

Chapter 8

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES, IMPROVEMENT OF BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

Settlement of Disputes between States

Background of the Rules

Regional trade agreements, including free trade agreements (“FTAs”), economic partnership agreements (“EPAs”), and bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) usually contain certain provisions for settlement of disputes between the state parties concerning the interpretation and application of the agreements’ provisions. Not only do such provisions provide the parties with the tools to settle disputes, but they also assume the important role of encouraging the parties of the relevant agreements to comply with the provisions thereby ensuring their effectiveness and making the interpretation of the provisions clear through the process of dispute settlement. All FTAs, EPAs and BITs which Japan has entered into also contain, whether detailed or not, such provisions for the settlement of disputes between the parties. State-to-state dispute settlement procedures are not as frequent as investor-state disputes in EPAs/FTAs and BITs.

The dispute settlement provisions in most of the agreements are similar to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”) in the WTO Agreement. They share the following four common elements:

- (i) if a dispute arises between the parties to a relevant agreement, they shall first conduct a consultation in respect of such dispute;
- (ii) if such consultation fails to settle such dispute, the complainant may then refer the matter to the dispute settlement body to be established pursuant to the relevant agreement;
- (iii) the dispute settlement body examines the relevant matter and renders a binding decision (judgment) or makes a recommendation; and
- (iv) the respondent rectifies violations of the agreement or provides for compensation to the complainant in line with the relevant judgment, or, in many cases, a mechanism is adopted whereby discussions are resumed based on the recommendation.

Despite these common elements, the provisions for dispute settlement in such

agreements significantly vary in their specific details, reflecting differences in political and economic factors underlying such agreements and the relationships of the parties thereto. Correctly understanding the meaning of such provisions and the relevant recent trends in respect thereof is important, not only to the Japanese government in reviewing its own international trade and foreign investment policy, but also, to Japanese business enterprises actively developing their businesses abroad. This Chapter will examine the mechanics of dispute settlement provisions in a number of EPAs/FTAs and BITs entered into by states with major market economies (such as the United States and the EU) and major emerging economies, and compare them with the mechanics of dispute resolution provisions existing in the EPAs entered into by Japan. The agreements examined herein are enumerated in Figure III-8-1 below.

Summary of Legal Disciplines

1) Nature and Types of Procedures Subject to Settlement in State-to-State Disputes

A comparison of the procedures for the settlement of state-to-state disputes based on the categories of EPAs/FTAs and BITs indicates a general tendency that such procedures in EPAs/FTAs contain relatively greater detail than those in BITs. Furthermore, a number of specific dispute settlement provisions included in most EPAs/FTAs are not included in most BITs. An important common element, generally appearing in both EPAs/FTAs and BITs, however, is the provision of the right of a party to unilaterally request a binding ruling of a dispute settlement body on certain disputes. Such commonality is fundamental to dispute settlement procedures. In contrast, many EPAs/FTAs and BITs contain several different types of provisions which “reference matters to a dispute settlement body”; such provisions differ from each other with respect to the organization of the dispute settlement body and available procedures. The following subsection groups the dispute settlement provisions found in EPAs/FTAs and BITs.

(a) EPAs/FTAs

The procedures employed by a dispute settlement body in rendering a binding decision in FTAs and EPAs can be grouped into three major categories.

The first category, a typical example of which is the procedures adopted by the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), is an “arbitration-type” procedure. In an “arbitration-type” procedure, each party is granted a right to request a panel or a panel of arbitrators, which is either ad hoc established or selected to examine and make a ruling in individual cases. All the EPAs/FTAs that Japan has entered into have adopted this type of dispute settlement procedure. Set forth below are typical examples of EPAs/FTAs which have adopted this type of dispute settlement procedure and which are entered into by parties other than Japan, with the numbers of the relevant provisions specified:

- NAFTA – Articles 2004 and 2008;
- Korea - Singapore FTA – Chapter 20, Article 20.6;
- Australia - Singapore FTA – Chapter 16, Article 4; and
- Thailand - New Zealand FTA – Chapter 17, Article 17.4.
- • CARIFORM-EU, Article 206

The second category is a “council-type” dispute settlement procedure, wherein the disputed matter is referred to a body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties’ governments (*i.e.*, a Council, Commission), and the relevant council examines the disputed matter and makes a decision or recommendation in respect thereof. Set forth below are typical examples of EPAs/FTAs which have adopted this category of dispute settlement procedure:

- Bangkok Agreement (Bangladesh, India, Korea, Laos, Sri Lanka, China) (Article 16);
- SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan) (Article 20);
- EEA (European Economic Area) (EU, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway) (Article 111, Paragraph 1, with certain exceptions); and

