

Outline of Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water Management

Main decommissioning work and steps

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed on December 22 2014 at Unit 4 and February 28 2021 at Unit 3.

Trial fuel debris retrieval at Unit 2 commenced from September 10 2024 and a milestone of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap


“Commencing fuel debris retrieval at the first Unit” was achieved.

Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and fuel debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident with nearby metal materials etc.

<Milestones in the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap>


Units 1-6	Completion of fuel removal	Within 2031
Unit 1	Start of fuel removal	FY2027 - FY2028
Unit 2	Start of fuel removal	FY2024 - FY2026



Measures for treated water

Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, ongoing efforts will continue, including enhanced monitoring, ensuring objectivity and transparency by engaging with third-party experts and having safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency.



Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

- ① "Removing" the contamination source
- ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
- ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water


- Strontium-reduced water from other equipment is being re-treated in the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS: multi-nuclide removal system) and stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of the building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 70 m³/day (in FY2024). It was confirmed that the milestone of “suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025,” which was achieved in FY2023, has been maintained in FY2024.
- Measures will proceed to further reduce and suppress the amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028.

(2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce the stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment is underway.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- While assessing the dust impact, measures to reduce the stagnant water level were implemented. In March 2023, the target water level in each building was achieved. For the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, "reducing stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024" was achieved.
- For zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building, measures to reduce the radiation dose are being examined with stabilization in mind.

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- As part of the tsunami countermeasures, openings in buildings were closed and work to install sea walls was completed. As countermeasures for heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to enhance drainage channels and other measures is being implemented as planned.



Progress status

- ◆ The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable. There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained.

Status of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Regarding the ALPS treated water discharge facility into the sea, after the inspection of the measurement/confirmation facility tank group C commenced last August, inspections proceeded sequentially. As the inspection of the measurement/confirmation facility tank group B which commenced last November was completed, all scheduled inspections were completed as planned. All inspection results confirmed no abnormalities affecting the discharge process.

Paint blistering and corrosion were detected inside the measurement/confirmation facility tank group B, but it was evaluated that they would not affect the functions of the tank and repair painting was conducted.


In preparation for the second discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea scheduled in June to July FY2025, the circulating/stirring operation commenced from May 9 to homogenize the water quality in the tank group. On May 16, samples were taken from the measurement/confirmation facility tank group C. These will be analyzed to confirm that the discharge criteria are satisfied before the dilution/discharge of ALPS treated water.

Non destructive analysis results of the second fuel debris sample (prompt report)


Samples taken during the second trial fuel debris retrieval were transported to the JAEA Oarai Nuclear Engineering Institute Irradiated Fuel Assembly Test Facility on April 25 and non-destructive analysis commenced on April 28.

The total mass of the samples was 0.187g, the largest was approx. 5mm x approx. 4mm and the dose rate measured inside the container was approx. 0.3 mSv/h. The received fuel debris sample was heterogeneous, overall, lighter in color than the first sample, brownish bronze with black areas and holes found on the surface.

The results of γ-ray spectrometry measurement detected Am-241, and the sample was considered to contain nuclear fuel components. Non-destructive analyses will continue and after compiling the results, a detailed analysis (solid and liquid) will be conducted.



Enlarged photos showing the external appearance of the fuel debris sample (taken from directly above)



Construction of the 10th Solid Waste Storage Facility and operation start of the 10-C Facility

As a facility for the indoor storage of containers enclosing debris generated in decommissioning, the 10th Solid Waste Storage Facility comprising three Facilities (A, B and C) has been installed sequentially. Operation commenced from last August at Facility A and from October at Facility B.

For C Facility, installation work commenced from October 2023. An inspection prior-to-use certificate dated April 25, 2025 was granted and operation commenced, and the entire 10th Solid Waste Storage Facility was completed.


During the next phase, after installing base frames to station containers, indoor storage of containers will commence.



External appearance of the 10-C Facility (February 17, 2025)



Inside the 10-C Facility (April 7, 2025)



Layout of the 10th Solid Waste Storage Facility (From left, A, B and C Facilities)

Major initiatives – Locations on site

Status of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea




Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on January 14, 2024
Product (C) [2024] Maxar Technologies.


I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

Temperatures inside the reactors


Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained as shown below for recent, though they varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.



*1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.
*2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.




