

## *Chapter 8*

# SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES, IMPROVEMENT OF BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

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## Settlement of Disputes between States

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### *Background of the Rules*

Regional trade agreements, including free trade agreements (“FTAs”), economic partnership agreements (“EPAs”), and bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) usually contain certain provisions for settlement of disputes between the state parties concerning the interpretation and application of the agreements’ provisions. Not only do such provisions provide the parties with the tools to settle disputes, but they also assume the important role of encouraging the parties of the relevant agreements to comply with the provisions thereby ensuring their effectiveness and making the interpretation of the provisions clear through the process of dispute settlement. All FTAs, EPAs and BITs which Japan has entered into also contain, whether detailed or not, such provisions for the settlement of disputes between the parties. State-to-state dispute settlement procedures are not as frequent as investor-state disputes in EPAs/FTAs and BITs<sup>1</sup>.

The dispute settlement provisions in most of the agreements are similar to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the “DSU”) in the WTO Agreement. They share the following four common elements:

- (i) if a dispute arises between the parties to a relevant agreement, they shall first conduct a consultation in respect of such dispute;
- (ii) if such consultation fails to settle such dispute, the complainant may then refer the matter to the dispute settlement body to be established pursuant to the relevant agreement;
- (iii) the dispute settlement body examines the relevant matter and renders a binding decision (judgment) or makes a recommendation; and

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<sup>1</sup> If we take NAFTA as an example, to date a total of 124 cases have been referred for dispute settlement procedures, of which 10 have been cases of state-to-state dispute settlement (seven cases based on Chapter 19, and three based on Chapter 20).

- (iv) the respondent rectifies violations of the agreement or provides for compensation to the complainant in line with the relevant judgment, or, in many cases, a mechanism is adopted whereby discussions are resumed based on the recommendation.

Despite these common elements, the provisions for dispute settlement in such agreements significantly vary in their specific details, reflecting differences in political and economic factors underlying such agreements and the relationships of the parties thereto. Correctly understanding the meaning of such provisions and the relevant recent trends in respect thereof is important, not only to the Japanese government in reviewing its own international trade and foreign investment policy, but also, to Japanese business enterprises actively developing their businesses abroad. This Chapter will examine the mechanics of dispute settlement provisions in a number of EPAs/FTAs and BITs entered into by states with major market economies (such as the United States and the EU) and major emerging economies, and compare them with the mechanics of dispute resolution provisions existing in the EPAs entered into by Japan. The agreements examined herein are enumerated in Figure III-8-1 below.

## ***Summary of Legal Disciplines***

### **1) Nature and Types of Procedures Subject to Settlement in State-to-State Disputes**

A comparison of the procedures for the settlement of state-to-state disputes based on the categories of EPAs/FTAs and BITs indicates a general tendency that such procedures in EPAs/FTAs contain relatively greater detail than those in BITs. Furthermore, a number of specific dispute settlement provisions included in most EPAs/FTAs are not included in most BITs. An important common element, generally appearing in both EPAs/FTAs and BITs, however, is the provision of the right of a party to unilaterally request a binding ruling of a dispute settlement body on certain disputes. Such commonality is fundamental to dispute settlement procedures. In contrast, many EPAs/FTAs and BITs contain several different types of provisions which “reference matters to a dispute settlement body”; such provisions differ from each other with respect to the organization of the dispute settlement body and available procedures. The following subsection groups the dispute settlement provisions found in EPAs/FTAs and BITs.

#### **(a) EPAs/FTAs**

The procedures employed by a dispute settlement body in rendering a binding decision in FTAs and EPAs can be grouped into three major categories.

The first category, a typical example of which is the procedures adopted by the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), is an “arbitration-type” procedure. In an “arbitration-type” procedure, each party is granted a right to request a panel or a panel of arbitrators, which is either ad hoc established or selected to examine and make a ruling in individual cases. All the EPAs/FTAs that Japan has entered into have adopted this type of dispute settlement procedure. Set forth below are typical examples of EPAs/FTAs which have adopted this type of dispute settlement procedure and which are entered into by parties other than Japan, with the numbers of the relevant provisions specified:

- NAFTA – Articles 2004 and 2008;
- Korea - Singapore FTA – Chapter 20, Article 20.6;

- Australia - Singapore FTA – Chapter 16, Article 4; and
- Thailand - New Zealand FTA – Chapter 17, Article 17.4.
- • CARIFORM-EU, Article 206

The second category is a “council-type” dispute settlement procedure, wherein the disputed matter is referred to a body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties’ governments (*i.e.*, a Council, Commission), and the relevant council examines the disputed matter and makes a decision or recommendation in respect thereof. Set forth below are typical examples of EPAs/FTAs which have adopted this category of dispute settlement procedure:

- Bangkok Agreement (Bangladesh, India, Korea, Laos, Sri Lanka, China) (Article 16);
- SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan) (Article 20);
- EEA (European Economic Area) (EU, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway) (Article 111, Paragraph 1, with certain exceptions); and

The third category is an intermediate entity between the first and second categories, wherein, similar to the second “council” type, the disputed matter is first referred to a body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties’ governments, but similar to the first “arbitration” type of dispute settlement procedure, for disputes which the body has failed to settle, certain quasi-judicial dispute settlement procedures (for example, an arbitration procedure), are available. Set forth below are typical examples of EPAs/FTAs which have adopted this category of dispute settlement procedure

- US - Jordan FTA (Article 17, Paragraph 1(b) and (c));
- EC - Morocco FTA (Article 86, Paragraphs 2 and 4);
- Cotonou Agreement (EU and ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) (Article 98, Paragraphs 1 and 2);
- EFTA (European Free Trade Association) (Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland) (Articles 47 and 48);
- EEA (European Economic Area: EU and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) (Article 111, Paragraph 1)
- CACM (Central American Common Market) (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) (Article 26);
- Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) (Article 47 and Article 24 of the Treaty establishing the Court of Justice);
- ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Viet Nam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia) (Article 8).

In most of the agreements enumerated above, the disputed matter can be referred by the parties to an arbitral body which is established on an *ad hoc* basis if the body consisting of

representatives of the contracting parties' governments has failed to settle the disputed matter. In contrast, the Andean Community and the EEA (with respect to those disputes concerning the rules of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community or the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, or the interpretation of the EEA provisions relevant to the measures adopted to implement such treaties) provide that the disputed matter which such council-type body has failed to settle can be referred to a permanent court that has been established within the relevant region. In this respect, the Andean Community has established a permanent court which addresses any dispute under such agreement, and the EEA has designated the Court of Justice of the European Communities to address any dispute under such agreement (except for disputes between EFTA countries, which are referred to the EFTA Court).

The overall trend of dispute settlement procedures appears to be that countries (or other political entities) entering into EPAs/FTAs are increasingly inclined to adopt the "hybrid-type" procedure. For example, with the exception of the NAFTA (which adopts an "arbitration-type" procedure), all of the agreements involving the United States have adopted a "hybrid-type" procedure. Also, the EU, which primarily adopted a "council-type" procedure up to and including the 1980s, has adopted a "hybrid-type" procedure in most of the agreements which it has entered into in the 1990s and later.

In contrast, it is noteworthy that Japan's EPAs always include an "arbitration-type" procedure (see, for example, Japan - Malaysia EPA, Chapter 13; Japan - Mexico EPA, Chapter 15; Japan - Singapore EPA, Chapter 21; Japan - Philippines EPA, Chapter 15 ASEAN -Japan Comprehensive EPA, Chapter 9; Japan - Viet Nam EPA, Chapter 13; Japan - Switzerland EPA, Chapter 14; Japan-India EPA; and Japan - Peru, Chapter 15 ), as well as a more detailed set of procedural provisions than other agreements entered into by other governments. Japan's preference for "judicial" dispute settlement procedures is shared by Singapore and Korea, both of which, similar to Japan, became increasingly active in negotiating and executing EPAs/FTAs since 2000 (see, for example, Chile - Korea FTA, Article 19.6, Paragraph 1; Korea - Singapore FTA, Section 20, Article 20.6; Singapore - New Zealand FTA, Article 61.1; Australia - Singapore FTA, Section 16, Article 4; and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (Chile, Brunei, New Zealand and Singapore), Article 15.6, Paragraph 1).

## (b) BITs

BITs generally include procedures for the settlement of state-to-state disputes. Most of them have adopted "arbitration-type" procedures, consisting of consultation and arbitration.

## 2) Particular Features of Specific Dispute Settlement Procedures

As stated above, the procedures for the settlement of state-to-state disputes in EPAs/FTAs and BITs are similar to the WTO dispute settlement procedures (the degree of similarity of WTO dispute settlement procedures differs in each agreement), as all of them contain provisions relating to: (i) consultation between disputing parties; (ii) referral of matters to a dispute settlement body; (iii) the rendition of a binding decision by that dispute settlement body; and (iv) the rectification by the respondent of any violations determined to exist. However, the details of the relevant provisions vary between the agreements.

