Chapter 2

United States

National Treatment ........................................................................................................................... 40
(1) Harbor Maintenance Tax “HMT” ........................................................................................... 40
(2) Merchant Shipping Act of 1920 (Jones Act) .......................................................................... 40
Quantitative Restrictions .................................................................................................................. 40
(1) Export Management System ................................................................................................... 40
(2) Export Restrictions on Logs ................................................................................................... 40
TARIFS .......................................................................................................................................... 41
(1) High Tariff Products ............................................................................................................... 41
(2) Method of Calculating Tariffs on Clocks and Wristwatches .................................................. 41
Anti-Dumping Measures .................................................................................................................. 42
(1) The Byrd Amendment (Amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930) (DS217/DS234) .................. 43
(2) Calculation of the Margin of Dumping via the Zeroing Procedure (WT/DS184) ................. 43
(3) Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (WT/DS184) ... 46
(4) Unfairly Long-Term Continuation of AD Duties (Sunset Provision) .................................... 46
(5) Anti-Dumping Investigation into Thick Plates from Japan .................................................... 47
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures .......................................................................................... 48
The 2014 Farm Bill ...................................................................................................................... 48
Safeguards ........................................................................................................................................ 50
Safeguard for Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic (CSPV) and Large Residential Washers ......... 50
Rules of Origin ................................................................................................................................... 51
Special Marking Requirements of Origin on watches and clocks ................................................ 51
Trade in Services .............................................................................................................................. 52
(1) The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007: FINSA .................................... 52
(2) Financial Services ................................................................................................................... 53
(3) Telecommunications ............................................................................................................... 53
(4) Maritime Transport ................................................................................................................. 54
Protection of Intellectual Property ................................................................................................... 54
(1) Trademarks Systems (WT/DS176, US Omnibus Act 211) .................................................... 54
(2) Copyright and Related Rights ................................................................................................. 54
(3) Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ..................................................................................... 56
Government Procurement ................................................................................................................ 57
Unilateral Measures ......................................................................................................................... 59
(1) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ..................................................................................... 59
(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ................................................................. 61
(3) Special 301 ............................................................................................................................. 62
(4) US Re-export Control Regimes .............................................................................................. 63
Other Matters ................................................................................................................................... 63
Part I: Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions

### National Treatment

(1) Harbor Maintenance Tax “HMT”

Please see page 111 in the 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

(2) Merchant Shipping Act of 1920 (Jones Act)

Please see page 67 in the 2017 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

### Quantitative Restrictions

(1) Export Management System

*This particular case was included in light of the following concerns despite it being a trade or investment policy or measure that does not expressly violate the WTO Agreements or other international rules.

**<Outline of the Measure>**

Export management has hitherto been carried out based on the “Export Administration Act” in the United States. At present, however, the “International Emergency Economic Powers Act” of the United States gives the government the ability to invoke unilateral export restrictions on agricultural goods for reasons of foreign policy or domestic shortages. The Export Administration Act was used in 1973 to ban exports of soybeans and soybean products and, again in 1974, 1975, and 1980, to restrict exports of wheat to the Soviet Union and Poland. Such restrictions significantly impact the targeted countries.

**<Concerns>**

Regarding the import of agricultural products, the Uruguay Round Agreement requires the replacement of non-tariff border measures with tariffs, in principle, and reduction of tariff rates. Japan believes that the regulation on export bans and export regulations under Article 12 of the Agriculture Agreement is not strong enough and lacks transparency, predictability and stability. Although the US system does not directly infringe on international rules, it does have trade distorting effects and obstructs stable food imports by importing countries. Therefore, it may present problems in terms of food security.

**<Recent Developments>**

In the WTO agriculture negotiations, Japan expressed the need for regulation reinforcement by substituting export tariffs for bans on exports and other restriction measures in order to restore the balance of rights and obligations between exporting and importing countries and to maintain food security. In December 2008, in the chairperson's text of modalities of agriculture, the reinforcement of regulations concerning export bans and restrictions in WTO Agriculture Agreement Article 12.1 was noted. Japan has continued to urge reinforcement of regulations against export bans and restrictions at WTO agriculture negotiations and various occasions for bilateral discussions.

(2) Export Restrictions on Logs

**<Outline of the Measure>**

The United States enacted logging restrictions in order to protect spotted owls and other animals. These restrictions reduced the domestic supply of logs, which led to the “Forest Resource Conservation and Shortage Relief Act of 1990,” a law which restricts log exports. The United States currently bans the exportation of logs taken from federal and state-owned forests west of the 100 west longitude line except Alaska and Hawaii. However, a specific quantity of logs may be exported where they are...
recognized by the government as surplus materials that are not used by domestic log processors.

**<Problems under International Rules>**

The United States argues that this measure is for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (GATT Article XX(g)) and therefore is allowed as an exception to Article XI, which prohibits quantitative restrictions. However, this is a restriction on the export of logs only; there are no restrictions on trade in logs within United States. The measure therefore cannot be justified under GATT Article XX(g) as a necessary and appropriate means of protecting forest resources. For this reason, it may be in violation of the GATT Article XI.

**<Recent Developments>**

Market prices of logs have been rapidly rising in recent years amid frequent forest fires and other natural disasters and growing demand for timber in the country. That has led to greater difficulty in procuring a sufficient amount of timber produce in the United States. Some remedy to, and/or improvement in, the current measure is required. Japan will continue encouraging improvements in these measures through such as multilateral and bilateral consultations.

### TARIFFS

**(1) High Tariff Products**

* This particular case was included in light of the following concerns despite it being a trade or investment policy or measure that does not expressly violate the WTO Agreements or other international rules.

**<Outline of the Measure>**

The current simple average bound tariff rate for non-agricultural products is 3.2%. Items with high tariffs include footwear (maximum 48%), glassware (maximum 38%), Apparel products (maximum 28.6%), porcelain and ceramics (maximum 28%), woolen goods (maximum 25%), trucks (25%), leather products, etc. (20%), cotton fabrics (16.5%), and titanium (maximum 15%). The tariff rate on trucks is very high, placing imported trucks under a severe competitive disadvantage; Japan has strong interests in seeing this tariff rate reduced. Furthermore, the binding coverage on non-agricultural products of the United States is 99.9% and the average applied tariff rate in 2016 was 3.2%.

**<Concerns>**

High tariff rates themselves do not, per se, conflict with WTO Agreements unless they exceed the bound rates. However, in light of the spirit of the WTO Agreements of promoting free trade and enhancing economic welfare, it is desirable to reduce tariffs to their lowest possible rate, and eliminate the tariff peaks (see “Tariff Rates” in 1. of Chapter 5, Part II) described above.

**<Recent Developments>**

With the aim of expanding the number of items subject to elimination of tariffs on IT products, ITA expansion negotiations were launched in May 2012, and an agreement was reached in December 2015. Elimination of tariffs on 201 items started gradually in July 2016, and elimination of approximately 90% of tariffs on the subject items is planned to be completed by July 2019. By January 2024, tariffs on all 201 items will have been completely eliminated for 54 members (see 2. (2) “Information Technology Agreement (ITA) Expansion Negotiation” in Chapter 5 of Part II for details). As for the United States, elimination of tariffs started in July 2016. For example, high tariff items for which tariffs are to be eliminated by the United States include parts such as microphones, and others (8.5%), binocular microscopes (7.2%), photoresist (6.5%), etc. Tariffs on all subject items including the above items will be eliminated gradually and will have been completely eliminated by 2019.

**(2) Method of Calculating Tariffs on Clocks and Wristwatches**
<Outline of the Measure>

The United States calculates tariffs on finished clocks and watches as the aggregate of the tariffs on their components. These calculations are complex and the trade procedures are onerous.

For example, the tariff on a wristwatch is the total of the tariffs on its: (a) movement; (b) case; (c) strap, band or bracelet; and (d) battery. A duty rate has not been set for 8 digit HS codes which classify wrist watches as completed products.

At the 9th and 10th digits of their HS Code, these components have numbers assigned unilaterally as Statistical Suffix according to the Statistical Notes to the Chapter 91 of the United States Tariff Schedule, and exporters are required to abide by them.