Unit 3



Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of April 2025, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 8.4×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ and 7.2×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00003 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



(Reference)

* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
[Cs-134]: 2×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
[Cs-137]: 3×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.286–0.940 μ Sv/h (April 23 – May 27, 2025).
To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.
Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.
Note 3: Dose assessment has been changed since July 2024 due to the change of standard meteorology, etc. in the implementation plan (effective July 8, 2024).

Other indices


There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown state or criticality sign detected.
Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

Measures for contaminated water and treated water

➤ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 70 m³/day (in FY2024). It was confirmed that the milestone of “suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025,” which was achieved in FY2023, has been maintained in FY2024.
- Measures will proceed to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated and suppress to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028.



*1 Values differ from those announced at the 20th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50th and 51st meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.
*2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings

➤ Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains

- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains, release started from September 14, 2015, and up until May 19, 2025, 2688 release operations had been conducted. The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.




Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 subdrains

➤ Implementation status of facing

- Facing is a measure that involves asphaltting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater from infiltrating the ground and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of April 2025, 97% of the planned area (1,450,000 m² on site) had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, implementation proceeds appropriately after constructing a yard from implementable zones that leave the decommissioning work unaffected. As of the end of April 2025, 55% of the planned area (60,000 m²) had been completed.

➤ Status of the groundwater level around buildings

- Regarding the groundwater level in the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, the difference between the inside and outside has remained constant, though the groundwater level on the mountain side varied due to rainfall. The groundwater level of the groundwater drain observation well remained sufficiently lower than the ground surface, at around T.P.+1.4m (the height of the ground surface: T.P.+2.5m).
- Regarding the subdrains of Units 1-4, the pumping amount varied depending on precipitation. The pumping amount in the T.P.+2.5m area remained constant after the facing in this area was completed.

➤ Operation of the multi-nuclide removal system and other water-treatment facilities

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (existing), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, an inspection prior-to-use certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the entire inspection prior to use was completed. For the multi-nuclide removal system (additional), an inspection prior to use certificate was granted by the NRA on October 12, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted from October 18, 2014. In March 2, 2023, an inspection prior to use certificate was granted by the NRA and the entire inspection prior to use was completed.
- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until May 15, 2025, approx. 790,000 m³ had been treated.


➤ Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water

- To reduce the risks of strontium-reduced water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal system is underway. Up until May 15, 2025, approx. 955,000 m³ had been treated.

➤ Storage status of stagnant water and amount of ALPS treated water, etc. stored in tanks

- The volume of ALPS treated water, etc. was approx. 1,277,229 m³ as of May 15, 2025.
- The total volume of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea since the discharge commenced on August 24, 2023, was approx. 93,997 m³ as of the completion of the first discharge in FY2025.

As of May 15, 2025



(1): Stagnant water storage inside buildings (Units 1-4, Process Main Building, High Temperature Incinerator Building, Waste Liquid Supply Tank, SPT (A), SPT (B), Units 1-3 CST, buffer tank)
(2): Units 1-4 tank storage ([2]-a RO-treated water (fresh water)) + [2]-b Concentrated salt water + [2]-c ALPS treated water, etc. + [2]-d Sr-reduced water, etc. (ALPS pre-treatment water)
*: Water amount from tank bottom to water-level gauge 0% (DS)
*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more
*2: Calculated in the method of contaminated water generated ([Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings] + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)), amount of ALPS treated water discharged was not taken into account.
*3: Amount of Sr-reduced water and others increased and decreased depending on the operation status of facilities due to clog of the cross-flow filter for the multi-nuclide removal system.

Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

➤ Status of discharge of ALPS treated water

As of May 27, 2025

Measurement object	Requirement and operation target	Measurement results	Compliance with requirement
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 4 points within 3 km of the Power Station)	• Discharge suspension level: 700 Bq/L or less • Investigation level: 350 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on May 26) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 6.8-8.5 Bq/L)	○ ○
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 1 point within 10 km square from the Power Station)	• Discharge suspension level: 30 Bq/L or less • Investigation level: 20 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on May 26) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 6.7 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Ministry of the Environment] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 21 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture; 1 point, Miyagi Prefecture, and 1 point, Ibaraki Prefecture,)	• National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L • WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on April 22, 24 and 25) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 9 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (flounder and others)	-	(Sampled on May 20) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 8.0 Bq/kg)	○
[Fukushima Prefecture] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 9 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	• National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L • WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on April 22) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 3.8 – 4.2 Bq/L)	○ ○

- From April 10 to 28, 2025, the first discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2025 was conducted.
- Regarding the status of sea-area monitoring on handling ALPS treated water, more tritium measurement points for seawater and fish were established near the power station and off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and

measurements of tritium and Iodine-129 of seaweed near the power station were added from April 20, 2022. As of May 28, 2025, no significant variation had been detected.

- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 4 points within 3 km of the power station, quick measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on May 26 showed concentrations under the lower detection limit (less than 6.8-8.5 Bq/L) at all points, which were below the TEPCO operation indices of 700 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 350 Bq/L (investigation level).
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 1 point within 10 km square of the power station, quick measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on May 26 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 6.7 Bq/L), which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 30 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 20 Bq/L (investigation level).
- The quick measurement results obtained by each organization were as follows:

Ministry of the Environment: The analytical results (obtained via quick measurements) for seawater sampled on April 22, 24 and 25 at 21 sampling points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture, 1 sampling point off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture and 1 sampling point off the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 9 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

Fisheries Agency: Quick analytical results for tritium in flounder sampled on May 20 showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 8.0 Bq/kg) in all samples.

Fukushima Prefecture: On April 22, tritium concentrations in seawater at 9 sampling points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture below the lower detection limit were recorded (less than 3.8 – 4.2 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

➤ Progress status of handling of zeolite sandbags

- At the Process Main Building (PMB) and High-Temperature Incinerator (HTI) Building, stagnant water will be treated to expose the floors. Prior to the treatment, high-dose zeolite and activated sandbags on the 2nd basement floors will be collected.
- From March 26, 2025, onsite work of “accumulation (Step 1)” commenced on the basement floor of HTI. After trial work and investigation into the implementation status (underwater investigation), the process will be transferred to continuous work.
- At present, accumulation of approx. three rows is almost complete. Water became turbid during the trial work, but the status was confirmed by sonar survey and investigation by camera which was already installed, that work progressed as planned (as tested by mockup).
- Conversely, new interferences (fallen lighting system and others) and movement of already detected anomalous objects (e.g. resembling a locker) were also confirmed. Tests for jigs to move these objects, including their work methods, are being conducted in mockup, but based on the phenomena obtained in this investigation, reevaluation will be conducted.

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.

➤ Progress toward work to remove spent fuel at Unit 1

- Before installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, ground assembly of steel frames in the off-site yard and installation on-site are both underway.
- In the off-site yard, ground assembly of the temporary gantry, upper and lower structures and box ring was completed. Ground assembly of the moving roof is underway. On site, the installation of the upper structure is underway.
- For Unit 1, prior to fuel removal, rubble will be removed inside the large cover. To avoid the risk of the auxiliary hoist of the fuel handling machine falling during rubble removal, an additional cover will be installed over the spent fuel pool (SFP) gate.
- During the mockup test, it was confirmed that even if the auxiliary hoist fell over the additional cover, it would not affect the SFP gate. Installing a large cover box ring would prevent the cover from being carried in. Accordingly, installation of an additional cover over the SFP gate commenced from around April 2025 before installing the box ring.
- Installation of the large cover upper structure will complicate SFP water injection using a concrete pump truck.

Accordingly, to diversify the water injection means in addition to the existing water injection using the SFP cooling facility, a new means of water injection (alternative water injection line) was installed.

➤ Progress toward work to remove spent fuel at Unit 2

- Work to install runway girders, which support the rails to be used when the fuel removal system moves between the Reactor Building and the front chamber, was completed. During the next phase, work on ancillary equipment was conducted as part of efforts to install the fuel-removal system.
- To ensure visibility during fuel removal, a purification system was installed in the spent fuel pool.
- From early May 2025, to prevent contamination spreading during fuel removal, ground assembly of a cornice house, which will expand when the fuel-handling machine is inserted into the Reactor Building, commenced.
- Progress toward work for the fuel removal to be commenced by FY2026 remains steady at present and work prioritizing safety will proceed.

