽Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete
- ▽Purification of strontium-reduced water complete
- ▽Reduction of strontium by 3rd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY II) (from 2019.7.12)
- Landing of the second Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)
- ▽Treatment start of strontium-reduced water (ALPS: from 2015.12.4, additional: from 2015.5.27, high-performance: from 2015.4.15)
- ▽Multi-nuclide Removal Equipment (ALPS) (System A: from 2013.3.30, System B: from 2013.6.13, System C: from 2013.9.27, hot tests conducted)
- ▽Multi-nuclide Removal Equipment (additional ALPS)
- ▽Start of full-scale operation (from 2017.10.16)
- ▽Multi-nuclide Removal Equipment (high performance ALPS) (from 2014.10.18, hot tests conducted)
- ▽Pre-service inspection granted (2023.3.2)
- Multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS)

Removal of contaminated water from seawater pipe trench
- ▽Trench Purification by mobile equipment
- ▽Completion of tunnel filling
- ▽Transfer of stagnant water complete
- ▽Completion of shaft filling
- Unit 2
- ▽Completion of tunnel filling
- ▽Transfer of stagnant water complete
- ▽Completion of shaft filling (except for upper part of Shaft D)
- 【Removal of contaminated water in seawater pipe trench】
- Unit 3
- ▽Completion of tunnel filling
- ▽Filling of openings II and III complete
- ▽Transfer stagnant water complete
- ▽Completion of filling parts running over drainage channel
- Unit 4
- Unit 2 seawater pipe trench Shaft D filling work



Suppressing the average amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 90 m³/day ▽

Contaminated water management【Redirect】

Groundwater bypass
- ▽Installation start of groundwater bypass
- ▽Operation start of groundwater bypass (drainage started from 2014.5.21)

Sub-drain
- ▽Recovery of existing sub-drain pit and start of new installation
- ▽Installation start of Water-Treatment Facility special for Sub-drain & Groundwater drains
- ▽Operation start of sub-drain (drainage started from 2015.9.14) (Treatment capacity: 1000 m³/day)
- ▽Enhancement of treatment capacity (2000m³/day)
- Pumping well

Land-side impermeable wall
- ▽Start of maintenance operation on north and south sides
- ▽Freezing completion
- ▽Start of maintenance operation in all sections
- In some temperature measurement tubes near the K drainage ▽ channel cross, temperature exceeded 0℃ locally
- ▽Installation start of land-side impermeable walls
- ▽Freezing start
- Start of maintenance operation on east side▽
- ▽Freezing completion (except for some parts)
- Although no influence was detected on the impermeable function of the land-side impermeable walls but test investigation is underway for the stoppage effect
- Land-side impermeable wall brine (refrigerant) circulation pipe

Facing
- ▽Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for areas of 2.5 and 6.5m above sea level and around Unit 1-4)
- ▽Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for around Unit 1-4)

Sub-drain purification system

Contaminated water management【Retain】

Bank groundwater measures
- ▽Completion
- detected from observation well of bank
- ▽Start of pumping of water from contaminated areas (well point)
- ▽Installation start of seaside impermeable walls
- ▽Installation of seaside impermeable walls complete
- ▽Operation start of groundwater drain (pumping-up started on 2015.11.5)
- Placement of seaside impermeable walls complete

Storage facility
- ▽Completion of purification treatment of RO concentrated salt water
- ▽Storage in steel square tanks
- ▽Completion of replacement of steel square tanks
- ntal tanks complete (except for condensed waste liquid storage tank)
- ▽Water leakage (300L) from flanged tank
- ▽Water leakage (100t) from flanged tank
- ▽Storage in flanged cylindrical tanks
- ▽Water leakage (10L) from flanged tank
- ▽Completion of fence to prevent leakage expanding
- ▽Work to raise fence height complete
- ▽Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete
- ▽Transfer and storage of all treated water in welded-joint tanks
- ▽Leakage of contaminated water from underground reservoir => Start of transfer to tanks
- ▽Transfer of contaminated water to tanks complete
- ▽Storage in cylindrical steel welded-joint tanks
- ▽Purification of strontium-reduced water com
- Flanged and welded-joint tanks
- ▽Sprinkling start of rainwater within tank fences by rainwater treatment facility (from 2014.5.21)
- Construction of welded-joint tanks