Although the rules were established for the purpose of protecting the US watch/clock industry, there is some opinion that the rules should be simplified from the point of view of benefitting of importers and consumers in the U.S.

<Problems under International Rules>

This calculation method is not a violation of WTO rules because it is in accordance with the US schedule of the tariff concession. However, the complex method of calculating tariffs and assignment of its own HS Code place excessive burdens on traders and is an obstacle to the promotion of smooth trade. The US calculation method was designed mainly for the mechanical clock/watch in the days when the type of clock/watch was dominant, before it also applied to the electric clock/watch. Now that mechanical clocks/watches account for only a fraction of timepieces distributed around the world, the measure fails to reflect the reality of business.

The issue was discussed during the Japan-US Deregulation Initiative talks in 2002 and 2003. The Report issued in June 2004 reflected Japanese concerns over clock and watch tariff rate calculation methodology and rules of origin certificates. The report stated that negotiations would continue with deference to both the Japanese government’s position and the ongoing WTO discussions. In fact, however, no improvement has been made so far.

<Recent Developments>

Since 2002, Japan has capitalized on a range of opportunities, including the Japan-US Deregulation Initiative, Japan-US Trade Forum, and WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) of the U.S., to ask them for some improvement and/or solution, only to find the problems left unresolved. We assume that the U.S. clock/watch business is faced with the same problems because they outsource production to contractors in Asia. To facilitate international trade, Japan will continue asking the United States for improvement.

Japan took part in negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement negotiations, and, the participants reached the outline agreement in 2015, which should have paved the way for immediate elimination of US tariffs on wristwatches once the Agreement comes into effect. However, with its announcement of withdrawal from the Partnership, the issue has been left as a challenge to be solved.

Anti-Dumping Measures

The U.S. is a traditional user of AD measures. The number of AD measures imposed by the U.S. since 1995 is 395 (as of December 31, 2016), and this number is largest among developed countries that are WTO Members1.

The US’s system for AD measures is highly transparent, because the US investigation authorities actively disclose related information2. This has made it easier for interested parties to assess the progress of and issues surrounding investigations and has secured opportunities for interested parties to submit their views and rebuttal arguments in order to protect their interests.

On the other hand, the U.S. still maintains some elements of unilateralism and protectionism in its operation of the AD system. The number of AD-related cases for which consultations were requested through the WTO dispute resolution process after the establishment of the WTO is 124, and of those, 3

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2 For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce makes available laws and regulations, manuals, inquiry formats, and other materials concerning AD investigation on its website (http://trade.gov/enforcement/operations/). Similar materials are also made available by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) on its website (https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations.htm).
54 cases arose from AD measures of the U.S.\textsuperscript{3} It is important for Japan to continue to monitor the consistency of AD measures of the U.S. with the agreement.

In the past, Japan has pointed out numerous issues with the U.S.’s AD system to the U.S. Government, demanding that they be improved. These issues include the Byrd Amendment, improper dumping determination through use of the zeroing methodology, and long-term continuation of AD measures (the administration of “sunset reviews”). Following are major issues that have recently arisen.

(1) The Byrd Amendment (Amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930) (DS217/DS234)

Please see pages 70-72 in the 2017 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

(2) Calculation of the Margin of Dumping via the Zeroing Procedure (WT/DS184)

\textbf{<Outline of the Measure>}

The United States has applied a calculation method under which the price difference is regarded as “zero” in calculating the weighted average of the product when an individual model of, or an individual transaction of, product is exported at a higher price than the normal values in the domestic market (where they are not dumped). With this approach, the dumping margin is artificially inflated (See Figure I-3-1). This way of calculation is called “zeroing”.

\textbf{<Problems under International Rules>}

In the case of the AD measure applied by the EU to bed linen from India (DS141), the WTO Appellate Body found in March 2001 that when comparing the weighted average of export prices and that of normal values to calculate a dumping margin (known as W-W comparison), applying the zeroing methodology is inconsistent with the WTO Agreements. However, the United States, taking the position that the WTO ruling against zeroing methodology applied only to the specific case (“as applied”), and did not constitute a finding that the “zeroing” methodology “as such” violated the WTO Agreements, continued to use the methodology.

Japan’s industries, including the bearing industry Japan, as well as other sectors, have been subject to AD duties at a rate calculated using the zeroing methodology. In November 2004, Japan, claiming that application by the United States of the zeroing methodology to 13 cases of AD measures, such as Japan-made heavy steel plates and ball bearing, as well as the zeroing methodology itself, violated the WTO Agreements, requested WTO consultations with the United States (DS322). In February 2005, Japan also requested the establishment of a panel. In January 2007, the Appellate Body fully accepted the claims of Japan, and determined as summarized blow.

\textbf{(i) Application of the zeroing procedures in original investigations (as such)}

The Appellate Body supported the Panel’s ruling that the application of the zeroing methodology in original investigations violates the AD Agreement because recognition of dumping and dumping margin must be based on the relation to the product investigated as a whole, not individual transactions, and because the comparison of normal values and export prices must be considered in its entirety. The Appellate Body ruled that the United States violated Articles 2.1, 2.4, and 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement by applying the zeroing methodology in original investigations to calculate dumping margins based on comparison between individual transactions (known as T-T comparison).

\textbf{(ii) Application of the zeroing procedures in periodic reviews (as such)}

The Appellate Body dismissed the Panel’s ruling that the application of the zeroing methodology in periodic reviews and other processes does not violate the AD Agreement, pointing out the same reasons mentioned above in (i), and ruled that application of the zeroing methodology in periodic reviews violated Articles 2.4 and 9.3 of the Agreement as the former requires the members to make a “fair comparison” between export prices and normal values, and the latter stipulates that the total amount of AD duties must not exceed that dumping margin.

\textsuperscript{3} See the WTO website (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A6#).
(iii) Application of the zeroing procedures in periodic reviews and sunset reviews (as applied)

The Appellate Body ruled that application of the zeroing procedures in periodic and sunset reviews of the AD measures violated the Articles 2.4, 9.3, 11.3 and other articles of the AD Agreement.

<Recent Developments>

To date, as in the above-mentioned case of DS322, etc., panels and the Appellate Body have found that zeroing in all stages of AD procedures, including original investigations and regular administrative reviews violates the AD Agreement. However, “if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction comparison” (referred to as “targeted dumping”) “a normal value established on a weighted-average basis may be compared to prices of individual export transactions” pursuant to the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. As this provision appears to assume a comparison of normal value with certain export transactions, some Members claim that the zeroing methodology is allowed under the provision. While, as described above, panels and the Appellate Body have repeatedly determined in past dispute cases that the zeroing methodology was inconsistent with the AD Agreement, none of these cases directly concerned targeted dumping under the second sentence of Article 2.4.2, and they have not explicitly determined that use of the zeroing methodology to calculate dumping margins in such cases violates the Agreement. In this respect, in recent years the United States have been finding targeted dumping in many cases and have been expanding and developing the use of the zeroing methodology.

The Republic of Korea in August 2013 and China in December of the same year requested WTO consultations, claiming that the application of the zeroing methodology in cases where targeted dumping was determined violates the AD Agreement (DS464 and DS471). In 2016, the Appellate Body found in DS464 that the zeroing methodology is inconsistent with the AD Agreement, since the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 does not require to select certain export transactions while ignoring others.

The Panel in DS471 also found that the text of the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 does not allow zeroing and that the zeroing methodology is inconsistent with the Article. In this case, the Panel's finding regarding zeroing was not appealed and thus it can be said that the dispute over the zeroing methodology is now settled.

However, the United States has been using the zeroing methodology through several analytical methods, such as Nails Test, Nails Test II and Differential Pricing Analysis, which it developed while making certain changes to its methodology to determine targeted dumping. Japan will continue to pay attention to the consistency of the targeted dumping determinations and methodologies used for determining dumping margins by the U.S. with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
<Figure I-2-1> Application of the Zeroing Methodology to Calculation of Dumping Margins: An Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Domestic Price ($)</th>
<th>Export Price ($)</th>
<th>Dumping margin of individual product ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product A</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product B</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product C</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-50 (Under zeroing methodology: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product D</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(For each product, domestic sales and exports volumes are all considered to be “1 unit” for ease of calculation.)