Fuel debris retrieval

➤ Completion of gas purge inside the heat exchanger of the Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-Hx) outlet header pipe to reduce the dose of the Unit 1 RCW-Hx

- The heat exchanger of the Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-Hx) installed on the 2nd floor of the Unit 1 Reactor Building is a high-dose source. Before removing water to reduce the dose, a gas purge after confirming hydrogen concentration inside the RCW-Hx outlet header pipe is planned, because of the potential high dose of stagnant hydrogen gas in the pipe as in the inlet header pipe.
- The gas purge commenced from March 28, 2025. After confirming that the hydrogen concentration inside the pipe was sufficiently reduced, to prevent stagnant hydrogen in the pipe, mechanical drilling of the pipe (opening it up to the atmosphere) was conducted on May 15. No abnormality was confirmed in the dust monitor and PCV parameters after the mechanical drilling.
- On May 16, to confirm the state inside the pipe, a camera was inserted from the drilling part. No deposits as detected inside the inlet header were confirmed and the hydrogen concentration inside the pipe was 0%.
- The purge of stagnant gas inside the inlet and outlet header pipes was completed. Accordingly, water removal of the heat exchanger will commence from the 2nd half of FY2025 to reduce the dose.
- Knowledge acquired in this work will be utilized to examine methods to reduce the dose inside Unit 1, and while investigating the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. For example they will be reflected in the examination concerning the assumption of contamination route of the Unit 1 RDW system.

Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

➤ Management status of rubble and trimmed trees

- As of the end of April 2025, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 408,100 m³ (+1,200 m³ compared to the end of March with an area-occupation rate of 74%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 70,200 m³ (a slight decrease, with an area-occupation rate of 40%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 10,600 m³ (-400 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 42%). The total storage volume of radioactive solid waste (incinerated ash and others) was approx. 38,500 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 60%). The increase in rubble was due to decontamination of flanged tanks, and work related to site preparation, etc.

➤ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment


- As of May 1, 2025, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 471 m³ (area-occupation rate: 67%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,473 m³ (area-occupation rate: 92%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for the multi-nuclide removal system and others, was 5,894 (area-occupation rate: 86%).

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

➤ Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but increased temporarily from April 2020 and is even currently increasing or declining at a low concentration at observation holes including Nos. 0-1, 0-1-2, 0-2, 0-3-1, 0-3-2 and 0-4. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 1-6 and increasing or declining at low concentration at Nos. 1-8, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12 and 1-14. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing and larger fluctuation was seen at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration of cesium has also remained constant as the overall area but been increasing or declining at observation holes with a low concentration and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations will continue, including to ascertain the impact of rainfall.
- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started to pass from August 30, 2022. It has remained low, despite concentrations of cesium and total β radioactive materials increasing during rainfall. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors were installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard started to pass.
- In the open channel area of the seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite the temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. Regarding the concentration of Cs-137, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Units 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. Regarding the concentration of Sr-90, variation was observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of weather, marine

meteorology and others. During the period for which ALPS treated water was discharged, the tritium concentration increased at the sampling point near the discharge outlet, but this was considered within the assumed range based on the oceanic dispersion simulation results.






Figure 5: Seawater concentration around the port

Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

➤ Staff management

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from January – March 2025 was approx. 9,100 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), which exceeded the monthly average workforce (approx. 7,900). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in June 2025 (approx. 4,200 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) for the most recent two years were maintained, at approx. 3,500 to 4,900.
- The number of workers from within Fukushima Prefecture decreased slightly and outside, decreased. As of April 2025, the local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) remained constant at around 70%.
- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.16, 2.18 and 2.08 mSv/person-year during FY2022, 2023 and 2024, respectively (The legal exposure dose limits are 100 and 50 mSv/person-year respectively over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose remained sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.





Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker (monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

➤ Status of heat stroke cases

- In FY2025, measures to further prevent heat stroke commenced from April to cope with the hottest season.
- In FY2025, no worker suffered heat stroke due to work up until May 26 (in FY2024, two workers up until the end of May). An environment encouraging workers to report any feelings of illness will continue to be created and countermeasures will be taken to prevent heat stroke.

➤ Countermeasures for infectious diseases

- Countermeasures for various infectious diseases (influenza, norovirus, COVID-19, etc.) depend on personal decisions and basic countermeasures (visiting medical institutions when feeling unwell, ventilation, avoidance of the "Three Cs," frequent handwashing, etc.) being implemented appropriately by each worker and TEPCO proceeds with decommissioning while prioritizing safety.

Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in () represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

(The latest values sampled during April 21 - May 26)

Summary of TEPCO data as of May 27, 2025

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

【Northeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

【East side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

【Southeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134 : ND (H25) → ND(0.27)
Cesium-137 : ND (H25) → ND(0.29)
Total β : ND (H25) → ND(13)
Tritium : ND (H25) → ND(0.34)

Cesium-134 : ND (H25) → ND(0.29)
Cesium-137 : 1.6 (H25/10/18) → ND(0.27) Below 1/2
Total β : ND (H25) → ND(13)
Tritium : 6.4 (H25/10/18) → 0.50 Below 1/10

Cesium-134 : ND (H25) → ND(0.24)
Cesium-137 : ND (H25) → ND(0.26)
Total β : ND (H25) → ND(13)
Tritium : ND (H25) → ND(0.34)

Cesium-134 : ND (H25) → ND(0.37)
Cesium-137 : ND (H25) → ND(0.37)
Total β : ND (H25) → ND(13)
Tritium : 4.7 (H25/8/18) → ND(0.31) Below 1/10

【North side of north breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

【Port entrance】

Cesium-134 : 3.3 (H25/12/24) → ND(0.25) Below 1/10
Cesium-137 : 7.3 (H25/10/11) → 0.34 Below 1/20
Total β : 69 (H25/8/19) → ND(11) Below 1/6
Tritium : 68 (H25/8/19) → 1.2 Below 1/50

【South side of south breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

Cesium-134 : 1.8 (H25/6/21) → ND(0.75) Below 1/2
Cesium-137 : 4.5 (H25/3/17) → ND(0.73) Below 1/6
Total β : 12 (H25/12/23) → 9.5
Tritium : 8.6 (H25/6/26) → 0.36 Below 1/20

Cesium-134 : ND (H25) → ND(0.30)
Cesium-137 : ND (H25) → ND(0.30)
Total β : ND (H25) → ND(13)
Tritium : ND (H25) → ND(0.34)

Cesium-134 : ND (H25) → ND(0.75)
Cesium-137 : 3 (H25/7/15) → ND(0.78) Below 1/3
Total β : 15 (H25/12/23) → 8.8
Tritium : 1.9 (H25/11/25) → ND(0.28) Below 1/2

【North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet】

【Near south release outlet (*)】

Sea side impermeable wall

Silt fence

Silt fence for construction

Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β -ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.

* Due to erosion, the sampling point was moved from approx. 320m south to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet in December 2021. In September 2023, since erosion was eliminated, the sampling point was returned to the original point, approx. 320m south from the south release outlet. Moreover, due to erosion, the sampling point has been moved again to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet since June 11, 2024.

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station <http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html>

Appendix 2
May 29, 2025











- Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on three basic policies:

- "Removing" the contamination source
- "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
- "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 150 m³/day or less (within 2020)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less (within 2025)
- [Completed] Treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed* (within 2020) *Except for Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High Temperature Incinerator Building.
- [Completed] Stagnant water in Reactor Buildings was reduced to about a half of the level at the end of 2020 (FY2022-FY2024)