Treatment of stagnant water
- ▽Start to maintain water-level difference with sub-drain water level
- ▽Installation of stagnant water transfer equipment/transfer start
- ▽Completion of work to improve reliability of transfer line (replacement with PE pipes)
- ▽Transfer start from each building to Central Rw Building
- ▽Treatment of stagnant water in buildings complete
- ▽Reduction of contaminated water in the Reactor Buildings to approx. half of the level at the end of 2020 achieved
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 1 T/B
- ▽Separation of stagnant water between Units 1 and 2
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 1 Rw/B
- ▽Separation of stagnant water between Units 3 and 4
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 2 T/B, Rw/B
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 3 T/B, Rw/B
- ▽Floor exposure of Unit 4 R/B, T/B, Rw/B
- ▽Completed lowering to target water level of Unit 2 R/B
- ▽Completed lowering to target water level of Unit 1, 3 R/B

Countermeasures to tsunami

Closure of openings
- ▽Examination start of measures to close building openings
- ▽Work for Units 1 and 2 T/B complete
- ▽Work for common pool complete
- ▽Work for HTI building complete
- ▽Work for Process Main Building complete
- ▽Work for Unit 3 T/B complete
- ▽Work for Unit 1-3 R/B complete
- ▽Measures to close openings were completed
- ▽Work for Units 1-4 Rw/B was completed

Seawall
- ▽Installation of outer-rise tsunami seawall complete
- ▽Construction start of Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall
- Japan Trench tsunami seawall
- ▽Completion of installation ▽On-site start
- Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall Completion of main wall construction▽

Mega float
- ▽Start of marine construction
- ▽Internal filling complete (reduction of tsunami risks)
- Temporary grounding of mega float▽


Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall complete

Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall

2 Handling of ALPS treated water

In “The Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated water and Decommissioning” held on April 13, the basic policy on how to handle ALPS treated water was set. Based on this, the response of TEPCO was announced on April 16.

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.





Information provision and communication to foster understanding

■ Occasions to deepen the understanding are organized by communications related to decommission via various media and visit to the power station.

■ On the dedicated website “Treated Water Portal Site” (Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean) within the TEPCO website, monitoring results of radioactive materials are published timely.


Dialogue meeting

■ Visit and dialogue meeting of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since 2019 for 13 cities, towns and villages.

■ Through various opportunities such as visit and on-site explanations, communications continue where opinions of related parties are heard, their thought is taken seriously, and TEPCO conveys its efforts, thought and countermeasures for reputational damage.

● Status of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea commenced from August 24, 2023, and the 1st discharge was completed on September 11.

During the discharge period, no abnormality was detected by the sea area monitoring conducted by the national government, Fukushima Prefecture and TEPCO.

<Discharges in FY2023>

Tank group discharged	Tank Group B	Tank Group C	Tank Group A	Tank Group B
Tritium concentration	140,000 Bq/L	140,000 Bq/L	130,000 Bq/L	170,000 Bq/L
Discharge commencement	August 24, 2023	October 5, 2023	November 2, 2023	February 28, 2024
Discharge termination	September 11, 2023	October 23, 2023	November 20, 2023	March 17, 2024
Discharge amount	7,788 m^3	7,810 m^3	7,753 m^3	7,794 m^3
Total tritium amount	1.1 trillion Bq	1.1 trillion Bq	1.0 trillion Bq	1.3 trillion Bq

● Rearing test of marine organisms

- To alleviate concerns and lead to relief of local residents, related parties and the everyone in society, marine orgasms are being reared in tanks of seawater containing ALPS treated water and the status is compared with the original seawater controls.
- External experts also confirmed that there was no difference in rearing statuses between the tanks of the original seawater controls and those of seawater containing ALPS treated water.
- As shown in the existing research results conducted in Japan and overseas, it was confirmed that “tritium in vivo reached equilibrium in a certain time period and the concentration of tritium in vivo reaching equilibrium did not exceed the level in the growing environment.”


Flounder in rearing preparation tank


Overall view of mockup tanks

- Daily rearing status is published in the TEPCO website and Twitter
  - TEPCO website: http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/information/newsrelease/breedingtest/index-j.html
  - TEPCO X (Old Twitter): https://twitter.com/TEPCOfishkeeper

● Publication of the Comprehensive Report of the IAEA safety review

The Comprehensive Report on the safety review concerning handling of ALPS -treated water was published by the IAEA on July 4, 2023.