Set forth below is an analysis of the particulars of the agreements; a grouping of the dispute settlement provisions; and a comparison thereof with those agreements entered into by Japan. This comparison covers the procedural steps which are considered particularly important to ensure that the WTO dispute settlement procedures function properly and are effective (with respect to the 28 EPAs/FTAs involving Japan or other countries subject to the analysis below, the specifics and procedural particulars thereof are summarized in the appendix to Section IV (State-to-state Dispute Settlement Procedures in Economic Partnership Agreements of Foreign Countries). See also the sequence of steps in the dispute settlement procedures of the EPAs entered into by Japan, as described in Figure III-7-2.

#### Analytical Topics of Each Agreement

- (a) subject matter of the dispute settlement procedures;
- (b) mandatory obligation for prior consultation;
- (c) rules relating to the dispute settlement procedures;
- (d) timelines;
- (e) relationship with dispute settlement procedures under other agreements;
- (f) selection of panelists or arbitrators;
- (g) method of determination by the dispute settlement body;
- (h) appellate process;
- (i) effective implementation of arbitral awards; and
- (j) retaliatory measures in cases of non-compliance.

#### (a) Scope of the Subject Matter of Dispute Settlement Procedures

##### (1) EPAs/FTAs

The scope of the matters that can be referred to the relevant dispute settlement body established under the relevant EPA/FTA can be grouped as follows:

- (i) certain EPAs/FTAs limit the scope of disputes that can be referred to the dispute settlement body to those concerning their interpretation or application of the agreement, (*i.e.*, CACM, Article 26, EC - Norway FTA, Article 29; Cotonou Agreement, Article 98, Paragraph 1; and ASEAN, Article 8, Paragraph 2); and
- (ii) in addition to permitting disputes concerning interpretation or application of the relevant agreement, other EPAs/FTAs permit for a wider scope of disputes that can be referred to the dispute settlement body, allowing parties to file claims in respect of measures which are not inconsistent with the provisions thereof, but effectively nullify or impair the benefits expected by such parties from such agreements (similar to “non-violation” claims under the WTO Agreement) (for example, CARICOM, Article 187; NAFTA, Article 2004 (with certain limitations); and Korea - Singapore FTA, Chapter

## 20, Article 20.2, Paragraph 1 (with certain limitations)).

All the EPAs entered into by Japan fall under category (1), above. They include a provision that any party may claim against the other(s) before an arbitral panel if any benefit accruing to it is nullified or otherwise impaired as a result of either: (i) the failure of the party complained against to carry out its obligations under such EPA; or (ii) measures taken by the respondent which are in conflict with the obligations.

In addition to the limitations described above, many EPAs/FTAs (excluding the Japan-Switzerland EPA and Japan-Chile EPA) exempt certain matters from the scope of the relevant dispute settlement procedure (with a view to setting aside such matters which are too sensitive to a party thereto or which a party thereto considers inappropriate to subject to a “judicial” dispute settlement. The Japan - Malaysia EPA, for example, provides that those provisions concerning dispute settlement procedures shall not apply to technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, cooperation in the field of intellectual property, controlling anti-competitive activities, or improvement of business environment and cooperation between the parties in respect thereof (Articles 67, 72, 128 (Paragraph 3), 133, and 144). The same applies to cooperation in the field of regulations controlling anti-competitive activities, and in sharing information on securities markets and security derivatives markets under the Japan – Singapore EPA (Article 105 and Article 107, Paragraph 3); certain measures concerning investment and the improvement of the business environment and bilateral cooperation (Article 138, Article 95, paragraphs 1 and 2 and Article 148, respectively) under the Japan - Mexico EPA. In the Japan-Philippines EPA/FTA, cooperation in the fields of intellectual property, controlling anti-competitive activities, improvement of business environment and cooperation between the parties in respect thereof are exempt from the application of the Chapter on Disputes (Article 119, Paragraph 4, Article 137, 143, and 148). The Japan-Chile EPA/FTA, on the other hand, exempts sanitary and phytosanitary measures, procedures for technical regulations (i.e., mandatory standards), voluntary standards and conformity assessment; competition policy; and improvement of business environment (Article 66, 71, 171, and 174) from dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 16). In the Japan-Thailand EPA/FTA, the dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 14) are not applied to competition and cooperation (Article 151, 158). In the Japan-Brunei EPA, the dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 10) are not applied to the provisions concerning the improvement of the business environment and cooperation (Article 100, 106). In the Japan-Indonesia EPA, the dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 14) are not applied to the provisions concerning the government procurement, competition, cooperation, improvement of business environment, and enhancement of trust to carry out business transactions (Article 138). In the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive EPA, it is stipulated that the provisions relating to dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 9) are not applied to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, provisions, mandatory technical regulations, discretionary standards and conformity assessment procedures (Article 42, 49). In the Japan – Viet Nam EPA, it is stipulated that the provisions relating to dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 13) are not applied to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations, discretionary standards and conformity assessment procedures, competition, and the development of and cooperation concerning the business environment (Article 49, 56, 103, 110, 115). In the Japan – Switzerland EPA, it is stipulated that the provisions relating to dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 14) are not applied to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations, discretionary standards and conformity assessment procedures, competition, cooperation in the field of intellectual property, current rights and responsibilities in the field of government procurement, and the development of closer economic relations (Article 36,

42, 106, 127, 130, 136). In the Japan-India EPA, it is stipulated that the provisions related to dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 14) do not apply to cooperation, improvement of business environment, and competition (Articles 122, 127, and 132). In the Japan-Peru EPA, it is stipulated that the provisions related to dispute settlement procedures (Chapter 15) do not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations, voluntary regulations, conformity assessment procedures, competition, improvement of business environment, and cooperation (Article 204).

Also, some agreements, in reflecting the special needs of the parties thereto, set forth special rules for dispute settlement procedures applicable only to certain subject areas (for example, NAFTA prescribes separate panel procedures only applicable to the issue of antidumping and countervailing duties (Chapter 19)).

## (2) BITs

In contrast to the EPAs/FTAs, there are no provisions in the BITs that permit “non-violation” claims. With limited exceptions, no examined BITs limit the scope of matters that can be referred to dispute settlement, although a small number of them provide that state-to-investor disputes which are pending in any international arbitration court at that point in time cannot be referred to any international arbitration court as a state-to-state dispute (*see*, Chile - Turkey BIT, Article 12, Paragraph 10, and South Africa - Turkey BIT Article 8, Paragraph 8).

### (b) Obligation to Conduct Prior Consultation

Most EPAs/FTAs obligate the disputing parties to conduct consultations amongst themselves before resorting to binding dispute settlement procedures. All EPAs entered into by Japan include this obligation.

All examined BITs obligate the parties to seek an amicable solution (through consultation, for example) with respect to any dispute before initiating any quasi-judicial procedure.

### (c) Rules Relating to Dispute Settlement Procedures

#### (1) EPAs/FTAs

In a dispute resolution proceeding, the panel (or arbitrator(s)) needs procedural rules by which it should be governed. The methods of setting procedural rules can be broadly classified into the following two categories:

- (i) those that use procedural rules established by an existing institution. (*See*, for example, EFTA Article 1, Paragraph 6 of Annex T, and the Cotonou Agreement, Article 98, Paragraph 2(c) (wherein the rules of procedures of the Permanent Court of Arbitration shall be used, unless otherwise agreed by the parties)); and
- (ii) other agreements require the rules of procedure to be determined separately.

In most EPAs/FTAs the rules of procedure fall under (2) above. Such agreements can be further subcategorized into:

- (a) those providing for common rules of procedure applicable to all disputes. (*See*, for example, NAFTA Article 2012, Paragraph 1; FTAA Chapter 23, Article 16, Paragraph 1; US - Jordan FTA Article 17, Paragraph 3; and Korea - Singapore FTA

Article 20.9, Paragraph 1); and

(b) those providing that each panel or arbitral panel shall, at its own discretion, establish rules of procedure on a case by case basis. (*See*, for example, CARICOM, Arbitration Procedure, Article 200, Paragraph 1; Australia - Singapore FTA Chapter 16, Article 6, Paragraph 4; and Thailand - New Zealand FTA Article 17.7, Paragraph 11).

Japan also utilizes (2) above. The Japan – Mexico and Japan – Chile EPAs stipulate that the joint committee established on the basis of the EPA/FTA in question shall specify the procedural rules applying to all arbitration procedures (Japan – Mexico, Article 159; Japan – Chile, Article 187). Moreover, with regard to the other agreements, as well as stipulating the arbitration procedures within the agreement, the ASEAN – Japan and Japan – Viet Nam agreements stipulate that the parties can, after discussion with the court of arbitration (arbitral tribunal), agree to adopt additional rules and procedures that do not violate the procedural provisions within the agreement in question (Japan – Singapore, Article 145; Japan – Malaysia, Article 150; Japan – Philippines, Article 155; Japan – Thailand, Article 164; Japan – Brunei, Article 112; Japan – Indonesia, Article 144; Japan – Switzerland, Article 143; ASEAN – Japan, Article 68; Japan – Viet Nam, Article 121).