(For each product, domestic sales and exports volumes are all considered to be “1 unit” for ease of calculation.)

When the zeroing methodology is not applied, a dumping margin is calculated as shown below:

\[
\text{Dumping margin (%) } = \frac{20 + 10 - 50 + 20}{95 + 70 + 150 + 85} \times 100 = 0\%
\]

That represents no dumping having occurred. However, under the zeroing methodology:

\[
\text{Dumping margin (%) } = \frac{20 + 10 + 0 + 20}{95 + 70 + 150 + 85} \times 100 = 12.5\%
\]

That represents a dumping having occurred.

<Figure I-2-2> Determination of the WTO Panel and Appellate Body concerning Zeroing Disputes

| EU – AD on Bed Linen from India (DS141) | Appellate Body | Report circulated in March 2001 | Violation | - | - | - | - | - |
| US - AD on Softwood Lumber from Canada (DS264) | Appellate Body | Report circulated in August 2004 | Violation | - | - | - | - | - |
| US – EU Zeroing (DS294) | Panel | Report circulated in October 2005 | Violation | Violation | - | - | No Violation | No Violation |
| | Appellate Body | Report circulated in April 2006 | - | - | - | - | Violation | - |
| US - AD on Softwood Lumber from Canada (Compliance) (DS264) | Appellate Body | Report circulated in August 2006 | - | - | Violation | - | - | - |
Part I: Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions

(3) Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (WT/DS184)

Please see pages 122-124 in the 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

(4) Unfairly Long-Term Continuation of AD Duties (Sunset Provision)

<Outline of the Measure>

Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement (the Sunset Provision) stipulates that any AD measure shall be terminated (sunsetted) in five years unless the authorities determine that the elimination of the AD duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. The US AD law includes the Sunset Provision, and sunset reviews are undertaken in the U.S. However, many AD measures have actually been enforced for more than five years. As of the end of June 2017, there were 13 AD measures against Japanese products that had lasted for 10 years or more (Figure I-2-1).

<Problems under International Rules>

As described above, Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement stipulates that any definitive AD measure shall be terminated in five years unless the authorities determine in a sunset review that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. However, many of the AD measures imposed by the U.S. have been enforced for more than five years. Japan has shown its concern that the administration of the sunset review system by the U.S. may be inconsistent with the AD Agreement.

In January 2002, Japan requested bilateral consultations with US about the sunset review of AD measures against Japanese corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat product, that the interest of Japanese steel industry was high (DS244). A panel was established in May 2002 and the dispute was adjudicated under the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EU, India, the Republic of Korea and Norway participated in the Panel proceeding as third parties.

In August, 2003, the Panel rejected Japan’s claims and determined that the US decisions under the sunset review were not inconsistent with the WTO Agreements. Dissatisfied with the decision, Japan appealed in September to the Appellate Body on focused issues, and in December, the Appellate Body accepted part of Japan’s claims, but concluded that, there was an insufficient factual basis to complete the analysis of Japan’s claims that the United States did not act consistently with the WTO Agreements.

<Recent Developments>

With regard to the current application of sunset reviews by the U.S., the authorities appear to make a decision on the premise that “once the AD measures are terminated, exports would resume, leading to continuation or recurrence of dumping or injury,” without taking into consideration the global supply-demand situation and the perspectives of cost-benefit performances of companies that respond to
administrative reviews and sunset reviews. This is one of the causes of long-term continuation of AD measures.

Since 2013, at AD Committee meetings held in the spring and autumn, Japan has taken actions such as requesting early termination of measures continued for a long time, and it will continue to request the U.S. to strictly apply Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement, which sets out the principle of termination of AD measures within five years in most cases, and to perform appropriate reviews in accordance with the WTO Agreement.

**<Figure I-2-3> AD Measures against Japan Continuing over 10 Years (As of June 2017)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of measure imposed</th>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Continuance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 December 1978</td>
<td>Prestressed concrete steel wire strand</td>
<td>38 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February 1987</td>
<td>Carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings</td>
<td>30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August 1988</td>
<td>Brass sheet &amp; strip</td>
<td>28 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1991</td>
<td>Gray Portland cement &amp; clinker</td>
<td>25 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 February 1995</td>
<td>Stainless steel bar</td>
<td>21 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July 1996</td>
<td>Clad Steel Plate</td>
<td>20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 1998</td>
<td>Stainless steel wire</td>
<td>18 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1999</td>
<td>Stainless steel plates</td>
<td>17 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June 2000</td>
<td>Large-diameter Carbon Steel Seamless Pipe</td>
<td>16 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June 2000</td>
<td>Carbon and Alloy Seamless Standard, Line, and Pressure Pipe (Under 4 ½ inches)</td>
<td>16 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 August 2000</td>
<td>Certain Tin Mill Products</td>
<td>16 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 December 2001</td>
<td>Welded Large Diameter Line Pipe</td>
<td>15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July 2003</td>
<td>Polyvinyl alcohol</td>
<td>13 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Anti-Dumping Investigation into Thick Plates from Japan

**<Outline of the Measure>**

In April 2016, the U.S. government initiated an AD investigation into the importation of cut-to-length plates from Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, the Republic of Korea, China, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey and Japan. For products from Japan, the Department of Commerce made the final determination of the dumping investigation in March 2017, and the ITC made the final determination of injury in May 2017.

**<Problems under International Rules>**

Product under investigation in the case is cut-to-length plates, which cover so-called tool steel. While cut-to-length plates are used as raw materials for line pipes, boilers, pressure vessels and industrial machines, tool steel has characteristics such as being used as cutting tools for automotive parts. Therefore, tool steel is different from other cut to length plates in terms of components, intended uses and price ranges. Under the AD Agreement, in determination of injury to a domestic industry, the authorities shall consider whether subject imports affect domestic like products in terms of volume and price. In this case, Japanese companies have argued that tool steel does not affect domestic like products and their producers because of the above-mentioned difference between tool steel and other cut-to-length plates. In its final decision, however, the ITC has concluded that subject exports, including tool steel, affect the domestic industry, which may violate the AD Agreement.
Part I: Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions

<Recent Developments>
At a public hearing and a meeting of the AD Committee held in November 2016 and April 2017, respectively, Japan pointed out the problems mentioned above in “Problems under International Rules.” Nevertheless, the United States decided in May 2017 to impose AD duties. Japan, working in cooperation with our industrial community, will continue to closely monitor actions of the United States so that they will conduct AD investigations in accordance with the WTO Agreement.

Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

The 2014 Farm Bill

<Outline of the Measure>
The United States introduced a price support loan program in 1930, and a deficiency payment system, which covers the difference between target prices and market prices subject to participation in production adjustment programs, in 1973. The 1996 Farm Bill (applicable period: from FY1996 to FY2002) eliminated the deficiency payment system, in which the amount of payments changed according to the market prices, and replaced it with the production flexibility contract payment system, in which the amount of payments is fixed regardless of the level of the market prices.

However, the slump in grain prices that began in 1997 resulted in economic damage to farmers that could not be offset with the production flexibility contract payments alone, because the amount of such payments was set in advance. The United States therefore provided emergency farm assistance packages four times between 1998 and 2001 totaling $27.3 billion.

In consideration of such circumstances, the 2002 Farm Bill (applicable period: six years from FY2002 to FY2007) essentially continued the policies of the 1996 Farm Bill while introducing a counter-cyclical payment system to cover the differences between the target prices and the market prices as done in the abolished deficiency payment system.

The 2008 Farm Bill (applicable period: from FY2008 to FY2012) basically continued the policies of the 2002 Farm Bill while introducing a new Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program to cover decreased income.

Serious discussions about the next Farm Bill began in 2011 as the expiration of the 2008 Farm Bill was nearing. However, discussions stalled because the majority and minority parties could not agree on the amount of farm budget reductions. Disagreement about reductions in the overall budget deficit and the presidential election in November 2012 also had an effect. The 2008 Farm Bill expired in September 2012 without being replaced by a new one. Discussions continued after the extension of the 2008 Farm Bill for a year in January 2013. The 2014 Farm Bill (applicable period: from FY2014 to FY2018) was enacted in February 2014. It abolished the deficiency payments, production flexibility contract payments and ACRE program and introduced agriculture risk coverage, price loss coverage and the supplemental coverage option, etc.