In the Executive Summary of the IAEA Comprehensive Report, the IAEA concluded the following: (1) the activities by Japan associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

We will continue to share necessary information with the IAEA, while striving to foster further understanding of the international community about the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-alps-treated-water-discharge-comprehensive-reports

Examination concerning handling of ALPS treated water

Tritiated Water Taskforce (2013.12 – 2016.5, 15 meetings)


Tank area viewed from the Large Rest House (2015.10.29)

2016.6 Report of Tritiated Water Taskforce

Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water (2016.11 – 2020.1, 17 meetings)

2018.8 Explanatory and hearing meeting, receiving opinions

2020.2 Report of Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water

Opportunity for receiving opinions from parties concerned concerning handling of ALPS treated water (2020.4 – 2020.10, 7 meetings)

2021.4.13 The basic policy on the handling of ALPS treated water was set
2021.4.16 The response of TEPCO was announced

2021.12.21 The “Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Specified Nuclear Facility” regarding ALPS treated water were submitted to the Nuclear Regulation Authority
2021.12.28 “The Action Plan concerning the Continuous Implementation of the Basic Policy on Handling of ALPS Treated Water” was formulated

Review meeting concerning the implementation plan on handling of ALPS treated water (from 2021.7 to 2022.4, 15 meetings)

2022.4.28, 5.13, 7.15 Application to partially revise the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted

2022.7.22 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was approved

2022.8.4 Work has commenced

2022.8/30 The "Approach to Strengthening and Expansion of Measures in the Handling of ALPS Treated Water" was summarized

2022.11.14 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)

2023.2.14, 20 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)

2023.5.10 Approval

2023.6.26 Completion of installation

2023.7.7 Receipt of Certificate of Completion for Pre-service Inspections

2023.8.24 Commencement of discharge

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

3 Removal of fuel from spent pool

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

- Completion of Unit 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)
- Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023), start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)
- Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026)

April 25, 2024
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Contaminated Water and Treated Water

Legend: Rubble removal, etc. | Installing a fuel removal machine | Fuel removal | Storage and handling of fuel

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024～

Unit 1

For Unit 1, a large cover will be installed over the whole building, within which rubble will be removed.

<Reference> Progress to date
Rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 2018 and has been implemented sequentially. In July and August 2019, the well plug, which was misaligned, was investigated, followed in August and September by the conditions of the overhead crane. Based on the results of these investigations, as the removal requires more careful work taking dust scattering into consideration, two methods were examined: Installing a cover after rubble removal, initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, then removing rubble inside the cover.



Rubble removal (image)



Fuel removal (image)

As part of efforts to remove fuel from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, investigations are underway to ascertain the conditions of the fallen roof on the south side and the contamination of the well plug. Based on the results, "the method initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, then removing rubble within the cover" was selected to ensure safer and more secure removal. Work to install a large cover started from August 2021. Work to complete the installation of a large cover by around FY2023 is ongoing, with fuel removal scheduled to run from FY2027 to FY2028.

▼2017.12 Completion of building cover dismantling and windbreak fence installation
▼2018.1-2020.12 Rubble removal on the north side of Reactor Building
▼2018.9-12 Removal of X-braces
▼2020.3-6 Installation of spent fuel pool cover
▼2020.9-11 Measures to prevent and alleviate rubble falling
▼2020.11-2021.6 Dismantling of remaining cover
▼2021.8 Start of large cover pre-work
▼2022.4 Start of large cover installation work



<Unit 1 northwest side 2024.1.24>

Unit 2

For Unit 2, with the removal of spent fuel in mind, a "gantry for fuel removal" (gantry and front room) will be constructed on the south side of the building.



Unit 2 Overview of fuel removal (bird's-eye view)

<Reference> Progress to date
Previously, scope to recover the existing overhead crane and the fuel-handling machine was examined. However, the high radiation dose inside the operating floor meant the decision was taken to dismantle the upper part of the building in November 2015. Findings from internal investigations of the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019 underlined the potential to conduct limited work there and the means of accessing from the south side was examined.