## (2) BITs

Most BITs provide that each panel (or arbitral panel) shall, in its own discretion, determine the rules of procedures on a case by case basis. Some BITs, however, provide that the rules of procedures shall be adopted from a third party (for example, some of the BITs entered into by the United States provide that the arbitration procedures articulated therein follow the applicable UNCITRAL rules).

## (d) Timelines

### (1) EPAs/FTAs

Even though the right to seek a binding ruling from a dispute settlement body is provided for under a relevant EPA/FTA, no effective resolution could be expected if a respondent was able to arbitrarily delay the relevant proceedings. Most of the EPAs/FTAs examined, including the EPAs entered into by Japan, set forth mandatory timelines to be met at each step of the dispute settlement process. In some EPAs/FTAs, however, no time limit in respect of proceedings is clearly established (*See*, for example, CACM, CARICOM, EC - Estonia FTA, and EC - Morocco FTA).

### (2) BITs

In contrast to EPAs/FTAs, only a very limited number of BITs set forth timelines in respect of the final arbitral award. They include: US - Czech FTA, Canada - El Salvador FTA and South Africa - Turkey FTA.

## (e) Priority of Forum in Relation to Dispute Settlement Procedures of Other Agreements

### (1) EPAs/FTAs



As individual EPAs/FTAs and the WTO Agreement contain provisions stipulating rights and responsibilities that are substantively the same or similar, there are cases in which a situation can arise where it is possible to use both the dispute resolution procedures in the WTO Agreement and the dispute resolution procedures in the relevant EPA/FTA or BIT (a typical example is the US - Canada lumber dispute over antidumping and countervailing duty measures in respect of soft wood lumber originating in Canada).

Some EPAs/FTAs set forth the relationship with the dispute settlement procedures in other agreements in the event that such cases arise; the content of these can be broadly classified into three categories, as follows:

- (1) priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the relevant FTA; or
- (2) priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO Agreement (or GATT); or
- (3) the complainant may choose between the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures and the FTA dispute settlement procedures.

NAFTA is an example of (1). This agreement stipulates that, with regard to disputes arising from substantially equivalent provisions in NAFTA or GATT, in the event that a NAFTA signatory intends to bring an action against another NAFTA signatory under the WTO dispute resolution procedures, it should first notify any third NAFTA Party (not due to be a respondent) of its intention. If that third Party wishes to take action under the NAFTA dispute resolution procedures, those Parties shall consult about whether to deal with the issue under the WTO or NAFTA provisions. If no agreement is reached, the dispute shall, as a general rule, be conducted on the basis of the NAFTA dispute resolution procedures (Article 2005, Paragraph 2), it is stipulated that, with regard to disputes where the NAFTA provisions regarding “Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements,” “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” or “Standard-Related Measures” in NAFTA (Article 2005, Paragraphs 3 and 4) are applied, the dispute resolution procedures in NAFTA rather than those in the WTO Agreement shall be used, depending on the will of the respondent country.

Examples of (2) include the EU – Chile Association Agreement, which stipulates a comprehensive preference for the WTO procedure - when a case is disputable under the WTO Agreement, it shall be referred to the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO Agreement (Article 189, Paragraph 3 (c)). Also, the US – Jordan FTA provides that disputes regarding trade in services or intellectual property can be referable to the panel procedures under that FTA only if they are not subject to resolution under the WTO dispute settlement procedures (Article 17, Paragraphs 4(a) and (b)).

Examples of (3) include FTAA (Chapter 23, Article 8, Paragraph 1) and the Korea - Singapore FTA (Article 20.3, Paragraph 1). However, where the dispute resolution procedure is left to the choice of the complainant, the relevant agreement usually provides that once either of the disputes settlement procedures is chosen, the selected procedure shall be used to the exclusion of the other (*see*, for example, the Korea - Singapore FTA, Article 20.3, Paragraph 2).

EPAs entered into by Japan fall under category (3), in that they impose no limitation on the right of the complainant to have recourse to the dispute settlement procedures available

under any other international agreement, but explicitly provide that once either of the dispute settlement procedures has been chosen, no other procedure can be used in respect of that dispute. However, the Japan - Singapore EPA (Article 139, Paragraph 4), Japan - Philippines EPA (Article 149, Paragraph 4), and Japan - Thailand EPA (Article 159, Paragraph 4) provide that the preceding procedure may be waived, if the parties agree.

## (2) BITs

Unlike the case of EPAs/FTAs, it is not envisaged that disputes concerning BITs will involve conflict with dispute resolution procedures in other international agreements, such as the WTO Agreement, so there appear to be no stipulations concerning the relationship between dispute settlement procedures under the BIT in question and dispute settlement procedures under other international agreements.

## (f) Selection of Panelists and Arbitrators

### (1) EPAs/FTAs

The rules of procedure may include a provision involving the method for selecting panelists or arbitrators. The first issue in this regard is whether a roster of candidates is to be prepared and maintained. For example, FTAA (Chapter 23, Article 12), CARICOM (Article 205, Paragraph 1), and MERCOSUR all provide that such a roster be prepared. NAFTA also provides that such a roster be prepared and maintained for panelists (for example, arbitrators) reviewing AD and CVD measures (Annexes 1901.2 and 1905) and in respect of ordinary dispute settlement procedures (Article 2009)). No such provision is found in the EPAs entered into by Japan.

The second issue in this regard is the specific method to be employed in selecting panelists or arbitrators. Most EPAs/FTAs provide that for panels or arbitrations consisting of three (3) panelists or arbitrators, as the case may be, each of the parties may appoint one such panelist/arbitrator, and that for panels or arbitrations consisting of five (5) panelists or arbitrators, as the case may be, each of the parties may appoint two such panelists/arbitrators. In each case, the method of selecting the remaining one panelist or arbitrator differs, depending on the terms of the relevant EPA/FTA, as follows:

(1) some EPAs/FTAs provide that the remaining panelist/arbitrator shall be selected by the mutual agreement of the panelists/arbitrators already appointed (for example, US - Jordan FTA, Article 17, Paragraph 1(c));

(2) some EPAs/FTAs provide that the remaining panelist/arbitrator shall be selected by the mutual agreement of the disputing parties (for example, NAFTA Article 2011, Paragraphs 1(b) and 2(b)), and that, if no agreement is reached on the remaining panelist/arbitrator, he/she shall be chosen by lot); and

(3) some EPAs/FTAs provide that the remaining panelist/arbitrator shall be selected by the mutual agreement of the panelists already appointed, and if no agreement is reached, the selection of the remaining panelist/arbitrator shall be determined by a third party (for example, the President of the International Court of Justice, in Thailand - New Zealand FTA, Article 17.5, Paragraphs 1 and 3; and the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Cotonou Agreement, Article 98, Paragraph 2(b)).

In the dispute under NAFTA between, the United States and Mexico concerning the market access commitment of sugar, no panel examination has commenced to date, more than six years after the filing of the complaint, because the United States has delayed the panelist selection procedure. This suggests that panel selection procedures requiring the mutual agreement of the disputing parties may generate a problem with respect to the effectiveness of the dispute resolution process.

Japan's EPAs might appear to fall under category (2) above, the parties are required to propose a certain number of candidates for the third panelist (who shall be the chairperson), and negotiate this matter. However, they differ from category (2) above in that, if no agreement has been reached on the selection of the chairperson by and between the parties prior to the mandatory deadlines thereunder: (i) the Secretariat-General of the WTO may be requested to appoint the third arbitrator (see, for example, Japan - Malaysia EPA, Article 148, Paragraph 4), or (ii) the third arbitrator may be chosen by lot (see, for example, Japan - Mexico EPA, Article 153, Paragraph 6, Japan - Singapore EPA, Article 143, Paragraph 4(d), and Japan - Philippines EPA, Article 153, Paragraph 5, Japan - Chile EPA, Article 180, Paragraph 4, Japan - Thailand EPA, Article 162, Paragraph 5, Japan - Indonesia EPA, Article 142, Paragraph 6).

## (2) BITs

BITs generally provide that an arbitral tribunal shall consist of three (3) arbitrators, with each party selecting one arbitrator, and each selected arbitrator then mutually agreeing upon the third arbitrator (who shall be the chairperson).

