

Outline of Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water Management

Main decommissioning work and steps


Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed on December 22, 2014, at Unit 4 and on February 28, 2021, at Unit 3. Trial fuel debris retrieval at Unit 2 commenced on September 10, 2024, and a milestone of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap "Commencing fuel debris retrieval at the first Unit" was achieved.

Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and fuel debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies that melted during the accident along with nearby metal materials, etc.

<Milestones in the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap>

| Units 1-6 | Completion of fuel removal | Within 2031 |
|-----------|----------------------------|-----------------|
| Unit 1 | Start of fuel removal | FY2027 - FY2028 |
| Unit 2 | Start of fuel removal | FY2024 - FY2026 |




Measures for treated water

Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, ongoing efforts will continue, including enhanced monitoring, ensuring objectivity and transparency by engaging with third-party experts and having safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency.

Flow of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea



Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

- ① "Removing" the contamination source
- ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
- ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water


- For stagnant water in buildings (contaminated water), first, cesium and strontium are reduced by the cesium absorption apparatuses (SARRY and KURION). Then, stagnant water in buildings is treated by the multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS) and stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of the building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the amount of contaminated water generated has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 70 m³/day (in FY2024). It was confirmed that the milestone of "suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025," which was achieved in FY2023, has been maintained in FY2024.
- Measures will proceed to further reduce and suppress the amount of contaminated water generated to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028.

(2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment will proceed.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- While assessing the dust impact, measures to reduce the stagnant water level were implemented. In March 2023, the target water level in each building was achieved. For the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, "reducing stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024" was achieved.
- Measures are being implemented for the reduction of radiation dose and stabilization of zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- As part of the tsunami countermeasures, openings in buildings were closed and work to install sea walls was completed. As countermeasures for heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while drainage channel enhancements and other measures are being implemented as planned.



Progress status


- ◆ The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable. There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained.

Unit 3 PCV internal investigation (non-submerged area) using micro-drones


Investigations were conducted over 11 days as planned from March 5 to 19, with a total of 21 flights carried out. Important data required for determining fuel debris retrieval methods was obtained, including conditions around the X-6 penetration, the CRD replacement opening and inside the pedestal.

No significant increase in dust levels within the PCV occurred during the investigation period, and no drone crashes took place. No major damage or obstructions were observed outside the pedestal. Inside the pedestal, structural detachment and deformation were observed. Near the bottom of the RPV, what appeared to be structural components and a CR guide tube were found lying on the ground.


Going forward, point cloud models will be generated from video footage and dose rates will be estimated based on radiation noise.



Near the RPV bottom inside the pedestal



Inside the X-6 penetration (view from inside the PCV)



Inside the pedestal (view near the opening)


Completion of seismic reinforcement at the 1st Large Waste Storage Facility and future plans

Construction of the 1st Large Waste Storage Facility has been underway to relocate secondary water treatment waste currently stored outdoors to indoor storage. Based on the seismic resistance classification established in FY2022, seismic reinforcement work on the east side of the building, which began in FY2024, has been completed, and the facility passed its Pre-service inspection on February 26 and 27, 2026. Installation of mechanical and electrical equipment such as cranes, required for storing secondary water treatment waste, resumed in January 2026 and is scheduled for completion around May 2026.

Installation of the SARRY adsorption vessel base will proceed in line with the implementation plan, including mechanical and electrical equipment installation, and is scheduled to begin in the second quarter of FY2026 once preparations are complete.



After reinforcement completed



ALPS treated water: discharge status update and FY2026 discharge plan

The seventh discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2025 was completed on March 24, 2026. During, seven discharges were carried out, with a total volume of 55,011 m³ and a total tritium discharge of approx. 16 trillion Bq.

Based on operational experience to date, the FY2026 discharge plan aims to reduce the workload associated with transfer operations (number of equipment operations) and establish a system enabling nighttime operations to be carried out with the same efficiency as daytime operations. In addition, by reviewing the evaluation and verification process for analysis results from the perspective of efficiency, it was determined that transfers of water to measurement and verification tanks (inter-tank transfers) and subsequent analysis could be carried out efficiently. Accordingly, the annual number of discharges has been set at 8. The annual discharge volume is expected to be approximately 62,400 m³, and the annual tritium discharge volume is expected to be approx. 11 trillion Bq.

Dismantling of the J8 area tanks is currently underway; on March 9, 2026, the third tank was dismantled. While hydrogen-air mixtures are currently used for cutting work on the J8 area tanks, going forward, hydrogen-air mixtures using hydrogen produced at the "Fukushima Hydrogen Energy Research Field (FH2R)" will be used for some of this work.



Units 1 and 2 Progress toward fuel removal

The Unit 1 large cover passed its Pre-service inspection on March 4 and 5, 2026, and the overhead crane for rubble removal passed its completion inspection on March 19. Among the ancillary facilities, installation and operational testing of the ventilation system were completed on March 10, and operational testing and system switching for the dust radiation monitor were completed on March 13. Once both systems are in service, rubble removal will begin, primarily by remote control using the overhead rubble removal crane, the 1,250-ton crawler crane and other equipment. Basically, removed rubble will be placed in containers such as vessels on the operating floor and transported out through the north-side exit. Some large steel structures and other items will be removed directly through the open retractable roof once the risk of dust dispersal has been confirmed as low. During rubble removal, dust concentrations will be monitored; if an alarm is issued, work will be halted, water will be sprayed as needed, and if the retractable roof is open, it will be closed immediately.

Regarding the Unit 2 fuel removal system, the Pre-service inspection was passed on March 18, and installation of the fuel removal system has been completed. In preparation for the start of fuel removal in the first quarter of FY2026, fuel removal training began on March 25.





Illustration of Unit 1 rubble removal

Major initiatives – Locations on site

ALPS treated water: discharge status update and FY2026 discharge plan

Unit 3 PCV internal investigation (non-submerged area) using micro-drones

Units 1 and 2 Progress toward fuel removal




Completion of seismic reinforcement at the 1st Large Waste Storage Facility and future plans

Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on January 14, 2024
Product (C) [2024] Maxar Technologies.



I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained as shown below for recent, though they varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.



*1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.
 *2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.