		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Contaminated water management [Remove]	Contaminated water treatment facility	▽ Reception start of contaminated water to Central Waste Treatment Building ▽ Decontamination equipment (AREVA) ▽ Evaporative concentration equipment ▽ Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) ▽ 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)		 Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)		▽ Treatment of RO-condensed salt water complete				▽ Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete	▽ Purification of strontium-reduced water complete					
	Removal of contaminated water from seawater pipe trench	 Landing of the second Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)	 Multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS)		▽ Multi-nuclide Removal System (ALPS) (System A: from 2013.3.30, System B: from 2013.6.13, System C: from 2013.9.27, hot tests conducted) ▽ Multi-nuclide Removal System (additional ALPS) ▽ Multi-nuclide Removal System (high performance ALPS) (from 2014.10.18, hot tests conducted)	▽ Reduction of strontium by Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) (from 2015.12.4) ▽ Treatment start of strontium-reduced water (ALPS: from 2015.12.4, additional: from 2015.5.27, high-performance: from 2015.4.15) ▽ Multi-nuclide Removal System (from 2014.12.26)		▽ Start of full-scale operation (from 2017.10.16)								
Contaminated water management [Redirect]	Groundwater bypass	 Pumping well	▽ Installation start of groundwater bypass		▽ Operation start of groundwater bypass (drainage started from 2014.5.21)											
	Subdrain		▽ Recovery of existing subdrain pit and start of new installation ▽ Installation start of Water-Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains			▽ Operation start of subdrain (drainage started from 2015.9.14) (Treatment capacity: 1000 m ³ /day)		▽ Completion of shaft filling	Unit 2 seawater pipe trench Shaft D filling work							
	Land-side impermeable wall	 Subdrain purification system		 Land-side impermeable wall brine (refrigerant) circulation pipe	▽ Installation start of land-side impermeable walls		▽ Freezing start	東側にて維持管理運転開始	▽ Freezing completion (except for some parts)							
	Facing					▽ Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for areas of 2.5 and 5.5m above sea level and around Units 1-4)					▽ Completion of waterproof pavement (facing) (except for around Units 1-4)					
Contaminated water management [Retain]	Bank groundwater measures		▽ Concentration of radioactive materials detected from observation well of bank ▽ Installation start of seaside impermeable walls	▽ Area 2.5m above sea level - Start of ground improvement by water glass ▽ Start of pumping of water from contaminated areas (well point)		▽ Completion ▽ Installation of seaside impermeable walls complete ▽ Operation start of groundwater drain (pumping-up started on 2015.11.5)										
	Storage facility	▽ Storage in steel square tanks		▽ Water leakage (300L) from flanged tank ▽ Water leakage (100L) from flanged tank ▽ Completion of fence to prevent leakage expanding ▽ Work to raise fence height complete	▽ Completion of replacement of steel square tanks				▽ Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete ▽ Transfer and storage of all treated water in welded-joint tanks							
		▽ Storage in flanged cylindrical tanks ▽ Water leakage (10L) from flanged tank		▽ Leakage of contaminated water from underground reservoir => Start of transfer to tanks ▽ Transfer of contaminated water to tanks complete ▽ Storage in cylindrical steel welded-joint tanks				 Construction of welded-joint tanks								
Treatment of stagnant water		▽ Installation of stagnant water transfer equipment/transfer start		▽ Completion of work to improve reliability of transfer line (replacement with PE pipes)		▽ Start to maintain water-level difference with subdrain water level ▽ Transfer start from each building to Central R/B Building			▽ Floor exposure of Unit 1 T/B ▽ Separation of stagnant water between Units 1 and 2 ▽ Floor exposure of Unit 1 R/B		▽ Treatment of stagnant water in buildings complete		▽ Reduction of stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to approx. half of the level at the end of 2020 achieved			
									▽ Separation of stagnant water between Units 3 and 4		▽ Floor exposure of Unit 2 T/B, R/B ▽ Floor exposure of Unit 3 T/B, R/B ▽ Floor exposure of Unit 4 R/B, T/B, R/B		▽ Completed lowering to target water level of Unit 2 R/B ▽ Completed lowering to target water level of Units 1, 3 R/B			
Countermeasures to tsunami risks	Closure of openings		▽ Examination start of measures to close building openings ▽ Work for common pool complete	▽ Work for Units 1 and 2 T/B complete ▽ Work for HTI building complete					▽ Work for Process Main Building complete ▽ Work for Unit 3 T/B complete		▽ Work for Units 1-3 R/B complete	▽ Measures to close openings were completed ▽ Work for Units 1-4 R/B was completed				
	Seawall	▽ Installation of outer-rise tsunami seawall complete								▽ Construction start of Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall ▽ Completion of installation ▽ On-site start	Japan Trench Tsunami seawall Completion of main wall construction					
	Mega float								▽ Start of marine construction Temporary grounding of mega float		▽ Internal filling complete (reduction of tsunami risks)					



Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall complete

Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall
<Unit 4 south side>

2 Handling of ALPS treated water



Reference 2/6

May 29, 2025

Secretariat of the Team for
Countermeasures for Decommissioning,
Contaminated Water and Treated Water

In “the Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning Issues” held on April 13, 2021, the basic policy on how to handle ALPS treated water was set. Based on this, the response of TEPCO was announced on April 16.

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.



● Rearing test of marine organisms

All planned marine organisms rearing tests have been completed. The results confirmed by the rearing tests were as follows:

• Marine organisms rearing tests were conducted both in “normal seawater” and in “ALPS treated water diluted with seawater”. The marine organisms in these two environments were compared via rearing data to confirm the absence of any significant differences between the two populations.

• TEPCO confirmed that “tritium is not concentrated in the living bodies and that the concentration of tritium in living bodies does not exceed that of the rearing environment” as demonstrated in previous knowledge.

• Flounders and abalones that were being raised in normal seawater were put in “water discharged into the environment” and TEPCO confirmed that there was no remarkable change in the growth of the flounders or abalones around this time. Flounder and abalone were reared in water discharged into the environment for approximately six months and we confirmed that there is no change in the growth of them.