The third category is an intermediate entity between the first and second categories, wherein, similar to the second “council” type, the disputed matter is first referred to a body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties’ governments, but similar to the first “arbitration” type of dispute settlement procedure, for disputes which the body has failed to settle, certain quasi-judicial dispute settlement procedures (for example, an arbitration procedure), are available. Set forth below are typical examples of EPAs/FTAs which have adopted this category of dispute settlement procedure

- US - Jordan FTA (Article 17, Paragraph 1(b) and (c));
- EC - Morocco FTA (Article 86, Paragraphs 2 and 4);
- Cotonou Agreement (EU and ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) (Article 98, Paragraphs 1 and 2);
- EFTA (European Free Trade Association) (Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland) (Articles 47 and 48);
- EEA (European Economic Area: EU and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) (Article 111, Paragraph 1)
- CACM (Central American Common Market) (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) (Article 26);
- Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) (Article 47 and Article 24 of the Treaty establishing the Court of Justice);
- ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Viet Nam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia) (Article 8).

In most of the agreements enumerated above, the disputed matter can be referred by the parties to an arbitral body which is established on an *ad hoc* basis if the body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties’ governments has failed to settle the disputed matter. In contrast, the Andean Community and the EEA (with respect to those disputes concerning the rules of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community or the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, or the interpretation of the EEA

provisions relevant to the measures adopted to implement such treaties) provide that the disputed matter which such council-type body has failed to settle can be referred to a permanent court that has been established within the relevant region. In this respect, the Andean Community has established a permanent court which addresses any dispute under such agreement, and the EEA has designated the Court of Justice of the European Communities to address any dispute under such agreement (except for disputes between EFTA countries, which are referred to the EFTA Court).

The overall trend of dispute settlement procedures appears to be that countries (or other political entities) entering into EPAs/FTAs are increasingly inclined to adopt the “hybrid-type” procedure. For example, with the exception of the NAFTA (which adopts an “arbitration-type” procedure), all of the agreements involving the United States have adopted a “hybrid-type” procedure. Also, the EU, which primarily adopted a “council-type” procedure up to and including the 1980s, has adopted a “hybrid-type” procedure in most of the agreements which it has entered into in the 1990s and later.

In contrast, it is noteworthy that Japan’s EPAs always include an “arbitration-type” procedure (see, for example, Japan - Malaysia EPA, Chapter 13; Japan - Mexico EPA, Chapter 15; Japan - Singapore EPA, Chapter 21; Japan - Philippines EPA, Chapter 15; ASEAN - Japan Comprehensive EPA, Chapter 9; Japan - Viet Nam EPA, Chapter 13; Japan - Switzerland EPA, Chapter 14; Japan - India EPA, Chapter 14; Japan - Peru EPA, Chapter 15; Japan - Australia EPA, Chapter 19; and Japan - Mongolia EPA, Chapter 16), as well as a more detailed set of procedural provisions than other agreements entered into by other governments. Japan’s preference for “judicial” dispute settlement procedures is shared by Singapore and Korea, both of which, similar to Japan, became increasingly active in negotiating and executing EPAs/FTAs since 2000 (see, for example, Chile - Korea FTA, Article 19.6, Paragraph 1; Korea - Singapore FTA, Section 20, Article 20.6; Singapore - New Zealand FTA, Article 61.1; Australia - Singapore FTA, Section 16, Article 4; and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (Chile, Brunei, New Zealand and Singapore), Article 15.6, Paragraph 1).

(b) BITs

BITs generally include procedures for the settlement of state-to-state disputes. Most of them have adopted “arbitration-type” procedures, consisting of consultation and arbitration.

2) Particular Features of Specific Dispute Settlement Procedures

As stated above, the procedures for the settlement of state-to-state disputes in EPAs/FTAs and BITs are similar to the WTO dispute settlement procedures (the degree of similarity of WTO dispute settlement procedures differs in each agreement), as all of them contain provisions relating to: (i) consultation between disputing parties; (ii) referral of matters to a dispute settlement body; (iii) the rendition of a binding decision by that dispute settlement body; and (iv) the rectification by the respondent of any violations determined to exist. However, the details of the relevant provisions vary between the agreements.

Set forth below is an analysis of the particulars of the agreements; a grouping of the dispute settlement provisions; and a comparison thereof with those agreements entered into by Japan. This comparison covers the procedural steps which are considered particularly important to ensure that the WTO dispute settlement procedures function properly and are

effective (with respect to the 28 EPAs/FTAs involving Japan or other countries subject to the analysis below, the specifics and procedural particulars thereof are summarized in the appendix to Section IV (State-to-state Dispute Settlement Procedures in Economic Partnership Agreements of Foreign Countries).