## (g) Method of Decision-making by the Dispute Settlement Body

### (1) EPAs/FTAs

In EPAs/FTAs, the following methods are used in the decision-making process by either the panel or the council body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties:

(i) Consensus, but if no consensus is reached, a majority vote is used (see, for example, Korea - Singapore FTA, Annex 20A, Paragraph 20; Australia - Singapore FTA, Chapter 16, Article 6, Paragraph 3; and Thailand - New Zealand FTA, Article 17.6, Paragraph 3); and

(ii) A (simple) majority vote is used from the outset (see, for example, EFTA Annex T, Article 1, Paragraph 7; FTAA, Chapter 23, Article 24, Paragraph 3; CARICOM, Arbitration Procedure, Article 207, Paragraph 7; European Agreements Arbitration Procedures, Article 114, Paragraph 4; and EC - Morocco FTA, Article 86, Paragraph 4).

Among EPAs entered into by Japan, the Japan - Malaysia EPA (Article 150, Paragraph 9), Japan - Singapore EPA (Article 144, Paragraph 8), Japan - Philippines EPA (Article 154, Paragraph 8), Japan-Chile EPA (Article 184, Paragraph 9), Japan-Thailand EPA (Article 163, Paragraph 8), Japan-Brunei EPA (Article 112, Paragraph 10), Japan-Indonesia EPA (Article 144, Paragraph 10), ASEAN - Japan Comprehensive EPA (Article 69, Paragraph 7), Japan - Viet Nam EPA (Article 121) and Japan - Switzerland EPA (Article 143, Paragraph 10) provide that the arbitral tribunal shall attempt to make its decisions by consensus, but may also make such decisions by majority vote should it fail to reach consensus. In contrast, the Japan - Mexico EPA provides that the arbitral tribunal shall make decisions by majority vote

(Article 154, Paragraph 7).

## (2) BITs

One occasionally encounters BITs that contain no specific provision on the method by which the arbitral tribunal is to render its decision, including the decision on its arbitral award. This is presumably linked to the fact that most, if not all, of the BITs examined provide that the rules of procedure shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal on an *ad hoc* basis.

Other BITs provide that the arbitral tribunal may make decisions by majority vote.

## (h) Appellate Proceedings

### (1) EPAs/FTAs

While it is desirable, for purposes of expeditious resolution of disputes, for either the relevant arbitral tribunal or the relevant council body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties to render a final and conclusive decision in first instance, the need for a more discreet examination of certain matters may require that an appeal against an award be filed, if necessary.

Most EPAs/FTAs, including those to which Japan is a party, have no provisions dealing with appellate procedures. EPAs entered into by Japan expressly state that the award of the arbitral tribunal is “final” (*see*, for example, Japan - Malaysia EPA, Article 150, Paragraph 10; Japan - Singapore EPA, Article 144, Paragraph 2; Japan - Mexico EPA, Article 154, Paragraph 8; Japan - Philippines EPA, Article 154, Paragraph 2; ASEAN – Japan Comprehensive EPA, Article 69, Paragraph 8; Japan – Viet Nam EPA, Article 121; and Japan – Switzerland EPA, Article 142, Paragraph 2). SAARC, however, explicitly provides for appellate procedures, and in FTAA inclusion of appellate proceedings is under consideration. Other EPAs/FTAs explicitly provide that no award shall be subject to an appeal (*see*, for example, Korea - Singapore FTA, Article 20.13, Paragraph 1).

## (2) BITs

The BITs contain no arrangements providing for appeals.

## (i) Implementation Procedures in Respect of Arbitral Awards

As described above, most EPAs/FTAs and BITs stipulate that the arbitral tribunal issues binding judgments and that an institution consisting of representatives of the contracting parties may also issue a binding judgment. Accordingly, when such an award is rendered (requiring the respondent either to take corrective measures or to make compensation, as the case may be), the respondent is obligated to implement it in good faith. EPAs/FTAs generally set forth provisions to ensure the implementation of the arbitral award by the respondent.

In contrast, only a small number of BITs include provisions to ensure the implementation of the relevant award (for example, Canada - El Salvador BIT provides that the complainant may either receive compensation from the responding party, or if the respondent has not implemented the arbitral award, suspend the provision of a benefit equivalent to the level of benefit subject to the arbitral award if the arbitral award is not

implemented (Article 13)).

### (1) Deadlines for Implementation

The following types of deadlines are found in provisions concerning the implementation of the award for both EPAs/FTAs and BITs:

(1) for some agreements, the limitation period is from the rendition of the final decision to the actual implementation thereof; and

(2) for other agreements, the limitation period is from the rendition of the final decision to the deadline for the parties to reach agreement on such implementation. That is, if the parties fail to reach agreement within the specified time period, the complainant may request that the panel hearing the original dispute settlement set out the deadlines for the implementation of the award (*see* for example, the Korea - Singapore FTA, Article 20.13, Paragraph 2(b); and Australia - Singapore FTA, Chapter 16, Article 9, Paragraph 1).

EPAs entered into by Japan fall under type (2) above. Specifically, the respondent is required to notify the complainant of the period necessary to implement the award within a certain period of time (*i.e.*, 20 days under the Japan - Malaysia EPA, Article 152, Paragraph 2; 20 days under the Japan - Singapore EPA, Article 147, Paragraph 1; 20 days under the Japan - Mexico EPA, Article 156, Paragraph 2; 20 days under the Japan - Thailand EPA, Article 166, Paragraph 2; 20 days under the Japan - Indonesia EPA, Article 146, Paragraph 2; 20 days under the ASEAN - Japan Comprehensive EPA, Article 21, Paragraph 2; 20 days under the Japan - Viet Nam EPA, Article 123; 20 days under the Japan - Switzerland EPA, Article 145, Paragraph 2; 30 days under the Japan - Brunei EPA, Article 144, Paragraph 2; 45 days under Japan - Philippines EPA, Article 157, Paragraph 1; and 45 days under the Japan - Chile EPA, Article 185, Paragraph 2) from the date of the award. If the complainant is not satisfied with the time period notified by the respondent, either party may request that the arbitral tribunal, after conducting consultations with the parties, determine such time period (*see*, for example, the Japan - Malaysia EPA, Article 152, paragraph 2; the Japan - Singapore EPA, Article 147, Paragraphs 1(c) and 4(b); the Japan - Philippines EPA, Article 157, Paragraph 1); the Japan - Indonesia EPA, Article 146, Paragraph 2; and the Japan - Switzerland EPA, Article 145, Paragraph 2), or without conducting such consultations (*see*, for example, the Japan - Mexico EPA, Article 156, Paragraph 2; the Japan - Chile EPA, Article 185, Paragraph 2; the Japan - Thailand EPA, Article 166, Paragraph 2; and the Japan - Brunei EPA, Article 114, Paragraph 2; Japan-ASEAN EPA, Article 67, Japan-Viet Nam EPA, Article 120 and Japan-Switzerland EPA, Article 142, Paragraph 1).

### (2) Surveillance regarding Implementation

Few agreements specifically provide for a surveillance mechanism to ensure that the respondent has in fact implemented the final decision of the panel or the council body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties, as the case may be. The ASEAN Protocol, which governs dispute settlement, requires that the respondent report to the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials' Meeting on its own implementation of final decisions rendered by the panel or the council body, as the case may be (Article 15, Paragraph 4).

No EPA entered into by Japan contains any specific provision in respect of

surveillance regarding implementation.

### (3) Method of Implementation

Whether or not the relevant dispute settlement body has the authority to recommend methods of implementing a relevant binding decisions (see, for example, Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the DSU of the WTO Agreement) is an important issue. In this respect, agreements can be categorized as follows:

- (1) it is left to the mutual agreement of the parties; and
- (2) the agreement provides that the panel is authorized to make recommendations on the implementation method (for example, US - Jordan FTA, Article 17, Paragraph 1(d) provides that the panel may make recommendations on the method of correcting violations found in the arbitral award pursuant to a request of a party.)

The Japan - Malaysia EPA (Article 149, Paragraph 1(d)), Japan - Singapore EPA (Article 144, Paragraph 1(d)), Japan - Philippines EPA (Article 154, Paragraph 1(d)), Japan-Thailand EPA (Article 163, Paragraph 1), Japan-Brunei EPA (Article 111, Paragraph 1), Japan-ASEAN EPA (Article 67), Japan-Viet Nam EPA (Article 120) and Japan-Switzerland EPA (Article 142, Paragraph 1) provide that the arbitral tribunal may include in its award suggested options of implementation by the respondent for the countries to consider, in accordance with (2) above. In contrast, no such provision is found in the Japan - Mexico EPA.

### (j) Retaliatory Measures in the Event of a Failure of Respondent to Implement an Award

The following types of retaliatory measures are permitted if the respondent fails to take actions required by the relevant award, the final report, or otherwise agreed upon by the parties based on the final report:

- (1) one type is to authorize a retaliatory measure, *i.e.*, to suspend a benefit provided to the respondent; and
- (2) the other type is to require the respondent to make a compensatory adjustment (*see*, for example, EFTA Annex T, Article 3, Paragraph 1(a); however, subparagraph (b) thereof effectively permits, the complainant to choose between the option (1) above and this option (2)).