<Unit 2 Construction of gantry for fuel removal>

▼2018.8-2020.12 Moving and containment of remaining objects
▼2020.6 Investigation inside the spent fuel pool
▼2021.6-2022.1 Decontamination of R/B operating floor (1)
▼2021.9-2022.5 Shielding installation in R/B operating floor (1)
▼2022.5-2022.6 Transfer of FHM
▼2022.7-2023.1 Removal and clean-up of FHM operation room
▼2022.12-2023.3 Removal of existing facilities in operating floor
▼2023.4-2023.11 Decontamination of R/B operating floor (2)
▼2023.11- Shielding of R/B operating floor (2)
▼2015.3-2016.11 Yard construction
▼2016.9-2017.4 West-side gantry installation work
▼2017.5 Opening a hole in the west-side external wall
▼2021.10-2022.4 Ground improvement work
▼2023.1 Start of steel erection
▼2023.2 Start of south-side existing facilities dismantling

As part of efforts to remove fuel from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool and based on findings from internal operating floor investigations from November 2018 to February 2019, instead of fully dismantling the upper part of the building, the decision was made to install a small opening on the south side and use a boom crane. Examination continues to initiate fuel removal from FY2024 to FY2026.

Unit 3

All fuel assemblies from Unit 3 had been removed by February 2021.

Overview of the fuel-handling facility inside the cover



Before installing a cover for fuel removal, the process of removing large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training via remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine to be installed on site (February – December 2015). Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.
With fuel removal in mind, rubble retrieval training inside the pool, which was scheduled in conjunction with fuel removal training, started from March 15, 2019 and fuel removal started from April 15, 2019. Fuel removal was completed on February 28, 2021.

▼2013.10 Completion of removal of large rubble on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2015.8 Completion of removal of the fuel-handling machine B within the spent fuel pool
▼2016.12 Completion of shielding on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2017.1 Installation start of a cover for fuel removal
▼2019.4.15 Start of fuel removal
▼2021.2.28 Fuel removal completed (566 assemblies)



<Unit 3 Cover for fuel removal (dome roof) 2019.2.21>

Unit 4

All fuel assemblies from Unit 4 had been removed by December 2014.

▼2011.11- 2012.7 Removal of rubble on the Reactor Building top floor
▼2012.4-2013.3 Ground improvement and foundation work
▼2013.4-2013.7 Installation of external walls and roof panels
▼2013.6-2013.10 Installation of overhead crane and fuel-handling machine
▼2013.8-2013.10 Removal of rubble inside the reactor well and pool
▼2013.11.18 Start of fuel removal
▼2014.12.22 Fuel removal was completed (1533 assemblies)


<Unit 4 Cover for fuel removal>

In the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap, the Phase 1 target involved starting to remove fuel from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completing Step 2 (by December 2013).
On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, namely the first Unit, got underway and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.
On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing fuel removal work, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (two of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)
This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building.


Fuel removal

* Part of the photo is corrected because it includes machine information related to nuclear material protection.

4 Work toward fuel debris retrieval

April 25, 2024
Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Start of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (within 2021 * The schedule will be extended for about 1 year due to the spread of COVID-19 infections)

Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

Unit 1 Investigation overview

・In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore:φ100 mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.

・In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



<Image of investigation>

・In February 2022, the guide ring" was installed to facilitate the investigation. From March 28, 2023, the investigation inside the pedestal by ROV-A2 started and confirmed that a portion of the bar arrangement was exposed. Regarding the soundness of the pedestal, based on the past earthquake resistant evaluation by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), it was evaluated that even though a portion of the pedestal was lost, there would be no serious risk. However, as the present information is very limited, the investigation will continue to acquire as much information as possible for continued evaluation.



<Status inside the PCV (February 9)> <Bar arrangement on the left side of the pedestal opening>

Unit 2 Investigation overview

・In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.

・In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.

・In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.


Bottom of the pedestal (after being processed in panoramic image visualization)



・In October 2020, as part of work to prepare for the PCV internal investigation and trial retrieval, a contact investigation to study deposits inside the penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted, which involved inserting a guide pipe incorporating an investigative unit into the penetration. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck. The investigative information obtained will be utilized in the mockup test of the equipment to remove deposits inside the X-6 penetration.

<Conditions of deposits before and after contact>


<Work in front of the penetration>



<Unit 2 Reactor Building 1st floor Location of the penetration>

Unit 3 Investigation overview

・In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.

・In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.

・In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals.

・Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.