Analytical Topics of Each Agreement

- (a) subject matter of the dispute settlement procedures;
- (b) mandatory obligation for prior consultation;
- (c) rules relating to the dispute settlement procedures;
- (d) timelines;
- (e) relationship with dispute settlement procedures under other agreements;
- (f) selection of panelists or arbitrators;
- (g) method of determination by the dispute settlement body;
- (h) appellate process;
- (i) effective implementation of arbitral awards; and
- (j) retaliatory measures in cases of non-compliance.

(a) Scope of the Subject Matter of Dispute Settlement Procedures

(1) EPAs/FTAs

The scope of the matters that can be referred to the relevant dispute settlement body established under the relevant EPA/FTA can be grouped as follows:

- (i) certain EPAs/FTAs limit the scope of disputes that can be referred to the dispute settlement body to those concerning their interpretation or application of the agreement, (*i.e.*, CACM, Article 26, EC - Norway FTA, Article 29; Cotonou Agreement, Article 98, Paragraph 1; and ASEAN, Article 8, Paragraph 2); and
- (ii) in addition to permitting disputes concerning interpretation or application of the relevant agreement, other EPAs/FTAs permit for a wider scope of disputes that can be referred to the dispute settlement body, allowing parties to file claims in respect of measures which are not inconsistent with the provisions thereof, but effectively nullify or impair the benefits expected by such parties from such agreements (similar to “non-violation” claims under the WTO Agreement) (for example, CARICOM, Article 187; NAFTA, Article 2004 (with certain limitations); and Korea - Singapore FTA, Chapter 20, Article 20.2, Paragraph 1 (with certain limitations)).

The EPAs entered into by Japan (excluding Japan - Switzerland EPA, Japan - Chile EPA and Japan - Australia EPA) fall under category (1), above. They include a provision that any party may claim against the other(s) before an arbitral panel if any benefit accruing to it is

nullified or otherwise impaired as a result of either: (i) the failure of the party complained against to carry out its obligations under such EPA; or (ii) measures taken by the respondent which are in conflict with the obligations.

In addition to the limitations described above, many EPAs/FTAs (excluding the Japan-Switzerland EPA and Japan-Chile EPA) exempt certain matters from the scope of the relevant dispute settlement procedure (with a view to setting aside such matters which are too sensitive to a party thereto or which a party thereto considers inappropriate to subject to a “judicial” dispute settlement. In the EPAs entered into by Japan, it is stipulated that the provisions related to dispute settlement procedures do not apply to some provisions.

Also, some agreements, in reflecting the special needs of the parties thereto, set forth special rules for dispute settlement procedures applicable only to certain subject areas (for example, NAFTA prescribes separate panel procedures only applicable to the issue of antidumping and countervailing duties (Chapter 19)).

(2) BITs

In contrast to the EPAs/FTAs, there are no provisions in the BITs that permit “non-violation” claims. With limited exceptions, no examined BITs limit the scope of matters that can be referred to dispute settlement, although a small number of them provide that state-to-investor disputes which are pending in any international arbitration court at that point in time cannot be referred to any international arbitration court as a state-to-state dispute (*see*, Chile - Turkey BIT, Article 12, Paragraph 10, and South Africa - Turkey BIT Article 8, Paragraph 8).

(b) Obligation to Conduct Prior Consultation

Most EPAs/FTAs obligate the disputing parties to conduct consultations amongst themselves before resorting to binding dispute settlement procedures. All the EPAs entered into by Japan include this obligation.

All examined BITs obligate the parties to seek an amicable solution (through consultation, for example) with respect to any dispute before initiating any quasi-judicial procedure.

(c) Rules Relating to Dispute Settlement Procedures

(1) EPAs/FTAs

In a dispute resolution proceeding, the panel (or arbitrator(s)) needs procedural rules by which it should be governed. The methods of setting procedural rules can be broadly classified into the following two categories:

- (i) those that use procedural rules established by an existing institution. (*See*, for example, EFTA Article 1, Paragraph 6 of Annex T, and the Cotonou Agreement, Article 98, Paragraph 2(c) (wherein the rules of procedures of the Permanent Court of Arbitration shall be used, unless otherwise agreed by the parties)); and
- (ii) other agreements require the rules of procedure to be determined separately.