With respect to option (1) above, some agreements permit the complainant to take unilateral retaliatory measures against the respondent (*see*, for example, NAFTA, Article 2019, Paragraph 1; the Korea - Singapore FTA, Article 20.14, Paragraph 2; and the Thailand - New Zealand FTA, Article 17.11, Paragraph 1 (wherein the respondent party has the right to dispute the level of such unilateral retaliatory measures in arbitration). Others permit the complainant to take retaliatory measures only after the panel or council body consisting of representatives of the contracting parties' governments, as the case may be, so authorizes (*see*, for example, SAARC, Article 20, Paragraph 11; Bangkok Agreement, Article 16; and Australia - Singapore FTA, Chapter 16, Article 10, Paragraph 2).

The Japan - Malaysia EPA (Article 152, Paragraphs 4 and 5), the Japan - Singapore

EPA (Article 147, Paragraphs 4(c) and 5), the Japan - Mexico EPA (Article 156, Paragraphs 4 and 5), the Japan - Philippines EPA (Article 157, Paragraphs 2 and 5), the Japan – Indonesia EPA (Article 146, Paragraph 6), the ASEAN – Japan Comprehensive EPA (Article 71, Paragraph 4), the Japan – Viet Nam EPA (Article 123, Paragraph 3) and the Japan – Switzerland EPA (Article 145, Paragraph 4) have adopted option (1) above, providing that the complainant may notify the respondent that it may unilaterally suspend benefits granted to the respondent under the EPA if the arbitral tribunal finds that the respondent has failed to take implementation measures.

### 3) Challenges in State-to-State Dispute Settlement Procedures

Japan has signed 13 EPAs and 18 BITs which have entered into force, a relatively small number in comparison with other developed countries. Nevertheless, it is believed that the number of regional or bilateral agreements between Japan and other countries will increase, as indicated by the recent movement toward economic integration in East Asia.

Thus far, no dispute settlement clause on state-to-state disputes has been invoked under any EPA/BIT entered into by Japan. However, if Japan enters into agreements with a wider range of countries, and as a result more business sectors actively develop businesses by virtue of preferential treatment granted, it would be increasingly likely that there will be disputes concerning the interpretation and/or application of the EPAs or BIT.

In such a situation, there is a possibility that a problem may arise (particularly in the case of EPAs), specifically, whether the dispute settlement procedures prescribed in the relevant EPA or BIT will apply or whether the WTO procedures will apply. This is because both the EPA and the WTO Agreement are aimed at promoting trade and economic activity, and there are cases in which the dispute relates to both agreements, such as cases where the EPA borrows the provisions of the WTO Agreement. Accordingly, the parties would need to carefully examine and determine the more advantageous forum for the settlement of disputes.

At this stage, it is possible that two cases with the same set of facts and between the same parties can be referred to both the forum prescribed under the EPAs/BITs and the WTO Agreement, generating difficult legal questions. The relevant procedural rules under customary international law (such as *res judicata* and the avoidance of a multiplicity of proceedings) are applicable to cases whose disputes are identical. For disputes to be identical under international law, the parties and the facts and causes of actions must be the same. Disputes involving an EPA/BIT and a WTO Agreement are not identical because different agreements are involved. In such cases, two or more forums may render conflicting judgments, resulting in confusion (*see, for example, Argentina - Chicken AD*), but there is no problem from a legal perspective, apart from special cases. Of course, if two or more cases addressing issues that are closely connected are separately referred to more than one forum, even if they do not have exactly the same factual foundation, it may be desirable to have a coordinated resolution in a single dispute between the parties. For example, in the cases relating to sweeteners between the United States and Mexico, Mexico referred the alleged violation of US market access commitment on sugar originated in Mexico to a NAFTA panel, and the United States referred Mexico's imposition of retaliatory internal taxes on sweeteners originating in the United States (and drinks with such sweeteners) to a WTO panel. It has been suggested that these matters should have been addressed in a single forum because of the close relationship between the two disputes. However, the dispute settlement procedures in these respective agreements only relate to the interpretation and application of the agreements

in question, so the emergence of cases in which “disputes” relating to multiple articles are handled separately using the respective procedures and the long time to achieve the resolution of the overall “dispute” is inevitable, as it stems from the pluralistic nature of international law; what Japan must consider is how to utilize the means of handling such situations. As described above, this issue is usually dealt with by establishing provisions on regarding the relationship with dispute settlement procedures under other agreements in each agreement. The relationship in terms of priority can generally be classified into the following three: (1) priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the relevant FTA; (2) priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO Agreement; or (3) the complainant may choose between the two, but in order to avoid conflicting results on practically the same issue under different agreements, additional use of the other procedures is prohibited. In the EPAs/FTAs Japan concluded, (3) has been used. It will be vital to continue to pay closely attention to the competition between state-to-state dispute settlement procedures in the future.

**Figure III-8-1 Regional Trade Agreements Examined in this Chapter, including Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”), Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), and Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”)**

[EPA/FTA]

	<b>Full Name (Abbreviation in bracket)</b>	<b>Reference in this Report</b>
1.	North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	NAFTA
2.	Free Trade Agreement of Americas (FTAA) — Third Draft Agreement	FTAA
3.	Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free-Trade-Area	US - Jordan FTA
4.	1980 Treaty of Montevideo — Instrument Establishing the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)	LAIA
5.	Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR	MERCOSUR
6.	General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, Signed at Managua on 13 December 1960 (CACM)	CACM
7.	Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy	CARICOM
8.	Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Government of the Republic of Colombia	CARICOM - Columbia FTA
9.	Andean Community — DECISION 563: Official Codified Text of the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement), and Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement	Andean Community
10.	Agreement on the European Economic Area	EEA
11.	AGREEMENT between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway	EC — Norway FTA
12.	EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part	EC — Morocco FTA



	<b>Full Name (Abbreviation in bracket)</b>	<b>Reference in this Report</b>
13.	EUROPE AGREEMENT establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lithuania, of the other part	Europe Agreement
14.	Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part, Signed in Cotonou on June 23, 2000	Cotonou Agreement
15.	Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association (Annex to the Agreement Amending the Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association) (EFTA)	EFTA
16.	Agreement on Free Trade between the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the Government of the Russian Federation	Russia - Kyrgyzstan FTA
17.	Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)	CEFTA
18.	The United Economic Agreement between the Countries the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)	GCC
19.	Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)	SAARC
20.	First Agreement on Trade Negotiations among Developing Member Countries of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok Agreement)	Bangkok Agreement
21.	Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China	ASEAN - China Agreement
22.	Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Singapore	Korea - Singapore FTA
23.	Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)	ASEAN
24.	Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA)	Australia - Singapore FTA
25.	Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement	Thailand - New Zealand FTA
26.	Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)	ANZCERTA
27.	South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA)	SPARTECA
28.	East African Community Free Trade Agreement	EAC


## [BIT]

	<b>Contracting Parties</b>	<b>Date of Signing</b>	<b>Abbreviations in this Report</b>
1.	United States and Czech	Signed the original agreement with Czechoslovakia October 22, 1991; agreed on the Protocol with Czech, May 1, 2004.	Original Agreement: US – Czechoslovakia BIT Protocol: US - Czech BIT
2.	United States and Uruguay	November 2005	US – Uruguay BIT
3.	France and Hong Kong	November 30, 1995	France - Hong Kong BIT
4.	France and Malta	August 11, 1976	France - Malta BIT
5.	Germany and Poland	November 10, 1989	Germany - Poland BIT
6.	Germany and China	December 1, 2003	Germany - China BIT
7.	United Kingdom and Turkey	March 15, 1991	UK - Turkey BIT
8.	United Kingdom and	December 22, 2003	UK - Vanuatu BIT

	<b>Contracting Parties</b>	<b>Date of Signing</b>	<b>Abbreviations in this Report</b>
	Vanuatu		
9.	Canada and El Salvador	June 6, 1999	Canada - El Salvador BIT
10.	Australia and Sri Lanka	November 12, 2002	Australia - Sri Lanka BIT
11.	Mexico and Czech	April 4, 2002	Mexico - Chile BIT
12.	Chile and Turkey	August 21, 1998	Chile - Turkey BIT
13.	Korea and Sweden	August 30, 1995	Korea - Sweden BIT
14.	Korea and Mauritania	December 15, 2004	Korea - Mauritania BIT
15.	China and Iceland	March 31, 1994	China - Iceland BIT
16.	Russia and Norway	October 14, 1995	Russia - Norway BIT
17.	India and Hungary	November 3, 2003	India - Hungary BIT
18.	Thailand and Germany	June 24, 2002	Thailand - Germany BIT
19.	Belarus and Finland	March 2006	Belarus - Finland BIT
20.	Saudi Arabia and Korea	April 4, 2002	Saudi Arabia - Korea BIT
21.	Republic of South Africa and Turkey	June 23, 2000	South Africa - Turkey BIT

Source: UNCTAD

**Figure III-8-2 Dispute Settlement Procedures of EPAs/FTAs Executed by Japan**



**Japan Malaysia EPA  
Flow of State-to-State Dispute Settlement  
(Chapter 13)**

Note)【】Indicates the article number of the agreement. For convenience, articles are indicated in Arabic numerals, and paragraphs are indicated (i), (ii),...