(*1) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
 (*2) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)
 (*3) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool)

Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of February 2026, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 7.5×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ and 1.8×10^{-11} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00005 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



(Reference)

* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
 [Cs-134]: 2×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
 [Cs-137]: 3×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
 * Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
 Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.285-0.943 µSv/h (February 25 - March 24, 2026).
 To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

- Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.
- Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Units 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.
- Note 3: Dose assessment has been changed since July 2024 due to the change of standard meteorology, etc. in the implementation plan (effective July 8, 2024).

Other indices


There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown state or criticality sign detected. Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

Measures for contaminated water and treated water

➤ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 70 m³/day (in FY2024). It was confirmed that the milestone of "suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025," which was achieved in FY2023, has been maintained in FY2024.
- Measures will proceed to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated and suppress to approx. 50-70 m³/day by FY2028.



*1 Values differ from those announced at the 20th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50th and 51st meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.
 *2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings

➤ Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains

- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains, releases started from September 14, 2015, and up until March 17, 2026, 2,885 releases had been completed.

The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.




Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 subdrains

➤ Implementation status of facing

- Facing is a measure that involves asphaltting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater from infiltrating the ground, and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of February 2026, 97% (1,410,000 m²) of the planned area (1,450,000 m²) on site had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, facing proceeds after appropriate yard coordination from the zones in which facing can be implemented without affecting the decommissioning work. As of the end of February 2026, 55% (30,000 m²) of the planned area (60,000 m²) had been completed.

➤ Status of the groundwater level around buildings

- For groundwater levels within the land-side impermeable walls, the difference between the inside and outside has remained constant, though the groundwater level on the mountain side varied due to rainfall. The groundwater level of the groundwater drain observation well remained sufficiently lower than the ground surface, at around T.P.+1.4m (the height of the ground surface: T.P.+2.5m).
- Regarding the subdrains of Units 1-4, pumping volumes varied with precipitation. The pumping amount in the T.P.+2.5m area remained constant after the facing in this area was completed.

➤ Operation of the multi-nuclide removal system and other water-treatment facilities

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (existing), hot tests with radioactive water were conducted (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, a Pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the entire Pre-service inspection was completed. For the multi-nuclide removal system (additional), a Pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA on October 12, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted from October 18, 2014. On March 2, 2023, a Pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA and the entire Pre-service inspection was completed.
- Treatment operations comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until March 12, 2026, approx. 811,000 m³ had been treated.

➤ Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water

- To mitigate risks associated with strontium-reduced water, treatment using the existing, additional, and high-performance multi-nuclide removal systems is underway. Up until March 12, 2026, approx. 973,000 m³ had been treated.

➤ Storage status of stagnant water and amount of ALPS treated water stored in tanks

- The volume of ALPS treated water was approx. 1,253,091 m³ as of March 12, 2026.
- The total volume of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea since discharges commenced on August 24, 2023,

was approx. 141,155 m³ as of the completion of the seventh discharge in FY2025.

As of March 12, 2026




Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

➤ Status of discharge of ALPS treated water

As of March 24, 2026

| Measurement object | Requirement and operation target | Measurement results | Compliance with requirement |
|---|--|---|-----------------------------|
| [TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 10 points within 3 km of the Power Station) | • Discharge suspension level: 700 Bq/L or less • Investigation level: 350 Bq/L or less | (Sampled on March 23) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 5.5 – 7.1 Bq/L) | ○ ○ |
| [TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 1 point within a 10 km square area in front of the Power Station) | • Discharge suspension level: 30 Bq/L or less • Investigation level: 20 Bq/L or less | (Sampled on March 23) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 7.3 Bq/L) | ○ ○ |
| [Ministry of the Environment] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 10 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture) | • National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L • WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L | (Sampled on March 11) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 9 Bq/L) | ○ ○ |
| [Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (flounder) | - | (Sampled on March 19) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 8.0 Bq/kg) | ○ |
| [Fukushima Prefecture] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 9 points around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station) | • National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L • WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L | (Sampled on March 9) • 4.6 Bq/L at 1 point (near the south release outlet), and below the lower detection limit at 8 points (less than 3.8 – 4.0 Bq/L) | ○ ○ |

- From March 6 to 24, 2026, the seventh discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2025 was carried out.
- For sea-area monitoring related to handling ALPS treated water, more tritium measurement points for seawater and fish were established near the power station and off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and measurements of tritium and Iodine-129 of seaweed near the power station were added from April 20, 2022. As of March 25, 2026, no significant variation had been detected.
- For sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 10 points within 3 km of the power station, rapid measurements taken of the tritium concentration in seawater sampled on March 23 showed concentrations under the lower detection limit (less than 5.5–7.1 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which were below TEPCO operation indices of 700 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 350 Bq/L (investigation level).
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 1 point within a 10 km square area in front of the Power Station, rapid measurements taken of the tritium concentration in seawater sampled on March 23 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 7.3 Bq/L), which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 30 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 20 Bq/L (investigation level).
- The rapid measurement results obtained by each organization were as follows:
Ministry of the Environment: The analytical results (obtained via rapid measurements) for seawater sampled on March 11 at 10 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 9 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.
Fisheries Agency: Rapid analytical results for tritium in flounder sampled on March 19 showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 8.0 Bq/kg) in all samples.
Fukushima Prefecture: On March 9, tritium concentrations in seawater at 9 points around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station showed concentrations of 4.6 Bq/L at 1 point (near the south release outlet), and below the lower detection limit (less than 3.8 – 4.0 Bq/L) at 8 points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

➤ Progress status of handling of zeolite sandbags and others

- Regarding high-dose zeolite and activated carbon sandbags (hereinafter referred to as “zeolite sandbags and others”) on the lowest floor (second basement floor) of the Process Main Building (PMB) and the High Temperature Incinerator Building (HTI), collection is planned to reduce risks. Examination of collection methods is underway, focusing on underwater collection, which is expected to provide a water shielding effect.
- Collection of zeolite sandbags and others on the lowest floor of PMB and HTI is divided into two steps (“accumulation” and “container enclosure”) to conduct the work effectively.
- As sandbags are prone to degradation and cannot be moved as they are, basically the zeolite and other materials are transferred via pump together with stagnant water.
- On-site accumulation of zeolite sandbags commenced from March 2025 at HTI, and trial accumulation of about three rows was completed. Regarding the remaining zeolite sandbags, after removing obstructions and crushing sandbags, zeolite is transferred to the planned zeolite accumulation site.
- Sandbag crushing commenced on January 28, 2026 and was completed on February 4.
- Zeolite transfer has been underway since February 10, 2026. Replacement of the ROV used for accumulation work has been underway, as its cumulative radiation dose has approached the upper limit. The progress rate remains at approx. 70% (about 102/146 m²), the same as last month (as of March 18, 2026). The remaining work primarily involves recovering zeolite from the corners and is planned to be carried out after the replacement.
- As of February 26, 2026, the ROV's suction nozzle camera had difficulty providing a clear view, but it was confirmed that the image quality recovered during subsequent operations. This is thought to be due to the removal of foreign matter adhering to the area around the light.
- It was confirmed that the previous ROV used for accumulation work had a significant amount of deposit (fragments of sandbags) attached to it. In some parts, fibrous material remains intact, suggesting that radiation degradation may be uneven. However, this has not caused any significant disruption to accumulation work to date.