In most EPAs/FTAs the rules of procedure fall under (2) above. Such agreements can be further subcategorized into:

(a) those providing for common rules of procedure applicable to all disputes. (*See*, for example, NAFTA Article 2012, Paragraph 1; FTAA Chapter 23, Article 16, Paragraph 1; US - Jordan FTA Article 17, Paragraph 3; and Korea - Singapore FTA Article 20.9, Paragraph 1); and

(b) those providing that each panel or arbitral panel shall, at its own discretion, establish rules of procedure on a case by case basis. (*See*, for example, CARICOM, Arbitration Procedure, Article 200, Paragraph 1; Australia - Singapore FTA Chapter 16, Article 6, Paragraph 4; and Thailand - New Zealand FTA Article 17.7, Paragraph 11).

Japan also utilizes (2) above. The EPAs that have clauses on procedural rules stipulate that the joint committee established on the basis of the EPA/FTA in question shall specify the procedural rules applying to all arbitration procedures (Japan – Mexico EPA, Article 159; Japan – Chile EPA, Article 187; Japan - Philippines EPA, Article 159; and Japan - Australia EPA, Article 19.16). Moreover, the other agreements, as well as stipulating the arbitration procedures within the agreement, (the ASEAN – Japan and Japan – Viet Nam agreements, for example), stipulate that the parties can, after discussion with the court of arbitration (arbitral tribunal), agree to adopt additional rules and procedures that do not violate the procedural provisions within the agreement in question.

(2) BITs

Most BITs provide that each panel (or arbitral panel) shall, in its own discretion, determine the rules of procedures on a case by case basis. Some BITs, however, provide that the rules of procedures shall be adopted from a third party (for example, some of the BITs entered into by the United States provide that the arbitration procedures articulated therein follow the applicable UNCITRAL rules).

(d) Timelines

(1) EPAs/FTAs

Even though the right to seek a binding ruling from a dispute settlement body is provided for under a relevant EPA/FTA, no effective resolution could be expected if a respondent was able to arbitrarily delay the relevant proceedings. Most of the EPAs/FTAs examined, including the EPAs entered into by Japan, set forth mandatory timelines to be met at each step of the dispute settlement process. In some EPAs/FTAs, however, no time limit in respect of proceedings is clearly established (*See*, for example, CACM, CARICOM, EC - Estonia FTA, and EC - Morocco FTA).

(2) BITs

In contrast to EPAs/FTAs, only a very limited number of BITs set forth timelines in respect of the final arbitral award. They include: US - Czech FTA, Canada - El Salvador FTA and South Africa - Turkey FTA.

(e) Priority of Forum in Relation to Dispute Settlement Procedures of Other Agreements

(1) EPAs/FTAs

As individual EPAs/FTAs and the WTO Agreement contain provisions stipulating rights and responsibilities that are substantively the same or similar, there are cases in which a situation can arise where it is possible to use both the dispute resolution procedures in the WTO Agreement and the dispute resolution procedures in the relevant EPA/FTA or BIT (a typical example is the US - Canada lumber dispute over antidumping and countervailing duty measures in respect of soft wood lumber originating in Canada).

Some EPAs/FTAs set forth the relationship with the dispute settlement procedures in other agreements in the event that such cases arise; the content of these can be broadly classified into three categories, as follows:

- (1) priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the relevant FTA; or
- (2) priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO Agreement (or GATT); or
- (3) the complainant may choose between the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures and the FTA dispute settlement procedures.

NAFTA is an example of (1). This agreement stipulates that, with regard to disputes arising from substantially equivalent provisions in NAFTA or GATT, in the event that a NAFTA signatory intends to bring an action against another NAFTA signatory under the WTO dispute resolution procedures, it should first notify any third NAFTA Party (not due to be a respondent) of its intention. If that third Party wishes to take action under the NAFTA dispute resolution procedures, those Parties shall consult about whether to deal with the issue under the WTO or NAFTA provisions. If no agreement is reached, the dispute shall, as a general rule, be conducted on the basis of the NAFTA dispute resolution procedures (Article 2005, Paragraph 2), it is stipulated that, with regard to disputes where the NAFTA provisions regarding "Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements," "Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures" or "Standard-Related Measures" in NAFTA (Article 2005, Paragraphs 3 and 4) are applied, the dispute resolution procedures in NAFTA rather than those in the WTO Agreement shall be used, depending on the will of the respondent country.

Examples of (2) include the EU – Chile Association Agreement, which stipulates a comprehensive preference for the WTO procedure - when a case is disputable under the WTO Agreement, it shall be referred to the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO Agreement (Article 189, Paragraph 3 (c)). Also, the US – Jordan FTA provides that disputes regarding trade in services or intellectual property can be referable to the panel procedures under that FTA only if they are not subject to resolution under the WTO dispute settlement procedures (Article 17, Paragraphs 4(a) and (b)).