(i) Domestic Support
The 2014 Farm Bill abolished the previously-available deficiency payments, production flexibility contract payments and ACRE program, and introduced agriculture risk coverage, price loss coverage and supplemental coverage option. It also introduced a new insurance policy for cotton because of the ruling of the US-Brazil Cotton Panel. The price support loan program was basically retained, although the loan rates were changed because of the ruling of the US-Brazil Cotton Panel.

i. Agriculture risk coverage (introduced by the 2014 Farm Bill)
The agriculture risk coverage (ARC) covers the difference between the revenue of the current year and 86% of the three-year average revenue over the last five years when the revenue of the current year is lower than 86% of the average revenue. The upper limit of the amount paid by ARC is 10% of the average revenue, and choosing between the ARC and price loss coverage (see (b) below) is an option.
ii. Price loss coverage (introduced by the 2014 Farm Bill)

The price loss coverage (PLC) covers the difference between the target prices and the market prices (or the loan rates when the market prices are lower than the loan rates) when the market prices are lower than the predetermined target prices. This system makes payments based on the past planting results and is basically the same as the abolished deficiency payments, but the target prices are significantly raised when compared to deficiency payments.

iii. Price support loan program (continued)

The price support loan program provides farmers with short-term loans by the Commodity Credit Cooperation (CCC) and allows the farmers to suspend their obligations to guarantee repayments by mortgaging their products when the market prices are lower than the loan rates. The 2014 Farm Bill changed the loan rates for cotton because of the ruling of the US-Brazil Cotton Panel, and the conventional system was basically retained for other products.

iv. Supplemental coverage option (introduced by the 2014 Farm Bill)

The supplemental coverage option (SCO) is supplemental insurance covering the portion not covered by the agricultural insurance subscribed to by farmers. The difference between the guaranteed revenue/yields of the agricultural insurance subscribed to by farmers and 86% of the standard revenue/yields of the agricultural insurance is covered. The SCO is not allowed to be used concurrently with agricultural risk coverage.

(ii) Export Promotion of Agricultural Products

In the 1980s, the European Union, faced with a serious glut of agricultural products, increased its subsidized exports. In order to counter this, in the 1985 Farm Bill the U.S. introduced the export enhancement program (EEP) and dairy export incentive program (DEIP). However, in response to the growing criticism against export subsidies at the WTO, etc., in the 2008 Farm Bill the U.S. reduced the amount expended, and abolished the EEP and part of the export credit guarantee program. In addition, the DEIP was abolished and the guarantee period of the remaining export credit guarantee program was shortened by the 2014 Farm Bill.

Export credit guarantee program

The export credit guarantee program seeks to promote exports of US agricultural products by having the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) provide debt guarantees for loans to finance exports of US agricultural products imported on a commercial basis by developing countries. The 2002 Farm Bill provided: (1) a short-term credit guarantee program (GSM-102) that provided debt guarantees on export credit transactions for 90 days to three years; (2) a medium-term credit guarantee program (GSM-103) that provided debt guarantees on export credit transactions for three to 10 years; (3) a suppliers export credit guarantee program (SCGP) that guaranteed a part of accounts receivable by exporters of US agricultural products from importers; and (4) a facilities financing guarantee program (FGP) that provided debt guarantees on investments for improving facilities related to agriculture in importing countries, with the intention of promoting exports of US agricultural products in an emergent market. Of these, GSM-103 and SCGP were suspended in 2006 in view of the outcome of the 2004 US-Brazil Cotton Panel, etc., and were abolished by the 2008 Farm Bill. The upper limit on GSM-102 fees was abolished by the 2008 Farm Bill, and the upper limit of the debt guarantee period was shortened from three years to two years by the 2014 Farm Bill.

<Problems under International Rules and Recent Developments>

(i) Domestic Support

The WTO Doha Round negotiations on agriculture have featured debates not only on the rules for reducing the aggregate measure of support (AMS) subject to reduction, but also on the rules requiring reductions in overall trade-distorting support (OTDS), including blue-box policies and de minimis. As a result, in the 2014 Farm Bill, the flexible production payments contract, which are classified in the WTO Agriculture Agreement as a green (permitted policy, was abolished while the price decline measures and revenue compensation measures were enhanced. In January 2017, the U.S. made a domestic support
Part I: Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions

notification for these measures, and new agriculture coverage, price loss coverage and supplemental coverage options were classified as yellow policies (those subject to AMS reduction requirements). Although the amount of AMS does not exceed the current commitment level, Japan needs to pay attention to consistency between AMS and new rules to be discussed in the future.

(ii) Export Promotion of Agricultural Products

Although export subsidies were fully abolished by the 2014 Farm Bill, frequent use of export credits, which is insufficient in making the disciplines of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture effective, gives an advantage to US agricultural products in terms of export competitiveness. Under this system, the CCC takes on the debts when the guaranteed debts go into default, making the system extremely close to circumventing export subsidies.

At the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, Kenya in December 2015, the members agreed on matters including the following with regard to agricultural export credits: (i) clearly define “export credits”; (ii) make the maximum repayment term no more than 18 months; and (iii) ensure that export credit programs are self-financing and cover the long-term operating costs and losses.

Safeguards

Safeguard for Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic (CSPV) Cells and Large Residential Washers

<Outline of the Measure>

The United States launched safeguard investigations on import of CSPV cells and large residential washers in May and June 2017, respectively. That year, the investigator, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) submitted recommendations to the President that safeguard measures be imposed on the products. In January 2018, President Trump decided to impose definitive measures on them.

With these measures, imported CSPV cells have ad valorem duties imposed on them over four years, from February 2018 through February 2022, at a rate of 30%, 25%, 20%, and 15% each year. (Only for imported cells, annual tariff quotas of 2.5 gigawatts (duty-free) are granted.) Some Japanese companies export CSPV cells to the U.S. market, and it is feared that the tariff burden will have some negative impact on them.

<Problems under International Rules>

The petition filed by U.S. domestic producers, as well as the investigation report produced by the USITC, state that the main purpose of the safeguard measures for CSPV cells in this case lies in taking action to rapid increases of low-priced and low-efficient CSPV products manufactured by Chinese companies. Given the principle of safeguard under the Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article 19.1 (a) of the GATT, which state safeguard measures should be applied only to the necessary extent, exemption of high-priced and high-efficient CSPV products manufactured by Japanese producers should be considered as they are not directly relevant to the purpose of the measures. However, high-efficient products have yet to be exempted.

In its original investigation report, dated November 13, the USITC failed to examine one of the conditions for imposing safeguard measures, “unforeseen developments” (Article 19.1(a) of the GATT), and produced a supplemental report, dated December 27, only after requested by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to do so. The supplemental report confirmed the existence of “unforeseen developments” on the grounds that anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties the United States had taken against Chinese firms over the past years failed as they moved their production bases overseas to avoid the duties. However, manufacturers’ attempts to evade trade remedies by moving its production bases are not unprecedented. Some may point out that such attempts should not be regarded as “unforeseen developments” that justify any safeguard measures.

<Recent Developments>
Since the President announced his decision in January 2018, many exporters have issued statements criticizing it. South Korea, insisting that the safeguard measures both for large residential washers and CSPV products are inconsistent with the WTO Agreements, has referred to the possibility of seeking for dispute resolution procedures at the Organization. Japan will continue working on the U.S. government to mitigate possible impact of the measures on Japanese products.

### Rules of Origin

**Special Marking Requirements of Origin on watches and clocks**

**<Outline of the Measure>**

According to the rules of origin marking prescribed in the US Tariff Act of 1930, origin markings on watches and clocks must be stated on the component part (i.e., movements, batteries, cases, bands, etc.). In addition, the ways of marking, such as inscribing, carving, stamping, and embossing, are elaborately provided in the Act. Such rules impose severe burdens on manufacturers of watches/clocks in the context of production control. Therefore Japan urges the U.S. to reduce/simplify such marking requirement and leave the choice of marking methods to the discretion of the manufacturers.

Although the rules were established for the purpose of protecting the US watch/clock industry, some take the position that the rules should be simplified from the point of view of benefitting importers and consumers in the U.S.