<Conditions inside the pedestal>



Unit 1 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.10)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	2nd (2015.4)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	3rd (2017.3)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (From 2022.2)	Acquiring information inside PCV (inside/outside of the pedestal) - Acquiring images - Measuring deposit thickness and sampling deposit - Detecting deposit debris, 3D mapping
Leakage points from PCV	- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11)	

Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)

Unit 2 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature
	2nd (2012.3)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature - Measuring the dose rate
	3rd (2013.2 – 2014.6)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (2017.1-2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	5th (2018.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	6th (2019.2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature - Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit
Leakage points from PCV	- No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C	

Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)

Unit 3 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2015.10-12)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2015.12)
	2nd (2017.7)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8)
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5)	

Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9)

Images are provided by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

5 Management of solid radioactive waste

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
Eliminating temporary outdoor storage of rubble and others * Except for secondary waste of water treatment and materials for reuse or recycling (within FY2028)

★2017.6 Revision ★2018.6 Revision ★2019.6 Revision ★2020.7 Revision ★2021.7 Revision ★2023.2 Revision ★2023.11 Revision

★ 2016.3 Announcement of Storage Management Plan of Solid Waste (Ver. 1)

▼ 2012.9 Transfer start of rubble to the soil-covered temporary storage facility

▼ 2015.6 Transfer start of rubble to the soil-covered temporary storage facility (Tank 3)

▼ 2013.1 Start of volume reduction of trimmed trees and storage in temporary storage tank A

▼ 2019.6 Start of building construction
1st Large Waste Storage

1st Large Waste Storage Roof construction (from the inside)



<Outline of soil-covered temporary storage facility>


External view of the 9th Solid Waste Storage

▼ 2014.7 Start of pre-work
9th Solid Waste Storage


Whole view of the soil-covered temporary storage facility Tank 3

▼ 2018.2 Operation start


2021.1.18

2021.3 High alert issued from the Shallow Draft Quay drainage channel PS monitor▼ (leakage from temporary storage Area W)

▼ 2021.7 Leakage of radioactive materials from a notch tank stored in temporary storage Area P

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

▼ 2013.5 Installation work gets underway
Solid Waste Incinerator

▼ 2016.3 Operation start

▲2016.8-11 Manual stop (due to pin-hole incidence)


Whole view of Solid Waste Incinerator


Electrical room


Control room

Large Equipment Decontamination Facility

▼2022.5 Start of operation

▼ 2017.4 Start of pre-work
Additional Solid Waste Incinerator

2017.10 Installation work gets

▼ 2018.5 Operation start
Large Equipment Decontamination Facility

Whole view of Solid Waste Incinerator (Left: System A; right: System B)

▼ 2020.9 Start of pre-work
Compaction Facility

2024.2 Start of operation ▼


[2023/4/25]
Site of Volume Reduction Facility

Present status Note

Storage of rubble and others

Present storage Approx.520,000 m³ (as of 2023.3)

Rubble (combustible), trimmed trees, used protective clothing)

Contaminated soil (0.005 - 1 mSv/h)

Rubble (metal, concrete, others)

More than 1 mSv/h

0.005-1 mSv/h

Less than 0.005mSv

Storage of water treatment secondary waste

Estimate for the next decade (or so) Approx.**760,000** m³

(*2)

Approx. 300,000 m³ — To (A) (*1) — Incineration

Approx. 70,000 m³ — Stored and managed in Solid Waste Storage as done for rubble

Approx. 60,000 m³ — (B)

Approx. 140,000 m³ — To (A) (*1) — Volume reduction

Approx. 180,000 m³ — To (A) (*1) — Volume reduction

Approx. 7,400 tanks — Treatment measures and others will be examined — To (B)

Status after a decade

(*3) Legend : Newly installed equipment and facility

Incineration

Incinerator Pre-treatment Facility
(scheduled for completion in FY2025)


Crusher example

- Radioactive Waste Incinerator
- Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator (Completion in May 2022)

Volume reduction

Compaction Facility
(scheduled for completion in FY2022)


Concrete crusher example


Metal cutter example

Melting

Melting equipment
(under consideration)


Electric furnace example

Approx. **290,000** m³ (*2)

Storage /management

Approx. 20,000 m³ — Solid Waste Storage (Storage capacity: approx. 250,000 m³)

Existing Solid Waste Storage
1st-8th (existing)
9th (Operation launch in 2018.2)