Information provision and communication to foster understanding

- Occasions to deepen the understanding are organized by communications related to decommission via various media and visit to the power station.

- On the dedicated website “Treated Water Portal Site” (Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean) within the TEPCO website, monitoring results of radioactive materials are published timely.

- Visit and dialogue meeting of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since 2019 for 13 cities, towns and villages.

- Through various opportunities such as visit and on-site explanations, communications continue where opinions of related parties are heard, their thoughts are taken seriously, and TEPCO conveys its efforts, thoughts, and countermeasures for reputational damage.

● Status of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea commenced from August 24, 2023, and the 1st discharge was completed on September 11.

During the discharge period, no abnormality was detected by the sea area monitoring conducted by the national government, Fukushima Prefecture and TEPCO.

<Discharges in FY2025>

Tank group discharged	Tank Group A
Tritium concentration	370,000 Bq/L
Discharge commencement	April 10, 2024
Discharge termination	April 28, 2024
Discharge amount	7,853 m ³
Total tritium amount	Approx. 2.9 trillion Bq


● Publication of the Comprehensive Report of the IAEA safety review

The Comprehensive Report on the safety review concerning handling of ALPS treated water was published by the IAEA on July 4, 2023.

In the Executive Summary of the IAEA Comprehensive Report, the IAEA concluded the following: (1) the activities by Japan associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

We will continue to share necessary information with the IAEA, while striving to foster further understanding of the international community about the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

<https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-alps-treated-water-discharge-comprehensive-reports>



Examination concerning handling of ALPS treated water

Tritiated Water Taskforce (2013.12 – 2016.5, 15 meetings)



2016.6 Report of Tritiated Water Taskforce

Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water (2016.11 – 2020.1, 17 meetings)

2018.8 Explanatory and hearing meeting, receiving opinions

2020.2 Report of Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water

Opportunity for receiving opinions from parties concerned concerning handling of ALPS treated water (2020.4 – 2020.10, 7 meetings)

Review meeting concerning the implementation plan on handling of ALPS treated water (2021.7 - 2022.4, 15 meetings)

2023.8.24 Commencement of discharge

2022.4.28, 5.13, 7.15

Application to partially revise the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted

2022.7.22 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was approved

2022.8.4 Work has commenced

2023.2.14, 20 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)

2023.6.26 Completion of installation

2023.7.7 Receipt of Certificate of Completion for Inspection Prior to Use

2022/8/30 The "Approach to Strengthening and Expansion of Measures in the Handling of ALPS Treated Water" was summarized

2022.11.14 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021


2022

2023

3 Removal of fuel from spent pool

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

- Completion of Units 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)
- Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023), start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)
- Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026)




Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Commencement of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (From September 10, 2024, trial fuel debris retrieval commenced)


Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

Unit 1 Investigation overview

- In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore:φ100 mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



- In February 2022, "the guide ring" was installed to facilitate the investigation. From March 28, 2023, the investigation inside the pedestal by ROV-A2 started and confirmed that a portion of the bar arrangement was exposed. Regarding the soundness of the pedestal, based on the past earthquake resistant evaluation by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), it was evaluated that even though a portion of the pedestal was lost, there would be no serious risk. However, as the present information is very limited, the investigation will continue to acquire as much information as possible for continued evaluation.




Unit 1 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.10)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	2nd (2015.4)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	3rd (2017.3)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (From 2022.2)	Acquiring information inside PCV (inside/outside of the pedestal) - Acquiring images - Measuring deposit thickness and sampling deposit - Detecting deposit debris, 3D mapping
Leakage points from PCV	- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11)	


Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)

Unit 2 Investigation overview

- In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.
- In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.



- In October 2020, a deposits contact investigation at the PCV penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck.




<Conditions of deposits before and after contact>

<Work in front of the penetration>

- From September 10, 2024, the end tool of the telescopic equipment passed through the isolation valve, and the trial fuel debris retrieval commenced. On October 30, fuel debris was gripped with the end tool, on November 2, the guide pipe was pulled off, and the telescopic equipment was stored in the enclosure. On November 7, fuel debris was carried out from the hatch on a side of the enclosure, and the trial retrieval was completed.