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Activities ahead of spent fuel removal from the pool are progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.

➤ Progress of work toward fuel removal at Unit 1

- Ahead of installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, ground assembly and on-site installation were conducted.

The last block of the retractable roof was installed on January 13, 2026, and a function check of the retractable roof was performed on January 19, thereby marking the completion of large cover installation.

- The Unit 1 large cover passed its Pre-service inspection on March 4 and 5, 2026.
- For the overhead crane for rubble removal, a completion inspection certificate was granted on March 19, 2026.
- Ahead of rubble removal and other work following the installation of the large cover, ancillary facilities for the large cover consisting of the ventilation equipment, dust radiation monitors and other components are installed.
- Regarding the ventilation equipment, work related to the installation of foundation bolts began on July 22, 2025. The installation of foundation bolts, exhaust fans, and filter units, as well as the installation of ducts, duct supports, and cables, has been completed, and test operation adjustment was completed on March 10, 2026. The equipment is scheduled to be put into service following the Pre-service inspection and receipt of the certificate of Pre-service inspection.
- Regarding the dust radiation monitors, work to install the dust radiation monitor containers began on July 15, 2025. The installation of the dust radiation monitor containers, the installation of the remote monitoring terminal, and the laying of the dust monitor pipes were completed, and test operation adjustment and system switchover were completed on March 13, 2026. The monitors are scheduled to be put into service following the Pre-service inspection and receipt of the certificate of Pre-service inspection.
- For Unit 1, rubble inside the large cover will be cleared before fuel removal begins. To mitigate the consequences if the fuel handling machine's auxiliary hoist falls during rubble clearance, additional protective covering was installed over the spent fuel pool (SFP) gate on June 27, 2025.
- Mock-up testing confirmed that the SFP gate would remain unaffected even if the auxiliary hoist were to fall onto the additional cover.
- The installation of the large cover makes it difficult to directly inject water from outside, such as by using a concrete pump truck. Therefore, to diversify water injection methods in addition to the existing SFP cooling system, an alternative injection line was installed.
- To reduce waste, the fuel handling machine that was installed in Unit 4 in 2013 will be sent back to the manufacturer for modification and will be reused for Unit 1.
- For reuse, parts that cannot be used in their current condition, or those expected to be discontinued or to deteriorate over time will be newly manufactured.
- Disassembly and transport of the Unit 4 fuel handling machine commenced on November 4, 2025, and removal of the platform and the gallery was completed.
- The items are currently being temporarily stored at off-site and are being prepared for transport to the factory. Transport is scheduled to be completed by mid-April.
- Rubble removal is performed remotely using overhead cranes for rubble removal, a 1,250-ton crawler crane, and various removal devices and heavy machinery.
- Due to high radiation levels in the operating floor, rubble removal is generally performed remotely using remote-controlled removal equipment. However, for tasks such as slinging equipment or containers and maintenance work, personnel may be present within a restricted work area.
- As a general rule, rubble to be removed is placed in containers such as vessels on the operating floor and transported out through the north exit.
- Some large steel structures and similar items will be removed directly through the open retractable roof once the risk of dust dispersal has been confirmed as low.
- During rubble removal, dust concentration levels must be monitored. If an alarm is issued, work must be suspended; water must be sprayed as necessary; and if the retractable roof is open, it must be closed immediately.
- Installing a large cover required the process to be extended. Considering the fact that the detailed dose impact can be confirmed from the operating floor, shielding needs to be added as an additional means of reducing radiation exposure, and the work time needs to be reviewed. Extending the schedule has become increasingly common due to bad weather, issues with large cranes used on-site, and other factors.
- For starting fuel removal (FY2027-2028), future timelines can be shortened by revising work procedures and other

aspects after rubble removal is completed. Accordingly, the start date currently remains unchanged.

- All rubble conditions need to be fully assessed, considering ongoing uncertainties in the process. The decision on whether to revise the entire timeline will be considered following the mid-stage of Rubble removal.
- **Progress of work toward fuel removal at Unit 2**
- The fuel removal system was transported from the factory on May 21, 2025, carried into the site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on May 24, 2025 and hoisted within the work platform for fuel removal on May 30, 2025.
 - Regarding the progress of fuel removal system installation, the system was granted a Pre-service inspection certificate on March 18, 2026, marking the completion of installation.
 - In preparation for the start of fuel removal work in the first quarter of FY2026, fuel removal training began on March 25, 2026.
 - To ensure visibility during fuel removal, a purification system was installed in the spent fuel pool.
 - On October 21, 2025, cleaning of the bottom of the cask pit began using submersible cleaning robots.
 - There was much fine sediment, which was vacuumed up to the point where it should have no impact on cask installation. The task was completed on November 5.
 - On November 10, 2025, removal of pieces of sheet-like piece on fuel began using an underwater ROV.
 - Removal of pieces of sheet-like piece that may hinder fuel removal was completed on December 12, 2025.
 - The sheet-like piece is thin and is presumably deteriorated urethane coating from handrails around the pool, as well as sealant fragments that have peeled off from the building roof.
 - During the removal of fuel from Unit 2, the SFP circulated cooling system will be shut down. There is a risk that the resulting steam may impact fuel removal operations. (When the system was shut down for approximately three and a half months during FY2024, the difference in temperature between the water and the air generated steam)
 - Therefore, in order to proceed continuously and smoothly with fuel removal, a device for adjusting the water temperature of the SFP has been prepared and stored. As this device can be installed quickly, at the current time, only preparatory tasks are being performed.
 - Even when the Unit 2 SFP circulated cooling system is shut down, the operational limit temperature of 65°C noted in the implementation plan will not be exceeded and there will be no safety issues.
 - Progress remains steady at present and work will continue with safety as the top priority.