Avoidance of dispute (at any time)【§147】

- Good offices
- Conciliation
- Mediation

(Within 15 days for perishable goods) 【§146(ii)】

Within 30 days  
【§148(i)(a)】

Within 30 days  
【§146(ii)】

Within 60 days  
【§148(i)(b)】

Appointment of arbitrator(s)  
Within 30 days【§148】

Within 90 days + α【§150(vii)】

Within 15 days【§150(vii)】

Within 30 days  
【§150(viii)】

Within 20 days【§152(ii)】

【§152(iii)】

【§152(ii)】

Within 20 days after date of expiry of implementation period【§152(iii)】

Within 30 days【§152(v)】

Arbitral tribunal

- In accordance with rules of international law 【§149(i)(b)】
- Consultations with experts and reporting system 【§149(ii)】
- Closed【§150(i)】
- May suspend work for a period not to exceed 12 months. If suspended for more than 12 months, authority for establishment shall lapse【§151(i)】

Compensation or alternative arrangement

Notification of intention to suspend application of obligations

No implementation of award within period  
【§152(iv)】

Request for consultations (extension of implementation period)  
Within 20 days【§152(ii)】


Extension of period


Implementation of award

Refer to an arbitral tribunal

Suspension of the application of concessions or other obligations under Article 152, paragraphs 3 and 5 may not be implemented until at least 30 days after the date of notification. Such suspension shall: (a) not be effected if, in respect of the dispute to which the suspension relates, consultations, or proceedings before an arbitral tribunal are in progress; (b) be temporary, and be discontinued when the Countries reach a mutually satisfactory resolution or where compliance with the original award is effected; (c) be restricted to the same level of nullification or impairment that is attributable to the failure to comply with the original award; and (d) be restricted to the same sector or sectors to which the nullification or impairment relates, unless it is not practicable or effective to suspend the application of concessions or obligations in such sector or sectors. 【§152(vi)】

If the Country complained against considers that the requirement set out in Article 152, paragraphs 3, 5 or 6 have not been met, it may request consultations with the complaining Country. The complaining Country shall enter into consultations within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the Countries fail to resolve the matter within 30 days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations, the Country complained against may refer the matter to an arbitral tribunal.【§152(vii)】





The suspension of the application of concessions or other obligations may only be implemented at least 30 days after the date of the notification in accordance with the applicable provisions of this Article. Such suspension shall: (a) not be effected if, in respect of the dispute to which the suspension relates, consultations or proceedings before the arbitral tribunal are in progress; (b) be temporary, and be discontinued when the Parties reach a mutually satisfactory resolution or where compliance with the award is effected; (c) be restricted to the same level of nullification or impairment that is attributable to the failure to comply with the award; and (d) be restricted to the same sector or sectors to which the nullification or impairment relates, unless it is not practicable or effective to suspend the application of concessions or obligations in such sector or sectors. [Article 219(3)]

If the Party complained against considers that the requirements for the suspension of the application to it of concessions or other obligations under this Agreement by the complaining Party set out in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) have not been met, it may request consultations with the complaining Party. The complaining Party shall enter into consultations within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the Parties fail to resolve the matter within 30 days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations pursuant to this paragraph, the Party complained against may refer the matter to an arbitral tribunal, which then shall determine whether such requirements have been met. [Article 219(4)]

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# Improvement on the Business Environment

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## (1) Background to the Rules

As a result of the expansion of international activities such as the advance of Japanese companies into overseas markets, the various problems faced by Japanese companies – including their local subsidiaries – in doing business internationally are becoming more diverse (developing industrial infrastructure in various countries, improving transparency in administrative procedures and decision-making, as well as in judicial decisions, simplifying and streamlining administrative procedures, increasing safety and protecting intellectual property rights, etc.). Given this situation, it is important to make appropriate requests to key figures in the governments of partner countries for improvements in areas where companies are facing issues relating to the business environment in the partner country in question.

When engaging in comprehensive discussions relating to such issues concerning the improvement on the business environment, there have hitherto been few cases in which a specific consultative body has been established, so the response has either been for individual companies or industry groups to discuss individual issues with the government of the partner country in question, or to take up the matter within various intergovernmental discussion forums. In discussions between governments, for a number of years there have been various bilateral consultative bodies relating to the economy that have held meetings both regularly and on an *ad hoc* basis (such as dialogue concerning regulatory reform and regular meetings between relevant ministries and agencies in the two countries); in addition, talks have taken place in a timely fashion when the opportunity has presented itself, but with particular regard to countries that did not have an adequately developed existing forum, there was a desire to establish a forum for close bilateral consultations between key figures in the governments in question, focusing on the trade and investment environment, in order to improve the business environment in the partner country. Moreover, procedures have developed within the WTO and other organizations for resolving issues legally, as a forum that can be used at any stage as a forum for settling individual disputes, but there are limits, in that these cannot be used in relation to cases where compliance with the agreement is not the problem. For example, procedures for seeking the rectification of governmental measures by the government of the partner country through the good offices of the Japanese government include the WTO dispute settlement procedures and the dispute resolution procedures in economic partnership agreements (EPAs); moreover, in cases where companies are seeking compensation for damages incurred as a result of actions by governments, it is possible to use the arbitration procedures stipulated in investment contracts, as well as domestic courts in the country in question, but these can only be used in cases where the problem is compliance with the agreement in question.

As a result of such considerations, in order to establish opportunities for the governments and companies of both countries to participate in intensive discussions concerning systems relating to trade and investment and their implementation status in the partner country, most Japanese EPAs contain a chapter on the “improvement on the business environment”, which provides for the establishment of a business environment improvement subcommittee as a forum for discussions aimed at the development and improvement on the business environment in the partner country. Both the private sector and government officials can participate in this subcommittee, through which it is possible for the governments concerned to raise issues in a coordinated fashion, including the problems faced by Japanese companies, including problems that it would be difficult for a single company to raise, as well as

problems faced by the industry as a whole or all companies that expand into the partner country in question.

With regard to frameworks under the economic partnership agreements between Japan and Mexico, Japan and Malaysia, Japan and Thailand, Japan and Chile, Japan and the Philippines, Japan and India, and Japan and Peru, the subcommittees have already begun to meet and requests on the part of both governments in relation to the government of the partner country have been put forward (however, in the framework under the Japan – Thailand EPA, only Japanese requests to the Thai government have been raised and discussed). The matters that can be taken up by the subcommittees cover a wide range of requests relating to trade, investment and the activities of local subsidiaries, and the requests made by Japan to its partner countries cover a broad array of topics, such as requests for improvements to the infrastructure development environment, including improved power supply quality and measures to rectify the lack of gas supply, as well as improvements in customs and tax procedures, measures to deal with counterfeit items, and speeding up visa, work permit and basic certification procedures, not to mention requests for improvements to measures to be taken where unfair trading is suspected. When an enterprise submits to arbitration based on the investment agreement, the international investment arbitration involves costs and risks (expenses, time, and relations with partner country). Considering this, it is important that relief can be actually received based on the investment treaty, by having problems of consistency with the investment treaty raised in forums for improvement on the business environment. As well as compiling minutes based on consensus between both parties, the subcommittee undertakes practical matters relating to obtaining a commitment to following up at the next meeting concerning progress in responding to matters requested of the counterpart country and checking on this.

## **(2) Overview of the System**

In most of the Japanese EPAs that have achieved some results in terms of the holding of subcommittee meetings, the chapter on the improvement on the business environment provides for establishing a “business environment improvement subcommittee”, which is a discussion mechanism for talks between the governments of the signatory countries on a wide range of issues relating to the improvement on the business environment, in order to cooperate in working on issues concerning the development of the business environment. The detailed provisions concerning the functions of each subcommittee differ according to the EPA in question, but in general, they are as follows:

- 1) To carry out discussions regarding the improvement on the business environment;
- 2) To report the findings of the subcommittee to each country and make recommendations;
- 3) To carry out a review of the implementation of the subcommittee’s recommendations in each country, where appropriate;
- 4) To publicize the subcommittee’s recommendations, where appropriate;
- 5) To report its recommendations and its findings concerning the implementation and operation of provisions concerning the improvement on the business environment, as well as other matters to the joint committee established under the agreement.