Gripping fuel debris with the end tool



Collecting gripped fuel debris in the transportation box

Unit 2 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature
	2nd (2012.3)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature - Measuring the dose rate
	3rd (2013.2 – 2014.6)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (2017.1-2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	5th (2018.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	6th (2019.2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature - Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit
Leakage points from PCV	- No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C	


Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)

Unit 3 Investigation overview

- In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, were investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.
- In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.

<Conditions inside the pedestal>




Unit 3 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2015.10-12)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Acquiring images- Measuring the air temperature and dose rate- Measuring the water level and temperature- Sampling stagnant water- Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2015.12)
	2nd (2017.7)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Acquiring images- Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8)
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5)	
<u>Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons</u> The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9)		


5 Management of solid radioactive waste

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Eliminating temporary outdoor storage of rubble and others * Except for secondary waste of water treatment and materials for reuse or recycling (within FY2028)



● Solid Waste Storage Management Plan for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Revision in December 2024)



- The exposure dose at the site boundaries will be reduced by aggregation to indoor storage and eliminating outdoor storage.
- The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.

6 Improvement of work environment


















Reference 6／6

May 29, 2025

Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for
Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

Regarding the site-wide reduction in the radiation dose and prevention of contamination spreading, the radiation dose on site was reduced by removal of rubble, topsoil and facing. Moreover, the operation was improved to use environmentally-improved areas as a Green Zone, within which workers are allowed to wear general work clothes and disposable dust-protective masks which are less of a physical burden.

2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024~
▼ From March 12, 2011, in response to the increased airborne concentration of radioactive materials, instructions were issued to wear full-face masks throughout the Fukushima Daiichi NPS site, excluding the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the rest house.	 External view of Access Control Facility	▼ From May 2013, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded sequentially. ▼ In June 2013, operation of the Access Control Facility started near the main gate of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, to which duties conducted at J-village were shifted, including contamination examination, decontamination, switching protective equipment on and off and distribution/collection of dosimeters.	 Large rest house under construction (2014.9.30)  Access Control Facility (2014.11.7)	▼ To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 2015. These monitors allow workers to confirm on-site dose rates at their workplaces in real time. ▼ In March 2015, the Fukushima revitalization meal service center opened. ▼ A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced in May 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. In March 2016, a convenience store opened in the large rest house. In April, the shower room went into operation.	 Facing (2017.4.13)  Move in general working clothes (2016.1.7)	 Facing (2017.4.13)  Partner Companies' Building	 Facing (2017.4.13) ▼ In February 2017, operation started at the Partner Companies' Building next to the New Administration Office Building. ▼ In May 2017, a heliport for emergency transport was installed inside the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and went into operation. Compared to the previous operation (at Koriyama Coast, Futaba Town or Fukushima Daini NPS, relaying to a doctor helicopter), a faster response is available for seriously ill patients requiring treatment at external medical institutions.	▼ From November 2018, from the west-side high-ground area, where Units 1-4 can be viewed, visitors can see the site in their normal clothes without having to change.  Visit by Governor of Fukushima Prefecture to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2018.11.1)  Visit by Prime Minister Kishida to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2021.10.17)	 Visit by Prime Minister Ishiba to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2024.12.14) (Left) Observation of the decommissioning state at high ground from which whole view of Units 1-4 can be seen (Right) Encouragement from Prime Minister Ishiba	<Travel survey results of major roads within the site> Compared with the last fiscal year, the dose rate was reduced on roads on the east side of Units 1-4 (area of black dot in the figure). In the area, the dose rate reduction is considered attributable to the construction of sea walls and others. <FY2023 4th Quarter> (Measured in February 2024)  Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., ©DigitalGlobe <FY2024 4th Quarter> (Measured in March 2025)  Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., ©DigitalGlobe	▼ In August 2021, operation started while eliminating the need for the DS2 mask during light work in G-zone outside the protection area around Unit 1-4 (except for inside Units 5 and 6). 		
		▼ In May 2013, areas excluding those around Unit 1-4, tank areas and rubble storage areas were set to full-face mask unnecessary areas. 		▼ In May 2015, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded to cover about 90% of the site.	▼ In March 2016, based on the progress of measures to reduce the environmental dosage on site, the site was categorized into two zones: Highly contaminated area around Units 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas where limited operation started to optimize protective equipment according to each category.  Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., ©DigitalGlobe		▼ In May 2018, within about 96% of the site, workers are allowed to wear light equipmentsuch as general workwear and disposable dust-protective masks.  Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., ©DigitalGlobe						