Fuel debris retrieval

- **Reduction of radioactive dose of the heat exchanger of the Unit 1 RCW (RCW-Hx)**
- The heat exchanger of the Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-Hx) installed on the 2nd floor of the Unit 1 Reactor Building (R/B) has become highly radioactive due to water flowing into the reactor during the accident, making it difficult for personnel to enter. Early dose reduction is required to mitigate the risks associated with this facility.
 - Work to reduce radiation levels (drainage) in the RCW-Hx began in 2022, and gas purging of the inlet and outlet header pipe of the RCW-Hx has already been completed.
 - Since all hydrogen gas-related work has been completed, work will proceed with draining the RCW-Hx(C) and conducting water sampling and draining of the RCW-Hx(A), (B), and RCW pump outlet header pipe.
 - Since it is difficult to use the existing drain lines for draining water from the RCW-Hx, a method involving the insertion of a water sampling device from the header pipe into the RCW-Hx will be adopted.
 - Water drainage work on the Unit 1 RCW-Hx is scheduled to begin in FY2026.

Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommissioning of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

- **Management status of rubble and trimmed trees**
- As of the end of February 2026, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 416,900 m³ (+3,700 m³ compared to the end of January with an area-occupation rate of 68%). The total storage volume of trimmed

trees was approx. 68,300 m³ (+200 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 39%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 11,700 m³ (+900 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 46%). The total storage volume of radioactive solid waste (incinerated ash and others) was approx. 38,600 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 61%). The increase in rubble was due to work related to areas around the Units 1-4 buildings, decontamination of flanged tanks, etc.

- **Management status of secondary waste from water treatment**
- As of March 5, 2026, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 516 m³ (area-occupation rate: 74%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,382 m³ (area-occupation rate: 91%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for the multi-nuclide removal system and others, was 5,975 (area-occupation rate: 87%).
- **Analysis Plan for Solid Waste in Preparation for the Decommissioning of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FY2026)**
- To strategically advance waste characterization and secure the necessary analytical capabilities (including analytical facilities and personnel), TEPCO formulated the “Analysis Plan for Solid Waste in Preparation for the Decommissioning of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” (hereinafter referred to as the “Analysis Plan”) in 2023. Since then, the Analysis Plan has been updated annually to reflect changes in analytical needs and characterization policies resulting from the progress of decommissioning.
 - TEPCO has formulated the FY2026 version of the Analysis Plan, incorporating the latest status of examination regarding the targets set in the “Map of Mid-Term Risk Reduction Targets for the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” and the latest decommissioning work processes.
 - TEPCO will continue collaborating with the national government, JAEA and NDF to develop analytical facilities, expand analytical capabilities, and foster and secure personnel.
- **Hot tests for drying secondary waste from water treatment (adsorbent)**
- To reduce the risk of leakage and the spread of contamination, transition to stabilization (dewatering) treatment and indoor storage for secondary water treatment waste is being planned. Development of technology to dry the adsorbent material is underway to eliminate the risk of corrosion and leakage from metal containers.
 - “Vacuum drying” is selected as the drying method for the containers, but a comparative evaluation of other candidates was also conducted, including “air drying”, which involves blowing dry hot air, and “heated drying”, which involves constructing a drying building and heating the adsorption vessels placed inside it.
 - Vacuum drying was selected due to its simple equipment configuration, minimal drying inconsistencies and the fact that it does not require high temperatures.
 - Vacuum drying offers inherent safety advantages, such as low risk of dust scattering; reduction in evaporation rate if the vacuum pump stops due to a power outage; virtually no migration of Cs, Sr, and other elements downstream; and no alternation of properties of the adsorbent or the structure of the adsorption vessel. It also has the advantage of no foreseeable impact on future waste streams.
 - During cold tests, it was confirmed that the bottom and outer periphery—areas, critical for preventing corrosion and leakage—dried satisfactorily, and that no migration of the adsorbent from inside the adsorption vessel to the outside was observed.
 - To confirm that there is no significant migration of radionuclides outside the adsorption vessel, a vacuum drying test under hot conditions using an actual adsorption vessel is scheduled to be conducted on the premises of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station from May to August 2026.
- **Construction progress on Solid Waste Storage Facility No. 11**
- Solid Waste Storage Facility No. 11 is used for the temporary storage of rubble generated during decommissioning work and radioactive solid waste (such as incineration ash from the incineration facility), all of which is stored in containers.
 - Solid Waste Storage Facility No. 11 consists of a “storage building” for storing waste and a “loading/unloading building” equipped with a slope for transporting waste to the storage building.

- Solid Waste Storage Facility No. 11 stores rubble generated by decommissioning work, sorted by material type as much as possible and placed in containers, as well as incineration ash generated by the Radioactive Waste Incinerator and the Additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator, both of which are stored in containers.
- High-dose-rate waste (surface dose rate exceeding 1 mSv/h) is stored on the basement level and 1st floor, while low-dose-rate waste (surface dose rate of 1 mSv/h or less) is stored on the 2nd through 5th floors.
- The storage building features a lane structure, and storage containers will be stacked in tiers.
- Regarding the status of preparatory construction work, work began on October 6, 2025. Currently, excavation work is underway beneath the building foundation (at a depth of approx. 10 m) prior to the concrete foundation work. The plan is to commence foundation work sequentially, starting from the loading/unloading building side, where excavation is expected to be completed first.
- Since the construction of Solid Waste Storage Facility No. 11 will require a large volume of concrete, the plan is to supply concrete from a plant currently under construction on TEPCO site near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
- Plant installation work began on February 12, 2025, and verification of concrete quality and pumping methods is currently underway.
- Concrete supply for the foundation work of the loading/unloading building for Solid Waste Storage Facility No. 11 is scheduled to begin around April 2026.
- Regarding Solid Waste Storage Facility No. 11, an application for a change to the implementation plan related to facility installation was submitted on August 8, 2025, and the review is ongoing.
- Foundation work for the loading/unloading buildings of Solid Waste Storage Facility No. 11 will begin around April 2026.
- To eliminate outdoor temporary storage of solid waste, operations in part of the building will begin ahead of schedule, with partial operations scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2027 or later (around May 2028).

Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination


Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

➤ Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has generally remained constant but temporarily increased from April 2020 and is even currently increasing or declining at a low concentration at observation holes including Nos. 0-1, 0-1-2, 0-2, and 0-3-2. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 1-6 and increasing or declining at low concentration at Nos. 1-8, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12 and 1-14. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing and a larger fluctuation was seen at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration of cesium has also remained constant across the area overall, but has been increasing or declining at observation

holes with low concentrations, and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations will continue, including ascertaining the impact of rainfall.

- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started passing from August 30, 2022. It has remained low, despite concentrations of cesium and total β radioactive materials increasing during rainfall. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors were installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard started passing.
- In the open channel area of the seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite the temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. For Cs-137 concentrations, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Units 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. For Sr-90 concentrations, variation was observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of weather, marine meteorology and others. During the period for which ALPS treated water was discharged, the tritium concentration increased at the sampling point near the discharge outlet, but this was considered within the expected range based on oceanic dispersion simulation results.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>




Figure 4: Groundwater concentration on the Turbine Building east side




Figure 5: Seawater concentration around the port

Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

Staff management

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from November 2025 – January 2026 was approx. 9,200 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), exceeding the monthly average workforce requirement (approx. 8,200). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in April 2026 (approx. 4,600 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) for the most recent two years were maintained, at approx. 3,600 to 5,100.
- The number of workers from both within and outside Fukushima Prefecture increased. As of February 2026, the local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) remained constant at around 70%.
- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.16, 2.18 and 2.08 mSv/person-year during FY2022, 2023 and 2024, respectively (the legal exposure dose limits are 100 and 50 mSv/person-year respectively over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose remained sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.




Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers weekday per day for each month of the most recent 2 years (actual values)




Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker (monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

➤ Countermeasures for infectious diseases

- Countermeasures for various infectious diseases (influenza, norovirus, COVID-19, etc.) depend on personal decisions and basic preventive measures (visiting medical institutions when feeling unwell, ventilation, avoidance of the “Three Cs”, frequent handwashing, etc.) being implemented appropriately by each worker. TEPCO continues decommissioning while prioritizing safety.

Status of Units 5 and 6

➤ Review of operation after removing Unit 6 spent fuel

- With the completion of spent fuel removal from Unit 6 in April 2025, the requirement for spent fuel cooling has been eliminated; therefore, an application to amend the implementation plan has been submitted.
- Since it has been confirmed that it is safe to suspend operations for equipment no longer required for spent fuel cooling, draining and treatment of system water (seawater and freshwater) will be conducted.
- After the transfer and treatment of system water are complete, isolation will be implemented by installing closure plates.
- As new fuel and high-dose-rate instruments remain stored in the fuel pool, operation of the FPC pump and F/D purification lines will continue.

Others

➤ Mid-and-Long-Term Decommissioning Action Plan 2026


- The “Mid-and-Long-Term Decommissioning Action Plan” has been formulated to indicate the main work processes involved in decommissioning as a whole and achieve the milestones laid out in the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap and the Risk Map of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). Based on FY2025 progress, the plan was revised.
- Points of the revision in the Mid-and-Long-Term Decommissioning Action Plan 2026 include the addition of examination on alternative storage sites for the temporary storage of high dose equipment, the reflection of preparatory processes leading up to the full-scale removal of fuel debris, and the addition of examination on the construction of Solid Waste Storage Facilities beyond No. 12.
- Based on the Mid-and-Long-Term Decommissioning Action Plan 2026, procurement plans will be formulated, with efforts proceeding toward expanding participation by local companies and procurement.

Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

“The highest value” → “the latest value (sampled during March 2 - 23)”；unit (Bq/L)；ND represents a value below the detection limit

Summary of TEPCO data as of March 24, 2026

Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β-ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.




Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in () represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013 (The latest values sampled during February 23 - March 23 2026)

Summary of TEPCO data as of March 24, 2026

| | Legal discharge limit | WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality |
|--------------|-----------------------|---|
| Cesium-134 | 60 | 10 |
| Cesium-137 | 90 | 10 |
| Strontium-90 | 30 | 10 |
| Tritium | 60,000 | 10,000 |



Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β-ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.

* Due to erosion, the sampling point was moved from approx. 320m south to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet in December 2021. In September 2023, since erosion was eliminated, the sampling point was returned to the original point, approx. 320m south from the south release outlet. Moreover, due to erosion, the sampling point has been moved again to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet since June 11, 2024.

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
<http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html>


Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on three basic policies:

- ① "Removing" the contamination source
- ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
- ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)



- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 150 m³/day or less (within 2020)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less (within 2025)
- [Completed] Treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed* (within 2020) *Except for Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High Temperature Incinerator Building.
- [Completed] Stagnant water in Reactor Buildings was reduced to about a half of the level at the end of 2020 (FY2022-FY2024)

| | | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | |
|--|---|--|---|---|---|--|---|--|--|---|---|---|---|--|------|--|------|--|
| Contaminated water management (Remove) | Contaminated water treatment facility | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reception start of contaminated water to Central Waste Treatment Building Decontamination equipment (AREVA) Evaporative concentration equipment Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multi-nuclide Removal System (ALPS) (System A: from 2013.3.30, System B: from 2013.6.13, System C: from 2013.9.27, hot tests conducted) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Treatment of RO-condensed salt water complete Reduction of strontium by Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) (from 2015.1.6) Reduction of strontium by 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY) (from 2014.12.26) Treatment start of strontium-reduced water (ALPS: from 2015.12.4, additional: from 2015.5.27, high-performance: from 2015.4.15) Multi-nuclide Removal System (additional ALPS) Multi-nuclide Removal System (high performance ALPS) (from 2014.10.18, hot tests conducted) | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete Purification of strontium-reduced water complete | | | | | | | | |
| | Removal of contaminated water from seawater pipe trench | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Landing of the second Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trench Purification by mobile equipment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of tunnel filling Transfer of stagnant water complete | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of tunnel filling Transfer of stagnant water complete Completion of shaft filling (except for upper part of Shaft D) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of shaft filling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unit 2 seawater pipe trench Shaft D filling work | | | | | | | | | |
| Contaminated water management (Redirect) | Groundwater bypass | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Installation start of groundwater bypass | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operation start of groundwater bypass (drainage started from 2014.5.21) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Subdrain | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recovery of existing subdrain pit and start of new installation Installation start of Water-Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operation start of subdrain (drainage started from 2015.9.14) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhancement of treatment capacity (200m³/day) | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Land-side impermeable wall | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Installation start of land-side impermeable walls | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Start of maintenance operation on east side | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Freezing start | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Start of maintenance operation on north and south sides Freezing completion | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Start of maintenance operation in all sections | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In some temperature measurement tubes near the K drainage channel cross, temperature exceeded 0°C locally | | | | | | | |
| | Facing | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of waterproof pavement (icing) (except for areas of 2.5 and 6.5m above sea level and around Units 1-4) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Placement of seaside impermeable walls complete | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of waterproof pavement (icing) (except for around Units 1-4) | | | | | | |
| Contaminated water management (Retain) | Bank groundwater measures | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> High concentration of radioactive materials detected from observation well of bank Installation start of seaside impermeable walls | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Area 2.5m above sea level - Start of ground improvement by water glass Start of pumping of water from contaminated areas (well point) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Installation of seaside impermeable walls complete Operation start of groundwater drain (pumping-up started on 2015.11.5) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Storage facility | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Storage in steel square tanks Storage in flanged cylindrical tanks Water leakage (10L) from flanged tank | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water leakage (800L) from flanged tank Water leakage (1000) from flanged tank Completion of fence to prevent leakage expanding Work to raise fence height complete Leakage of contaminated water from underground reservoir => Start of transfer to tanks Transfer of contaminated water to tanks complete Storage in cylindrical steel welded-joint tanks | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of purification treatment of RO concentrated salt water Completion of replacement of steel square tanks | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Construction of welded-joint tanks | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purification of strontium-reduced water in flanged tanks complete Transfer and storage of all treated water in welded-joint tanks | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purification of strontium-reduced water complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Flanged and welded-joint tanks | | | | | |
| Treatment of stagnant water | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Installation of stagnant water transfer equipment/transfer start | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of work to improve reliability of transfer line (replacement with PE pipes) | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Start to maintain water-level difference with subdrain water level Transfer start from each building to Central RW Building | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Floor exposure of Unit 1 TB Separation of stagnant water between Units 1 and 2 Floor exposure of Unit 1 RWB | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Floor exposure of Unit 2 TB, RWB Floor exposure of Unit 3 TB, RWB Floor exposure of Unit 4 RWB, TB, RWB | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completed lowering to target water level of Unit 2 RB | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduction of stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to approx. half of the level at the end of 2020 achieved Completed lowering to target water level of Units 1, 3 RB | | |
| | Closure of openings | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examination start of measures to close building openings Work for common pool complete | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work for Units 1 and 2 TB complete Work for HTI building complete | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work for Process Main Building complete Work for Unit 3 TB complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work for Units 1-3 RB complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures to close openings were completed Work for Units 1-4 RWB was completed | | | | | | | |
| Countermeasures to tsunami risks | Seawall | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Installation of outer-rise tsunami seawall complete | | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Construction start of Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan Trench tsunami seawall Completion of installation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> On-site start | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of main wall construction | | | | |
| | Mega float | | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Start of marine construction Temporary grounding of mega float | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internal filling complete (reduction of tsunami risks) | | | | | | | |



In "the Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning Issues" held on April 13, 2021, the basic policy on how to handle ALPS treated water was set. Based on this, the response of TEPCO was announced on April 16.

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.




● Rearing test of marine organisms

All planned marine organisms rearing tests have been completed. The results confirmed by the rearing tests were as follows:

- Marine organisms rearing tests were conducted both in "normal seawater" and in "ALPS treated water diluted with seawater". The marine organisms in these two environments were compared via rearing data to confirm the absence of any significant differences between the two populations.
- TEPCO confirmed that "tritium is not concentrated in the living bodies and that the concentration of tritium in living bodies does not exceed that of the rearing environment" as demonstrated in previous knowledge.
- Flounders and abalones that were being raised in normal seawater were put in "water discharged into the environment" and TEPCO confirmed that there was no remarkable change in the growth of the flounders or abalones around this time. Flounder and abalone were reared in water discharged into the environment for approximately six months and we confirmed that there is no change in the growth of them.

Information provision and communication to foster understanding

- Occasions to deepen the understanding are organized by communications related to decommission via various media and visit to the power station.



- On the dedicated website "Treated Water Portal Site" (Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean) within the TEPCO website, monitoring results of radioactive materials are published timely.



Dialogue meeting

- Visit and dialogue meeting of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since FY2019 for 13 cities, towns and villages in the Hamadori region. From FY2021 onward, these activities have been expanded to include the entire Fukushima Prefecture.



- Through various opportunities such as visit and on-site explanations, communications continue where opinions of related parties are heard, their thoughts are taken seriously, and TEPCO conveys its efforts, thoughts, and countermeasures for reputational damage.

● Status of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea commenced from August 24, 2023, and the 1st discharge was completed on September 11.

During the discharge period, no abnormality was detected by the sea area monitoring conducted by the national government, Fukushima Prefecture and TEPCO.

<Discharges in FY2025>

| Tank group discharged | Tank Group A | Tank Group C | Tank Group A | Tank Group B |
|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Tritium concentration | 370,000 Bq/L | 250,000 Bq/L | 380,000 Bq/L | 210,000 Bq/L |
| Discharge commencement | April 10, 2025 | July 14, 2025 | August 7, 2025 | September 11, 2025 |
| Discharge termination | April 28, 2025 | August 3, 2025 | August 25, 2025 | September 29, 2025 |
| Discharge amount | 7,853 m ³ | 7,873 m ³ | 7,908 m ³ | 7,872 m ³ |
| Total tritium amount | Approx. 2.9 trillion Bq | Approx. 2.0 trillion Bq | Approx. 3.0 trillion Bq | Approx. 1.7 trillion Bq |

| Tank group discharged | Tank Group C | Tank Group A | Tank Group B |
|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Tritium concentration | 250,000 Bq/L | 310,000 Bq/L | 250,000 Bq/L |
| Discharge commencement | October 30, 2025 | December 4, 2025 | March 6, 2026 |
| Discharge termination | November 17, 2025 | December 22, 2025 | March 24, 2025 |
| Discharge amount | 7,838 m ³ | 7,833 m ³ | 7,834 m ³ |
| Total tritium amount | Approx. 2.0 trillion Bq | Approx. 2.4 trillion Bq | Approx. 2.0 trillion Bq |

● Publication of the Comprehensive Report of the IAEA safety review

The Comprehensive Report on the safety review concerning handling of ALPS treated water was published by the IAEA on July 4, 2023.