The participants in this subcommittee consist of representatives of the governments of the two countries, but it is also possible to invite participation by representatives of industry groups, if both sides agree, and a major feature of these subcommittees is that they provide an opportunity for representatives of companies associated with the issues under discussion to directly discuss these matters with representatives of the government of the partner country. These subcommittee meetings are held as needed, in response to requests by one or other of



the countries, followed by coordination and agreement among the parties concerned. Moreover, a liaison office or contact point within each government is established under this framework, so even when the business environment improvement subcommittee is not in session, companies can submit queries and requests concerning legislation and regulations in the partner country.

The agreements prescribe that the role of the liaison office is to accept queries and requests from companies, convey these to the relevant government department, furnish a response, and convey this response to the party who submitted the request. In the same way, in this framework, a contact point for queries exists within the partner country, which is characterized by the fact that it conveys requests, etc. to the appropriate authorities within the government and obtains responses from those authorities via the liaison office. Moreover, the liaison office is charged with reporting its findings to the subcommittee, as well as exchanging information with the relevant departments within the government of its own country. It is envisaged that, based on these findings, the governments of each country will select which issues to raise in the subcommittee.

In addition to this, in the EPAs between Japan and Malaysia, Japan and Viet Nam, Japan and Switzerland, and Japan and Peru, it is stipulated that the liaison office can designate a liaison facilitation institution to accept requests from companies and convey them to the liaison offices of each country, in order to facilitate smooth communication between companies and liaison offices. An overview of these frameworks relating to the improvement on the business environment prescribed in the chapter on business environment improvement is shown in the diagram below:

Figure III-8-3 The Mechanism Relating to Improving the Business Environment (Example of the Japan – Malaysia EPA)

\* There are cases where the content differs, depending on the partner country or region.





Figure III-8-4 The Mechanism Relating to Improving the Business Environment (Example of the Japan-Peru EPA)



### (3) Stipulation of business environment improvement subcommittees in EPAs in force and their implementation status

Of Japan's EPAs/FTAs with 12 countries and one region in force, business environment improvement subcommittees were established under bilateral EPAs/FTAs with 11 countries excluding the Japan-Singapore EPA and AJCEP. Outlines of the stipulation of business environment improvement subcommittees in EPAs in force and their implementation status are given below. In addition, the holding of subcommittee meetings for the period between March 2013 and February 2014 is given in Figure III-8-5.

#### i) Japan-Mexico EPA

The chapter on the improvement of the business environment (Chapter 13) provides for the establishment of a business environment improvement committee. This chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on the dispute settlement. The business environment improvement committee holds meetings with the participation of such parties as the Japanese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Embassy of Japan in Mexico), the JETRO Mexico Office, Keidanren (Japan Business Federation; Japan - Mexico Economic Committee), the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Mexico, the Japan Maquiladora Association, and the Mexican government (Ministry of the Economy). The first meeting took place in April 2005, and the latest meeting (seventh) was held in August 2013. Japan requested Mexico to take more strict measures against counterfeit products in those committee meetings. Consequently, both sides established a hotline (with a designated person in charge) between the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI) and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Mexico. Both sides also established a hotline with a person in charge at the Central Customs to improve customs and taxation procedures based on the request of Japanese side. Japan requested Mexico to prevail its equivalency agreement to

Japanese medical devices, and Mexico accepted Japan's request. Therefore, Japanese companies are enjoying this treatment.

In addition, requests have been made relating to the improvement of security (measures to deal with the theft of goods in transit, strengthening of security at tourist spots, and the establishment of a hotline at the Mexican Ministry of Security), the improvement of the environment relating to tourism, and the development of infrastructure, and environmental improvements have been secured. Moreover, the Mexican side has requested improvements in procedures relating to the import of agricultural produce, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and the establishment of direct flights (since November 2006, Aeromexico has been operating direct flights between Narita and Mexico City). The business environment improvement committee has already met seven times and has been highly appreciated by Japanese companies in Mexico, which are requesting that it continue to meet. Moreover, making use of the channels of communication with Mexican government officials that have been built up through these meetings, the Japanese government is seeking to further strengthen relations from a variety of perspectives, including contributing to strengthening the competitiveness of the Mexican economy.

ii) Japan-Malaysia EPA

In the chapter on the improvement on the business environment (Chapter 11), the parties are obliged to establish a subcommittee on the improvement on the business environment, and to designate a liaison office to receive requests from parties such as local subsidiaries. Furthermore, under Chapter 5 of the implementation agreement, requests from local subsidiaries shall be answered by the liaison office of the other country, and it is envisaged that a liaison facilitation institution will be designated to convey the response from the liaison office in the counterpart country to the local subsidiary. Moreover, this chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on dispute settlement. The business environment improvement subcommittee holds meetings with the participation of such bodies as the Japanese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Embassy of Japan in Malaysia), the JETRO Kuala Lumpur Office, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Malaysia, and the Malaysian government (Ministry of International Trade and Industry, etc.). The first meeting was held in March 2007 and the latest meeting (fifth) took place in September 2011. In meetings of this subcommittee, the Japanese side has made requests for improvements in relation to such matters as the stable supply of electricity and gas, the improvement of discipline relating to environmental regulations (regulations on the recycling of electrical appliances (currently being formulated) and tax breaks for energy conservation), the improved operation of the duty exemption framework for imported electro-galvanized steel sheets, measures to deal with counterfeit goods (with an intellectual property subcommittee holding separate meetings), the improvement of security (measures to deal with truck hijacking), and the further liberalization of service sectors, and various concrete responses have been adopted. Moreover, from the Malaysian side, requests have been made for improvements relating to cooperative projects in the automotive field, hygiene inspection measures relating to agricultural produce and foodstuffs, and issues related to acquiring the JIS certification for glass wool.

iii) Japan-Chile EPA

The chapter on the improvement on the business environment (Chapter 15) prescribes the establishment of a subcommittee on the improvement on the business environment. This chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on dispute settlement. The business environment improvement subcommittee takes place with the participation of such bodies as

the Japanese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Embassy of Japan in Chile), the JETRO Santiago Office, the Japan – Chile Economic Committee, the Japan – Chile Chamber of Commerce, the Chilean government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chilean customs authority) and the Federation of Chilean Industry. The first meeting took place in April 2008 and the second in April 2009. At meetings of this committee, the Japanese side has made requests regarding such matters as improving the convenience of residence permit procedures and driving license conversion procedures, and improvements in port usage fees, and a number of positive responses have been received. Moreover, from the Chilean side, there have been requests relating to such matters as holding seminars about improving the investment environment and introducing a system of digital certificates of origin.

#### iv) Japan-Thailand EPA

The chapter on cooperation in the field of improving the business environment (Chapter 7), in the implementation agreement, prescribes the establishment of a subcommittee on improving the business environment, as well as the designation of a liaison office to act as a point of contact for accepting requests from local subsidiaries and other parties. This chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on dispute settlement. The business environment improvement subcommittee takes place with the participation of such bodies as the Japanese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Embassy of Japan in Thailand), the JETRO Bangkok Office, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok, and the Thai government (the investment committee and ministries, agencies and institutions relating to topics proposed for discussion by the Japanese side). The committee met for the first time in September 2008 and the most recent meeting was the fifth held in November 2013. At meetings of this subcommittee the format is such that the country holding the meeting receives requests from the counterpart country, so at the meetings that have taken place to date, the Japanese side has submitted requests to the Thai side. In the fifth meeting, Japan requested Thailand to resolve issues related to the relaxation of regulations on foreign investments in the Foreign Business Act, measures related to the flood in Thailand, intellectual property, custom procedures, labor policies, steel policies, and business infrastructure improvement, etc. Thailand explained the status of these issues and gave some positive responses.

#### v) Japan-Indonesia EPA

The chapter on the improvement on the business environment (Chapter 12) prescribes the establishment of a subcommittee on the improvement on the business environment, stipulating that a liaison office shall be designated within the government of each country, to act as a point of contact for such matters as requests from local subsidiaries, etc. This chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on dispute settlement. The committee operates in coordination with the High-level Joint Public-Private Forum on Investment, which is a framework for improving the investment environment (launched in 2004).

#### vi) Japan-Brunei EPA

The chapter on the improvement on the business environment (Chapter 8) stipulates the establishment of a subcommittee on business environment improvement. This chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on dispute settlement.