**<Problems under International Rules>**

Simplification of these requirements is consistent with GATT Article IX: 2, which provides that the difficulties and inconveniences that marks of origin may cause to the commerce and industries of exporting countries should be reduced to a minimum. Such action would comport with the spirit of the Agreement on Rules of Origin.

At the Japan-US Deregulation Initiative talks in 2002 and 2003. Japan made a request to simplify the requirements. The Report issued in June 2004 reflected Japanese concerns over clock and watch tariff rate calculation methodology and rules of origin certificates. The report stated that negotiations would continue with deference to both the Japanese government’s position and the ongoing WTO discussions. In fact, however, no improvement has been made so far.

**<Recent Developments>**

Since 2002, Japan has capitalized on a range of opportunities, including the Japan-US Deregulation Initiative, Japan-US Trade Forum, and WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) of the U.S., to ask them for some improvement and/or solution, only to find the problems left unresolved. We assume that the U.S. clock/watch business is faced with the same problems because they outsource production to contractors in Asia. To facilitate international trade, Japan will continue asking the United States for improvement.

**Standards and Conformity Assessment (1) American Automobile Labeling Act**

Please see pages 130-131 in the 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

**(2) Regulation on Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)**

Please see page 131 in the 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

**(3) Adoption of the Metric System**
Part I: Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions

Please see pages 131-132 in the 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

Note) The State of Alabama permits measurements being indicated solely under the metric system.

### Trade in Services

(1) The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007: FINSA

* This particular case was included in light of the following concerns despite it being a trade or investment policy or measure that does not expressly violate the WTO Agreements or other international rules.

**<Outline of the Measure>**

The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 authorizes the President to investigate acquisitions, mergers and takeovers of US firms by foreign persons or entities, and to suspend or prohibit transactions that threaten US national security.

This Act, generally known as the “Exon-Florio Amendment”, is a revision of Article 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, which governs matters concerning foreign investment examinations in terms of national security. Major changes made in this revision include: establishing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as a statutory institution, instituting reviews of examination criteria (incorporating the impact on critical infrastructure and technology), and strengthening Congressional oversight (requiring notification to Congress of the examination results of individual cases), etc.

Upon submission of allegations by the parties concerned or requests from CFIUS members, CFIUS decides whether to conduct an investigation, and, where it does, submits a report to the President. The President decides on suspension or prohibition of the investment on the basis of the report.

In the past, several Japanese firms had to change their original plans because of CFIUS investigations of their acquisitions of US firms. For example, when Toshiba purchased the Westinghouse Electric Co in 2006, an examination was conducted by CFIUS since, among other products, Westinghouse built nuclear power plants.

**<Concerns>**

Although the WTO Agreement has no general rules on investment, the GATS disciplines service trade activities through investment. Although this Act itself does not necessarily violates the WTO Agreements and the GATS Agreement allows exceptions for national security reasons under certain conditions, it is necessary for the United States to operate its investment restriction measures in conformity with the WTO Agreement and the GATS.

**<Recent Developments>**

Japan has been pointing out the problem of transparency and fairness in administration of foreign investment examinations.

According to the CFIUS’ report to Congress in 2015, 143 notifications were issued by CFIUS in 2014. There have been 12 cases in which Japanese companies were involved (screenings and examinations were conducted on 66 cases out of the 143 cases). In 2013, an examination was conducted regarding investment by SoftBank in Sprint Nextel Corporation. Therefore, it is necessary to keep watch to ensure that this Act will not unfair impact investments by Japanese firms in the United States in the future.
(Reference) Implementation status of screening, etc. by CFIUS based on the Foreign Investment and National Security Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of notifications</th>
<th>No. of notifications withdrawn during the screening period</th>
<th>No. of investigations</th>
<th>No. of notifications withdrawn during investigations</th>
<th>No. of President’s decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>97</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>147</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manufacturing Industries</th>
<th>Mining and Public Projects, and Construction</th>
<th>Wholesaling, Retail and Transport</th>
<th>Finance, Information &amp; Communication and Services</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Prepared by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry based on the “CFIUS ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (public/unclassified version)”)

(2) Financial Services

Refer to page 79 of the 2017 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

(3) Telecommunications

* This particular case was included in light of the following concerns despite it being a trade or investment policy or measure that does not expressly violate the WTO Agreements or other international rules.

<Outline of the Measure>

The United States retains foreign ownership restrictions for direct investment in wireless telecommunications services by virtue of Article 310 of the Federal Communications Act (direct investment up to 20%, indirect investment up to 25% (unless the indirect investment is in the public interest)).

In case of investment by a foreign country in radio station licenses, “public interest” determination under the “Foreign Carrier Entry Order” of 1996 requires the degree of market opening in the country of the foreign company to be at the same level as that in the United States (equivalency test); investments that exceed the upper limits of the investment ratios may be approved after taking into consideration other public interest factors presented by the Executive Office of the President, including concerns over national security, law enforcement, foreign policies, and trade policies.

In the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services of February 1997, the United States retained restrictions only for direct investment (20%) and committed to eliminate restrictions for indirect investment. In consideration of this, with regard to indirect investments, equivalency determination was
eliminated for WTO member countries, and the U.S. adopted interpretation to enable free entry in principle that, in the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) regulations (November 1997) on the entry of foreign carriers, the public interest is served even when the investment by WTO member countries does exceed 25%. However, the regulation has not yet been eliminated. In order to ensure a flexible network of foreign telecommunication business, elimination of the regulation is desired. Also, concerning the eligibility criteria of “public interest” for entry of foreign businesses into the US market in relation to Articles 214 and 310(b)(4) of the Federal Communications Act as set forth by the above-mentioned FCC regulations, preliminary reviews based on factors not related to telecommunications policies, such as “trade concerns”, “foreign policy”, and “significant danger to competition”, inhibit the period and predictability for foreign business entries, and thus constitute substantial barriers to foreign company participation in the market. As an example, it took an inordinately long time for a Japanese company’s subsidiary to be granted a license.

Furthermore, in these public interest examinations, there is no legal basis to have a body called “Team Telecom” from authorities concerned, and the content of examinations is also unclear.

Elimination or clarification of the examination criteria is desired to ensure opportunities and predictability for foreign business entries.

<Concerns>

The abovementioned measures do not violate the WTO Agreement so long as they do not contravene GATS commitments of indirect investment on radio station license. However, it is desirable that liberalization be made under the spirit of the WTO and the GATS.

<Recent Developments>

Japan has raised concerns and requested improvement in the above problems on several occasions. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decided to refrain from applying the regulations for direct investments under Article 310(b)(3) of the Federal Communications Act in August 2012, and took measures such as clarifying some procedures in relation to regulations on indirect investments under Paragraph (b)(4) of the same article for radio stations for public communications services and for broadcasting stations in August 2013 and April 2017, respectively. (However, these measures are not intended to abolish the regulations).

(4) Maritime Transport

Please see pages 81-82 in the 2017 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

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| Protection of Intellectual Property |

(1) Trademarks Systems (WT/DS176, US Omnibus Act 211)

No specific actions have been taken for solving problems. For more, including specific problems, see pages 82-83 in the 2017 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

At present it has not directly affected Japan’s interests, but from the point of view of securing the effectiveness of the WTO Agreements, it is necessary to keep watch continuously on the status of deliberations in the Congress to see if a similar bill is introduced.

(2) Copyright and Related Rights

(i) Clarification of video-game rental rights

<Outline of the Measure>

Article 11 of the TRIPS Agreement provides for copyright holders to grant rights to commercially
rent copyrighted computer programs to the public. Article 106(3) and Article 109(b) of the US Copyright Act grant rental rights for computer programs in general, but Paragraph (b)(1)(B)(ii) of the same article exempts videogames which are inseparable from the game machine from the granting of program rental rights.

<Problems under International Rules>

This restricts the protection of rental rights for videogame programs, and may violate Article 11 of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires the granting of rental rights to computer programs in general.

<Recent Developments>

In the Recommendations by the Japan-US Regulatory Reform Initiative of October 2007, Japan requested the United States to promptly revise its domestic copyright law to specifically grant rental rights for all videogame programs. However, the situation has not improved, and the problem has yet to reach a solution. It is necessary to continuously keep a watch on the United States’ future responses.