In the Executive Summary of the IAEA Comprehensive Report, the IAEA concluded the following: (1) the activities by Japan associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

We will continue to share necessary information with the IAEA, while striving to foster further understanding of the international community about the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

<https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-alps-treated-water-discharge-comprehensive-reports>



2021.12.21 The "Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Specified Nuclear Facility" regarding ALPS treated water were submitted to the Nuclear Regulation Authority
2021.12.28 "The Action Plan concerning the Continuous Implementation of the Basic Policy on Handling of ALPS Treated Water" was formulated

Review meeting concerning the implementation plan on handling of ALPS treated water (2021.7 - 2022.4, 15 meetings)

2022.4.28, 5.13, 7.15

Application to partially revise the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted

2022.7.22 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was approved

2022.8.4 Work has commenced

2022

2022/8/30 The "Approach to Strengthening and Expansion of Measures in the Handling of ALPS Treated Water" was summarized

2023

2022.11.14 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)
2023.5.10 Approval for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)
2023.7.7 Receipt of Certificate of Completion for Inspection Prior to Use
2023.6.26 Completion of installation

Examination concerning handling of ALPS treated water

Tritiated Water Taskforce (2013.12 - 2016.5, 15 meetings)



2016.6 Report of Tritiated Water Taskforce

Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water (2016.11 - 2020.1, 17 meetings)

2018.8 Explanatory and hearing meeting, receiving opinions

2020.2 Report of Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water

Opportunity for receiving opinions from parties concerned concerning handling of ALPS treated water (2020.4 - 2020.10, 7 meetings)

2021.4.13 The basic policy on the handling of ALPS treated water was set
2021.4.16 The response of TEPCO was announced

2019

2020

2021

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Tank area viewed from the Large Rest House (2015.10.29)

3 Removal of fuel from spent pool

Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

- Completion of Units 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)
- Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023), start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)
- Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026)









Legend

Rubble removal, etc.

Installing a fuel removal machine

Fuel removal

Storage and handling of fuel

| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026~ | |
|--|---|------|---|------|---|------|------|--|------|---|------|------|------|------|------|--|--|
| <p>Unit 1</p> <p>For Unit 1, a large cover will be installed over the whole building, within which rubble will be removed.</p> <p><Reference> Progress to date Rubble removal on the north side of the operating floor started from January 2018 and has been implemented sequentially. In July and August 2019, the well plug, which was misaligned, was investigated, followed in August and September by the conditions of the overhead crane. Based on the results of these investigations, as the removal requires more careful work taking dust scattering into consideration, two methods were examined: Installing a cover after rubble removal, initially installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, then removing rubble inside the cover.</p>   | | | | | | | | ▼2017.12 Completion of building cover dismantling and windbreak fence installation ▼2018.1-2020.12 Rubble removal on the north side of Reactor Building ▼2018.9-12 Removal of X-braces | |  ▼2020.3-6 Installation of spent fuel pool cover ▼2020.9-11 Measures to prevent and alleviate rubble falling ▼2020.11-2021.6 Dismantling of remaining cover ▼2021.8 Start of large cover pre-work ▼2022.4 Start of large cover installation work | | | | | | ▼2026.1 Completion of large cover installation | |
| <p>Unit 2</p> <p>For Unit 2, with the removal of spent fuel in mind, a "gantry for fuel removal" (gantry and front room) will be constructed on the south side of the building.</p> <p><Reference> Progress to date Previously, scope to recover the existing overhead crane and the fuel-handling machine was examined. However, the high radiation dose inside the operating floor meant the decision was taken to dismantle the upper part of the building in November 2015. Findings from internal investigations of the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019 undermined the potential to conduct limited work there and the means of accessing from the south side was examined.</p>  | | | | | ▼2015.3-2016.11 Yard construction ▼2016.9-2017.4 West-side gantry installation work ▼2017.5 Opening a hole in the west-side external wall | | | ▼2018.8-2020.12 Moving and containment of remaining objects ▼2020.6 Investigation inside the spent fuel pool ▼2021.6-2022.1 Decontamination of R/B operating floor (1) ▼2021.9-2022.5 Shielding installation in R/B operating floor (1) ▼2022.5-2022.6 Transfer of FHM ▼2022.7-2023.1 Removal and clean-up of FHM operation room ▼2022.12-2023.3 Removal of existing facilities in operating floor ▼2023.4-2023.11 Decontamination of R/B operating floor (2) ▼2023.11- Shielding of R/B operating floor (2) ▼2024.4 Start of preparation for installing an opening ▼2024.6 Completion of installation of gantry for fuel removal ▼2024.9 Start of trial operation of ventilation equipment ▼2024.10 Start of installation of runway girder ▼2025.3 Completion of installation of runway girder ▼2025.5 Completion of hanging of fuel-handling machine | | ▼2021.10-2022.4 Ground improvement work ▼2023.1 Start of steel erection ▼2023.2 Start of south-side existing facilities dismantling | | | | | | | |
| <p>Unit 3</p> <p>All fuel assemblies from Unit 3 had been removed by February 2021.</p>   | | | ▼2013.10 Completion of removal of large rubble on the Reactor Building top floor ▼2015.8 Completion of removal of the fuel-handling machine B within the spent fuel pool ▼2016.12 Completion of shielding on the Reactor Building top floor ▼2017.1 Installation start of a cover for fuel removal | | | | | ▼2019.4.15 Start of fuel removal ▼2021.2.28 Fuel removal completed (568 assemblies) | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>Unit 4</p> <p>All fuel assemblies from Unit 4 had been removed by December 2014.</p>   | ▼2011.11- 2012.7 Removal of rubble on the Reactor Building top floor ▼2012.4-2013.3 Ground improvement and foundation work ▼2013.4-2013.7 Installation of external walls and roof panels ▼2013.6-2013.10 Installation of overhead crane and fuel-handling machine ▼2013.8-2013.10 Removal of rubble inside the reactor well and pool ▼2013.11.18 Start of fuel removal ▼2014.12.22 Fuel removal was completed (1533 assemblies) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

* Part of the photo is corrected because it includes machine information related to nuclear material protection.


Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Commencement of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (From September 10, 2024, trial fuel debris retrieval commenced)

Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

Unit 1 Investigation overview

- In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore:φ100 mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



In February 2022, "the guide ring" was installed to facilitate the investigation. From March 28, 2023, the investigation inside the pedestal by ROV-A2 started and confirmed that a portion of the bar arrangement was exposed. Regarding the soundness of the pedestal, based on the past earthquake resistant evaluation by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), it was evaluated that even though a portion of the pedestal was lost, there would be no serious risk. However, as the present information is very limited, the investigation will continue to acquire as much information as possible for continued evaluation.



Unit 1 PCV internal investigation

| | | |
|-------------------------------|---|--|
| Investigations inside the PCV | 1st (2012.10) | - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation |
| | 2nd (2015.4) | - Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation |
| | 3rd (2017.3) | - Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation |
| | 4th (From 2022.2) | - Acquiring information inside PCV (inside/outside of the pedestal) - Acquiring images - Measuring deposit thickness and sampling deposit - Detecting deposit debris, 3D mapping |
| Leakage points from PCV | - PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11) | |

Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)

Unit 2 Investigation overview


- In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.
- In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.



In October 2020, a deposits contact investigation at the PCV penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck.



From September 10, 2024, the end tool of the telescopic equipment passed through the isolation valve, and the trial fuel debris retrieval commenced. On October 30, fuel debris was gripped with the end tool, on November 2, the guide pipe was pulled off, and the telescopic equipment was stored in the enclosure. On November 7, fuel debris was carried out from the hatch on a side of the enclosure, and the trial retrieval was completed.



Unit 2 PCV internal investigation


| | | |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| Investigations inside the PCV | 1st (2012.1) | - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature |
| | 2nd (2012.3) | - Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature - Measuring the dose rate |
| | 3rd (2013.2 - 2014.6) | - Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation |
| | 4th (2017.1-2) | - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature |
| | 5th (2018.1) | - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature |
| | 6th (2019.2) | - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature - Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit |
| Leakage points from PCV | - No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C | |

Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons
The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)

Unit 3 Investigation overview

- In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, were investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.
- In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.


<Conditions inside the pedestal>




Unit 3 PCV internal investigation

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| Investigations inside the PCV | 1st (2015.10-12) | - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2015.12) |
| | 2nd (2017.7) | - Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8) |
| Leakage points from PCV | - Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5) | |
| Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9) | | |

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
Eliminating temporary outdoor storage of rubble and others * Except for secondary waste of water treatment and materials for reuse or recycling (within FY2028)



● Solid Waste Storage Management Plan for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Revision in February 2026)
















Note: Used protective clothing before incineration and BG-level concrete waste for which treatment and reuse is decided at present are not included.

- The exposure dose at the site boundaries will be reduced by aggregation to indoor storage and eliminating outdoor storage.
- The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.

6 Improvement of work environment

While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

Regarding the site-wide reduction in the radiation dose and prevention of contamination spreading, the radiation dose on site was reduced by removal of rubble, topsoil and facing. Moreover, the operation was improved to use environmentally-improved areas as a Green Zone, within which workers are allowed to wear general work clothes and disposable dust-protective masks which are less of a physical burden.

| 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024~ |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|--|---|---|--|--|------|------|-------|
| <p>▼ From March 12, 2011, in response to the increased airborne concentration of radioactive materials, instructions were issued to wear full-face masks throughout the Fukushima Daiichi NPS site, excluding the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the rest house.</p>  <p>External view of Access Control Facility</p> | <p>▼ From May 2013, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded sequentially.</p> <p>▼ In June 2013, operation of the Access Control Facility started near the main gate of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, to which duties conducted at J-village were shifted, including contamination examination, decontamination, switching protective equipment and off and distribution/collection of dosimeters.</p>  <p>Access Control Facility (2014.11.7)</p> | <p>▼ From May 2013, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded sequentially.</p> <p>▼ In June 2013, operation of the Access Control Facility started near the main gate of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, to which duties conducted at J-village were shifted, including contamination examination, decontamination, switching protective equipment and off and distribution/collection of dosimeters.</p>  <p>Large rest house under construction (2014.9.30)</p> | <p>▼ To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 2015. These monitors allow workers to confirm on-site dose rates at their workplaces in real time.</p> <p>▼ In March 2015, the Fukushima revitalization meal service center opened.</p> <p>▼ A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced in May 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. In March 2016, a convenience store opened in the large rest house. In April, the shower room went into operation.</p>  <p>Move in general working clothes (2016.1.7)</p> | <p>▼ In March 2015, the Fukushima revitalization meal service center opened.</p> <p>▼ A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced in May 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. In March 2016, a convenience store opened in the large rest house. In April, the shower room went into operation.</p>  <p>Facing (2017.4.13)</p> | <p>▼ In February 2017, operation started at the Partner Companies' Building next to the New Administration Office Building.</p> <p>▼ In May 2017, a heliport for emergency transport was installed inside the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and went into operation. Compared to the previous operation (at Koriyama Coast, Futaba Town or Fukushima Daini NPS, relying to a doctor helicopter), a faster response is available for seriously ill patients requiring treatment at external medical institutions.</p>  | <p>▼ In May 2018, within about 96% of the site, workers are allowed to wear light equipment such as general workwear and disposable dust-protective masks.</p>  | <p>▼ From November 2018, from the west-side high-ground area, where Units 1-4 can be viewed, visitors can see the site in their normal clothes without having to change.</p>  <p>Visit by Governor of Fukushima Prefecture to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2018.11.1)</p>  <p>Visit by Prime Minister Kishida to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2021.10.17)</p> | <p>▼ In August 2021, operation started while eliminating the need for the DS2 mask during light work in G-zone outside the protection area around Unit 1-4 (except for inside Units 5 and 6).</p>  | <p>▼ Travel survey results of major roads within the site</p> <p>Compared with the last fiscal year, the dose rate was reduced on roads on the east side of Units 1-4 (area of black dot in the figure). In the area, the dose rate reduction is considered attributable to the construction of sea walls and others.</p> <p><FY2023 4th Quarter> (Measured in February 2024)</p>  <p><FY2024 4th Quarter> (Measured in March 2025)</p>  | <p>Visit by Prime Minister Ishiba to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2024.12.14)</p> <p>(Left) Observation of the decommissioning state at high ground from which whole view of Units 1-4 can be seen</p> <p>(Right) Encouragement from Prime Minister Ishiba</p>  | | | |