Examples of (3) include FTAA (Chapter 23, Article 8, Paragraph 1) and the Korea - Singapore FTA (Article 20.3, Paragraph 1). However, where the dispute resolution procedure is left to the choice of the complainant, the relevant agreement usually provides that once either of the disputes settlement procedures is chosen, the selected procedure shall be used to the exclusion of the other (*see*, for example, the Korea - Singapore FTA, Article 20.3, Paragraph 2).

The EPAs entered into by Japan fall under category (3), in that they impose no limitation on the right of the complainant to have recourse to the dispute settlement procedures available under any other international agreement, but explicitly provide that once either of the dispute settlement procedures has been chosen, no other procedure can be used in respect of that dispute. However, some of the EPAs entered into by Japan provide that the preceding procedure may be waived if the parties agree (Japan - Singapore EPA, Article 139, Paragraph 4; Japan - Philippines EPA, Article 149, Paragraph 4; and Japan - Thailand EPA, Article 159, Paragraph 4).

(2) BITs

Unlike the case of EPAs/FTAs, it is not envisaged that disputes concerning BITs will involve conflict with dispute resolution procedures in other international agreements, such as the WTO Agreement, so there appear to be no stipulations concerning the relationship between dispute settlement procedures under the BIT in question and dispute settlement procedures under other international agreements.

(f) Selection of Panelists and Arbitrators

(1) EPAs/FTAs

The rules of procedure may include a provision involving the method for selecting panelists or arbitrators. The first issue in this regard is whether a roster of candidates is to be prepared and maintained. For example, FTAA (Chapter 23, Article 12), CARICOM (Article 205, Paragraph 1), and MERCOSUR all provide that such a roster be prepared. NAFTA also provides that such a roster be prepared and maintained for panelists (for example, arbitrators) reviewing AD and CVD measures (Annexes 1901.2 and 1905) and in respect of ordinary dispute settlement procedures (Article 2009)). No such provision is found in the EPAs entered into by Japan.

The second issue in this regard is the specific method to be employed in selecting panelists or arbitrators. Most EPAs/FTAs provide that for panels or arbitrations consisting of three (3) panelists or arbitrators, as the case may be, each of the parties may appoint one such panelist/arbitrator, and that for panels or arbitrations consisting of five (5) panelists or arbitrators, as the case may be, each of the parties may appoint two such panelists/arbitrators. In each case, the method of selecting the remaining one panelist or arbitrator differs, depending on the terms of the relevant EPA/FTA, as follows:

(1) some EPAs/FTAs provide that the remaining panelist/arbitrator shall be selected by the mutual agreement of the panelists/arbitrators already appointed (for example, US - Jordan FTA, Article 17, Paragraph 1(c));

(2) some EPAs/FTAs provide that the remaining panelist/arbitrator shall be selected by the mutual agreement of the disputing parties (for example, NAFTA Article 2011, Paragraphs 1(b) and 2(b)), and that, if no agreement is reached on the remaining panelist/arbitrator, he/she shall be chosen by lot); and

(3) some EPAs/FTAs provide that the remaining panelist/arbitrator shall be selected by the mutual agreement of the panelists already appointed, and if no agreement is reached, the selection of the remaining panelist/arbitrator shall be determined by a third party (for example, the President of the International Court of

Justice, in Thailand - New Zealand FTA, Article 17.5, Paragraphs 1 and 3; and the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Cotonou Agreement, Article 98, Paragraph 2(b)).

In the dispute under NAFTA between, the United States and Mexico concerning the market access commitment of sugar, no panel examination has commenced to date, more than six years after the filing of the complaint, because the United States has delayed the panelist selection procedure. This suggests that panel selection procedures requiring the mutual agreement of the disputing parties may generate a problem with respect to the effectiveness of the dispute resolution process.

Japan's EPAs might appear to fall under category (2) above, the parties are required to propose a certain number of candidates for the third panelist (who shall be the chairperson), and negotiate this matter. However, they differ from category (2) above in that, if no agreement has been reached on the selection of the chairperson by and between the parties prior to the mandatory deadlines thereunder: (i) the Secretariat-General of the WTO may be requested to appoint the third arbitrator or (ii) the third arbitrator may be chosen by lot.

(2) BITs

BITs generally provide that an arbitral tribunal shall consist of three (3) arbitrators, with each party selecting one arbitrator, and each selected arbitrator then mutually agreeing upon the third arbitrator (who shall be the chairperson).