(ii) Copyright Exception (WT/DS160; US Copyright Act 110(5)(b))

<Outline of the Measure>

Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act allows some exceptions to the public transmission rights of the copyright holders. In subparagraph (b), it grants exceptions for a store with small floor space or in a store using only a small television or speaker.

<Problems under International Rules>

The EU claimed that provisions such as Section 110(5) (b) of the Copyright Act violate Articles 9 and 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, and made two points:

1) Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement is based on Articles 1-12 of the Berne Convention, and Article 11 of the Berne Convention grants exclusive rights to the copyright holder to agree to public transmission of music and other copyrighted works. The Berne Convention customarily allows limitations on copyrights within the scope of “minor reservations” as exceptions to this, but the U.S. copyright law provisions do not correspond to other exceptions to the Berne Convention, including minor reservations.

2) Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement allows members to limit the exclusive rights of the copyright holder in “certain special cases which do not conflict with normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.” The US provisions do not correspond to this exception.

At the request of the EU, a panel was established in May 1999 (Japan, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and Brazil are participated as third parties). On June 15, 2000, the panel found that that Section 110(5)(b) of the Copyright Act did not constitute legitimate exceptions under the TRIPS Agreement, and thus, the US measures must be brought into conformity.

<Recent Developments>

In January 2001, the arbitrator ruled that the United States had 12 months from the panel report to implement the recommendation; in other words, until July 2001. When the United States made no move to amend the Copyright Act as required, the case was referred to arbitration to determine appropriate compensation and countermeasures. In June 2003, the U.S. and the EU reached a temporary agreement under which the United States would compensate the EU a total of $3.3. Although the agreement was in effect until December 21, 2004, the situation had not improved. After that, the United States made a progress report at regular meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body (January 2017, etc.); however, the law has not yet been modified. This also raises issues regarding the effectiveness of panel recommendations, and continued scrutiny is needed.

(iii) Expansion of the Subjects Protected by Performers’ Right

<Outline of the Measure>

Article 1101 of the US Copyright Act protects only the sounds or sounds and images of a live
musical performance. The US Copyright Act does not provide any protection for live performances other than musical ones. As a result, if a Japanese actor performs a play or “rakugo” (a traditional Japanese performance) in the United States, it would not be protected under the US Copyright Act.

<Problems under International Rules>

There are doubts regarding compliance of Article 1101 of the US Copyright Act with the TRIPS Agreement, as Article 14 of the TRIPS Agreement does not limit the protection of live performances to “musical performances.”

<Recent Developments>

Live performances in the U.S. by Japanese performers are likely to increase, and appropriate protection will be needed for the rights of these artists. Japan, in the Recommendations by the Japan-US Regulatory Reform Initiative of October 2008, requested that the United States expand the subjects protected by the US Copyright Act to include all live sound and audio-visual performances; and reinforce the protection of performers’ rights as soon as ones closely related to the copyright.

In addition, there is the issue of the operation of the United States being undecided concerning the right of making works available to the public in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them through uploading the works to a server or when sending copyrighted works via the Internet (the so-called right of uploading). This right has been approved for authors, performers, and producers of phonograms as stipulated in the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The United States has not stipulated this right in their Copyright Law, and while such right is considered to be guaranteed through the distribution right (section 106(3) of the Copyright Law), there has been a court decision suggesting that merely making an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work available to the public does not constitute violation of the distribution right (Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008). Therefore, there is a risk that the right to make copyrighted works available, as recognized under the WCT and the WPPT, may not be protected. It is necessary to closely watch how the United States will implement court decisions and other rules concerning the right to make copyrighted works available. However, in February 2016, the US Copyright Office released a report on the right of making available, indicating that in the United States the right of making available is fully covered by the right of distribution under the Copyright Law, and that the right of distribution extends to works which are only uploaded and have yet to be downloaded.

(3) Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930

<Outline of the Measure>

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 targets unfair import practices by excluding from the United States imports that infringe upon valid US-registered intellectual property rights. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 removed the requirement of injury in cases involving the infringement of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and layout-designs of integrated circuits. This removal of the injury requirement in 1988 simplified the burden of proving a violation of Section 337, and thus made Section 337 an easily accessible remedy for US domestic industries (See Figure I-2-2).

<Problems under International Rules>

ITC’s exclusion orders were issued against products, and thus third parties that are not respondents would not be able to import the products. The EU initiated a dispute proceeding in GATT in 1987, claiming that Section 337 of the US Tariff Act violated the national treatment principle provision of GATT Article III:4 because in ITC procedures (1) the examination period is shorter than litigation in domestic courts, and respondents are not provided with sufficient time to prepare rebuttal arguments; and [2] domestic products plaintiffs can file lawsuits in the US courts in case of domestic infringing products but can also file lawsuits in ITC in case of foreign products, thus imposing heavy burdens, etc. on respondents. In November 1989, the GATT Council adopted a panel report that concluded that although, Article XX(d) of the GATT establishes an exception permitting the exclusion of imports that infringe upon patents and other intellectual property rights under certain circumstances, in light of the above-mentioned points, suspected infringing imported products are accorded treatment less favorable
than like products of US origin in the domestic court procedures, and so Section 337 procedures violated the national treatment provisions of Article III:4 of the GATT and could not be justified by Article XX(d).

Despite such a clear and definitive statement of inconsistency with the GATT, even after the adoption of the report, however, the United States did not implement the panel’s decision. Japan regarded this as a significant problem and requested improvements at GATT Council meetings, etc.

<Recent Developments>
In its Uruguay Round implementing legislation enacted in December 1994, the United States significantly amended Section 337 so that it more fully complied with the GATT Council’s recommendations.

The deadline for final relief was eliminated, though the ITC still establishes a “target date” for final determination in each investigation within 45 days of the initiation of an investigation, depending on how it is administered, could result in discriminatory treatment of imports. On January 12, 2000, the EU requested bilateral consultations regarding this provision. Japan should continue to continuously monitor developments closely.

In addition, on June 24, 2013 the ITC introduced a pilot program aimed at shortening examination periods. Under this program, decisions of examination are to be made within 100 days, and time lines are set based on that time schedule. The ITC applied the program to an investigation dated May 11, 2016, third after the introduction, actually within 100 days. The program was also applied to another investigation, dated October 19, 2016, and the first decision was made within 100 days after the start of the investigation on February 8, 2017.

Since the introduction of the pilot program, some 200 investigations have been launched concerning Section 337 of the Tariff Act. The ITC has considered application of the program only to six of them. Whether the program will be fully implemented is to be seen, and it is necessary to keep monitoring their actions, including whether the program will be officially adopted.

Figure 1-2-2 Number of Investigations Initiated under Section 337

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>18 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>26 (4)</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>54 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>57 (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government Procurement

<Outline of the Measure>
The U.S. has adopted rules for government procurement which require the federal government and governments of some states to purchase US-made products or use US-made materials (known as Buy American rules).

Buy American schemes are legislated as the Buy American Act and the Buy America Act.
The Buy American Act, having come into effect in 1933, provides that US-made products should be treated favorably in procurement by the federal government. The Buy American Act is implemented according to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Under the FAR, bid prices offered by potential suppliers of foreign products for federal procurement and foreign materials for federal public works projects are added by 6-12% and 6%, respectively, to treat US-made products and materials favorably.

In some cases, the Buy American Act may not apply. The Trade Agreement Act (TAA) provides exempted products from the Buy American Act when they come from a country the United States has signed a trade agreement with. Specifically, procurement of products and services from the signatories of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and countries the United States has signed an FTA with, or “designated countries,” is exempted from the Buy American Act to the extent of national treatment the United States has committed to with the countries for government procurement. However, any product is regarded as produced in a “designated country” only when the product is wholly manufactured or substantially transformed in the country.

The Buy America Act, offering a separate scheme from the Buy American Act, requires state governments to procure steel and other materials produced in the United States for large-scale transport and infrastructure projects they carry out with subsidies granted by the federal government. The Act is implemented by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Federal Railway Administration (FRA), and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under their own rules. For instance, when a project is financed with a federal fund administered by the FTA, steel and other materials used for the project must be US-made. Under criteria the FTA has set, steel and other materials are regarded as manufactured in the United States only when they are fully manufactured through the processes based in the United States and all their components are also manufactured within the United States. However, secondary (subordinate) parts produced in foreign countries are not ruled out here.