#### vii) Japan-Philippines EPA

The chapter on the improvement of the business environment (Chapter 13) stipulates the establishment of a subcommittee on the improvement of the business environment, the

establishment of consultative groups on the business environment and report their findings to the subcommittee, and the designation of a liaison office to accept requests from local subsidiaries and other parties. This chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on dispute settlement. The business environment improvement subcommittee takes place with the participation of such bodies as the Japanese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines), the JETRO Manila Office, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines, and the Philippine government (Ministry of Trade and Industry, etc.). The first meeting was held in June 2009, and the most recent, the seventh meeting, was held in September 2013. Since the first meeting of this committee, Japan has been requesting the implementation and appropriate enforcement of the steel tariff quotas, appropriate enforcement of the automotive component duty rate, development and improvement of infrastructure relating to roads, airports, railways, and ports, swift privatization of power generation assets and electricity companies based on the electricity reform law, improvement of the vulnerability of power lines, and increased computerization of customs offices and implementing measures to deal with the smuggling of used cars and oil products based on this agreement. The Philippines has been making improvements to meet Japan's requests. At the most recent seventh meeting, in consideration of the trends of increased investments from Japan, discussions were held on topics such as tax issues, inexpensive and stable electricity supply, effective utilization of Batangas Port and Subic Bay, additional levies by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), technical cooperation in global supply chain analysis in the priority sectors, industrial human resource development, etc.

viii) Japan-Switzerland EPA

The chapter on closer economic partnership (Chapter 13) provides for the establishment of a subcommittee for developing closer economic partnership, and the designation of a liaison office to serve as a point of contact for requests from local subsidiaries; the implementation agreement states that it is possible to designate a liaison facilitation institution, to act as an intermediary between the liaison office and local subsidiaries. This chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on dispute settlement. At the first meeting held in Tokyo in June 2010, opinions were exchanged on the further development of economic relationship between two countries.

ix) Japan-Viet Nam EPA

The chapter on the improvement of the business environment (Chapter 11) prescribes the establishment of a subcommittee on the improvement of the business environment, stipulating that a liaison office shall be designated to serve as a point of contact for requests from local subsidiaries and other parties; moreover, it provides for the possibility of designating a liaison facilitation institution to act as an intermediary between the liaison office and local subsidiaries. This chapter is exempt from the application of the chapter on dispute settlement. The actual operation of the committee takes place in coordination with the Japan – Viet Nam Joint Initiative, which is a framework for improving the investment environment (launched in 2003).

x) Japan-India EPA

Chapter 12 provides that “With a view to promoting trade and investment between the Parties, each Party shall, in accordance with its laws and regulations, take appropriate measures to further improve the business environment for the enterprises of the other Party conducting their business activities in its Area,” and “The Parties shall, in accordance with

their respective laws and regulations, promote cooperation to further improve the business environment in their respective Areas.”

In the first meeting, held in Tokyo in October 2012, the Japanese side requested improvement in the business environment in areas such as distribution, infrastructure, land expropriation and technical regulations, in addition to the dividend distribution tax and transfer pricing tax system, the alternative minimum tax, the goods and services tax, displaying the maximum retail price, external commercial borrowing, and the foreign investment ratio in the insurance sector. The Indian side requested improved inspections on imported Indian shrimp and trade procedures for marine products, generic medicines, and working visas for IT technicians.

#### xi) Japan-Peru EPA

In the chapter on business environment development (Chapter 13), the establishment of a subcommittee on business environment development is stipulated. In addition, the chapter provides for designation of a national contact point that will transmit requests from local subsidiaries to the liaison office in the counterpart country and convey the responses from the liaison office to the local subsidiaries. Furthermore, this chapter is excluded from the chapter on dispute settlement. The Sub-Committee on Improvement of Business Environment consists of the Japanese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Japanese Embassy in Peru), JETRO's Lima Office, the Japan-Peru Economic Committee, the Japan Peru Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the government of Peru (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism, Ministry of Foreign Relations, and the Ministry of Home Affairs), and the Japan - Peru Economic Council.

The first meeting was held in November 2012, and Japan presented requests to strengthen the promotion of investment, improve the legal system, establish transparent administrative procedures, simplify the tax system, improve employment/labor issues, and accelerate immigration control procedures; and Peru proposed the establishment of a working group on several of them. At later dates, these issues were followed up through holding investment seminars and meetings of working groups on immigration control procedures and employment/ labor-management issues. Also, the Peruvian side requested the development of rules to prevent double taxation and Japan's cooperation in the transfer of knowledge and technology.

Figure III-8-5 Main Improvement Requests Made by Japan at Business Environment Improvement Subcommittee Meetings and the Outcomes Thereof (status of subcommittee meetings held during the period between March 2013 and February 2014)

Request for Improvement		Outcome
Japan-Mexico EPA Seventh business environment improvement subcommittee meeting (August 2013)		
Tourism	Resuming the operation of Japanese version of immigration card Relaxation of the upper limits on currency exchange to Mexican pesos or creation of special categories	To be answered by Mexico in writing.
Security	Improvement of security measures in cities Disclosure of the status of crime occurrence and information on crime exposure Continued use of Japanese language security signs in airports Prevention of cargo theft	Mexico explained the efforts of the authorities in security enhancement on major highways, reinforcement of disciplines of police officers/employees in airports, and strengthening cooperation at federal/state/municipal levels, etc. Unanswered items to be answered by Mexico in writing.
Accreditation standards and measures to deal with counterfeit items	Reinforcement of investigation of counterfeit items and holding seminars Establishment of consultation points for application for the registration of accreditation standards Approval within the guideline period of approval review Application of pesticide registration (Japanese standard of maximum residue)	Mexico answered that the review period begins when the adequacy of submitted documents is confirmed and that public comments should be submitted for the pesticide registration of accreditation standards. Unanswered items to be answered by Mexico in writing.
Customs clearance and tax affairs	Elimination of DTA (customs processing fee) or switching to fixed amount-based system Integration of ISR (income tax) and IETU (corporation tax) Speeding up of IVA refund Improved predictability and reliability of tax systems Creation of tax incentives to facilitate investments	To be answered by Mexico in writing.
Labor	Early conclusion of the Social Security Agreement	Mexico explained that foreign workers also have the rights to use social security systems, and conclusion of the Social Security Agreement is difficult due to the impacts on state finance. Unanswered items to be answered by Mexico in writing.
Social infrastructure	Promotion of opportunities for the acceptance of Japanese companies in infrastructure business Promotion of acceptance of Japanese companies in infrastructure business at planning stage	Mexico explained its national infrastructure plan. Unanswered items to be answered by Mexico in writing.
Japan-Thailand EPA Fifth business environment improvement subcommittee meeting (November 2013)		



Request for Improvement		Outcome
Measures related to the flood	Further promotion of flood prevention measures, information provision in English, investigation of causes	The Thai government stated that it will improve English information on its websites. It also said that it will convey the information on flood insurance to the officer in charge.
Intellectual property	Reinforcement of measures against counterfeit products, elimination of delay in patent reviews, etc., establishment of laws and regulations	The Thai government said that the delay in reviews will be improved by review highway cooperation and the work of law revision is in progress.
Custom procedures	Consistent operation, promotion of law revision, provision of appropriate information	The Thai government stated that the officer in charge of customs was not present and would like to hold another meeting.
Labor policies	Simplification of signature, support for training, clarification of legislative systems through guidelines	The Thai government explained the present status and remarked that it will continue discussion with Japan on various issues.
Steel Policy	Promoting the efficiency in procedures of TISI rules, preferential treatment for superior importers, elimination of delay in issuing import permits, reduction in the frequency of plant inspections, establishment of sufficient tax-free categories	The Thai government said that it would discuss these issues at steel consultations.
Business infrastructure development	Improvement in Bangkok Port and Laem Chabang Port.	The Thai government stated that it is taking measures to eliminate road congestion and the reinforcement of rail transport.

#### (4) Regular Meetings Between Japan and Various Countries

In addition to the meetings prescribed in economic partnership agreements and investment treaties, there have been many meetings at which matters relating to the improvement of the business environment are addressed. Between Japan and Brazil, for example, meetings of the “Japan-Brazil Trade & Investment Promotion Joint Committee”, which is not based on any treaty, have been held six times since 2009. In these meetings, discussions have occurred on the improvement of trade/business environments on the part of both parties, and there have been achievements such as extension of expiration date of commercial visa and extension of the period of technology transfer contracts, etc. In 2013, industrial cooperation was included in the topics at the “First Meeting of the Japan-Brazil Joint Committee on Promoting Trade, Investment, and Industrial Cooperation”. In addition, as a joint initiative between Japan and Viet Nam, an action plan focused on problems in the investment environment in Viet Nam has been compiled in coordination with the chapter on business environment improvements in the Japan-Viet Nam Economic Partnership Agreement, with initiatives being carried out with the aim of following up on progress regarding these issues. Japan and Indonesia are holding meetings of the Japan-Indonesia Joint Public-Private Sector Investment Forum, which provides a framework for implementing improvements in the Indonesian investment environment and promoting Japanese investment in Indonesia.

Companies are facing problems relating to governmental measures in their export

destinations or countries into which they are expanding, as well as conveying requests and submissions directly to the local government, frequently convey these requests and submissions via the Japanese government. In addition to the inter-governmental meetings on improvements in the investment environment prescribed in economic partnership agreements and other agreements, inter-governmental meetings held on both a regular and an ad hoc basis provide an opportunity to raise such issues with other governments.