(g) Method of Decision-making by the Dispute Settlement Body

(1) EPAs/FTAs

In EPAs/FTAs, the following methods are used in the decision-making process by either the panel or the council body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties:

(i) Consensus, but if no consensus is reached, a majority vote is used (see, for example, Korea - Singapore FTA, Annex 20A, Paragraph 20; Australia - Singapore FTA, Chapter 16, Article 6, Paragraph 3; and Thailand - New Zealand FTA, Article 17.6, Paragraph 3); and

(ii) A (simple) majority vote is used from the outset (see, for example, EFTA Annex T, Article 1, Paragraph 7; FTAA, Chapter 23, Article 24, Paragraph 3; CARICOM, Arbitration Procedure, Article 207, Paragraph 7; European Agreements Arbitration Procedures, Article 114, Paragraph 4; and EC - Morocco FTA, Article 86, Paragraph 4).

Among the EPAs entered into by Japan, all excluding Japan - Mexico EPA, Article 154, Paragraph 7 provide that the arbitral tribunal shall attempt to make its decisions by consensus, but also may make such decisions by majority vote should it fail to reach consensus.

(2) BITs

One occasionally encounters BITs that contain no specific provision on the method by which the arbitral tribunal is to render its decision, including the decision on its arbitral award. This is presumably linked to the fact that most, if not all, of the BITs examined provide that the rules of procedure shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal on an *ad hoc*

basis.

Other BITs provide that the arbitral tribunal may make decisions by majority vote.

(h) Appellate Proceedings

(1) EPAs/FTAs

While it is desirable, for purposes of expeditious resolution of disputes, for either the relevant arbitral tribunal or the relevant council body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties to render a final and conclusive decision in first instance, the need for a more discreet examination of certain matters may require that an appeal against an award be filed, if necessary.

The EPAs entered into by Japan have no provisions dealing with appellate procedures and expressly state that the award of the arbitral tribunal is “final”. SAARC, however, explicitly provides for appellate procedures (Article 20, Paragraph 9). Other EPAs/FTAs explicitly provide that no award shall be subject to an appeal (*see*, for example, Korea - Singapore FTA, Article 20.13, Paragraph 1).

(2) BITs

The BITs contain no arrangements providing for appeals.

(i) Implementation Procedures in Respect of Arbitral Awards

As described above, most EPAs/FTAs and BITs stipulate that the arbitral tribunal issues binding judgments and that an institution consisting of representatives of the contracting parties may also issue a binding judgment. Accordingly, when such an award is rendered (requiring the respondent either to take corrective measures or to make compensation, as the case may be), the respondent is obligated to implement it in good faith. EPAs/FTAs generally set forth provisions to ensure the implementation of the arbitral award by the respondent.

In contrast, only a small number of BITs include provisions to ensure the implementation of the relevant award (for example, Canada - El Salvador BIT provides that the complainant may either receive compensation from the responding party, or if the respondent has not implemented the arbitral award, suspend the provision of a benefit equivalent to the level of benefit subject to the arbitral award if the arbitral award is not implemented (Article 13)).

(1) Deadlines for Implementation

The following types of deadlines are found in provisions concerning the implementation of the award for both EPAs/FTAs and BITs:

(1) for some agreements, the limitation period is from the rendition of the final decision to the actual implementation thereof; and

(2) for other agreements, the limitation period is from the rendition of the final decision to the deadline for the parties to reach agreement on such implementation. That is, if the parties fail to reach agreement within the specified time period, the

complainant may request that the panel hearing the original dispute settlement set out the deadlines for the implementation of the award (*see* for example, the Korea - Singapore FTA, Article 20.13, Paragraph 2(b); and Australia - Singapore FTA, Chapter 16, Article 9, Paragraph 1).

The EPAs entered into by Japan fall under type (2) above. Specifically, the respondent is required to notify the complainant of the period necessary to implement the award within a certain period of time from the date of the award. If the complainant is not satisfied with the time period notified by the respondent, either party may request that the arbitral tribunal determine such time period. Some provide that this shall occur after consulting with the parties; in others, no such prior consultation is necessary or without conducting such consultations.

(2) Surveillance regarding Implementation

Few agreements specifically provide for a surveillance mechanism to ensure that the respondent has in fact implemented the final decision of the panel or the council body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties, as the case may be. The ASEAN Protocol, which governs dispute settlement, requires that the respondent report to the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials' Meeting on its own implementation of final decisions rendered by the panel or the council body, as the case may be (Article 15, Paragraph 4).

No EPA entered into by Japan contains any specific provision in respect of surveillance regarding implementation.