The Buy America Act is considered as free from the obligations the United States assumes under any international agreement it has concluded. This is because of the reservations made by the United States to the application of the WTO GPA to large-scale transport and road projects financed by the federal government. As most of the large-scale projects in the United States are at least partially financed by the federal government, the reservations allow the United States to deny national treatment to suppliers from other countries.

<Problems under International Rules>

As described above in “Outline of the Measure”, the United States has in place schemes for treating favorably domestic products or prohibiting procurement of anything other than domestic products. Depending on the manner they are implemented, the schemes may violate the WTO GPA and other international rules.

<Recent Developments>

(a) The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act

The FAST Act is an amendment to the Buy America Act. Intended to make obligatory more use of domestic products, including train control, power equipment and vehicles and prototypes, the FAST Act requires the share of domestic components for a vehicle account for at least 60%, 65%, and 70% of the cost in 2016 and 2017, 2018 and 2019, and 2020 onwards, respectively, and that the final assembling of vehicles be carried out in the United States.

(b) Movements of New York and Texas for introduction of their Buy American and Buy America Acts

In June 2017, the New York State Legislature passed the New York Buy American Act, signed by the Governor into law in December. The Act requires state agencies to purchase US-made products when procuring goods or services above a specific amount.

In Texas, the state legislature also passed a law that reinforces the Buy America Act in May 2017. A major difference from the federal Buy America Act lies in the level of cost increases in a project for which it is exempted from the Buy America Act. Under the federal act, projects are relieved from the obligation to use steal produced in the United States when that would result in an increase of cost by
0.1% or 2,500 dollars. The state law exempts a project from the Buy America rules only when its cost would increase by 20%.

Both state laws are mainly intended to narrow the range of exemption from the federal Buy America Act at the state level. With the reservations made by the United States to the WTO GPA, as mentioned above, the Buy America rules do not immediately violate the Agreement in terms of trade with Japan. However, it is necessary to watch carefully whether any movements of states for preferential treatment or obligatory procurement of domestic products may violate international rules.

Unilateral Measures

(1) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974

Outline of the Measure

Section 301 of Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to take action in cases such as where US rights under a trade agreement are violated, or where measures, policies, etc. of a foreign country violate or are inconsistent with a trade agreement. For amendments that had been made before to the Section, please see the 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

Investigation Procedures

The USTR engages in the following investigation procedures: (a) initiates investigations into trade practices based on complaints from interested parties or on its own authority (Section 302); (b) simultaneously requests consultations with the country in question (Section 303); (c) determines whether there is any practice, etc. that necessitates implementing an action or what action the USTR should take, within a set period of time (for investigations under a trade agreement, 30 days from the conclusion of dispute settlement procedures or 18 months from the beginning of investigation, whichever comes sooner; for others, 12 months from the beginning of investigation) (Section 304); and (d) implements the action, in principle, within 30 days of the decision (though the USTR may delay action for a period of up to 180 days) (Section 305).

Reason for Measures

For mandatory action (Section 301(a))

The USTR shall take action if the act, policy or practice of a foreign government (a) is in violation of the GATT or other trade agreements or otherwise denies benefits to the United States; or (b) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts US commerce.

For discretionary action (Section 301(b))

The USTR must take action in cases where a measure, policy, etc. of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts US commerce and action by the United States is appropriate.

As for the meaning of “unreasonable” measures, etc. taken by a foreign country, the law stipulates that it applies to measures, etc. that are “not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with US legal rights under international laws,” but which are “deemed to be unfair and inequitable” (Section 301(d)(3)(A))

In addition, several measures have been cited as examples of unreasonable measures, etc. taken by a foreign country, such as “violation of opportunities to establish a company,” and “denial of appropriate protection of intellectual property rights” (Section 301(d)(3)(B)).

Problems under International Rules

In November 1998, the EU requested WTO consultations with the United States because procedures based on Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 and other provisions could potentially permit unilateral

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4 Sections (1), and Section (2) below, are written as of April 25, 2018.
Part I: Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions

decisions or measures by the US government without waiting for a WTO panel decision or WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) approval. Because no agreement was reached in the consultations, a panel was established in March 1999. Japan participated as a third party and presented arguments in support of the EU’s position. The panel report (WT/DS152/R) was adopted at the DSB meeting in January 2000.

The panel found that the wording of Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 and other provisions seemed to contravene DSU Article 23.2, but when read in conjunction with the interpretative guidelines for the Trade Act prepared by the US President (Statement of Administrative Action) and other statements by the U.S. government (“the United States will administer those provisions in a manner that is consistent with its obligations under the WTO Agreement”), Section 304 and other provisions are not WTO violations. The panel decision is based on the assumption that the United States will adhere to statements it made during the panel meetings. Therefore, Japan will need to continue to watch for faithful administration of the US statement.

<Recent Developments>

In August 18, 2017, the USTR launched on its own authority an investigation under Section 301 for technology transfer pressures and other acts by China. The USTR specifically pointed out four issues below as targets of the investigation.

(a) Forced technology transfer
The government of China allegedly used opaque and discretionary administrative processes for approval, joint venture requirements, foreign ownership restrictions, government procurement, and a range of other measures to regulate and/or intervene in the US firms in their business in the country, in order to force them to transfer their technology and/or intellectual properties to Chinese companies.

(b) Mandatory inclusion of certain provisions in license contracts, etc.
The government of China allegedly adopted laws, policies, and other measures to force US firms to include certain provisions (on compensation, ownership of improved technologies, etc.) into contracts, depriving them of abilities to set market-based conditions when negotiating with Chinese companies for licensing and other technology-related issues, and consequently weakening their technological dominance in China.

(c) Systematic acquisition of US firms
The government of China allegedly instructed or unfairly encouraged Chinese companies to invest in or acquire US firms to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual properties and have technologies transferred between them in a large scale in critical sectors for industrial planning.

(d) Theft of trade secrets
The USTR intended to examine whether the government of China had carried out and/or supported the hacking of commercial computer networks in the United States and/or the stealing of intellectual properties, business secrets, and/or any other confidential information from US companies, inflicting damage to them and/or bringing any competitive advantage to Chinese companies and/or its commercial sector.

Through the investigation, the USTR found that the measures taken by China, mentioned above, were unreasonable or discriminatory, imposing burdens and/or restrictions on commercial activities of the United States. Having received the findings, President Trump instructed on March 22, 2018:
- That the USTR release a list of items on which additional 25% duties should be imposed;
- That the USTR deal with discriminatory practices of China for technology licensing through the dispute settlement procedures at the WTO; and
- That the Department of Finance propose regulations for investments by China in sensitive technologies of the United States.

Under the instructions, the USTR, claiming that China's Regulations on Technology Import and Export Administration impose discriminatory technology licensing requirements and violate the national treatment and other obligations under the TRIPS Agreement (Article 3), filed a request for consultations with China at the WTO on March 23, 2018. On April 3, the USTR also released a tariff
list on Chinese products. The list provides 1300 items, including aerospace, ICT, robotics, industrial machinery, and medical products (worth $50 billion). After a public comment process and a hearing, a final determination on the tariff will be issued.

In response to the actions above, China decided on April 4, 2018, to impose a 25% additional duty on 106 items within 14 categories of commodities originated from the United States, including soybeans, automobiles, and chemical products. On the same day, claiming that tariff measures taken by the United States might violate concession obligations (Article 2 of the GATT), China requested consultations at the WTO.

In turn, on April 5, 2018, President Trump instructed the USTR to consider retaliatory measures against China (worth $100 billion).

For other major investigations launched recently under Section 301 of the Trade Act, please see the 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962

<Outline of the Measure>

Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the President of the United States can take measures to adjust imports of products, including embargo, tariff increase, tariff quota, and quantity limit, when imports threaten the national security. Prior to the President's decision to take any action, the Secretary of Commerce must investigate whether the import of product threatens the national security, and deliver an investigation report within 270 days after the start of the investigation. When any threats of national security are found, the Secretary must report such findings to the President and make recommendations on whether to take measures to adjust the imported products.