Approx. 70,000 m³

(A) (*1) Approx. 80,000 m³

(B) Approx. 60,000 m³

Approx. 50,000 m³

Additional Solid Waste Storage
10th-11th
(Scheduled for completion after FY2024)

Based on the estimates for the amount of waste to be generated, the storage capacity (approx. 250,000 m³) will be reached in around 2031. Scope to install an additional solid waste facility and others will be examined

(*1) Reuse will be examined

Spent Adsorption Vessel Temporary Storage

Large Waste Storage
(Scheduled for completion FY2025)
The earthquake-resistant design is being reviewed based on the Fukushima prefecture offshore earthquake in FY2021


Work of main part

(*1) Items for which incineration, compaction, melting or reuse is difficult are stored directly in Solid Waste Storage without being treated
(*2) As values less than 10,000 m³ are rounded, they may not be consistent with the total of breakdown
(*3) In the estimate, approx. 240,000 m³ of waste will be stored in Solid Waste Storage at the end of FY2028.

Note: Used protective clothing before incineration and BG-level concrete waste for which treatment and reuse is decided at present are not included.

- The exposure dose at the site boundaries will be reduced by aggregation to indoor storage and eliminating outdoor storage.
- The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.

6 Improvement of work environment

While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

Regarding the site-wide reduction in the radiation dose and prevention of contamination spreading, the radiation dose on site was reduced by removal of rubble, topsoil and facing. Moreover, the operation was improved to use environmentally-improved areas as a Green Zone, within which workers are allowed to wear general work clothes and disposable dust-protective masks which are less of a physical burden.

2011 2012年 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023～

▼ From March 12, 2011, in response to the increased airborne concentration of radioactive materials, instructions were issued to wear full-face masks throughout the Fukushima Daiichi NPS site, excluding the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the rest house.

▼ From May 2013, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded sequentially.

▼ In June 2013, operation of the Access Control Facility started near the main gate of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, to which duties conducted at J-village were shifted, including contamination examination, decontamination, switching protective equipment on and off and distribution/collection of dosimeters.

External view of Access Control Facility

Large rest house under construction (2014.9.30)

▼ To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 88 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 2015. These monitors allow workers to confirm on-site dose rates at their workplaces in real time.

▼ In March 2015, the Fukushima revitalization meal service center opened.

▼ A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced in May 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. In March 2016, a convenience store opened in the large rest house. In April, the shower room went into operation.

Access Control Facility (2014.11.7)

▼ In February 2017, operation started at the Partner Companies' Building next to the New Administration Office Building.

▼ In May 2017, a heliport for emergency transport was installed inside the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and went into operation. Compared to the previous operation (at Koriyama Coast, Futaba Town or Fukushima Daini NPS, relaying to a doctor helicopter), a faster response is available for seriously ill patients requiring treatment at external medical institutions.

▼ From November 2018, from the west-side high-ground area, where Unit 1-4 can be viewed, visitors can see the site in their normal clothes without having to change.



Visit by Governor of Fukushima Prefecture to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2018.11.1)

Visit by Prime Minister Kishida to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2021.10.17)

Visit by Prime Minister Kishida to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2023.8.21)
Observation of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities from high ground on Units 5 and 6side

<Travel survey results of major roads within the site>
It was confirmed that compared with the last fiscal year, the dose rate has been declining on roads near the southeast side of the Unit 4 Turbine Building and the west side of the Process Main Building (area circled by yellow dot line).

<FY2021 4th Quarter> (Measured 2022.2)
<FY2022 4th Quarter> (Measured 2023.2)



▼ In May 2013, areas excluding those around Unit 1-4, tank areas and rubble storage areas were set to full-face mask unnecessary areas.

▼ In May 2015, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded to cover about 90% of the site.

▼ In March 2016, based on the progress of measures to reduce the environmental dosage on site, the site was categorized into two zones: Highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas where limited operation started to optimize protective equipment according to each category.



▼ In March 2017, the G-zone area was expanded (to cover 95% of the whole site).

▼ In May 2018, within about 96% of the site, workers are allowed to wear light equipment such as general workwear and disposable dust-protective masks.



▼ In August 2021, operation started while eliminating the need for the DS2 mask during light work in G-zone outside the protection area around Unit 1-4 (except for inside Units 5 and 6).

Move in general working clothes (2016.1.7)

Facing (2017.4.13)