(3) Method of Implementation

Whether or not the relevant dispute settlement body has the authority to recommend methods of implementing a relevant binding decisions (see, for example, Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the DSU of the WTO Agreement) is an important issue. In this respect, agreements can be categorized as follows:

- (1) it is left to the mutual agreement of the parties; and
- (2) the agreement provides that the panel is authorized to make recommendations on the implementation method (for example, US - Jordan FTA, Article 17, Paragraph 1(d) provides that the panel may make recommendations on the method of correcting violations found in the arbitral award pursuant to a request of a party.)

Among the EPAs entered into by Japan, some provide that the arbitral tribunal may include in its award suggested options of implementation by the respondent for the countries to consider (in accordance with (2) above); others do not have such provisions.

(j) Retaliatory Measures in the Event of a Failure of Respondent to Implement an Award

The following types of retaliatory measures are permitted if the respondent fails to take actions required by the relevant award, the final report, or otherwise agreed upon by the parties based on the final report:

- (1) one type is to authorize a retaliatory measure, *i.e.*, to suspend a benefit

provided to the respondent; and

(2) the other type is to require the respondent to make a compensatory adjustment (*see*, for example, EFTA Annex T, Article 3, Paragraph 1(a); however, subparagraph (b) thereof effectively permits, the complainant to choose between the option (1) above and this option (2)).

With respect to option (1) above, some agreements permit the complainant to take unilateral retaliatory measures against the respondent (*see*, for example, NAFTA, Article 2019, Paragraph 1; the Korea - Singapore FTA, Article 20.14, Paragraph 2; and the Thailand - New Zealand FTA, Article 17.11, Paragraph 1 (wherein the respondent party has the right to dispute the level of such unilateral retaliatory measures in arbitration). Others permit the complainant to take retaliatory measures only after the panel or council body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties' governments, as the case may be, so authorizes (*see*, for example, SAARC, Article 20, Paragraph 11; Bangkok Agreement, Article 16; and Australia - Singapore FTA, Chapter 16, Article 10, Paragraph 2).

The EPAs entered into by Japan have adopted option (1) above.

3) Challenges in State-to-State Dispute Settlement Procedures

Japan has signed 14 EPAs and 21 BITs which have entered into force, a relatively small number in comparison with other developed countries. Nevertheless, it is believed that the number of regional or bilateral agreements between Japan and other countries will increase, as indicated by the recent movement toward economic integration in East Asia.

Thus far, no dispute settlement clause on state-to-state disputes has been invoked under any EPA/BIT entered into by Japan. However, if Japan enters into agreements with a wider range of countries, and as a result more business sectors actively develop businesses by virtue of preferential treatment granted, it would be increasingly likely that there will be disputes concerning the interpretation and/or application of the EPAs or BIT.

In such a situation, there is a possibility that a problem may arise (particularly in the case of EPAs), specifically, whether the dispute settlement procedures prescribed in the relevant EPA or BIT will apply or whether the WTO procedures will apply. This is because both the EPA and the WTO Agreement are aimed at promoting trade and economic activity, and there are cases in which the dispute relates to both agreements, such as cases where the EPA borrows the provisions of the WTO Agreement. Accordingly, the parties would need to carefully examine and determine the more advantageous forum for the settlement of disputes.

At this stage, it is possible that two cases with the same set of facts and between the same parties can be referred to both the forum prescribed under the EPAs/BITs and the WTO Agreement, generating difficult legal questions. The relevant procedural rules under customary international law (such as *res judicata* and the avoidance of a multiplicity of proceedings) are applicable to cases whose disputes are identical. For disputes to be identical under international law, the parties and the facts and causes of actions must be the same. Disputes involving an EPA/BIT and a WTO Agreement are not identical because different agreements are involved. In such cases, two or more forums may render conflicting judgments in the same case, resulting in confusion (*see*, for example, in the *Argentina - Chicken AD* (DS241) case, Argentina's measures were determined to be in violation of the

AD Agreement, but the preceding Ad Hoc Tribunal of MERCOSUR rejected Brazil's claims), but there is no problem from a legal perspective, apart from special cases.

Of course, if two or more cases addressing issues that are closely connected are separately referred to more than one forum, even if they do not have exactly the same factual foundation, it may be desirable to have a coordinated resolution in a single dispute between the parties. For example, in the cases relating to sweeteners between the United States and Mexico (DS308), Mexico referred the alleged violation of US market access commitment on sugar originated in Mexico to a NAFTA panel, and the United States referred Mexico's imposition of retaliatory internal taxes on sweeteners originating in the United States (and drinks with such sweeteners) to a WTO panel. It has been suggested that these matters should have been addressed in a single forum because of the close relationship between the two disputes. However, the dispute settlement procedures in these respective agreements only relate to the interpretation and application of the agreements in question, so the emergence of cases in which "disputes" relating to multiple articles are handled separately using the respective procedures and the long time to achieve the resolution of the overall "dispute" is inevitable, as it stems from the pluralistic nature of international law; what Japan must consider is how to utilize the means of handling such situations. As described above, this issue is usually dealt with by establishing provisions on regarding the relationship with dispute settlement procedures under other agreements in each agreement. The relationship in terms of priority can generally be classified into the following three: (1) priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the relevant FTA; (2) priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO Agreement; or (3) the complainant may choose between the two, but in order to avoid conflicting results on practically the same issue under different agreements, additional use of the other procedures is prohibited. In the EPAs/FTAs Japan concluded, (3) has been used. It will be vital to continue to pay closely attention to the competition between state-to-state dispute settlement procedures in the future.