Upon receipt of the Secretary's report that import of the product threatens the national security, the President must decide within 90 days whether he concurs with the findings in the report and decide whether he will take any action to adjust its imports. Once the President decides to take an action to adjust imports (embargo, tariff increase, import quantity limit, tariff quota, commence negotiations to limit imports, etc.), it must be implemented within 15 days.

[Investigation Procedures]

Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon his/her own motion, the Secretary of Commerce: (i) immediately initiates an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of the article (Section 232(b)(1)(A)); and (ii) immediately provide notice to the Secretary of Defense of any investigation initiated (Section 232(b)(1)(B)). In the course of the investigation, the Secretary of Commerce: (i) consults with the Secretary of Defense regarding methodological and policy questions raised in the investigation; seek information and advice from, and consult with, appropriate officers of the United States; and (iii) if it is appropriate and after reasonable notice, holds public hearings or otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity to present information and advice relevant to such investigation (Section 232(b)(2)(A)). Upon the request of the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense must provide the Secretary of Commerce an assessment of the defense requirements of any article that is the subject of an investigation conducted (Section 232(b)(2)(B)).

Within 270 days after the launch of the investigation, the Secretary of Commerce must submit an investigation report to the President. When having found the imported product threatens to impair the national security, the Secretary of Commerce must report the findings to the President (Section 232(b)(3)(A)). Any portion of the report which does not contain classified information must be published in the Federal Register (Section 232(b)(3)(B)).

<Problems under International Rules>

Among the import adjustment measures by the U.S. under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, increases of tariffs above the rate stated in the list of tariff concessions, may be inconsistent with Article 2 (Tariff Concessions) and embargo and quantity restrictions may be inconsistent with Article 11 (Quantitative Concessions), respectively. In this respect, the U.S. may invoke Article 21 of the GATT (Security Exceptions).
One of the points at issue on Article 21 of the GATT is whether the Panel has the authority for review when a member invokes the article. On this issue, members have quite different opinions between them. Some countries, including the United States, argue that Article 21 is a self-judging clause and that the Panel does not have the authority for review. The U.S. also argues that national security is a political matter that cannot be settled through dispute settlement processes at the WTO.

There are no prior judgments adopted regarding the interpretation of Article 21 of the GATT. In this regard, if this article is broadly interpreted allowing extremely broad range of exceptions for national security reasons, there is concern of abuse of the national security exception and the risk of shrinking the global trade.

<Recent Developments>

In April 2017, the U.S. initiated a Section 232 investigation on imported steel and aluminum. The U.S. pointed out as the background of the launch of the investigation lay subsidies and other unfair measures taken by foreign governments that had given rise to a structure of oversupply which had consequently distorted the U.S. and global markets and damaged its domestic industry. They also pointed out that the investigation had been initiated because anti-dumping or countervailing duties would be insufficient to counter such unfair imports and because the problem of structural oversupply had yet to be solved.

In January 2018, Secretary of Commerce Ross delivered the investigation report to the President (published in February). In the report, the Secretary found imported steel and aluminum both threatened to impair the national security, and recommended to the President, as measures he should take to limit imports, additional duties, quantity quota, or a combination of them.

Having received the investigation report, President Trump decided in March 2018 to impose 25% and 10% of additional duties on imported steel and aluminum, respectively, while Canada and Mexico were exempted for the time being, and for other countries, the duties might be modified or removed “Should the United States and any such country arrive at a satisfactory alternative means to address the threat to the national security such that I determine that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security” (country exclusion). Exclusions may also be granted to products that cannot be produced in a sufficient amount or that require national security considerations upon a request made by a US entity (product exclusion).

Imposition of the additional duties on steel and aluminum, set to start on March 23, 2018, was temporarily put off on May 1 for imports from seven countries and region -- Canada and Mexico, as well as Australia, Argentina, South Korea, Brazil, and the EU. On March 26, an announcement came that South Korea would be indefinitely exempted from additional duties on imported steel on the condition that, for exports of steel produced in Korea to the U.S., they should set a product-specific quota equivalent to 70% of its average annual exports to the U.S. between 2015 and 2017 as an alternative means to address the threat to the national security. The WTO Agreements prohibit the member countries from seeking or taking any voluntary export restrictions (Article 11 of the Agreement on Safeguards). How the quota mentioned above is implemented should be carefully watched.

The EU, China, India, Russia, and Turkey, arguing that the measures taken by the U.S. is in effect safeguard measures, have requested a consultation for compensations, with an eye to countermeasures under the Agreement of Safeguard (or rebalancing measures). The U.S. has refuted, stating that measures taken under Section 232 are national security measures and not safeguard measures.

Japan has repeatedly expressed our concerns to the U.S., saying that imports of steel and aluminum from Japan give no harmful effect to their national security, working on them to get exempted from the measures. The measures taken by the U.S. under Section 232 not only close the US market but also disrupt the global steel and aluminum markets, giving a significant negative impact on the entire multilateral trade system. Japan endeavors at various levels to avoid as much of the potential negative consequence on the industry as possible.

(3) Special 301

<Outline of the Measure>

Special 301 sets forth a process introduced as a result of a revision to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 based on Article 1303 of the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Under
this provision, the USTR is to identify (a) countries that “deny adequate and effective protection to the intellectual property rights” and (b) countries that “deny fair and equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection” as “priority foreign countries” in the report to be submitted within 30 days after the submission of the annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. The USTR must initiate investigations and consultations with the “priority foreign countries” within 30 days after such identification (Section 302(b)(2)(A) and Section 303 of the Trade Act of 1974), and within 30 days from the conclusion of dispute settlement procedures or 6 months from the beginning of investigations determine whether there is any practice, etc. that necessitates implementing a countermeasure and, if so, what action the USTR should take (Section 304(a)(3)).

The USTR has prepared a Priority Watch List and a Watch List to promote the process under Special 301.

<Problems under International Rules>
There is the same concern as for procedures regarding Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

<Recent Developments>
In the “2017 Special 301 Report” released by the USTR in April 2017, 11 countries including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine and Venezuela were placed on the Priority Watch List, and other 23 countries were placed on the Watch List.

(4) US Re-export Control Regimes
Please see pages 156-157 in the 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements -WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA-.

Other Matters

Container size regulations for alcoholic beverages

<Outline of the Measure and Concerns>
In the United States, distribution of distilled alcoholic beverage is allowed only in containers of specific sizes, such as 1,750 ml, 1,000 ml, 750 ml, and 500 ml. Alcoholic beverages cannot be exported to the country in bottles of sizes traditional in Japan, for instance 1,800 ml and 720 ml, a high barrier to exporters.

On this issue, in a letter it exchanged with Japan, the Department of Finance promised that on receipt of request from the Japanese alcoholic beverage industry, it would publish a proposal for amendments to the container size regulations and invite public comments to initiate procedures for getting the proposal approved.

<Recent Developments>
At the Japan-US summit meeting in November 2017, the United States confirmed they were considering amending container size regulations for distilled beverages.
### Part I: Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Issues Related to Counterfeit, Pirated, and Other Infringing Products

- Standards and Conformity Assessment
- National Treatment
- Trade in Services
- Safeguards
- Tariffs
- Protection of Intellectual Property

#### Products

- Tariff Structure
- Safeguard Measures against Semi-Finished and Certain Finished Products of Alloy and Non-Alloy Steel
- Export Restrictions on Mineral Resources and Local Content Issue
- Import Restriction (Compulsory Registration by Importers of Steel Products)
- Quantitative Import Restrictions (Rice, Salt, and Used Capital Goods)
- Execution of Japan-Indonesia EPA
- Suspension of Infringing Goods at Borders
- Technical Regulations for Steel Products
- Foreign Investment Restrictions, etc.
- AD measures on Japanese cold-rolled stainless steel sheet
- Regulations on Toys that can be an entry barrier for foreign companies
- Local Content Requirements for LTE Devices, etc.

#### Legal Measures

- Cyber Security Bill
- Imported Vehicle Certification System
- Non-Alloy Steel

#### Other Measures

- (1) Anti-Dumping Measures
- (2) Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
- (3) Indonesia's Amended Patent Law
- (4) Export Restrictions on Mineral Resources and Local Content Issue