Figure III-8-1 Regional Trade Agreements Examined in this Chapter, including Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs"), Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), and Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs")

[EPA/FTA]		
	Full Name (Abbreviation in bracket)	Reference in this Report
1.	North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	NAFTA
2.	Free Trade Agreement of Americas (FTAA) — Third Draft Agreement	FTAA
3.	Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free-Trade-Area	US - Jordan FTA
4.	1980 Treaty of Montevideo — Instrument Establishing the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)	LAIA
5.	Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR	MERCOSUR
6.	General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, Signed at Managua on 13 December 1960 (CACM)	CACM
7.	Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy	CARICOM

	Full Name (Abbreviation in bracket)	Reference in this Report
8.	Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Government of the Republic of Colombia	CARICOM - Columbia FTA
9.	Andean Community — DECISION 563: Official Codified Text of the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement), and Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement	Andean Community
10.	Agreement on the European Economic Area	EEA
11.	AGREEMENT between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway	EC—Norway FTA
12.	EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part	EC—Morocco FTA
13.	EUROPE AGREEMENT establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lithuania, of the other part	Europe Agreement
14.	Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part, Signed in Cotonou on June 23, 2000	Cotonou Agreement
15.	Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association (Annex to the Agreement Amending the Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association) (EFTA)	EFTA
16.	Agreement on Free Trade between the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the Government of the Russian Federation	Russia - Kyrgyzstan FTA
17.	Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)	CEFTA
18.	The United Economic Agreement between the Countries the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)	GCC
19.	Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)	SAARC
20.	First Agreement on Trade Negotiations among Developing Member Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok Agreement)	Bangkok Agreement
21.	Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China	ASEAN - China Agreement
22.	Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Singapore	Korea - Singapore FTA
23.	Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)	ASEAN
24.	Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA)	Australia - Singapore FTA
25.	Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement	Thailand - New Zealand FTA
26.	Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)	ANZCERTA
27.	South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA)	SPARTECA
28.	East African Community Free Trade Agreement	EAC

[BIT]

	Contracting Parties	Date of Signing	Abbreviations in this Report
1.	United States and Czech	Signed the original agreement with Czechoslovakia October 22, 1991; agreed on the Protocol with Czech, May 1, 2004.	Original Agreement: US—Czechoslovakia BIT Protocol: US - Czech BIT
2.	United States and Uruguay	November 2005	US—Uruguay BIT
3.	France and Hong Kong	November 30, 1995	France - Hong Kong BIT
4.	France and Malta	August 11, 1976	France - Malta BIT
5.	Germany and Poland	November 10, 1989	Germany - Poland BIT
6.	Germany and China	December 1, 2003	Germany - China BIT
7.	United Kingdom and Turkey	March 15, 1991	UK - Turkey BIT
8.	United Kingdom and Vanuatu	December 22, 2003	UK - Vanuatu BIT
9.	Canada and El Salvador	June 6, 1999	Canada - El Salvador BIT
10.	Australia and Sri Lanka	November 12, 2002	Australia - Sri Lanka BIT
11.	Mexico and Czech	April 4, 2002	Mexico - Chile BIT
12.	Chile and Turkey	August 21, 1998	Chile - Turkey BIT
13.	Korea and Sweden	August 30, 1995	Korea - Sweden BIT
14.	Korea and Mauritania	December 15, 2004	Korea - Mauritania BIT
15.	China and Iceland	March 31, 1994	China - Iceland BIT
16.	Russia and Norway	October 14, 1995	Russia - Norway BIT
17.	India and Hungary	November 3, 2003	India - Hungary BIT
18.	Thailand and Germany	June 24, 2002	Thailand - Germany BIT
19.	Belarus and Finland	March 2006	Belarus - Finland BIT
20.	Saudi Arabia and Korea	April 4, 2002	Saudi Arabia - Korea BIT
21.	Republic of South Africa and Turkey	June 23, 2000	South Africa - Turkey BIT

Source: UNCTAD